of certain ren. D. Closely connected with the cases covered by the Exception doctrine of trusts, but extending beyond them, we have provisions the rules of equity by which special favour is extended for childto provisions made by parents for their children. This exception has already been noted in stating the general rule (t). In the ordinary case of a marriage settlement the children of the contemplated marriage itself are said to be "within the consideration of marriage" and may enforce any covenant for their benefit contained in the settlement. Where a settlement made on the marriage of a widow provides for her children by a former marriage, such children, though in the technical language of equity volunteers, or persons having no part in the consideration, are likewise entitled to enforce the provisions for their benefit; but it is doubtful whether this extends to the case of a husband making a provision for his children by a former wife (u). The question how far limitations in a marriage settlement to persons other than children can be supported by the consideration of marriage, so as not to be defeasible under 27 Eliz. c. 4, against subsequent purchasers, is a distinct and wider one, not falling within the scope of the present work (x). excep sue by E. There is also a considerable class of statutory excép- Statutory tions in cases where companies and public bodies, though tions: not incorporated, are empowered to sue and be sued by powers to their public officers or trustees. The enactments of this public kind relating to companies are collected and commented on by Lord Justice Lindley (y). The trustees of Friendly Societies and Trade Unions are likewise empowered to sue, and may be sued, in their own (t) P. 188, above, cp. per Cotton, L. J. 15 Ch. D. at p. 242. (u) Gale v. Gale, 6 Ch. D. 144, 152. (x) The references in Gale v. Gale (last note) will guide the reader, if desired, to the authorities, including (y) Lindley, Ptnp. 1. 509, sqq. officers, &c. Covenants General application of rule. Contract for benefit of third person. names, in cases concerning the property of the society or union (2). By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5, a person who is not a party to an indenture may nevertheless take the benefit of a covenant in it relating to real property. This enactment has not, so far as we know, been the subject of any reported decision (a). Having disposed of these special exceptions, we may now proceed to examine the rule in its ordinary application, which may be expressed thus:-The agreement of contracting parties cannot confer on a third person any right to enforce the contract. There are two different classes of cases in which it may seem desirable, and in which accordingly it has been attempted, to effect this: (1) where the object of the contract is the benefit of a third person: (2) where the parties are numerous and the persons really interested are liable to be changed from time to time. It was for a long time not fully settled whether a contract between A. and B. that one of them should do something for the benefit of C. did or did not give C. a right of action on the contract (b). And there was positive authority that at all events a contract made for the benefit (z) Friendly Societies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 60, s. 21; Trade Union Act, 1879, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 31, s. 9. It is the same with building societies formed before the Act of 1874 and not incorporated under it. A statute enabling a local authority to recover expenses, and not specifying any remedy, has been held to make the local authority a quasi-corporation for the purpose of suing: Mills v. Scott, L. R. 8 Q. B. 496. And the grant of a right by the Crown to a class of persons may have the effect of incorporating them to enable them to exercise the right: Willingdale v. Maitland, 3 Eq. 103, explained by Jessel, M. R. in Chilton v. Corporation of London, 7 Ch. D. at p. 741. (a) For an example of the inconvenience provided against by it see Lord Southampton v. Brown, 6 B. & C. 718, where the person who was really interested in the payment of rent on a demise made by trustees, and with whom jointly with the trustees the covenant for payment of rent was expressed to be made, was held incapable of joining in an action on the covenant. (b) See Viner, Abr. Assumpsit, Z. (1. 333-7); per Eyre, C. J., Co. of Feltmakers v. Davies, 1 Bos. & P.98; note to Pigott v. Thompson, 3 Bos. & P. 149. son cannot of a person nearly related to one or both of the contracting parties might be enforced by that person (c). However Third perthe rule is now distinctly established that a third person sue at law. cannot sue on a contract made by others for his benefit even if the contracting parties have agreed that he may, and that near relationship makes no difference as regards any common law right of action. This was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in Tweddle v. Atkinson (d). The following written agreement had been entered into: "Memorandum of an agreement made this day between William Guy," &c., "of the one part, and John Tweddle of the other part. Whereas it is mutually agreed that the said William Guy shall and will pay the sum of £200 to William Tweddle his son-in-law, railway inspector, residing in Thornton, in the county of Fife in Scotland, and the said John Tweddle father to the aforesaid Willam Tweddle shall and will pay the sum of £100 to the said William Tweddle each and severally the said sums on or before the 21st day of August, 1855; and it is hereby further agreed by the aforesaid William Guy and the said John Tweddle that the said William Tweddle has full power to sue the said parties in any Court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified." William Tweddle, the son of John Tweddle, brought an action against the executor of William Guy on this agreement, the declaration averring his relationship to the parties, and their intention to carry out a verbal agreement made before the plaintiff's marriage to provide a marriage portion. The action was held not to be maintainable. The Court did not in terms overrule the older cases to the contrary, considering that their authority was already sufficiently disposed of by the effect of modern decisions and practice (e). (c) Dutton v. Poole (Ex. Ch.), 2 Lev. 210, Vent. 318, 322. Approved by Lord Mansfield, Cowp. 443. There appears to have been much difference of opinion at the time. (d) 1 B. & S. 393, 30 L. J. Q. B. 265. (e) See also Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433. Much less can a stranger to a contract who has suffered Authori ties in equity against right of third person. Apparent excep tions. Williams tractee). The doctrines of equity are at first sight not so free from doubt. There is clear and distinct authority for these propositions: When two persons, for valuable consideration as between themselves, contract to do some act for the benefit of another person not a party to the contract— (i) That person cannot enforce the contract against either of the contracting parties, at all events if not nearly and legitimately related to one of them (ƒ). Probably the only exception is that mentioned above, pp. 188, 199, in favour of children provided for by marriage settlements. (ii) But either contracting party may enforce it against the other although the person to be benefited had nothing to do with the consideration (g). On the other hand the case of Gregory v. Williams (h) shows that a third person for whose benefit a contract Gregory v. is made may join as co-plaintiff with one of the actual (third contracting parties against the other, and insist on the person co- arrangement being completely carried out. The facts of plaintiff with conthat case, so far as now material, may be stated as follows: Parker was indebted to Williams and also to Gregory; Williams, being informed by Parker that the debt to Gregory was about 9007., and that there were no other debts, undertook to satisfy the debt to Gregory on having an assignment of certain property of Parker's. Gregory was not a party to this arrangement, nor was it communicated to him at the time. The property having been assigned to Williams accordingly, the Court held that Gregory, suing jointly with Parker, was entitled to call low, L. C. on the Law of Torts, 619 any such duty seems to be clearly negatived by Alton v. Midland Ry. Co. 19 C. B. N. S. 213, 34 L. J. C. P. 292. 81. (f) Colyear v. Mulgrave, 2 Kee. (g) Davenport v. Bishopp, 2 Y. & C. 451, 460, 1 Ph. 698, 704. (h) 3 Mer. 582. upon Williams to satisfy his debt to the extent of 9007. (but not farther, although the debt was in fact greater) out of the proceeds of the property. It was not at all suggested that he could have sued alone in equity any more than at law (i); and the true view of the case appears to be that the transaction between Williams and Parker amounted to a declaration of trust of the property assigned for the satisfaction of Gregory's claim to the specified extent (k). partner Another apparent exception is the case of Page v. Cox (1), Page v. Cox: prowhere it was held that a provision in partnership articles vision for that a partner's widow should be entitled to his share of widow in the business might be enforced by the widow. But the ship decision was carefully put on the ground that the provision articles. in the articles created a valid trust of the partnership property in the hands of the surviving partner. The result is that there is no real and allowed authority for holding that rights can in general be acquired by third parties under a contract, unless by the creation of a trust. These peculiar cases do not however affect the general principle. "A mere agreement between A. and B. that B. shall pay C. (an agreement to which C. is not a party either directly or indirectly) will not prevent A. and B. from coming to an agreement the next day releasing the old one" (m). "An agreement between A. and B. that B. shall pay C. gives C. no right of action against B." (n). (i) For an attempt of a third person to sue at law under very similar circumstances see Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433, showing clearly that A. cannot sue on a promise by B. to C. to pay C.'s debt to A. (k) Empress Engineering Co. (C.A.) 16 Ch. D. 125, 129, 130, by Jessel, M. R. and James, L. J. (7) 10 Ha. 163, cp. Murray v. Flavell (C. A.) 25 Ch. D. 89. (m) Jessel, M. R., Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. D. 125, 129. (n) Lindley, L. J. Re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Co. 25 Ch. D. at p. 111. These statements overrule what is said in Touche v. Metrop. Railway Warehousing Co. 6 Ch. 671, 677. As to that case see Lindley, 1. 396. Compare further Eley v. Positive, &c., Life Assurance Co. (C. A.) 1 Ex. D. 88 (a provision in articles of association that A. shall |