OTHER PROGRAMS, FOR EXAMPLE THE MBT-70 TANK HAVE BEEN THIS AVERAGE BASED ON 13 MAJOR SETS OF NEW AND OLD SYSTEMS (SOURCE: ODDR&E) 1 d COST GROWTH IMPLICATIONS IF SIGNIFICANT UNANTICIPATED INCREASES CONTINUE THEN, DOD WILL BE FORCED • EITHER TO REDUCE FORCES BELOW PLANNED LEVELS • OR, TO SACRIFICE DESIRED PERFORMANCE FURTHER LOSS IN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE WILL OCCUR THE SECOND CAUSE OF MANAGEMENT AND TIMING FACTORS THESE ARE THE PROBLEMS THE PUBLIC SEES AS "COST OVERRUNS" DATA TAKEN FROM ANALYSIS OF COST CHANGES IN 45 WEAPON SYSTEMS REPORTED IN JUNE 30, 1972 SAR'S ESTIMATING ERRORS (25%) BOTH BUYER AND SELLER HAVE STRONG MOTIVATIONS TO ACCEPT LOW COST ESTIMATES IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT THE BUYER OVERSTATES PERFORMANCE TO GAIN APPROVAL OVER COMPETING SYSTEMS THE SELLER UNDERSTATES THE COST DUE BOTH UNDERESTIMATE THE SHEER DIFFICULTY OF PREDICTING THE UNKNOWN INFLATION (30%) DOD HAS REPORTED ITS FINDINGS TO THE COMMITTEE • THE GOVERNMENT IS LEARNING HOW TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM IN CONTRACT ESCALATION CLAUSES SPECIFICATION CHANGES (45%) THIS MAY BE THE MOST IMPORTANT CAUSE OF OVERRUNS - TRYING TO DO TOO MUCH CHALLENGING THE STATE OF THE ART FRONTIER - TRYING TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE THE SYSTEM TOO FAST THESE CHANGES AFFECT QUANTITY, SCHEDULE AND |