fairly and forever ejected from the universe, though we have been gravely assured, by the same philosophy, that God himself could not prevent its ingress. Soberly, according to this principle, the existence of sin at all, is an utter impossibility. Grace and redemption become unmeaning terms. The incarnation and crucifixion of the Son of God, were the awfully magnificent scenes of an undemandedempty tragedy. On this point Dr. Porter thus writes: "Dr. Taylor's views of self-love cannot stand inquiry. Fuller, in his Gospel its own Witness,' shows this to be an infidel sentiment; and Smalley, volume 1st of his sermons, shows that Satan is innocent, if ultimate 'regard to self is no sin." "This one principle, sweeps the whole away. There remains no radical distinction of character between the saint and the sinner. The most depraved individual on earth, or even among apostate spirits, is doubtless the centre of his own affections. And though he may have perverted views of what is his real interest, he means, notwithstanding, to act, and does act, from a 'primary' regard to himself. And if this is the highest principle of action to a holy being, then an angel and a devil stand on the same ground, as to moral character; in other words, there is no distinction between holiness and sin."* The practical operation of this principle, if but legitimated and carried out in the moral government of God, is thus represented : "Besides, this theory would split the moral system into as many jarring parts, with as many centres of 'primary' affection, as it contains individuals. It would set every moral agent at variance with every other moral agent, and with God himself. Whereas, the simple precept, 'Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,' sets up another standard in every bosom. It establishes a common centre of moral affection to the universe of moral agents, and binds the hearts of all to each other, and to the throne of Jehovah."+ So sung Pollock : "Virtue-I need not tell, when proved and full The volume before us contains a large variety of rich * Memoir, pp. 223–236. + Memoir, pp. 236-237. and instructive matter, which our limits forbid us at present to notice. We heartily wish it an extensive circulation. With the blessing of God, it cannot fail to exert a happy influence on the cause of sound doctrine and practical piety. The distinguished subject of it, has finished his course. God has taken him from this distracted world, to the peace, and purity, and bliss of heaven. May he call and raise up others like him, to occupy the high places in Zion, and adorn and defend the pure Gospel of Jesus. ART. V.-ON THE NATURE OF SIN. By Rev. NATHANIEL HEWITT, D. D. O. My dear sir, the great questions now agitated between us, respect our opposite conceptions of the Nature of Sin. Will you state precisely your belief on this funda mental doctrine. P. My views of the nature of sin are derived from Romans v. 13.—" Sin is not imputed when there is no law," and its parallel texts. "This assertion [of the Apostle] leads us irresistably to the conclusion, that nothing in any being is accounted sin, but conduct that is a violation of law." "In regard to the nature of sin itself,-what that is, in the subjects of his moral government, for which God blames and punishes-the Apostle warrants me in asserting the unlimited proposition: that sin in every form and instance is reducible to the act of a moral agent in which he violates a known rule of duty."t O. You affirm, if I understand your meaning, that in order to constitute an act of man sinful, it is essential that a "rule of duty" known to him at the time when the act is performed, be violated by the act which is done. P. I do: because "it is absurd to class any of his [moral agent's] choices under the head of sin, but those in which he violates known obligation. For a known obligation must either be violated or complied with; and compliance with obligation is holiness if any thing is-so that sin must consist in the violation, rather than the contrary. And the obligation which is violated must be known; for if there be + Idem, p. 4. * See Professor Fitch's Discourses on the Nature of Sin, p. 3. no knowledge of an obligation, there can be no act of will whatever in reference to it: and there is just as much reason, if the determination of the agent be compared with such an unknown obligation, to say that he complies with it, as that he violates it, in any case; because, without the knowledge of an obligation, he has never really made the choice for a compliance or a violation."* "The testimony of Paul admits [not] of evasion: 'Sin is not imputed'—it is not charged to a moral agent as having any existence, and as forming any ground of blame--when there is no lawwhen there is none applied to the agent which he violates." Disc. p. 11. O. Saul of Tarsus was guilty of sin, when he did many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth; yet he committed these acts of sin, "ignorantly and in unbelief.” Your proposition, therefore, that sin in "every form and instance," is an act in violation of known duty is unscriptural; for it is a contradiction to say that a man violates known obligation ignorantly. This instance of sin is "necessarily at variance with the essential characteristics of sin, embraced in the general proposition," and consequently your proposition falls to the ground. P. "I meant not to be understood to confine the rules of duty to what the phrase might designate in the popular acceptation, to the published laws of God or man merely, but would extend them to all moral obligations, however made known, by the conscience, by the works of God, or by published statutes. Moral obligations wherever and however made known to a given moral agent, are to him a law; and it is a violation of such as are known to him, or knowable."+ O. Hold, sir. You have essentially varied your proposition. Known and knowable are as far apart as knowledge and ignorance. Your proposition is, "sin in every form and instance is a violation of known duty." Unless then you can make it appear that a duty which is unknown but knowable, is as well known by being knowable though unknown, as when it is in fact known, then it is plain that you have not only varied your proposition, but, what is more important, have renounced it. P. Suffer me to complete the statement I was making when you interrupted me. "I deny not the distinction between what are popularly called sins of ignorance and sins of knowledge. For in either case a known obligation is violated to constitute the sin of the act; but the obligation in one case does not, and in the other does, arise from a knowledge of the specific law. Sins of ignorance are those acts in which the moral agent transgresses the known obligation to acquaint himself with laws that were applicable, or some known general obligation of morality from which he might have inferred the given law; while those of knowledge are the acts in which he violates the obligation which arises from knowledge of the given published law itself."* "So that it is absurd to speak of an obligation extending to an agent when it is wholly removed beyond his knowledge or the possibility of it; or, to speak of his conduct as bearing any relation to such a (supposed) unknown and undiscoverable obligation." "That God in his law makes sin to be a violation of known obligation, is obvious from the fact that he makes the published law itself the ground of the charge of sin on his subjects no farther than that law is known, or the ability and obligation to become acquainted with it are known."‡ O. That I may accurately apprehend your meaning allow me to ask, if there are in a sin of ignorance two criminal acts the one, that of being ignorant, and the other, the violation of the law of which the sinner is ignorant. P. Certainly not. I have already declared, that, "if there be no knowledge of an obligation, there can be no act of will respecting it." The specific law, in the case you mention, being unknown to the transgressor, he, of course, puts forth no act of will respecting it, and is, therefore, not guilty of sin, in violating it. For his ignorance he is culpable only. O. It follows then, that there is no sin in violating God's law, when it is done ignorantly, but only in being ignorant of the law. By the sin of ignorance, you mean, the sin of being ignorant. The direct acts of Saul against Christ and his disciples, were not sins, according to your definition of sin, and his criminality consisted solely in being ignorant and unbelieving. But Paul, as you will doubtless admit, denominates his hostile acts against Christ, sins of great and aggravated guilt. It appears to me, most clearly, that your statement of the nature of sin is directly contradictory to the Apostle's, and is therefore unscriptual. P. You have overlooked the qualification which I made of my main proposition. I was careful to specify knowable obligations as equally binding on the moral agent as those are which are known. That Jesus was the Christ, was knowable to Saul, and he was, therefore, culpable for all the hostile acts which he committed against him. O. I adverted, as you doubtless recollect, to the qualifying word, knowable, when you stated it; and I repeat what I then mentioned, that it is something beyond a mere qualification of your unqualified and "unlimited" proposition-it is fundamentally inconsistent with it, and subversive of it. If sin is, in every form and instance, a violation of known duty, then, in no form or instance can it be a violation of unknown duty. By knowable, I suppose you mean that which is unknown, but which, nevertheless, may be known-i. e. learned, acquired. Of course, a knowable obligation is one which exists, but of which an agent is ignorant, although he has the means of learning it. Now, it is self-evident, that a limited proposition is not an unlimited one. If the violation of an unknown, although knowable obligation, is in any form or instance sin, then, your unlimited proposition is limited, and so, as an unlimited proposition, it is overthrown. If consistent with yourself, you must abandon the definition of sin, on which you rely for the truth of your whole system. Although you admitted the qualification, "knowable," yet you subsequently rejected it. For you stated that "God makes the published law itself the ground of the charge of sin on his subjects, no farther than that law is known, or the ability and obligation to become acquainted with it are known." According to this assertion, an unknown obligation is binding only when it is known to be knowable. If now, the sin of violating a law of God consists, not in the violation of the law, but in violating the obligation of knowing the law, and the sin of violating the obligation of knowing the law, consists not in being ignorant of the law, but in violating the obligation to know what is known to be knowable, then it follows, that there is no sin in violating a knowable obligation. Thus, you abandon your qualification of "knowable," in distinction from known obligation. VOL. 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