765, 27 L. Ed. 760; Beck v. Parker, 85 Pa. 262, 3 Am. Rep. 625; Reed v. Taylor, 32 Iowa, 209, 7 Am. Rep. 180; In re Sievers (D. C.) 91 Fed. 366. The same is true, also, of proceedings given by statute to wind up the affairs of an insolvent corporation by the appointment of a receiver (In re Watts & Sachs, 190 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 718, 47 L. Ed. 933; In re Wilmington Hosiery Co. [D. C.] 120 Fed. 180); and so is it as to debts and claims which are not discharged by bankruptcy (Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v. Horter, 81 Pa. 39; Ex parte Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. [N. S.] 61); as well as to those persons whose debts do not aggregate the requisite amount (Shephardson's App., 36 Conn. 23); or who are not subject to proceedings, such as wage-earners, farmers, and corporations not made specifically liable (Rittenhouse's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 468). Neither, as it has been held, does the existing bankruptcy law meet the case of an absconding debtor, so as to prevent the issuing of a domestic attachment. McCullough v. Goodhart, 8 Dist. (Pa.) 378. Poor debtor laws, and those which provide for the release of insolvent convicts, would seem to be in the same situation; the bankruptcy law having no provision adapted to these cases, and the parties to whom they apply being, otherwise, left without remedy. Jordan v. Hall, 9 R. I. 219, 11 Am. Rep. 245. And, notwithstanding the concession made above, not a little could also be said in favor of those insolvent laws, such as the act of 1836, which merely provide means for relieving from custody a debtor who has been arrested upon civi! process without undertaking to discharge him from his liabilities. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. Law, 344; In re Rank, Crabbe, 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,566; Sullivan v. Hieskell, Crabbe, 525, Fed. Cas. No. 13,594. Subject to these exceptions, however, but without losing sight of their significance, the insolvent laws of a state being rendered inoperative by an existing federal bankruptcy law, those of Pennsylvania. must be regarded as no longer in force, with all the attendant consequences, whether the act of 1836 or that of 1901 be taken to represent them.

But it by no means follows that the right to a warrant of arrest such as is now in controversy is thereby disposed of. The state insolvency system which is superseded by the enactment by Congress of a bankruptcy law is one thing, and the relief accorded to a debtor in custody under a warrant of arrest, agreeably to its provisions, is another, and the two are not to be confounded. The debtor, in other words, secures a release, not by virtue of the insolvent laws, but simply in conformity with them; that is to say, by following the course which is there marked out, the one statute, so far as it is applicable, being written into the other. How far in this respect the act of 1901 takes the place of the act of 1836, which has been repealed by it, it is not important to inquire. Whichever be taken, having been made a constituent part of the act of 1842, the right thereby secured to a debtor in custody under a warrant of arrest. either before or after commitment, is preserved and retained and made available to him without regard to the fate of the insolvent laws as such, whether suspended or repealed, being in effect independent of them. I do not lose sight of the fact that the bond, which the de

fendant is to give, is in terms to take the benefit of these laws and to comply with their requirements, and that the petition which he is to present to the court for leave to do so is to set forth what is directed by the act of 1836, and to be verified in accordance with it. But a careful reading of the act of 1842 (sections 14, 15, 16) will disclose that this amounts to no more than an adoption of the course to be pursued and the steps to be taken by the act referred to; the reference over being made for the sake of convenience merely and to avoid unnecessary repetition. Suppose, for example, that the provisions of the act of 1836 had been written into the act of 1842 at length -as by express declaration is in effect the case-and it was there enacted, as now, that upon complaint being made of any of the several matters, upon which the writ is allowable, a warrant should go out, and upon the defendant being brought in and the facts found against him, he should be committed, to be released, however, upon giving bond that within 30 days he would petition the court for leave to assign his property for the benefit of creditors to be administered and distributed under the direction of the court; and so on, according to all that is provided for. Can there be any serious question that the warrant as so authorized could issue, regardless of whether or not the state insolvent laws from which these provisions had been taken had been superseded by an act on the subject of bankruptcy? And yet that in effect is the situation here. Or, to put it in another form, the act of 1842, in adopting and incorporating into itself, as an alternative of the proceedings upon the warrant, the course marked out by the insolvent laws for the relief of a failing debtor, is not thereby made a part of the insolvency system of the state, nor so tied up to it as to be obnoxious to an existing bankruptcy law and be nullified thereby. A petition in bankruptcy, duly prosecuted, is no doubt effective to avoid the proceedings. Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362. But the statute by which the warrant is given is no more affected by the bankruptcy law itself, and is no more incompatible with it-aside from the question of getting a preference-than is that which sanctions a capias or any other execution process to reach the person or property of the debtor of which it is only an additional and special

form.

This disposes of the case; but there is another ground upon which the right to the writ may be sustained. As pointed out above, a warrant of arrest, being authorized by the statutes of the state, must be regarded as agreeable to the usages of law; and, being necessary to a complete exercise of the court's jurisdiction, is capable of being adopted, although not specifically provided for by any federal statute. Rev. St. § 716 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 580]. But in incorporating it into the federal law the court is only called upon to preserve the substance; and if, as argued, notwithstanding the views. expressed above, the insolvent laws of the state are superseded and the defendant thereby deprived of the right to resort to them which he would otherwise have as a means of being relieved from custody, the bankruptcy law by which this is brought about may well be looked to, to supply what is lacking. It is equally effective and entirely ap propriate, the commitment of the defendant being merely until he

shall be discharged by law; and is even more readily available, no bond being required nor anything in fact but the filing of a proper petition. Proceedings in bankruptcy also undoubtedly do away with the necessity for taking the benefit of the insolvent laws, although a bond may have been given by the defendant to do so. Nesbit v. Greaves, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 120; Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362. And why, then, may not a complete substitute be found in them? The writ is to be saved, if possible; and, if it can be done by falling back upon the bankruptcy law in this way, there is no reason why the practice should not to that extent be modified, not only in the federal, but in the state courts as well, it being desirable, of course, if not indeed necessary, that the two should be in harmony. It is true that a resort to bankruptcy would not release the defendant where the debt or demand upon which the warrant of arrest was predicated was not dischargeable. Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v. Horter, 81 Pa. 39; In re Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 61. But in that case the right to the benefit of the insolvent laws would not be interfered with, and there is no occasion therefore to consider it.

In whatever way we look at the case, therefore, the writ is sustained; and, the affidavit on which it was issued not having been denied, the defendant must be committed unless he is prepared to comply with the other alternative. A question is raised as to where the commitment should be. The act says to the jail of the county in which the hearing is had. But all the jails of the district are open to federal process, and the Lycoming county jail, at Williamsport, where the court was sitting when the defendant was brought in and where it will be convenient for him to confer with his counsel, will therefore be selected. It may be well to note, in this connection, that any proceedings to secure his release, after commitment, other than by a petition in bankruptcy, will have to be taken before a United States commissioner, the state courts having no authority to relieve those who are committed upon a writ from the federal courts. Rev. St. § 991 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 709]; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301, 11 L. Ed. 139; McNutt v. Bland, 2. How. 9, 11 L. Ed. 159.

The rule to show cause why the warrant of arrest should not be quashed is discharged; and thereupon the defendant is committed to the common jail of Lycoming county, at Williamsport, Pa., to be there detained until he shall be discharged by law.

Ex parte CRAWFORD.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. April 5, 1907.)

No. 1,013,

1. COURTS-FEDERAL COURTS-PROCEDURE IN AID OF EXECUTION.

The remedy given to a judgment creditor by Act Pa. July 12, 1842 (P. L. 339), by the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant on a showing of fraudulent removal or concealment of his property, is one "to reach the property of a judgment debtor" within the meaning of Rev. St. § 916 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 684], and under said section is available in the federal courts.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 936.]

2. BANKRUPTCY-EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ACT ON STATE INSOLVENCY LAWSARREST OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR.

Act Pa. July 12, 1842 (P. L. 339), which authorizes the arrest and im prisonment of a judgment debtor on a showing that he is about to remove or has concealed property with intent to defraud his creditors, is not an insolvency law of the state, although it provides that the debtor may be released on his giving a bond that he will apply within 30 days for the benefit of such law and comply with its requirements, but merely provides a remedy in aid of execution, and its operation is not suspended by the national bankruptcy act.

[Ed. Note.-Effect of national bankruptcy act on state insolvency laws and on assignments for benefit of creditors, see note to Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 51 C. C. A. 11.]

On Writ of Habeas Corpus and Return Thereto.

For opinion below, see 154 Fed. 761.

Seth I. McCormick, for petitioner.

A. L. Cole, opposed.

Before DALLAS, GRAY, and BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judges.

DALLAS, Circuit Judge. The United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting in the Circuit Court for that district, awarded a warrant of arrest under the Pennsylvania statute of July 12, 1842 (P. L. p. 339), in pursuance whereof George H. Crawford was committed to jail. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to do this being denied, we allowed a writ of habeas corpus, and upon its return the case thereby presented was argued by counsel, and having been duly considered by us, is now for adjudication. It should be promptly disposed of, and to avoid delay we will but briefly state the grounds of our decision.

The contention on behalf of the prisoner appears to be that authority was not given to the federal courts to issue the process which was issued in this instance, either by section 914, or 915, or 916 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 684], and that, even if it had been, such authority would not presently exist, because, as is argued, the enactment by Congress of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]) suspended the Pennsylvania act of July 12, 1842. Neither of these positions is tenable. A judgment had been recovered in a commonlaw cause, and the warrant of arrest, being a remedy provided by the state law "to reach the property of the judgment debtor," was, we

154 F.-49

think, plainly within section 916. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel of the prisoner are not in point. In Friedly v. Giddings et al., 119 Fed. 438, the court was dealing with a motion for an adjudication that, by reason of the character of the cause of action, the defendants ought to be confined to jail, according to the statutes of the state It was not dealing with a remedy upon a judgment, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor. The state statute under consideration in Curtis v. Feste, 6 Fed. Cas. 1004, Fed. Cas. No. 3,502, was in a very high degree penal. It did not provide a remedy to reach property, but made it "the duty of the court, in all cases described in it except one, upon conviction of the debtor, to sentence him to three years' imprisonment, and in the other case, to sentence him to the same term of imprisonment, with a condition that he should be discharged on payment of the debt."

The Pennsylvania statute of July 12, 1842, is not an insolvent law. The proceeding it provides is not designed to effect the distribution of the debtor's assets amongst his creditors. It is a proceeding in aid of execution. Its object is to reach property of a judgment debtor which he fraudulently conceals. The case of Commonwealth v. O'Hara, 6 Phila. 402 (cited for the prisoner), was decided by a Pennsylvania court of first instance, and the learned judge by whom that decision was rendered afterwards became a justice of the court of last resort of that state, and as such participated in its unanimous judgment in the case of Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62. This adjudication, and others which need not be particularly referred to, accord with our present conclusion.

The order of this court is that George H. Crawford be remanded to the custody of the keeper of the common jail of Lycoming county, there to be detained in pursuance of and in accordance with the order of the Honorable R. W. Archbald, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

NOTE.-Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of habeas corpus denied 27 Sup. Ct. 795, 206 U. S. 561, 51 L. Ed.

UNITED STATES v. WALSH.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit. July 2, 1907.)

No. 702 (1,849).

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-PROVISO-WOOL GOODS. In construing Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule L, par. 391, 30 Stat. 187 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1670], relating to "all manufactures * of which silk is the component material of chief value,” and containing a proviso that "all manufactures of which wool is a component ma terial shall be classified and assessed for duty as manufactures of wool," held, that the ordinary rule should be applied that a proviso at the close of an independent paragraph like this should be construed as limiting only what precedes it, and that the words "all manufactures" in the proviso have no broader relation than the same words in the beginning of the paragraph.