5. NEGLIGENCE, Who may Recover for.-For acts to constitute
negligence toward any particular person, there must be a breach of
duty owing to him at the particular time and under the particular
circumstances; and to give him a right of action for injuries resulting
from such breach of duty, such negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. (Ga.) Morris v. Rounsaville, 207.

6. NEGLIGENCE- General Instructions.-In Actions Based on
Negligence, where the duty varies with the conditions and eircum-
stances, a mere general statement of the law with regard to the duty
ordinarily imposed should not be given. (Utah) Herndon v. Salt
Lake City, 827.

7. NEGLIGENCE Sale of Impure Oil-Injury to Consumer.-One
who, in violation of the pure food statute, sells impure oil to a retail
grocer, knowing it will be sold to customers for use in cooking, is
liable to one who purchases some of the oil from the grocer and is
made ill by eating food cooked in it. The fact that he (the original
seller) did not know the oil to be impure is no defense, for he was
bound to know whether it was wholesome and complied with the
law. (Minn.) Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil etc. Co., 441.

See Animals; Damages; Master and Servant.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See Bills and Notes.

NEW TRIAL.

1. PRACTICE-New Trial, Order Sustaining or Overruling De-
murrer. A ruling of the court in sustaining or overruling a demur-
rer, and in allowing or disallowing an amendment to pleading, cannot
be made the ground of a motion for a new trial; but direct excep-
tions should be filed to such ruling, if a review of it is to be had.
(Ga.) Hawkins v. Studdard, 190.

2. NEW TRIAL-Misconduct of Jury not Prejudicial.-It is not
error to refuse an application for a new trial unless such refusal is
in some way prejudicial to the substantial rights of the applicant.
(Kan.) State v. Shaw, 298.

3. NEW TRIAL, When Properly Denied.-The evidence was suffi-
cient to authorize the verdict, and the court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying a new trial. (Ga.) Mallet v. Watkins, 226.

NOTICE.

1. NOTICE.-Possession of Land Under an Unrecorded Deed is
constructive notice of the title of the occupant. (Miss.) Allen-West
Commission Co. v. Millstead, 556.

2. NOTICE from the Continuance in Possession of a Tenant.-Where
land in possession of a tenant is conveyed, the continued possession
of the tenant of the grantee is not constructive notice of the unre-
corded deed. (Fla.) Feinberg v. Stearn, 119.

NUISANCE.

1. NUISANCE, PUBLIC.—A Bawdy-house is a public nuisance.
(Neb.) Seifert v. Dillon, 642.

2. NUISANCE, PUBLIC, Consisting of a Bawdy-house-Owner
of Lot, Right of to Restrain.-The right of a land owner to restrain
an adjoining property owner from using his property as a bawdy-
house, or house of ill-fame, to which persons resort for the purposes
of prostitution and lewdness, is a right belonging to the land, and
the fact that defendant's premises were so used before plaintiff pur-
chased his property constitutes no defense to an action to enjoin
the same. (Neb.) Seifert v. Dillon, 642.

3. NUISANCE, PUBLIC, Consent of Municipal Authorities to.-
The fact that municipal authorities tolerate the maintenance of a
house of prostitution on defendant's property, and thereby violate
the law themselves, constitutes no defense to a suit by a near-by
property owner to enjoin such maintenance, special damages being
shown. (Neb.) Seifert v. Dillon, 642.

4. NUISANCE, PUBLIC - Bawdy-house, Special Injuries from,
When Shown.-Where a near-by property owner and those in his
employ are compelled to witness indecent conduct of the inmates
of a bawdy-house, and to hear loud, boisterous, indecent and an-
noying noises made by them and their dissolute companions, he
thereby suffers a special injury different from that suffered by the
general public, and is therefore entitled to enjoin the same, not-
withstanding the maintenance of such place is a public nuisance.
(Neb.) Seifert v. Dillon, 642.

5. NUISANCE, PUBLIC, Prescriptive Right to Maintain.—The
illegal use of property as a house of ill-fame constitutes a continu-
ing injury to a near-by property owner which is unaffected by lapse
of time. (Neb.) Seifert v. Dillon, 642.

Offenses Continuing Throughout One Day, against the game laws, 816.
English decisions, 815, 816.

law in Michigan as to saloons, 817.

Note.

law in Texas as to contravention of local option law, 817.

law in Texas as to saloons, 817.

law in Texas as to theatrical performances, 817.

making unlawful sales, 816.

several sales of liquor without license before conviction, 817.

unlawful cohabitations, 816.

violations of Sunday laws, 817.

when constitute but one crime, 815-817.

where offenses are distinct in nature, 817.

OIL LEASE.

See Landlord and Tenant, 3.

Oysters, ownership of, 752.

PARENT AND CHILD.

1. PARENT AND CHILD-Father's Liability to Mother for the
Support of Child After a Divorce.-Where the wife, on account of
the misconduct of the husband, obtains a decree granting her a
divorce and awarding to her the custody of their minor child, and
no question as to the support of such child by the father has been
made or passed on, the father is not relieved of his legal obligation
for a proper support of the child. If he fails or refuses to discharge
this obligation, the mother, in an original action, may recover of the
father the amount of expenditures made by her after such decree,
for a proper support of such child. (Ga.) Brown v. Brown, 229.

2. PARENT-Liability for Child's Negligent Use of Automobile.
Where a father was possessed of an automobile which he kept upon
his premises, and his daughter, about nineteen years of age, was
accustomed to drive it, and did so whenever she felt like it, asking
permission to use it when the father was at home, but when not
at home took it sometimes without permission, there being no proof
that the daughter was actually employed by the father to operate
the machine, held, in an action against her father, where the daugh-

ter, in using the machine for her own pleasure in driving her per-
sonal friends, negligently injured a person in the highway, that
such proof was not sufficient to constitute the daughter the servant
or agent of the master, and that a motion for a direction of a
verdict for the defendant should have prevailed. (N. J. L.) Doran
v. Thomsen, 677.

3. PARENT-Liability for Child's Negligent Use of Automobile.
The court charged the jury: "If she took that machine out at that
time in pursuance of a general authority of her father to take it
whenever she pleased for the pleasure of the family and for her
own pleasure, for the purpose for which the master bought it, for
the purpose for which her father owned it, for the purpose for
which he expected her to operate it, then she was the servant of
the father. Under those circumstances that was the business for
which the father bought the machine." Held, error, because it based
the creation of the relation of master and servant upon the purpose
which the parent had in mind in acquiring ownership of the vehicle
and its permissive use by the child, ignoring an essential element
in the creation of that status as to third persons, that such use must
be in furtherance of, and not apart from, the master's service and
control. (N. J. L.) Doran v. Thomsen, 677.

PAROL EVIDENCE.

See Evidence, 9-11.

PARTIES.

See Intervention.

PARTITION.

1. EQUITABLE PARTITION or Suit to Terminate Trust.—Where
the result sought and actually attained in a suit is partition among
the life tenants and remaindermen named in a will, the proceeding,
although the word "partition" is not used therein, will be regarded
as one for equitable partition, and not one for the termination of the
executor's power to sell or the execution of a trust putting the bene-
ficiaries in possession of their respective interests in the corpus of
the trust estate. (Mo.) Stewart v. Jones, 595.

2. EQUITABLE PARTITION Contrary to Intention of Testator.-
A statutory provision that no partition of devised land shall be made
contrary to the intention of the testator expressed in his will ap-
plies to equitable partition as well as to those strictly legal. (Mo.)
Stewart v. Jones, 595.

3. PARTITION Contrary to Provisions of Will.-Where a testator
gives to his widow for life the homestead on the outskirts of a grow-
ing town, and directs its sale at her death and a division of the
proceeds among his daughters and nieces, it cannot be said that his
sole purpose is to provide a home for the widow, and partition will
not be decreed in her lifetime, although she has parted with the
home. (Mo.) Stewart v. Jones, 595.

4. PARTITION-Leased Coal in Place.-A Purchaser of the In-
terests of some of the heirs of coal in place leased by their paternal
ancestor with right to the lessee to mine it to exhaustion in consid-
eration of a stipulated royalty, or a fixed sum in lieu thereof if a
minimum quantity is not mined annually, the lease to be void upon
default in payment of such fixed sum, is not entitled to partition
of said coal, in his suit against other heirs for that purpose, during
the life of such lease. (W. Va.) McMullen v. Blecker, 894.

5. PARTITION-Leased Coal in Place.-A Guardian as such
cannot maintain an original suit, or intervene in such partition suit,

for an accounting of royalty due his ward under said lease; such
suit being properly maintainable only in the name of the ward by
next friend. (W. Va.) McMullen v. Blecker, 894.

6. PARTITION, Who Might Compel at the Common Law.-At the
common law, only coparceners could compel partition by judicial
process. (Fla.) Hobbs v. Frazier, 179.

7. PARTITION, Who may Compel Under the Statutes of Florida.
In Florida, any one or more of several joint tenants, tenants in com-
mon, or coparceners may compel partition by a suit in equity. The
joint tenants, tenants in common and coparceners contemplated by
the statute are those who are in some way the owners of a beneficial
interest in the land, or whose status and duties are of such a na-
ture as to require the exercise of the right to compel partition by
judicial proceedings. (Fla.) Hobbs v. Frazier, 179.

8. PARTITION, Trustee in Bankruptcy may not Sue for.-A
trustee in bankruptcy having legal title with no beneficial interest
in undivided property and no duties with reference to the undivided
property requiring partition for the benefit of a cestui que trust is
not, in general, such a tenant in common as authorizes him to sue
for partition. (Fla.) Hobbs v. Frazier, 179.

9. BANKRUPTCY, Trustee in, Authority of to Sue for Partition.
The federal bankruptcy statute contains no express authority to a
trustee in bankruptcy to sue for partition of the property of the
bankrupt, the title to which is by the law vested in the trustee in
bankruptcy for the purpose of paying the debts of the bankrupt,
and the nature of the trustee's power and duties does not necessarily
make the right to sue for partition exist by implication. A sale of
the bankrupt's interest may be made without partition, and this may
be sufficient for debt-paying purposes. (Fla.) Hobbs v. Frazier, 179.
10. PARTITION, Right of, When Exists.-The statutes of the
state do not contemplate that partition may be enforced except
when required by the demands or the interests of a beneficial owner,
or when shown to be necessary to protect the rights of those bene-
ficially interested. (Fla.) Hobbs v. Frazier, 179.

11. PARTITION, Trust in Bankruptcy, When does not Show He
has a Cause for. Where a trustee in bankruptcy sues for partition
of property and merely alleges that he "is desirous of obtaining a
partition and division of the said premises," and it does not in any
way appear that partition is essential to the statutory duties of
such trustee, or that the bankruptcy court has authorized the pro-
ceeding, or that it is necessary to fully protect the rights of those
interested in the estate of the bankrupt, the right of the trustee in
bankruptcy to sue for partition is not apparent. (Fla.) Hobbs v.
Frazier, 179.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. PARTNERSHIP-New Member, Admitting by Consent of the
Partners. While the sale of his interest to a stranger by one mem-
ber of a partnership does not make such stranger a member of the
firm, there is no rule of law forbidding all the members of a firm
from agreeing to admit a new member as a partner therein. (Neb.)
Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.

2. PARTNERSHIP, When not Dissolved by Admitting a New
Member. Where one of the partners sells his interest in the firm
with the consent of the other members, and a purchaser is taken
in and recognized as a partner and the business continued, this
does not work a dissolution of the firm. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin,
629.

3. PARTNERSHIP - New Member, Transfer to-Statute of
Frauds. Where by agreement between all the partners a new mem-

ber is admitted to the firm, he acquires an interest in the partner-
ship property by operation of law; and such transfer is not within
the statute of frauds. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.

4. PARTNERSHIP, Right of to Renewal of a Lease Though
Changes have Taken Place in the Interests of the Partners.-In
an action by a partnership for the specific performance of a cove
nant to renew a five-year lease, it is immaterial that at certain times
during the first term of said lease other persons held an interest in
said partnership, where the persons who constituted the partner-
ship at the time of demanding such renewal are the same persons
who were members of the firm at the time of the execution of the
lease. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.

5. PARTNERSHIP, Capacity of to Take Title to Real Estate,
Estoppel to Question.-Where a lessor has accepted the benefits of
a lease made by him to a partnership, he cannot, in an action by
such partnership to enforce the specific performance of a covenant
to renew, plead that the partnership was without capacity to take
the legal title to real estate. (Neb.) Gorder v. Pankonin, 629.

PERJURY.

1. PERJURY-Judgment of Acquittal in Action Where Com-
mitted. In a prosecution for perjury the judgment of acquittal in
the cause in which the perjury was committed is not admissible to
prove the defendant's innocence. (Kan.) State v. Bevill, 345.

2. PERJURY-Judgment of Acquittal in Action Where Com-
mitted. A party cannot, after securing an acquittal by perjury, sue-
cessfully plead such acquittal in bar of a prosecution for the perjury
so committed. (Kan.) State v. Bevill, 345.

PLEADING.

1. PLEADING-What may be Proved Under General Denial-
Where a complaint alleges the assignment of the contract sued upon,
which is a necessary allegation, a general denial puts the question of
assignment in issue. (Wis.) Johnson v. Nickers, 1046.

2. DEMURRER-Discrepancy Between Summons and Complaint.—
A demurrer to a complaint on the ground that it fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action does not reach discrepancies
between the relief to which the complaint may entitle and the prayer
in the summons. (Minn.) Freeman v. Paulson, 438.

3. PRACTICE Amendment, Striking Out Names of Parties.-
Under the code of Alabama, a plaintiff may strike out the names of
parties to his complaint without working a discontinuance of his
action. (Ala.) Scarbrough v. City Nat. Bank, 71.

4. PLEADING.-A Demurrer Admits Only Such Facts as are suf-
ficiently pleaded. (Ind.) Caywood v. Supreme Lodge K. & L. of
H., 253.

5.

PRACTICE-Special Demurrer, When Should be Sustained.-
The petition was subject to special demurrer on the ground that it
did not set forth with sufficient particularity the expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in the support of the child. (Ga.) Brown v. Brown,

229.

6. PLEADING-Defect not Waived by Failure to Demur.-If the
complaint by an assignee of a contract fails to show a valid assign-
ment, and therefore does not state a cause of action, the defect is not
waived by failure to demur. (Wis.) Johnson v. Nickers, 1046.

See Equity.

POLICE OFFICER.
See Railroads, 4-7.