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is not absolutely necessary to enable the employer to keep out of his employ those whom he does not want. It is generally understood that any employer may hire whom he pleases and many employers manage to keep out a large proportion of those who are not desirable without the use of a rustling card system. The exclusion of "undesirables" as effected by the Anaconda card may or may not constitute a black list and the threat of exclusion may or may not be the threat of the black list. As has already been remarked, the purpose of selective and consistent exclusion of undesirable employees has been achieved, with or without the rustling card, only to a very limited extent. Quite as effective exclusion is believed to be possible through a company bureau of employment of the type now common in the United States, a bureau which actually hires men and through which they "clear" when quitting or discharged. Two or three of the smaller mining companies of the Butte district have established such bureaus and, so far, report satisfaction. Such a bureau, moreover, would be quite as effective a record-keeping agency as is the present system of the Anaconda Company. It would be free from the objectionable features of that system: the necessity of getting a permit before it is possible to even apply for work and the possibility of the abuse of such a permit. In other words, the purposes of the rustling card system which are not subject to criticism, the bookkeeping purposes, are fulfilled by record keeping parts of the system, which would function quite as efficiently in a modern employment bureau. As for the purposes which are subject to criticism, whether the criticism is valid or not, they are being only incompletely achieved. Despite the rustling card, I. W. W.'s and other radicals are working in the mines. dence also indicates that Metal Mine Workers, I. W. cialists, and others have been kept out by means of it. It is entirely legitimate and quite right and proper for employers to reject job-applicants on either one of two grounds; viz., (1) that they are not qualified to do the work required; and (2) that they will be likely to inflict damage upon company property. There is grave doubt of the wisdom of doing it for any other reason. PAUL F. BRISSENDEN.

New York University.

The eviW.'s, so

POSTSCRIPT

On April 18, 1920, the I. W. W. miners' local in Butte called a strike. The strikers demanded, apparently without presenting their demands before the strike was called: (1) the release of "political and industrial" prisoners, (2) a six-hour day from collar to collar, (3) an increase in wages from $5.50 to $7.00 per day, (4) abolition of the contract and bonus systems, and (5) abolition of the rustling card. On the nineteenth the strike was on and picket lines out. Two days later, on the twenty-first, there was a clash between deputy sheriffs and strike pickets on the Anaconda road. There was shooting; and, as a result, according to a news item which appeared in the New York World on April 22, "fourteen I. W. W. strike pickets and one policeman [deputy sheriff?] are in hospitals tonight with gunshot wounds." Subsequently at least one of the strikers died. This shooting affray ended the strike, at least in its active phase.

There have followed more or less closely on the heels of this last strike two developments of no little importance in the history of the Butte rustling card. The first of these was the explicit announcement by the Anaconda Copper Mining Company that I. W. W.'s would not be employed in its mines. On the occasion of the writer's last visit to Butte, in July, 1920, he found posted in that company's offices and elsewhere on its properties large posters reading as follows: "No member of the I. W. W. will be employed at this property.-Anaconda Copper Mining Company." These notices bore the date May 10, 1920. This new policy was adopted, no doubt, largely as a result of the strike of the preceding month. It is to be noted also that it involved the explicit elimination from employment in the Anaconda mines (and so, very largely, from employment in the Butte district) of one of the two miners' organizations which have been most actively hostile to the rustling card.

The second new development was an important change in the employment system in the Butte mines-a change which involved the transference of the administration of the system from the single auspices of the Anaconda Company to the joint auspices of all (or nearly all) the operators in the district. This new, jointly operated machinery is called The Butte Mutual Labor Bureau. It happened that the offices of this new bureau were just being opened at the time of the writer's last visit to Butte. The new bureau issues a "recommendation card"-a cardboard folder

bearing on the cover the name of the bureau and on the inside containing the following:

No......

This is to certify that at this date of issuing this card...

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is recommended by Butte Mutual Labor

Manager.

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For the Protection of Holder
(Non-transferable)

This card is the exclusive property of the Butte Mutual Labor Bureau, who may recover and take possession of it at any time. It cannot be sold or loaned, and if presented by any one but the original holder it will be taken up and canceled. If lost, notify the Manager at once.

The above conditions are accepted.

Signature

Before this card is issued to the applicant he is required to fill out an "application for recommendation" which presents two pages of questions to be answered-many more questions than were asked by the Anaconda Company before issuance of its rustling card. Among the questions on the new application form are several concerning citizenship, one which asks: "Do you believe in a constitutional form of government?" and the three following in regard to radical labor organizations: "Are you & member of the I. W. W.? Are you a member of the O. B. U.? Do you believe in the purposes or methods of the I. W. W.?"

When a miner who has secured one of these "recommendation cards" gets a job in one of the mines his card is held at the mine office during the period of his employment. When he quits work in that mine he goes to the office of the bureau, makes application again, and, after his record is checked up, again receives the card for the purposes of another job hunt.

It is evident that this card, like the Anaconda Company card described above, is a "rustling" not a hiring card. However, it would seem to be a distinct improvement over the Anaconda card in that it is issued jointly by the mine operators of the district rather than by a single company. P. F. B.

A "STABILIZED DOLLAR" WOULD PRODUCE VIOLENT

CHANGES IN PERIODS OF FALLING PRICES

Professor Fisher's new book, Stabilizing the Dollar, brings under one cover much of the material he has presented in numerous papers and develops the argument for his plan in such persuasivc form that the reader can hardly escape regretting his inability to be converted. The evils of changing prices are so vividly portrayed, the mode of escape so logically presented, that the careworn student of the phenomena of prices would fain accept the analysis. The book is in a class with Henry George's Progress and Poverty in the matter of winning exposition; and to say that is near the height of praise. But, if one is more concerned with understanding than with peace of mind, the very clearness of the explanations, the simplicity of the plan, and the confidence in its effectiveness awaken caution and enjoin care in the attempt to forecast what the effect of the plan would be in the economic circumstances under which it would have to be put into operation if it became a working reality.

The writer desires to call attention briefly to the phase indicated in the title of this paper, i.e., the probability that if Fisher's plan were in operation the periods when prices are falling would be marked by sharp drops in money values that would be disastrous to many lines of business and would increase the distress that goes along with depressions in the recurring business cycles.

Professor Fisher presents on page 204 of his book a diagram illustrating the movement of the index number with and without stabilizing according to his plan. This diagram is reproduced here with an additional conjectural line indicating what the writer believes would be something like the movement of price changes under Fisher's plan in actual operation with the commercial banking practices as they are in common operation. Instead of the fairly even "stabilized index number" line or the irregularly rising "unstabilized index number" line, there is reason to believe that the actual course of prices would be somewhat as shown by the intermediate line. No attempt has been made to calculate the precise movements of such a line. All that it suggests in an exaggerated degree is that periods of rising prices in times of prosperity would be followed by abrupt declines in prices when depression sets in. The declines that are the normal results of reaction would be greatly increased in speed by Fisher's plan and

[graphic]

1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 In the diagram the upper curved line, reproduced from Fisher's Stabilizing the Dollar (p. 204), shows the actual movement of prices, while the lower curved line shows the movement of prices that Fisher believes would have taken place had his plan been in operation. The dotted line is conjectural, meant merely to illustrate the probable violent falls in prices that would occur were Fisher's plan operating in the recurring periods of decline from prosperity to depression. No attempt has been made to calculate the dotted line to scale. It doubtless exaggerates the violence of the probable fall and is unduly smooth.

the difficulties of readjustment would be more serious. Business mortality would rise, failures multiply, and opportunities for mitigating disaster by spreading the losses over the community would lessen. The level might not rise as high as in the case of unstabilized prices, hence the distance of the fall might be shorter but the descent would be more abrupt, less subject to control. Instead of a fairly stable price level there would have been experienced in the period covered by the table a somewhat lower level in the peaks of prices and a more violent collapse as periods of expansion passed into contraction. The paragraphs which follow attempt to make clear the reasons for anticipating more trouble from the operation of Fisher's plan than it professes to be able to cure, granting that it could be set going as he so ably outlines it.

Fisher's plan is doubtless too well known to justify taking the

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