(183 N.Y.S.) and the subsequent amendment to the Banking Law. I am satisfied by the proof presented that the money in this account came at all times from the funds belonging to the decedent. Decree to be entered according to these views. In re GREIM'S ESTATE. (Surrogate's Court, Westchester County. June 18, 1920.) 1. Taxation 861-On death of one tenant by entirety, transfer tax will be imposed on such tenant's interest. On the death of a wife holding as tenant by the entirety, transfer taxes are imposed on her interest, which passed to her husband, even though the land was acquired before the Transfer Tax Law, which assessed interest by the entirety. 2. Courts 91 (2)-Surrogate will follow decision of Appellate Division in his department. A surrogate will follow the decision of the Appellate Division of the department in which he is located. 3. Taxation 866-On death of wife, transfer taxes may be imposed on entirety interest, though purchase price was paid by husband. The interest of the husband as tenant by the entirety is subject to the transfer tax on death of the wife, though the purchase of the land was effected with the husband's funds. In the matter of the transfer tax on the estate of Helene Greim. Appeal from a pro forma order entered on the report of the transfer tax appraiser. Report of appraiser affirmed. Charles Wesley, of White Plains, for petitioner. Francis A. Winslow, of New York City, for state comptroller. SLATER, S. [1, 2] This is an appeal from the pro forma order entered May 19, 1920, upon the report of the transfer tax appraiser. The pro forma order assessed a tax upon certain real estate formerly owned by the decedent and her husband as tenants by the entirety, acquired in 1908. The petitioner claims that the property is not subject to the tax, because it was held by the husband and wife before the Transfer Tax Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60, §§ 220-245), which assessed interests by the entirety. It is contended that the husband took, not as survivor, but by virtue of the unity created by the grants. I have carefully considered all the cases on this subject. Matter of Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181, October, 1915; Matter of McKelway's Estate, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348, L. R. A. 1917E, 1143, May 8, 1917; Matter of Moebus, 178 App. Div. 709, 165 N. Y. Supp. 887, 2d Dept., June 22, 1917, followed in Re Beresford, 183 App. Div. 947, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1068, April, 1918; Matter of Teller, 178 App. Div. 450, 165 N. Y. Supp. 517, 1st Dept., June, 1917, appeal dismissed 223 N. Y. 565, 119 N. E. 1081; Matter of Horler, 180 App. Div. 608, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221, 1st Dept., December, 1917; Matter of Wormser, 102 Misc. Rep. 501, 169 N. Y. Supp. 206, Fowl For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes er, S., February, 1918; Matter of Dolbeer, 226 N. Y. 623, 123 N. E. 381, April, 1919; Matter of Orvis, 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88, 3 A. L. R. 1636. This court is constrained to follow the decision in Matter of Mobus, 178 App. Div. 709, 165 N. Y. Supp. 887, decided June 22, 1917, by the Appellate Division of this Department. The same Appellate Division followed the Moebus Case in the Matter of Beresford, 183 App. Div. 947, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1068, which involved a case of tenancy by the entirety. While it may be true, from reading the cases of Matter of Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181, and Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348, L. R. A. 1917E, 1143, the Court of Appeals might hold otherwise, still this court is in duty bound to follow the law laid down in the Mobus Case until it is overruled by decision of the Court of Appeals. As late as February, 1918, in Matter of Wormser, 102 Misc. Rep. 501, 169 N. Y. Supp. 206, Surrogate Fowler held, where a husband conveys real estate to himself and wife, their survivor and the heirs of such survivor and assigns forever, the entire estate upon his death vests in his wife, who survived, and is not subject to transfer tax. [3] The petitioner also raises another contention: It is claimed that the husband furnished the money for the purchase price of the real estate, and the conveyance to him and his wife as tenants by the entirety was not donative, in the sense that, in case of her death, he would be subject to tax. I know of no holding by any court upon this point. We have the reflection from the cases of Matter of Orvis, 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88, 3 A. L. R. 1636, and Matter of Dolbeer, 226 N. Y. 623, 123 N. E. 381. The real estate in the instant case was acquired some years prior to the enactment of the Transfer Tax Law, and therefore cannot come within the views expressed in these cases, which seem to indicate that interests created subsequent to the adoption of the statute may be subjected to the tax on the method of acquisition, and further indicate that the court might take testimony which would disclose who furnished the money. Because of these views, the report of the appraiser is affirmed. (112 Misc. Rep. 171) HORN v. KLUGMAN. * (Municipal Court of City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, Seventh District. May 21, 1920.) 1. Statutes 184-To be construed in harmony with context and object of legislation. In construing a statute, that sense should be adopted which harmonizes with the context and promotes to the fullest manner the apparent policy and object of legislation. 2. Statutes 184-Inartistic language not to nullify object of statute, when intent is clearly expressed. A failure to employ more artistic words or phrases should not nullify the object of a statute, when the intent is otherwise clearly and reasonably expressed. For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes *Order reversed, 184 N. Y. Supp. --. (183 N.Y.S.) 3. Statutes 197-Words "and" and "or" to be used interchangeably, where required by meaning of statute. The word "and" is frequently used interchangeably with the word "or," and vice versa; the words being convertible by the substitution of one for the other, as the sense may suggest or require. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, And; Or.] 4. Statutes 208-Clause to be read in light of context. A phrase, passage, or sentence of a statute is not to be understood absolutely as if it stood for itself, but is to read in the light of the context, in connection with the general composition of the act and others in pari materia. 5. Statutes 216-Opinions of legislators in debate not to be considered. The opinions of legislators who were active in drafting legislation, expressed in debate, cannot be considered in construing the statute. 6. Constitutional law 70 (1)—Harshness or unjustness of statute not judicial question. Courts have no alternative but to uphold and enforce statutes found to be impracticable, harsh, and unjust; it being for the Legislature to find a remedy. 7. Landlord and tenant ~306-Statute as to pleading and proof required in summary proceedings construed so as to make "or" read as "and." The word "or," in the provision of Code Civ. Proc. § 2231, subd. 2a, as added by Laws 1920, c. 139, requiring the landlord, in summary proceedings for possession of premises used for dwelling purposes in a city of the first class, to allege and prove that the rent is not greater than that paid for the month preceding default "or" has not been increased more than 25 per cent. during the past year, should be construed as "and," in view of the purpose of the statute, and in view of chapters 133, 135, chapter 136, §§ 1, 2, chapters 137, 139, and Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1496, 1531, and 2231, subd. 1. Summary proceeding by Sam Horn against Louis Klugman. Proceeding dismissed. Abraham J. Halprin, of New York City, for landlord. BOGENSCHUTZ, J. Petitioner brings these proceedings under the statute (section 2231, subd. 2, Code Civ. Proc., amended by Laws 1920, c. 139) to dispossess a monthly tenant for nonpayment of rent. The decision in this proceeding is to govern six similar proceedings. The amendment (Laws 1920, c. 139) has restricted the maintenance of summary proceedings under section 2231, subd. 2, Code of Civil Procedure, as follows: "2a. No proceeding as prescribed in subdivision two of this section shall be maintainable to recover the possession of real property in a city of the first class occupied for dwelling purposes * under a lease or tenancy for one year or less or under any lease or tenancy commencing after this subdivision takes effect, unless the petitioner alleges in the petition and proves that the rent of the premises described in the petition is no greater than the amount paid by the tenant for the month preceding the default for which the proceeding is brought or has not been increased more than twentyfive per centum over the rent as it existed one year prior to the time of the presentation of the petition. Nothing in this subdivision shall preclude the For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes tenant from interposing any defense that he might otherwise have. This subdivision shall be in effect only until the first day of November, 1922. "Sec. 2. This act shall take effect immediately." Petitioner alleges a hiring on January 15, 1920, at a rental of $27 a month and the tenant's failure to pay the rent for the month from April 15th to May 15th after demand. In compliance with the amendment (chapter 139, Laws 1920) he alleges: "That the rent of the premises ** * 串 is no greater than the amount paid by the tenant for the month preceding the default and has not been increased more than twenty-five per centum, over the rent as it existed one year prior to time of the commencement of this proceeding." The tenant for defense, in addition to a general denial, alleges "a counterclaim, and an unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive agreement, as defined in chapter 136, Laws 1920, sections 1, 2." It appears that the petitioner became the owner of the property on October 30, 1919. The tenant has occupied his apartment as a monthly tenant for several years, and in April, 1919, was paying a monthly rental of $17. This sum was thereafter increased until it reached $21, the amount he was paying when petitioner became the owner. On January 15, 1920, the petitioner increased the rent to $27, which sum the tenant paid for three months, as he claims, under protest. It will be observed that the sum demanded was largely in excess of a 25 per centum increase over what was paid a year ago, although there was no increase over what the tenant paid the month before. Upon this formula of proof the tenant contends that the proceedings cannot be maintained, because it appears "that the rent of the premises has been increased more than 25 per centum over that fixed a year prior." In other words, he contends that petitioner was bound to prove both elements alleged in the petition. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the statutory requirements as to what must be alleged and proven is in the alternative; that proof of either one was sufficient. Having proven that the rent had not been increased over that paid for the month before, he contends that his right to maintain the proceedings and to a final order is established, regardless of the fact that the increase for the year is over 25 per centum. If there be merit in the tenant's contention-that both features must be shown in petitioner's favor-then obviously the proceedings must fail, and it will render consideration of other issues unnecessary. The question involved is one of statutory construction. [1] The language of the amendment is not ambiguous and should receive natural and logical construction. It concededly is one of several acts that concern dealings between landlords and tenants to give emergency relief. Considered in the light of apparent intent, the tenant's contention seems to be supported on every theory of reasonable construction. In construing statutes, that sense should be adopted which harmonizes with the context and promotes to the fullest manner the apparent policy and object of the legislation. People ex rel. Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49, 1 N. E. 599; Manhattan Co. v. Kaldenberg, 165 N. Y. 1, 58 N. E. 790; People ex rel. Hunt v. Lane, (183 N.Y.S.) 132 App. Div. 406, 116 N. Y. Supp. 990, affirmed 196 N. Y. 520, 89 N. E. 1108; People v. Schwartz, 183 App. Div. 367, 169 N. Y. Supp. 954. [2, 3] The dispute arises because the word "or" is used in connecting the compound sentence: "Unless the petitioner alleges in the petition and proves that the rent of the premises *** is no greater than the amount paid by the tenant for the month preceding * * * or has not been increased more than 25 per centum over the rent as it existed one year prior. A failure to employ more artistic words or phrases should not nullify the object of a statute, when the intent is otherwise fairly and reasonably expressed. People v. Gates, 56 N. Y. 387, 393; McKuskie v. Hendrickson, 128 N. Y. 555, 28 N. E. 650; People ex rel. Garvey v. Prendergast, 148 App. Div. 129, 132 N. Y. Supp. 115. The word "and" is frequently used interchangeably with "or," and vice versa; the words being convertible by the substitution of one for the other as the sense may suggest or require. Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. 388, 19 Am. Dec. 515; People v. Lytle, 7 App. Div. 553, 562, 40 N. Y. Supp. 153; Casella v. McCormick, 180 App. Div. 94, 167 N. Y. Supp. 564; People v. Schwartz, supra; People ex rel. Mun. G. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 224 N. Y. 156, 120 N. E. 132. Whether the word "or," as used in the present connection, shall be construed as "and," must be determined from the text and context of the several acts in the legislative programme dealing with the general subject-matter. The text is set forth in the statute (Laws 1920, c. 136, §§ 1, 2), which reads: "Section 1. Unjust, unreasonable and oppressive agreements for the payment of rent having been and being now exacted by landlord from tenants and a public emergency existing in the judgment of the Legislature by reason thereof. * "Sec. 2. Where it appears that the rent has been increased more than twenty-five per centum over the rent as it existed one year prior to the time of the agreement under which the rent is sought to be recovered, such agreement shall be presumptively unjust, unreasonable and oppressive." [4] The further sense and intent of this legislative policy is clearly disclosed by the composite context that attends the language and design outlined in each of the several enactments. Laws 1920, cc. 139, 137, 135, 133. In other words, it is an elementary principle of legal interpretation of statutes that a phrase, passage, or sentence is not to be understood absolutely as if it stood for itself, but is to be read in the light of the context, in connection with the general composition of the act and others in pari materia. People v. Schoonmaker, 63 Barb. 44; Fairchild v. Gwynne, 16 Abb. Prac. 23; People ex rel. Bockes v. Wemple, 115 N. Y. 302, 22 N. E. 272; Staten Island W. S. Co. v. City of New York, 144 App. Div. 318, 323, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1028. It will be readily observed that the design of the Legislature is to discourage and curb as far as possible during a limited period attempts at summary removal of short term tenants, while the general housing |