The two applications cover an apparatus used in playing a game. The game is the same in both cases; but the apparatus is slightly different. Applicant Kinyon has a broad claim, which covers not only the particular form shown in his application, but also the form shown in Carter's application. Carter's application has one claim, which is limited to the specific form shown. Kinyon, the applicant having the broad claim, is the one who seeks to have the interference dissolved. The question to be decided, therefore, is whether or not it is proper to declare an interference between two applications which show and claim different species and only one of which has a claim broad enough to cover both species. If each application contained this broad claim, it is unquestionable that an interference ought to be declared. (Searle v. Frumveller v. Sessions, C. D., 1892, 27; 58 O. G., 804; Dodd v. Reading, C. D., 1892, 49; 58 O. G., 1413.) If one of the cases is a patent and the other an application and the patent contains narrow claims to one species and the application broad claims dominating those of the patent and specific claims directed to a different species, it is also unquestionable that an interference ought not to be declared. (Reed v. Landman, C. D., 1891, 73; 55 O. G., 1275; Zeitinger v. Reynolds v. McIntire, C. D., 1891, 212; 57 O. G., 1279.) It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider whether the principle governing the present interference is the same as that governing the interference between a patent and an application. It is obvious that the applicant Carter might have had a claim in his application as broad as the broad claim in the Kinyon application. In such case an interference would be proper. It is also obvious that the applicant having the narrow claim may not wish to contest the interference. In such case he might file a disclaimer, under Rule 107, aud the interference would be dissolved as a matter of course. If, however, an interference had never been declared, both cases would have been passed to issue and the applicant having the single narrow claim would find his patent dominated by the patent having the broad claim without having had a chance to have decided by an interference which party was entitled to the broad claim as being the original inventor. His only remedy, as far as this Office is concerned, would be to file a reissue application and demand that it be put in interference with the patent containing the broad claim. If this should be done and he should succeed in this interference, the reissued patent would contain the broad claim and the claim to the species shown in his application. There would then be extant two patents having an interfering claim. This would necessitate a suit in equity if either patentee wished to have the broad claim of the other patentee declared void. Necessarily this would result in an increase of litigation, and if interferences in this Office have any justification it is that they should in some measure prevent litigation by having only one of the interfering applications mature into a patent. 1 therefore think the action of the Examiner in declaring an interference was proper. If the applicant having the narrow claim does not choose to contest the interference, he can easily avoid such a proceeding by filing a disclaimer under Rule 107. For the applicant having the broad claim, as is the present case, to bring a motion for dissolution seems indefensible. He practically asks that the broad claim be allowed to him and refused to another applicant who has a right to make it. In the present case there is an additional reason for not dissolving the interference, and it is that, according to the statement of the Examiner, there would be nothing patentable in Carter's application if Kinyon's claims were patented, for the reason that the features of novelty on which the claims in both applications were allowed are the same in both cases, and that the differences which Kinyon points out between the species shown in his application and that shown in Carter's application are immaterial in view of the prior state of the art. The decision of the Examiner refusing to dissolve the interference is affirmed. EX PARTE JEWETT. Decided December 30, 1893. 66 O. G., 651. JEWETT-DAMPER-REGULATOR-BROAD CLAIM THEREFOR REJECTED ANTICIPATION. A claim for the combination in a temperature-regulator of a fluid-containing chamber, a diaphragm arranged to be acted on by the expansion of the fluid in the chamber, and means for increasing and decreasing the quantity of the fluid in the chamber, Held to be anticipated by the patent to Jewett, No. 427,327, dated May 6, 1890, for a damper-regulator, and patent to Atsatt, No. 406,018, dated July 2, 1889, covering a device for automatically regulating combustion in hot-water and hot-air heating apparatus, which discloses all else covered by the claim except applicant's particular means (an air-pump) for increasing and decreasing the air in the chamber; but it is common to use an air-pump for such purpose. APPEAL from the Examiners-in-Chief. DAMPER-REGULATOR. Application of Charles G. Jewett, No. 345,499, filed March 27, 1890. Mr. Adolph Barthel and Mr. L. S. Bacon for the applicant. SEYMOUR, Commissioner: Appeal is taken from the decision of the Examiners-in-Chief rejecting the following claim on the ground that it is indefinite: 2. In a temperature-regulator, the combination with the fluid-containing chamber, a diaphragm arranged to be acted on by the expansion of said fluid, and means connecting with the fluid-chamber for increasing or decreasing the quantity of fluid therein, substantially as described. The appeal must be considered in connection with the claim allowed by the Board, which is as follows: 1. In a damper-regulator, the combination, with a liquid-containing chamber and a circulating system in which the same is located, of an expansion-chamber in said liquid-containing chamber, a pipe leading from the same, a diaphragm over said pipe, operating-levers adapted to be moved by said diaphragm, a branch pipe leading into said pipe, a three-way valve in' said branch pipe, by means of which air may escape from the expansion-chamber, an air-compressor communicating with the branch pipe, and two valves by means of which the damper-regulator may be closed out of the circulation system, substantially as described. The references are patents to Brown, November 27, 1860, No. 30,716; Davis, February 24, 1885, No. 312,825; Atsatt, July 2, 1889, No. 406,018; Powers, September 10, 1889, No. 410,717; Jewett, May 6, 1890, No. 427,327. The appellant urges the allowance of the second claim as one affording better protection to his invention, in that it is not limited to defined means for increasing or decreasing the air in the expansion chamber. The claim must be rejected upon either of two grounds: first, because it is so broad as to embrace the construction which is disclosed in appellant's Patent No. 427,327, dated May 6, 1890, which in this application is separately described, stated to be disclosed in his patent, then disclaimed in this application, and finally claimed in the claim under consideration; second, Atsatt in his Patent No. 406,018, granted July 2, 1889, covering a device for automatically regulating combustion in hot-water and hot-air heating apparatus, in lines 82-89, inclusive, after describing his own temperature-regulator having a fluid-containing chamber and a diaphragm arranged to be acted upon by the expansion of said fluid, which in turn through levers and chains actuates the damper, discloses all else covered by this claim except the defined means for increasing and decreasing the air in the chamber in the following language: If it is desired to regulate the temperature to a still lower degree, the chamber is charged through the stop-cock p with more than one atmosphere, when a very moderate degree of heat will cause the dense air in the chamber to expand sufficiently to expand the diaphragm, and thus regulate the draft. Atsatt does not define the means by which this increase of air may be effected; but it is common to use an air-pump for such purpose. By the very liberal action of the Board the appellant has already been allowed a claim covering this defined means of increasing or decreasing the air in the chamber, and if there are other means intended to be secured by the appellant by this broad claim the dis closure of Atsatt in equally broad terms clearly anticipates it. The decision of the Examiners-in-Chief is affirmed. EX PARTE FERGUSSON. Decided January 2, 1894. 1. ELECTRIC Gas-Lighting ATTACHMENT-LACK OF INVENTION. Where the only difference between the attachments in the references and those in the claims resided in the particular means by which the attachments were secured in place for use and the means simply involved a selection for the purpose, Held that there was no invention in selecting the particular means employed by the applicant, regardless of whether his particular means had ever been used to attach the device to its place or not. 2. SAME LACK OF INVENTION AND ANTICIPATION, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN. Complete anticipation is rare, and to reject a claim on the ground that it is substantially met by a reference is practically the same as to reject it on the ground of lack of invention in view of the reference, such differences as remain not involving invention. The two grounds of rejection, as applied to this case, are the same subject-matter of thought viewed from different points. APPEAL from the Examiners-in-Chief. ELECTRIC GAS-LIGHTING ATTACHMENT. Application of Henry A. Fergusson filed September 8, 1892, No. 445,317. Messrs. Dodge & Sons for the applicant. SEYMOUR, Commissioner: The claims appealed are: 1. An electric gas-lighting attachment for existing gas-fixtures, comprising a block of insulating material adapted to fit directly upon the burner, an electromagnetic sparking device carried by said block, and a circuit closer or switch, in combination, said parts being adapted for application to and removal from the gas-fixture without removal, alteration, or special adaptation of any part of the fixture. 2. In combination with a gas-fixture, a sparking attachment applied to the burner and a circuit-closer applied to the key or cock, both of said parts being applicable to and removable from the fixture at will and without removing or in any manner altering any part of the gas-fixture. 3. In combination with a gas-fixture, a sparking attachment applied to the burner and a circuit-closer applied to the cock controlling said burner, both of said parts being capable of ready application and removal without removing or affecting any part of the fixture. 4. In combination with the burner of a gas-fixture, a sparking attachment provided with a supporting-block of insulating material adapted to fit upon the burner and a clamping-screw for securing the same in place. 5. In combination with a gas-fixture and with a sparking attachment, a circuit closer and breaker provided with a spring-clasp for securing it to the key or cock. 6. In a gas-lighting attachment, the combination, with the key or cock, of a forked block H, adapted to fit upon the cock or key and provided with spring plates or wings to hold it in position thereon. The references are patents to Smith, June 23, 1874, No. 152,427; Bogart, May 16, 1876, No. 177,459; Hinds, January 16, 1877, No. 186,343; McGowen, October 4, 1887, No. 370,801; Finck, February 7, 1888, No. 377,553; McGowen, August 21, 1888, No. 388,294. Electric gas-lighters applicable to gas-fixtures with but slight changes for holding them in place and with a circuit-breaker attached to the key are old and well known. There is nothing novel in this application, unless it be the means by which one part of the circuitbreaker is attached to the key and the other to the fixture. The applicant attaches one part of his circuit breaker to the key by clamping. McGowen does it by a screw. The applicant attaches the other part of his circuit-breaker by a yoke and set-screw. McGowen does it by a spring attached to the gas-pipe by a screw tapped into the pipe. Should a purchaser of the appellant's device attach the block H to the gas-key by removing the threaded screw and washer, passing the screw through the block H, and replacing the screw, and should he then turn the yoke so that the wire m would make and break the circuit with the wire g in its new position, and should let the set-screw holding the yoke be screwed into a hole in the gas-fixture at that point, the device would then be adjusted and held in place on the fixture by the same means as in McGowen's device. There would be no difference in the mode of operation. It is true the circuit-breaker in McGowen's device is in the gas pipe circuit, while in the appellant's device it is in the wire circuit. The case presents the question whether these means by which the gas-lighter is attached to the gas-fixture involve invention. The appropriate insulation of the parts tends somewhat to obscure this question; but it cannot be claimed that the appellant's insulation presents any new features either in itself or in connection with any part. The block A is itself an insulating-block; but it required no invention to insulate in that manner; nor does this form of insulation appear to present any special advantages over that shown in McGowen. The attempt is made, however, to show that thermal insulation is important at this point, upon the assumption that the heat of the burner would destroy the helix; but the gas-burner is not hot, and the adjacent parts need no thermal insulation from it. The electrical insulation by the block A of insulating material does not appear to be of the importance claimed, except in case the particular sparking device described in the specification is used, its parts being not otherwise insulated; but since the purpose of the appellant is, as stated in his application, to attach any available lighter to any usual gas-fixture without change, and since his claimed novelty of construction is directed wholly to avoid changes, the case turns upon that one feature. Recurring now to the question whether the means by which the gaslighter and circuit-breaker are attached to the gas-fixture involve invention, it will be seen that these means are not peculiar, but, on the contrary, are old and very familiar in the crudest mechanical arts. The clamp for the forked block H and the set-screw for the yoke and insulating-block A are not patentable in themselves; neither is the shape of the yoke and of these blocks, enabling them with the set-screws and spring-clamp to be used as means for fastening the device to gas |