agency, because the purchaser is financially unable to carry out his
contract. (Ark.) Moore v. Irwin, 97.

Brokers and Factors, admissions of as evidence against principals, 325.
Building Contractors, admissions of as evidence against owner, 323–325.

1. COMMON CARRIERS-Insurers, Limitations upon Liability
of as Carriers of Livestock.-The liability of a common carrier as
an insurer does not extend to any damage resulting from an in-
trinsic cause against which care and foresight could not provide,
for such cause is within the principle which excuses common ear-
riers from loss or damage resulting from the act of God. Under this
rule the liability of the carrier undertaking to transport livestock
for those who choose to employ him does not extend to any damage
resulting from the nature, disposition or viciousness of the animal.
(Fla.) Summerlin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 164.

2. COMMON CARRIERS, Liabilities for Which cannot Contract
for Exemption.-A common carrier of goods cannot legally stipulate
for exemption from liability for losses occasioned by its own neg-
ligence, or that of its agents or servants, and all stipulations for
exemption from negligence, whether gross or ordinary, are ineffectual.
A failure to exercise the care and diligence due from railroad com-
panies as common carriers is negligence, without any legal distine-
tion as being gross or ordinary. (Fla.) Summerlin v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 164.

3.

CARRIERS-Returning Goods-Liability for Loss on Connect-
ing Lines. When goods have been carried over connecting lines to
the point of destination and there refused by the consignee, and the
shipper, on receiving notice thereof, in writing appoints the com
pany owning and operating one of the lines his agent to stop the
goods for him before delivery to consignee and return the same to
him, and agrees to indemnify and save harmless such company from
any suit or legal proceedings, loss, damage, expense, counsel fees,
costs and charges arising from or caused by its attempt to comply
with the request, such writing does not imply a verbal contract
by such company to transport and safely carry the goods over all
the connecting lines; and such company will not be liable for loss
of the goods or damage thereto, occurring on the return without
its fault and not on its own road. (Ohio St.) Erie R. R. Co. v. Cap-
pel, 686.

Of Livestock.

4. COMMON CARRIERS, Liabilities of, Contracts Limiting.—The
doctrine of the common law which holds the carrier to the liability
of an insurer does not deny to the parties to the shipment the right
to enter into contracts with reference to this liability, and it is well
settled that the owner and the carrier may, by contract, provide for
a limitation of the carrier's liability that is not illegal or unreason-
able. (Fla.) Summerlin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 164.

5. CARRIERS OF LIVESTOCK, Limitations upon the Liability
of. The liability of a common carrier of livestock does not extend
to any damage resulting from the natural disposition or viciousness
of the animals. (Fla.) Summerlin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 164.

6. CARRIERS OF LIVESTOCK, Duties and Obligations of.-
Whenever a railroad company receives cattle or livestock, and un-
dertakes to transport the same for hire, such company assumes the
relation of a common carrier, and becomes chargeable with the du-
ties and obligations which are incident to that relation, except so
far as such duties and responsibilities may legally be modified by
special contract. (Fla.) Summerlin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 164.
Street Railways.

7. STREET RAILWAY-Starting Car as Passenger Alights.-A
conductor who starts his car at a time when he knows a passenger
is in the act of alighting is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
(Wis.) Jirachek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & L. Co., 1070.

8. STREET RAILWAY-Necessity of Formal Finding of Negli-
gence. Where the facts found by the jury, taken in connection with
the admitted facts, establish beyond controversy that a street-car
conductor rang the bell for the car to start when he knew that a
passenger was alighting therefrom, and the car started, to the injury
of the passenger, there is no necessity for a formal finding of negli
gence by the jury. (Wis.) Jirachek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & L.
Co., 1070.

9. STREET RAILWAYS-Degree of Care Toward Passengers.-
A street railway company is required to exercise the highest degree
of skill and care which may reasonably be expected of intelligent and
prudent persons employed in that business, but it is not an insurer
of the safety of passengers and not bound absolutely to carry them
safely or without injury. (Ark.) Oliver v. Ft. Smith Light etc.
Co., 86.

10. STREET RAILWAYS-Passenger on Running-board-Sudden
Start of Car.—A street railway company is negligent if, having slack-
ened or stopped a car for passengers to get on and off, it starts the
car with such a sudden jerk as to cause passengers, who are riding
upon the running-board when there is no room for them inside the
car, to surge back and forth and crowd or throw one of them to the
ground. (Ark.) Oliver v. Ft. Smith Light etc. Co., 86.

11. STREET RAILWAYS.-To Start a Street-car Suddenly is not
negligence per se. (Ark.) Oliver v. Ft. Smith Light etc. Co., 86.

12. STREET RAILWAYS.-While a Passenger, Riding on the Run-
ning-board of a street-car when there is no room for him inside takes
upon himself the duty of looking out for and protecting himself
against the usual and obvious perils of his position, such as the sway-
ing or jolting of the car while carefully and prudently operated, he
does not assume any risk or danger caused by the operation of the
car in an unusual, improper and negligent manner. (Ark.) Oliver
v. Ft. Smith Light etc. Co., 86.

13. STREET RAILWAY.-Where a Passenger, Riding on the Run-
ning-board of a car when there is no room inside, is thrown to the
ground, the railway company, though negligent in suddenly starting
the car, is not liable if his own negligence contributed to the injury.
(Ark.) Oliver v. Ft. Smith Light etc. Co., 86.

14. STREET RAILWAYS-Passenger on Running-board.—When
there is evidence tending to show that a passenger, while standing
on the running-board of a crowded street-car and trying to pay his
fare when there is no room inside, is injured by the car starting sud-
denly, a verdict should not be directed for the railway company, but
the case should go to the jury. (Ark.) Oliver v. Ft. Smith Light etc.
Co., 86.

15. STREET RAILWAYS-Rules Respecting the Risk of Riding
on the Platform.-A rule of a street railway company that persons

riding on the platforms do so at their own risk is reasonable and
within the scope of the company to make. (Mass.) Tompkins v.
Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 392.

16. STREET RAILWAYS-Risk Assumed in Getting on a Crowded
Car.-One who becomes a passenger on a car so crowded that he can-
not get inside takes the risk incident to transportation in these eit-
cumstances, among which is that of temporarily alighting for the
purpose of permitting the other passengers to get off the car con-
veniently. (Mass.) Tompkins v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 392.

17. STREET RAILWAYS-Passenger, When does not Cease to be
Such.-By Temporarily Alighting from a Crowded Car to permit an-
other passenger to conveniently get off one does not cease to be a
passenger. This is one of the incidents to travel during the rush
hours. (Mass.) Tompkins v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 392.

18. STREET RAILWAYS-Risk of Negligence, When Assumed by
a Passenger. If a street railway has adopted and posted notices of
a rule that passengers riding on the platforms do so at their own risk,
and because of the crowded condition of a car, a passenger having
notice of the rule stands on the front platform and alights for the
purpose of allowing another passenger to conveniently get off, and
while attempting to regain his position on the car is injured by the
negligence of the carrier or its agents in suddenly starting such ear,
this is one of the risks assumed by riding on such platform, and he
cannot recover of the corporation for his injuries. (Mass.) Tomp
kins v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 392.

See Damages, 4-6; Express Companies; Railroads; Street Railways.
Note.

Carriers, admissions of agents, officers and employés of, 319, 322, 325.
Clams, ownership of, 752.

COEXECUTORS.

See Executors and Administrators, 11-13.

COMMERCE.

1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Sale of Goods on Commission.—
Where goods are shipped by a resident of another state to his eom-
mission agent in Wisconsin, not in response to an order from a pur-
chaser but to be held by the agent as part of his stock of commission
goods in that state, a sale and delivery by him is not a transaction
of interstate commerce; and the place of payment specified in the note
given for part of the purchase money, though in another state, has no
bearing upon the question whether the sale and delivery was an act
of interstate commerce. (Wis.) Duluth Music Co. v. Claney, 1051.

2. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Interstate Carrier, Who is not—-
Question of Fact.-Whether an express company to which liquors
consigned from another state for divers persons are delivered by an
interstate common carrier, to be by such company received for and
delivered to such consignees, is an interstate carrier is a question
of fact to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions.
(Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.

3. COMMON CARRIERS, Delivery by of Goods Addressed to the
Care of a Designated Person.-If goods are consigned and addressed
to specified persons in the care of an express company, the latter is
thereby made a proper person to whom to make delivery. (Mass.)
Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.

4. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Sale of Corporate Stock. The
sale by a foreign corporation of its unsubscribed stock does not in-

volve interstate commerce.
Stephens, 1074.

(Wis.) Southwestern Slate Co. V.

5. LIQUORS, INTOXICATING Interstate Commerce.-Whatever
be the precise meaning of interstate commerce, goods brought from
one state into another at some time reach a stage where they are
no longer immune by reason of interstate commerce from any fur-
ther legal intrastate regulation. Respecting intoxicating liquors, that
point of time is fixed by the act of Congress of August 8, 1890, to
be upon arrival in the state. (Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's
Express Co., 416.

6. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Conclusiveness of Adjudications
of the United States Supreme Court.-As to the meaning and defini-
tions of terms employed in the statutes of the United States con-
cerning interstate commerce, the decisions of the supreme court of
the United States are conclusive. (Mass.) Commonweath v. People's
Express Co., 416.

7. INTERSTATE COMMERCE - · Continuance of After Goods
Arrive Within the State. The interstate commerce clause of the
constitution guarantees the right to ship merchandise from one state
into another, and protects it until the termination of the shipment
by delivery at the place of consignment, and this right is wholly un-
affected by the act of Congress which allows state authority to at-
tach to the original package before sale, but only after delivery.
(Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.

8. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, Final Carrier, Though Acting
Wholly Within the State, may be Engaged in.-The final link in an
interstate shipment may be through a carrier wholly within the
terminal state, even when the completed delivery is by horse and
wagon. (Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.

9. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-Constitutionality of Statute For-
bidding Corporations to Receive for Hire or to Deliver for Reward.—
A statute prohibiting any person or corporation not regularly con-
ducting a general express business, excepting railway corporations,
from receiving intoxicating liquors for transportation for hire or
reward for delivery in a city or town without first being granted a
permit, may be regarded as having ample scope for operation in re-
spect to trade beginning and ending within the commonwealth, and
may therefore be held constitutional. (Mass.) Commonweath v. Peo-
ple's Express Co., 416.

10. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, When a Question of Fact.-
Where intoxicating liquors are shipped from another state, consigned
to specified persons in this state in the care of a designated express
company doing business here, and are delivered to such corporation
for such consignees, it cannot be held as a matter of law that such
express company is not engaged in interstate commerce, and a rul-
ing so made is erroneous, where there is evidence from which the
jury might find that such express company was engaged in inter-
state commerce. (Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co.,

416.

COMMON LAW.

COMMON LAW-Its Nature, Origin and Growth.-The com-
mon law is the result of growth, and its development has been de-
termined by the social needs of the community which it governs. It
is the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which
are for the time dominant leave their impress upon the law. It is
of judicial origin, and seeks to establish doctrines and rules for the
determination, protection, and enforcement of legal rights. Mani-
festly it must change as society changes and new rights are rec-
ognized. To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere abstraction,
Am. St. Rep., Vol. 131-72

it must gradually adapt itself to changed conditions. Necessarily
its form and substance have been greatly affected by prevalent
economic theories. (Minn.) Tuttle v. Buck, 446.

CONCEALED WEAPONS.
See Weapons.

CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT.

1. CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT and the Right of Entry for a
Breach Thereof.-Where lands are conveyed on a condition that they
are to be used for the purposes of the commission of fish and fisheries,
and are never used for that purpose, though more than twenty years
have elapsed, there is a breach of condition for which the grantor
and his heirs have a right of entry. (Mass.) Fay v. Locke, 402.

2. CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT, Breach of by the United States.
If the United States acquires title to real property subject to a con-
dition subsequent in the conveyance, its title may be destroyed
through a breach of such condition under the same circumstances
as if the conveyances were to a private person. (Mass.) Fay v.
Locke, 402.

Note.

Confessions and Admissions of Third Persons in Criminal Cases, as part
of the res gestae, 786, 788.

by letter, 785, 786.

considered with circumstantial evidence, 780, 787, 788.

death of declarant, 785.

dying declarations within the rule of exclusion, 788, 789.
exception in Texas to rule regarding, 779, 786.

in bastardy cases, 785.

in English cases, 783-785.

of codefendants, 782.

rejection as hearsay, reasons for and illustrations, 780, 781, 782,

783.

rule of hearsay excludes, 779.

rule where offered to discredit witness who was declarant, 789.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. CONSTITUTION—Harmonizing Different Parts.-In construing
a constitution it is the duty of the court to harmonize the different
parts and to give each one its proper effect so far as possible under
the rules of construction. (Utah) Blackrock Copper M. & M. Co. v.
Tingey, 850.

2. CONSTITUTION—Consideration of Entire Instrument.—In con-
struing a constitutional provision, it is the duty of the court to have
recourse to the whole instrument, if necessary, to ascertain the true
intent and meaning of the particular provision in question. (Utah)
Blackrock Copper M. & M. Co. v. Tingey, 850.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Construing Statute to Avoid Un-
constitutionality.-A statute which would be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to a certain class, and constitutional as applied to another
class, may be held to have been intended to apply to the latter class
only, if this seems in harmony with the general purpose of the legis-
lature. (Mass.) Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 416.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Party Whose Rights are not Af-
fected, When may Question the Constitutionality of a Statute.-The
rule that a court will not listen to an objection made to the constitu-
tionality of a law by a party whose rights it does not affect is in-
applicable to a case where the vice of the law consists in an un-