55 1 amended by inserting "and the Committee on the Budget" 2 after "Appropriations" each place it appears in such section. 3 (c) Section 134 (c) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 190b) is 4 amended by inserting "or the Committee on the Budget" 5 after "Appropriations". 6 (d) Section 136 (c) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 190d) is 7 amended by striking out "Committee on Appropriations of 8 the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations," and in9 serting in lieu thereof "Committees on Appropriations and 10 the Budget of the Senate and the Committees on Appropria11 tions, the Budget,". 12 AMENDMENTS TO LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT 13 OF 1970 14 SEC. 904. (a) Section 232 of the Legislative Reorgani15 zation Act of 1970 (31 U.S.C. 1172) is amended by re16 numbering paragraphs (2) and (3) as (3) and (4), 17 respectively, and by inserting after paragraph (1) the fol18 lowing new paragraph: 19 "(2) the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and 20 House,". 22223 21 (b) Section 236 of such Act (31 U.S.C. 1176) is 22 amended by inserting "and the Budget" after “Appropria 24 (c) Section 242 (a) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 190h) is 56 1 amended by inserting "or the Committee on the Budget" 2 after "Appropriations". 3 (d) Section 243 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 190i) is 4 amended by inserting “(a)” immediately after “243” and 5 by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: "(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall also apply 6 7 to the Committee on the Budget of the Senate." 8 EXERCISE OF RULEMAKING POWERS 9 SEC. 905. (a) The provisions of this title (except sec10 tion 906) and titles I, III, IV, V, and VII (except section 11 702(c) and section 704) are enacted by the Congress (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, or of that House to which they specifically apply; and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so far as relating to the procedure in such House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House. 24 (b) Any rule provided in this Act may be waived or 25 suspended by the Senate or the House of Representatives 57 1 only by a vote of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum 2 being present. 3 (c) If a point of order is made in either the Senate or 4 the House of Representatives, and sustained by the Presid 6 ing Officer of that House, that any bill, resolution, amend ment, motion, or other matter is not in order by reason of any 7 rule provided in this Act, the decision of the Presiding Officer 8 may be overruled only by a vote of two-thirds of the Mem9 bers voting, a quorum being present. 10 11 13 EFFECTIVE DATES SEC. 906. (a) Titles I, II, VIII, and IX and section 12 406 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) Except as otherwise provided therein, titles III, IV 14 (except section 406), V, and VI shall apply with respect to 15 the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and succeeding fiscal 16 17 18 years. (c) Title VII shall take effect on the first day of the first session of Congress following the date of enactment of 19 this Act. Memorandum To: Members, Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management and Expenditures. 'rom: E. Winslow Turner, Chief Counsel. Subject: Markup of S. 1541 (Committee Print No. 2); Discussion of Relevant Matters. BUDGET COMMITTEES Committee Selection and Composition S. 1541 (Comte. Print No. 2), Title I, provides for the membership of the separate House and Senate Budget Committees to be selected and approved in the same nanner as for other standing committees. This means that for the Senate, the steering committees would make the initial selection, which would be ratified by che respective caucuses, and elected pro forma by the Senate. In the House, the selection or steering committee would be the Ways nad Means Committee, whose majority and minority members would recommend the membership to their respective caucuses for ratification, and formal election would be by the House. The intent here by staff was to provide in the working draft of S. 1541 the traditional selection approach (which could vary in the future as the party caucus rules and procedures were changed with respect to standing committees) and thus provide a base for discussion of alternative approaches. The following are suggested alternatives which members may wish to consider singly, or in combination: (a) Keep the present 40-60 percent split, but have all members, including those from appropriations and revenue, actually elected by the caucuses. This would mean that nominations would be made from the caucus floor and that votes would be taken on individual nominees. Formal election would be by each House, but selected members could be subject to a vote at this final level of action. A variation of this would be to drop the 40-60 percent split, and have members elected without committee restriction, or with a restriction that no more than two members could be from any of the following committees: appropriations; revenue, armed services; foreign relations. Another variation has been suggested: that the 40-60 percent split be dropped, but that members be nominated by the leadership of each party and ratified by the respective caucuses. (b) The Joint Study Committee recommended that the appropriations and revenue committees select their own representatives on the budget committees, and that the Speaker and President pro tem appoint the members at large. It presumed that members would be selected on a majority-minority ratio of 4-3 in the House and 3-2 in the Senate (Congressman Reuss wants this majorityminority_ratio reduced to 3-2 in the House Budget Committee as required by present Democrat caucus rules, and the ratio changed as future Congresses may provide). S. 1541 (Comte. Print No. 1) had all members appointed by the Speaker and President pro tem, but in accordance with the recommendations of the Majority and Minority Leaders. The 40-60 percent split was included, but at large members could not come from the appropriations or revenue committees. An additional suggestion would have the membership on a budget committee come only from members of the policy committees (or similar committees) of both parties in the respective Houses. In the alternative, the policy committees themselves might serve as the budget committees. (c) Critics of the JSC bill and S. 1541 point out that there are no provisions for wide participation and changing representation on the proposed budget committees. Senator Mondale and the ADA suggest membership limited to six years, with staggered terms. After the first two years, one-third of the committee would be rotated out and new members rotated in. This would happen every two years, and would give a wide number of members a chance to serve. Others seeking more immediate flexibility recommend that no senator or member should be permitted to serve for more than two consecutive Congresses, but in the long range, a member could return to the budget committee perhaps several times for four-year periods. Chairmanship S. 1541 (Comte. Print No. 2) provides that chairmen of the budget commitees will be selected and approved in the same manner as for the standing committees, i.e., by recommendation by the steering or selection committees and ratification by the caucuses. It further provides that no chairman of a budget committee could at the same time remain chairman of a standing committee. As with the membership composition and selection, staff felt that a bette point of departure for markup would be to leave the selection of budget conmittee chairman to the present system. However, it did add one restriction that no senator or member would be eligible to serve as chairman during ar session of a Congress if he served as chairman of the committee (at any time during the preceding Congress. The following alternatives re committee chairmanship have been suggested: (a) that the chairman and ranking minority member be elected by ther respective caucus, rather than "selected" under the present procedure. (b) that in addition to caucus election, the chairman and ranking minority member be subject to challenge and election on the floors of the respective Houses (c) that the chairman and ranking minority member be elected by the budget committee. (d) that such chairman and ranking minority members be selected by the leadership of their respective Houses. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF THE BUDGET S. 1541 (Committee Print No. 2), Title II, follows essentially the same language as Comte. Print No. 1, except that it adds in Sec. 202(e) some additional responsibility relating to the maintenance of central files and indexes for fiscal. budgetary and program-related data. Among other things, Title II authorize the COB to "utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress. The GAO has raised an issue as to its contemplated role vis-a-vis the COB and the Congressional budget process in general. The traditional relationship of GAO to Congress has been one of agent: providing data, audits, program evaluation and personnel to committees, and, at GAO's option, to Members. It sees the JSC's recommendation of budget committees serviced by a joint staff as a mechanism which would not impair the traditional GAO function. Placing authority in the COB to utilize the information, reports and personnel of GAŎ may create conflicts between two ostensibly independent agencies of Congress according to the GAO. On the other hand, if the GAO is not required to support the COB in its budgetary information and evaluation function, there could be a wasteful duplication of effort or an impairment of the Congressional budget process. The GAO has recommended several amendments, the purpose of which is to strike the language relating to the utilization of the GAO and Library, and to add language assuring that nothing in the Act would modify any existing GAO and Library authority. The issue appears to be, in what degree, and in what manner, do Subcommittee members wish to empower the COB to utilize the GAO, and if conflicts shall arise, what legislative mechanism shall resolve them? CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS (TITLE III) Concurrent Resolution S. 1541 (Comte. Print No. 2) has revised this title somewhat in order to meet certain major objections and suggestions with respect to the workability of the original bill. The basic concept-that is, the report of a concurrent resolution containing firm limits for Congressional amendment and approval-has been preserved, however. Such a concurrent resolution would be reported by the respective budget committees not later than March 22nd, and would contain the following items: (a) total ceilings on budget authority and outlays; (c) the appropriate deficit or surplus; (d) the appropriate level of revenues and debt: (e) sub-ceilings on budget authority and outlays, allocated by committees; (f) general reserve (for allocation by subsequent Con. Res.) for programs and contingencies; (g) recommendation to tax committees; revenue and debt changes. The objective here is to develop a mechanism by which Congress imposes a rule on itself re the expenditures, revenues, and the appropriate deficit or surplus; in short, a budget rule that will govern its action on subsequent legislation. |