of them can come into this court till the right is first tried at law."

This we consider as expressing the rule of law; the principle dictating the rule being the duty and necessity of affording a practical and efficient form of remedy for protection to persons and property founded in the very conception of government: 6 Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 972. If this case falls within the rule, the allowance of the proceeding is no infraction of the constitutional right of trial by jury, for that guaranty refers to, and is coextensive only with, the common-law right then existing, and it was always a principle of the common law that the trial by jury must give way to an appeal to equity, when from the nature of the situation, the transaction to be investigated, and the relation of the parties to that transaction the ordinary proceeding at law would not answer sufficiently the purpose of administering justice: Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510; Oelrich v. Spain, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 211, 21 L. ed. 43; Cook v. Schmidt, 100 Ala. 582, 13 South. 686; 6 Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 972-974. It is the duty of affording an 184 efficient and speedy and economical administration of justice which evoked and established the principle of jurisprudence under which a court of equity interferes to avoid a multiplicity of suits. This principle, then, is established by the application of reason to the circumstances of the particular case, and, of course, it can have no other limit than that of reason. The classification by the text-writers and courts of the instances in which a particular jurisdiction founded on a general principle has been exercised may be a guaranty of safety in following in their footsteps; but it is only a recognition of the controlling principle, and does not by any means restrict the principle itself.

The question here, then, is, What is the principle upon which equity interferes to avoid a multiplicity of suits? In determining this, it may be borne in mind that the jurisdiction is not to be invoked when the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete, and that no court has the right to infringe upon the wholesome doctrine of multifariousness which prevents a mingling in one suit of entirely distinct and separate causes of action between different parties. Subject to these restrictions, the principle and rule is that where numerous parties are jointly and severally claiming against one, or where one is claiming against many liable jointly or severally, and the same title or right of defense will be called in question, and will be determinative of the

issue for or against all, a case for the interposition of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits is made without the aid of any independent equity. The fact that this unity of claim. or defense frequently or generally arises from privity or joint action by or between the many affords an obvious instance of the application of the rule, and it has induced some to suppose that the junction and unity of interest calling for the application of the rule 185 is limited to such cases. But the association and unity of interest in the many as to the other party may be brought about just as well by the nature of the transaction or the situation and relation of the parties, independent of all privity or joint action. And therefore privity, or joint right, or liability, although good examples for the application of the principle, afford no test for the propriety of its application.

The case made by the bill in this case is this: An explosion in a coal mine killed one hundred and ten persons. The several administrators of these persons have brought several suits against the appellant as the owner and operator for damages, insisting that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The appellant in effect says, if these actions are allowed to proceed at law, it will be ruined in costs and expenses, though it be successful in every suit; that the plaintiffs are all insolvent, and thus could not pay the taxed costs against them, should they be unsuccessful; that the suits are pending in different courts, and will be called for trial in different courts at the same time; that by reason of this, and the necessity of having the same witnesses in each trial, it is impossible for the defendants to present a proper defense to these multitude of claims. The appellant says, moreover, that it has defenses to all these suits, which will be put forward in each case, and which will be determinative of all alike; and on this ground it is insisted that this is a plain case for the application of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits. We agree with this contention on principle.

The first thing to obliterate from the mind in considering the question is that it is immaterial how the unity of title, claim or defense is brought about. It is the factum of a single title against many, or a common defense against many, which is the foundation of the 186 jurisdiction. A vested right of property and a vested cause of defense for protection against liability stand precisely on the same basis; and whence and how such right originated is wholly immaterial: 8 Cyc. 911; Pritchand v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124,

1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102, 27 L. ed. 104. If the unfortunate persons who lost their lives by the explosion had jointly leased the mine, and their administrators had instituted several actions as in this case against the owner, it is conceded that the privity between the plaintiffs established by the contract would justify a bill to have the question of liability determined in one suit. But why? Only because a single and common defense would, if successful, determine all the suits. Suppose, however, the owner leased to a third party, instead of the operators and the same accident happened, and a thousand suits were brought or threatened by solvent, or especially by insolvent, parties, what reason is there for, or could there be for, denying the jurisdiction to enforce in a single suit the common cause of defense against all? Ingenuity, we think, cannot discover a substantial distinction between the two cases under which the owner in one instance may take shelter in a court of equity against the wrongful and vexatious suits, while in the other he must submit to financial ruin in defending a thousand vexatious actions at law.

We now examine the precedents to show that the great legal minds who have administered the principles of equity in the past do not disagree with this conclusion. In the case of Lord Tenham (2 Atk. 484), the master builder of equity jurisprudence, whose words we have quoted above, lays it down as clear and certain that when a general right is set up, and is disputed by many, the party may come into equity in the first instance against the many, and have that right determined 187 in one suit; for if this could not be done there would be no end of bringing actions of trespass, since each action would determine only the particular right in question between the plaintiff and defendant. Suppose the case was reversed, and the many had already instituted their separate suits; would not the principle announced entitle the party having a common defense against all, through a "general right," to claim the aid of the court for a settlement of liability vel non in a single suit? Clearly so. It is the general vested right in property, or common cause of defense for the protection of property, which opens the field for the operation of the principle. In the case of Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282, the same great judge laid down the rule in language which covers this case. There the suit was to establish a right of fishing against a number of defendants not connected by title or privity. At first a

demurrer was sustained by the chancellor, but on reargument he said he had changed his mind, saying that it matters not about privity of any sort, nor about a general right on the part of the defendants; that the question as to such bills "is whether the plaintiffs have a general right to the sole fishing, which extends to all the defendants." This case has been followed and approved in England to the present day. One of the most interesting applications is in the case of Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 8, decided in 1866. In that case a reservoir of the water company had burst, and seven thousand three hundred and fifteen persons lost their lives or had their property injured, and many were prosecuting claims against the company. The bill was filed to test the liability in a single suit, and was sustained. The vice-chancellor defined the case for a bill of peace as being one in which "there were a number of persons claiming as against one, or one person against a number, 188 and where all were claiming alike." On appeal the court sustained the lower court, saying: "It seems to me to be a very fit case, by analogy, at least, to a bill of peace, for a court of equity to interpose and prevent the unnecessary expense and litigation which would be occasioned, and to decide once for all the validity or invalidity of the certificates upon which the claims of all the parties depend."

The same view of the law is entertained by the supreme court of the United States and many of the states. In Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244, 47 L. ed. 380, though the court declined to exercise the jurisdiction, it stated with accuracy the rule itself, stating that it did not require a common title, nor community of right or interest in the subject matter, among the defendants, but only a common interest in the questions of law or fact in controversy. And the statement of law in this case has been approved by the same court at the present term (1907) in the case of Bitterman v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91, 52 L. ed. 171, 12 Ann. Cas. 693. The following, amongst many other, cases strongly support the rule that, when all the cases may be determined on a single question or defense common to all, the jurisdiction will be exercised: Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 257, 62 C. C. A. 139; Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Bradley, 108 Wis. 467, 84 N. W. 870; Southern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 132 Cal. 408, 64 Pac. 572, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 497; Lehigh Val. R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. 730; American Cent. Ins. Co.

v. Landau, 56 N. J. Eq. 513, 39 Atl. 400; Louisville etc. Ry. v. Ohio Val. Imp. Co. (C. C.), 57 Fed. 45; Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. (C. C.), 43 Fed. 824; De Forest v. Thompson (C. C.), 40 Fed. 375; 1 Pomeroy's Equity, secs. 269-274.

We are committed to the same principle in Alabama. In the early case of Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. 383, 21 189 Am. Dec. 638, it is said: "It is not conceived to be necessary, in bills of peace, that there should appear to be any privity or connection between the defendants. There are cases where bills of peace have been brought, though there has been a general right claimed by the plaintiffs, and yet no privity between the plaintiffs and defendants, nor any general right on the part of the defendants." And in the case of Cleveland v. Insurance Co. of North America, 151 Ala. 191, 44 South. 37, we used the following language comprehending the rule of Lord Hardwicke: "The jurisdiction of a court of equity will be exercised in suits by a single party against a number of persons to restrain the prosecution of simultaneous actions at law brought against him by each defendant, and to procure a decision of the whole in one proceeding, where all the actions depend upon the same law and facts."

It is insisted that the case of Turner v. Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 South. 132, is opposed to the view above expressed. That there are expressions in the opinion to that effect is not to be doubted, but there are other expressions which approve and define with accuracy the very basis of our conclusion in this case. Judge McClellan in that case says: "So, when one party is subjected to or threatened with numerous and vexatious actions at law, or is the victim of numerous, repeated and continuing wrongs, so that a multitude of suits would be necessary for his redress at law, he may come into chancery, because the necessity for numerous suits or defenses to numerous suits at law is in itself such a wrong and vexation to him as vests him with an equity." This case is founded on this declaration of the law, which is clearly and precisely and accurately stated. In reference to other expressions in the opinion it is sufficient to say that every decision must be read in the light of the exact case before the court, and which it 190 was intended to decide: Gaines v. Hennen, 24 How. (U. S.) 553, 16 L. ed. 770; Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. v. Crocker, 95 Ala. 412, 11 South. 262. The point and principle here at issue was not in the least involved in the Turner case (135 Ala. 73, 33 South. 132). Judge McClellan in the opening of his opinion so