sions to insure enough flexibility to take account of unforeseen emer gencies and sudden changes in the economy.

Congress has already had a favorable experience with an omnibus appropriations bill. In 1950 both the Senate and the House passed one omnibus bill. The House passed the bill on May 10, the Senate passed it on August 4, and the President signed it into law on September 62 months earlier than the final general appropriations bill had been enacted the previous year. The omnibus bill cut the President's origi nal budget request by $2.3 billion. After its passage, Senator Harry Byrd, Sr., the original proponent of an omnibus approach in the Senate commented:

The enactment of the single appropriation bill this year required less time. promoted fuller participation in debate, and resulted in savings rather than increases.

Representative Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, concluded that:

The single appropriations bill offers the most practical and efficient methodof handling the annual budget and the national fiscal program. Judged by our experience, there is no legitimate reason which can be advanced against it.

Since the state of the economy may change, emergencies may occur. or projections of outlays for uncontrollable expenditures may increase. it is necessary to build a degree of flexibility into the spending ceiling and priority-setting process. My bill allows Congress, either on its own initiative or in response to a Presidential request, to consider amendments changing the binding outlay ceiling and the composition of spending within that ceiling. In the case of a Presidential request, Congress would be required to act within 30 days or the President's proposal would become law.

Finally, under S. 905, the President would be prohibited from impounding funds for any other than technical fiscal management reasons. Under no circumstances could he impound funds if it meant that, as a result of the impoundment, the activities for which appropriations had been granted would not be fully carried out.

In short, the bill would establish a firm and carefully calculated ceiling on spending. It would then establish a process by which the Congress could rationally determine the nation's fiscal priorities within that ceiling. And it would prohibit Presidential frustration of reasonable, responsible congressional action.

I do not claim that this is a perfect bill, or the only possible means of reforming the congressional budgetary process. It is, at least, a good beginning. If enacted, I believe it would go a long way toward claiming for the Congress its rightful powers and assuring that they are exercised well.

I have a summary of this proposal, Mr. Chairman, which I would like to offer for your record, if I might.

Senator METCALF. Please do. Without objection, it will be incorporated at this point in the record.

[The document follows:]

PROPOSAL BY SENATOR STEVENSON TO REFORM THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REVIEW

PROCESS

(1) Prior to receipt of the President's budget, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation shall make estimates of tax revenues (and other sources of revenue) based on the best available economic projections. These estimates shall be adjusted from time to time, as may be appropriate.

(2) No later than 10 days after receipt of the President's budget, the Joint Economie Committee shall hold hearings on the President's budget and, using the revenue projections prepared by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taration make recommendations concerning the federal budget surplus or deficit, if any, appropriate for economic growth and stability.

(3) After receiving the recommendations of the Joint Economic Committee, the Appropriations Committee in each House, giving due regard to the recommendabons of the Joint Economic Committee, shall report out a spending [outlay] viling.

(4) Congress shall be required to set a ceiling on total spending (with no ceptions), no later than 45 days after receiving the President's budget message for the coming fiscal year.

(5) If Congress has not enacted a spending ceiling within 45 days of receiving the President's budget message, the sum total of budget outlays set forth in the President's budget shall become the legally binding spending ceiling.

(6) The rules of both Houses would be changed so that, to the extent pracable, all legislation considered shall contain estimates of the projected outlays aring the current and four succeeding fiscal years for each activity that would alt from passage of the legislation.

(7) The rules of both Houses would specifically prohibit each from passing slation which would result in exceeding the outlay ceiling.

(9) The rules of both Houses would be changed so that contract authority, beluding contract authority expended from trust funds, and budget authority railable through the State and Local Financial Assistance Trust Fund must e first approved through the appropriations process before they are available budget authority.

(9) The Appropriations Committee would report out only one bill which must al the spending ceiling. The bill must include a contingency fund. In addition appropriations (including appropriations made pursuant to (8) above), the il shall specify the amount of outlays for each activity for the fiscal year.

a) The bill must be reported out of the House Appropriations Committee by by 15 and out of the Senate Appropriations Committee within 15 days after it as passed the House. If portions of the bill are not ready, then agencies of the ernment would operate on a continuing resolution basis at the same level as → previous year. The previous year's outlays would be counted toward the sending ceiling.

(10) The rules of both Houses would be changed so that floor amendments appropriations bills must be "strike out and insert" and the total amount serted must not be greater than the amount struck out. The amendment may andate the Appropriations Committee to recommend the appropriate places rcuts subject to floor approval. The Appropriations Committee recommendaCons will be amendable when returned to the floor.

(11) The Congress would review the spending ceiling six months after it is set. (12) The President may at any time submit a report to the Congress asking Zat the spending ceiling be changed stating the reasons and recommending what tivities should receive increased or decreased funding. He may also recomnd that outlays for specific activities may be changed while keeping the total ending ceiling constant.

a) By a majority vote of both Houses, Congress can amend the total by which The President has recommended the ceiling be changed.

b) By a majority vote of both Houses, Congress can change the composition the expenditures specified by the President for increase or decrease.

(e) If Congress has not acted within 30 days, the President's recommendations tomatically become law. The action of the Congress during the 30 day period all be governed by the expedited procedures set up in the Executive Reorgazation Act.

(13) The President will be prohibited from reserving (impounding) funds inless legislative approval is granted as set forth in (12) above) if such a servation would impair the efficient operation of the activity for which obligaanal authority had been provided or if such a reservation would result in not lly carrying out the activity for which the obligational authority had been rovided.

Senator STEVENSON. I would be glad to try to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator METCALF. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Senator Stevenson, first of all, let me thank you for a very thoughtful, thought-provoking, and excellent proposal that you have...

Senator STEVENSON. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. There is one question that I have on page 3 of your statement. I don't have the relevant section of your bill before me. I believe it is paragraph 4 which begins:

Finally, under S. 905, the President would be prohibited from impounding funds for any other than technical fiscal management reasons. Under no circumstances could he impound funds if it meant that, as a result of the impoundment, the activities for which appropriations had been granted would not be fully carried out.

Does this particular provision take into consideration the AntiDeficiency Act and the impoundment for waste?

Senator STEVENSON. That basically, Senator, is what we do. We incorporate the Anti-Deficiency Act, or at least the provision established in that act so that waste is a legitimate basis for impoundment so long as the impoundment for waste of efficiency purposes did not frustrate the will of Congress with respect to that activity.

Senator NUNN. This would not preclude his impoundment for waste! Senator STEVENSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. We wouldn't call it impoundment under those cir cumstances, but freezing of funds.

Senator STEVENSON. It is a tough definitional problem. But the intent of this bill would not be to prevent impoundments for waste Senator NUNN. In some circumstances, for instance, if we had submarine authorization and appropriation for a new type submarine and the President found out in another year that it wouldn't work it was going to sink, under the Anti-Deficiency Act he could prevent this expenditure.

It would curtail completely the authorization for which the appro priation was originally intended. We should be careful in this area You do feel we should continue the antideficiency authority of the President?

Senator STEVENSON. Yes, I do. The intent in this case would not be to prevent the kind of impoundment you referred to. In other cases of impoundment, a procedure is established. Basically, what the Presi dent would do would be to recommend a change in the spending ceiling to the Congress, specifying in which areas and by how much h wished to decrease spending. The Congress would have a fixed period of time within which to act on that recommendation.

Failing to do so within that period of time the ceiling would be changed in accordance with the recommendation and the impound ment would be recognized by the inaction of the Congress.

Under the procedures established in the bill, it is expected tha Congress would act on the recommendation, to either follow the President's recommendation or to make its own changes in the ceiling Senator NUNN. I have one other question.

On the joint committee, there is a lot of concern about whether the joint committee is going to work. Do you see any reason in the event this subcommittee or in the event the Senate determines tha it would be better to carry out these provisions in each separate body and reconcile the differences in the way we do in any other legislation

Do you see any reason why we should not proceed in that direcSon? Is a joint committee necessary absolutely to carry out your ntent?

Senator STEVENSON. I don't believe it is. I do not recommend a joint committee. I have suggested that we work within the existing Committee structure, the separate committees. I think with the proedures established in this and perhaps in other bills the present system could be made to work.

One of the concerns which I have mentioned about a joint committee approach is that the joint committee would inevitably be composed of the most senior members of the most powerful committees to the exclusion of many other Members of the Congress with the same essential responsibilities.

I think that to use the existing committee structure; namely the two Appropriations Committees, would provide for a more representative

process.

Those committees are becoming more representative in terms of philosophy, in terms of geography, and in terms of seniority.

Senator NUNN. I have one other comment. I particularly like your Proposal about cutting and then adding back.

Whether you do it in one amendment with a cut and add back in Te same amendment or whether you did it with a procedure whereby on had a cut and then an add back, I think if we establish a ceiling his type of approach will be not only necessary but I think it will so provide the junior Members with much more opportunity to are some type activity on the floor regading this.

Senator STEVENSON. It is my understanding that there is some exFrience in Georgia which is of relevance.

Senator NUNN. We do have that procedure and it does work very Tell. We stay within the ceiling by doing that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator METCALF. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Roth?

Senator ROTH. I have two or three questions I would like to ask you, Senator Stevenson.

What role would the President play in setting the ceiling under jur legislative proposal or would this be entirely a congressional

tion?

Senator STEVENSON. The ceiling would be established by the Coness but only after the President's budget, after the Congress had d an opportunity to consider the recommendations of the Presint, including the budget, itself.

What we try to do is take three factors into account. One is the ommendations of the President and the budget. A second is the cessities of the economy, of sound fiscal policy. We attempt to do it through the Joint Economic Committee in hearings on the needs the economy in the coming year.

It may be a budget surplus or a budget deficit. And finally through Joint Committee on Taxation we try to take into account the third tor, the projected revenues.

That committee would hold hearings and project revenues. Then → Appropriations Committees, on the basis of the findings of the nt Committee on Taxation and the Joint Economic Committee,

and also on the basis of the President's recommendations, would establish the ceiling in the first instance.

Senator ROTH. Hopefully we will be talking about some reforms that will endure for a considerable period of time.

The problem that I foresee is that the President has no substantive role after his original recommendation. Are we running the risk of developing a procedure that will build in a continued confrontation between Congress and the Executive?

Senator STEVENSON. I would hope that this might lead to cooperation. The present situation has created confrontation between the legislative and the executive branches. This proposal would include some flexibility. It would provide for contingencies, emergencies, the ceiling could be changed either at the initiative of the Congress or at the initiative of the President.

Changes in the ceiling would provide an opportunity for continuing cooperation between the two branches of the Government.

I guess my basic feeling, Senator, is for there to be cooperation there must be strength in the Congress. There must be equality between the two branches. Our founders understood this.

The heart of the congressional power is the power of the purse. That is where the strength comes from. At the moment one branch, Congress, is less equal than the others. I can't think of anything more likely to create strength within the Congress, more equality between the two branches which, in turn, would lead to partnership and cooperation evisioned by our founders, than through congressional declaration of its power of the purse and perhaps most important of all, a new ability within the Congress to exercise that power

responsibly.

Senator ROTH. A number of people feel we should bring this about by rule changes and leave the White House out. I am concerned that we are asking the President, whoever he may be, to administer a budget over which he would have very little effective control.

I would like to turn to the question of revenue. I am sure no one will propose a general tax increase without the action of the President. Under your proposal, would the Congress have to make simultaneous decisions on both revenue levels and the expenditure ceiling? Senator STEVENSON. In setting the ceiling the Congress, initially through the Appropriations Committee, would consider not only the recommendations of the President but the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Taxation which would project revenues.

Then if those projections were changed by action during the Congress, which either increased or decreased revenues, or for any other reasons there might be unforeseen changes in the condition of the economy-a procedure is set up for changes in the ceiling, the outlay. Senator ROTH. How would you enforce the outlay ceiling? Under your proposal, the President could recommend a change or the Congress could take such action.

In the Congress, would it require a simple majority or something greater?

Senator STEVENSON. To change the ceiling?
Senator ROTH. Yes.