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marines.

At Washington it was arranged that no one should begin to build new battleships until the year 1931, but then a very elaborate schedule of new construction was provided for. The United States was therefore confronted with the building of ten huge battleships within the next six years, costing about $40,000,000 each, and had an enormous program of construction in cruisers and destroyers and submarines to undertake, in order to try to catch up with the other countries, whose fleets were larger or newer than our own. Both Great Britain and Japan had a far larger tonnage of cruisers than we had, because we had practically ceased to build such ships during the last 15 years, and while we were trying to catch up with them it was only reasonable to expect that their building would continue and that it would perhaps even be increased when they saw our own programs being speeded up. In destroyers, it is true, we had a lot of war-time vessels still afloat, but they were rapidly approaching the end of their useful life and the destroyer fleets of the other countries were newer and would outlive ours. The same was true of submarines. Altogether it looked as if the United States would have to spend about $250,000,000 a year in new construction for an indefinite time, or else fall hopelessly behind in relative strength to these other powers. It was not only from a money standpoint that this would have been disastrous. Inevitably these friendly nations would have been stirred by apprehension if they had seen us embark on any such colossal building program, and the good relations and friendly attitude that we are all anxious to preserve would inevitably have been disturbed.

I have been giving the picture only as it appeared to us Americans, but there was a similarly dismal outlook confronting each of the other countries. It is not necessary to specify the details, but some of those countries were gravely troubled by the expense involved in this naval competition, and some of them thought they had already reached the limits of taxation that their people could reasonably be expected to bear. It is enough to say that for one reason or another every nation was anxious to avoid this spectre of a naval race. Every one of us realized that although the Washington treaty had, to a certain extent, stopped competition in battleships, it had merely transferred the competition to those other categories that were unlimited. We Americans, although better able to afford new construction than any other nation, felt greatly handicapped by our present marked inferiority in cruiser fleets and by the certainty that in 1936 we would be equally inferior in modern destroyers and submarines.

What then has been accomplished? To begin with, we have all agreed to keep our present battleships, which are perfectly seaworthy and effective, and to take a holiday in new battleship construction

to January 1, 1937. In that one stroke we have saved an outlay by the United States of about $400,000,000. When we think of the number of miles of improved roads, or the number of bridges, or the number of public buildings, that can be had for that sum of money, I for one am convinced that civilization is the gainer by this agreement. Then in cruisers, although our present fleets are pitifully small compared with the cruiser fleets of Great Britain and Japan, our building power has been recognized and Great Britain has readily agreed to parity, and Japan has agreed to a satisfactory relationship between the fleets, with the result that while we build at moderate speed during these seven years the British and Japanese Fleets are either reduced or will remain at about to-day's level, to the great relief of the taxpayers of all three countries. The same is true of destroyers. We will scrap a considerable number of our war-time vessels, Great Britain scraps some, and Japan scraps some; and the resultant fleets, which will be large enough for each of us and for all the normal police work that such vessels are called upon to conduct, will nevertheless represent parity with Great Britain and a satisfactory relationship with Japan.

In submarines our problem has been different, because while we are encouraged by the agreement of the five powers to use the submarines in a humane way, nevertheless the temptation to sink merchant ships without warning is very great, and we felt that the world would be better insured against such a murderous submarine campaign as occurred in the last war if the submarine as an instrument of warfare were altogether abolished. Some of the other nations were not ready to go so far, however, and the best we could do was to agree to a parity in such vessels at a low figure between Great Britain and Japan and ourselves, a figure that requires the destruction of a considerable number of these vessels in the British, the Japanese, and the American Fleets and to that extent removes the menace to innocent life that results from the very existence of these rattlesnakes of the sea. So there is substance in our agreement. I have not undertaken to burden you with a lot of statistics on tonnages, but have tried to give you in fair outline the substance of the treaty that has been made. The benefits to all concerned are very obvious. Please bear in mind that none of us considers that we have won a diplomatic victory. The treaty represents a victory for no one nation but rather an honorable and reasonable arrangement which is fair to every one. A great deal of rubbish has been talked about international relations and the friendliness of one nation for another, but I think it is not rubbish to claim that the accomplishment of this treaty means much for the preservation of friendly and peaceful relationships between these three great naval powers.

Take Great Britain, for example. In the future she will know and we will know that in-naval strength we stand upon an equality, that neither of us is likely to be surprised by a sudden outbreak of building on the part of the other. We go on about our affairs respecting one another, understanding one another better and without the apprehension that sometimes has characterized our thought of one another's naval power. Then on the other hand, take Japan. We know that her intentions toward us are friendly, for otherwise she would never agree to stand still in cruiser building, while we go on and build a cruiser fleet that is stronger than hers. And Japan must know, and I am sure that she does know, that our intentions toward her are friendly in the extreme, or we would not willingly scrap a great number of our destroyers and cheerfully consent to a parity with her in submarines. Japan and America have to-day given tangible evidences of friendliness which far exceed in value all of the oratory that was ever uttered. We have not merely said that we desire friendly relations between the two countries, but we both have proved it in a way so substantial that no skeptic can doubt it. All in all, to-day has been a red-letter day in the cause of world peace. The members of the American Delegation are starting home with the firm conviction that their countrymen will approve what has been done in America's name at the London Naval Conference.

23

Remarks of the Chairman of the American Delegation, Henry L. Stimson, at the Reception Tendered to the Delegation by the City of New York, New York, April 29, 1930

YOUR HONOR: We are very grateful for this welcome. Some of us are natives of New York, and have the peculiar happiness of being welcomed by old friends and neighbors. But whether native New Yorkers or not, we all appreciate the warmth of a New York welcome. It is very gratifying to us to be met at the gateway of home with the knowledge that our efforts have met with your approval. We do not take this welcome as a personal tribute but as an indication of your sympathy with the great cause of international good will and peace for which we have labored. The American Delegation went to London with the primary purpose of promoting good will between the nations of the earth. We believe that naval limitation is one of the most direct and potent steps towards achieving such good will. For just as naval competition between nations leads to rivalry, suspicion, and ever-increasing competition, so, on the other hand, naval limitation leads to mutual confidence, and confidence leads to further limitation in the future. Each process runs in a circle, but one is a vicious circle which leads ultimately to war and the other is a beneficent circle which leads towards permanent peace.

We feel that we have accomplished a long step on this road to peace. By this treaty which we bring home, competition will be completely ended between the navies of the three greatest naval powers of the world-America, Britain, and Japan; and with the other two powers-France and Italy-we have also reached agreements which though not complete are leading in the same direction. Eventually, we confidently hope, competition will be abolished between all five powers.

I am glad to tell you that we met with fairness and good will from all the other delegations of the different powers. The spirit of the conference was one of its finest attributes and is one of the most hopeful results of our meeting. Naval limitation is necessarily a continuing process, and we feel that the conference which we have just left will lead to further progress along the same road.

For the American Delegation I need only say that we have tried to represent the United States to the best of our ability. There has been among us no word or sign of party division since we left these

shores. So on returning we represent no party in American politics. We went and we return representatives of the desire of the nation for friendship with all the world. Having worked on that basis I can tell you, Gentlemen, that it is a very happy thing to be welcomed as we are welcomed this morning, and we thank you from the bottom of our hearts.

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