declares. He says: "There is no pretense that this case falls within the first, second, or fourth classes" pointed out by Mr. Pomeroy, in which equitable jurisdiction on account of multiplicity of suits is allowed. And then he shows that the bill was not sufficient under the third class. So that the question in this case, which comes directly within the fourth class, as defined by Mr. Pomeroy and Judge McClellan, was not before the court in the Turner case, and was not, and could not have been, decided. The case, however, of Tribette v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 35 Am. St. Rep. 642, 12 South. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, is directly opposed to our views. That case we consider as overruled by the subsequent one in the same court of Crawford v. Mobile etc. R. R. Co., 83 Miss. 708, 102 Am. St. Rep. 476, 36 South. 82, in which the court expressly approves the view repudiated in the Tribette case. It is said in the Hightower case: "We think the doctrine announced by Pomeroy is sound and clearly established by the best considered modern cases." After this repudiation of the Tribette case by the supreme court of Mississippi, we will not follow the reasoning of the opinion in that case to point out its deflection from and opposition, in our opinion, to the ancient as well as modern view of the extent of the jurisdiction of courts of equity in reference to multiplicity of suits. That jurisdiction is too well established and too beneficent, when wisely exercised, to be any longer called in question. It would be a strange casus in juridical evolution to meet the needs of society if there was no remedy against 191 a party being vexatiously prosecuted at the same time by over seven thousand separate invalid claims held by insolvent plaintiffs, as in the Sheffield Waterworks case (L. R. 2 App. Cas. 8), when each case is founded upon the same facts, and when it is alleged and admitted, by the objection to the jurisdiction, that there is a defense common to all the claims. It is to avoid the monstrosity of such a result that the court of chancery extends its plenary jurisdiction to stay the proceedings at law until the question of liability can be determined in one suit, and therefore we hold that the bill in the case was well filed. The bill in this case was dismissed on motion. The demurrers, therefore, are not before us; nor have we to do more than to say that the bill on its statements has equity on the single ground of preventing the multiplicity of suits unaided by the other matters averred. The decree of the lower court is reversed, and one will be here rendered overruling the motion. Reversed and rendered. Haralson, Anderson and Denson, JJ., concur. BILLS OF PEACE OR INJUNCTION TO PREVENT MULTI. PLICITY OF SUITS. I. Scope and References to Former Notes, 30. II. Introductory Remarks, 31. III. Pomeroy's Doctrine, 32. IV. Illustrations. a. Where Community of Interest in the Questions of Law and b. Where Community of Interest in the Subject Matter of the V. Conclusion, 49. I. Scope and References to Former Notes. Our inquiry in this note is directed primarily to the point raised in the principal case, namely, when will equity assume jurisdiction in order to prevent numerous suits at law brought by separate individuals against a single adversary to recover damages for injuries growing out of a single tort, until the common defense can be established, where there is no independent equity. But as the cases where the aid of equity has been invoked under circumstances similar to those in the principal case are very few, we shall not confine ourselves simply to the cases of that class, but will give those which by implication throw light on the doctrine involved in the principal case. Hence, our discussion will, to some extent at least, involve the general subject of equitable interposition for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits. This general subject, however, will be found treated in the note appended to Woodward v. Seely, 50 Am. Dec. 449, where the definition and history of bills of peace or injunction to prevent multiplicity of suits is clearly stated, and the English and earlier American cases bearing upon the subject are given. In fact, the doctrine of equity jurisdiction to prevent multiplicity of suits has been often treated in these series in its application to cases arising out of particular classes of wrongs. Thus, equity jurisdiction with reference to enjoining purprestures and nuisances in order to prevent repeated actions for damages caused thereby is treated on pages 673, 674 of the note appended to Crighton v. Dahmer, 35 Am. St. Rep. 670; and the doctrine of multiplicity of suits as a ground for equity assuming jurisdiction to restrain repeated trespasses for the same reason is discussed on pages 736 to 740 of the note appended to Moore v. Halliday, 99 Am. St. Rep. 731. Where equity will interpose to prevent breach of contract for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits is touched upon also in the note appended to Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 90 Am. St. Rep. 634. Injunction to restrain the enforcement of a void municipal ordinance to prevent a multiplicity of suits which would follow its enforcement is treated on pages 735, 736 of the note to New Orleans B. & A. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 Am. St. Rep. 372; and in our recent note to Illinois Steel Co. v. Schroeder, 126 Am. St. Rep. 991, will be found an elaborate discussion of the doctrine of equitable interference to prevent a multiplicity of suits, when applied to actions to quiet title and obtain possession of land against several persons who hold under a common source, but each of whom claims a separate and distinct tract of the land. The cases cited in all of these notes, and also those in the note to Fellows v. Fellows, 15 Am. Dec. 427 (upon the question of joinder of defendants in equity), have more or less bearing upon the general subject of equity jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and it is advisable to refer to those notes in connection with this one; especially is this true with reference to the note appended to Illinois Steel Co. v. Schroeder, 126 Am. St. Rep. 991, where some of the general rules which have been promulgated on this question were stated, and where there is a lengthy review of a comparatively late case from the state of Alabama, which, though decided under different circumstances, contains language which seems distinctly opposed to the doctrine announced in the principal case. II. Introductory Remarks. The decision in the principal case (ante, p. 20), which holds that the familiar rule that equity will assume jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits can be applied in favor of a tort-feasor against whom numerous actions at law have been brought by separate individuals, to recover damages for personal injuries growing out of a single tort, until the common defense can be established, presents a very interesting topic of discussion; particularly so, because this decision is, perhaps, the only one in which the rule has been thus applied, and the decision has been very sharply criticised by the supreme court of another state in a still more recent case. But while it may be true that the doctrine of multiplicity of suits has never before been applied to actions for damages under circumstances similiar to those in which it was applied in the principal case, and that that case is in conflict with the earlier and later cases of the same kind, still, our investigation shows that there are many cases which, by analogy, sustain the ruling in the principal case. Moreover, none of the opposing cases attempt to controvert the soundness of the reasons given by the Alabama court as the basis of its decision, namely, "The duty and necessity of affording a practical and efficient form of remedy for protection to persons and property founded in the very conception of government"; "The duty of affording an efficient and speedy and economical administration of justice"; and again: "A vested right of property and a vested cause of defense for protection against liability stand precisely on the same basis; and whence and how such right originated is wholly immaterial." In our note to Illinois Steel Co. v. Schroeder, 126 Am. St. Rep. 991, we learned that "the discretionary powers of a chancellor are so broad, that the question whether or not the court will entertain jurisdiction in any particular case depends more upon the facts and circumstances of the case than upon any arbitrary or fixed rules." This seems especially true where jurisdiction is invoked solely upon the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, for the cases are uniform in holding that a chancellor is bound by no inflexible rule in determining when equity should interfere by injunction to grant relief upon this ground, but that the question depends, as was said in Adams v. Oberndorf, 121 Ill. App. 497, "upon the circumstances of each particular case, and upon whether such interference is called for to discountenance useless litigation"; or, as was said by the supreme court of Wisconsin: "Equity jurisdiction goes as far as reason will permit, under the circumstances of each particular case, to discountenance useless litigation and prevent irreparable injury. With that familiar principle in view, we need not feel bound in any case to test the right of a party to proceed by injunction, by precedents": Milwaukee Electric Ry. etc. Co. v. Bradley, 108 Wis. 467, 84 N. W. 870. But since the discretionary powers of a chancellor are not exercised arbitrarily, but are governed by the general principles of law applicable to the case in hand, it will be found that all the cases in which the intervention of equity has been invoked to prevent, by injunction, a multiplicity of suits, the courts have referred to the rules on that subject laid down by Prof. Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, as the guide by which their discretion should be exercised. We will first, therefore, note the doctrine promulgated by this recognized authority, and follow it up with numerous illustrations showing how the courts have applied it and their pertinent comments thereon. And while we shall not confine our illustrations to cases where the aid of equity was invoked under circumstances altogether similar to those in the principal case, but will give other cases which, by analogy, throw light on the position there taken, still, to keep this note within reasonable bounds, we will not include cases covered by the previous notes referred to, though by analogy they may be pertinent to our topic. III. Pomeroy's Doctrine. The doctrine laid down by Prof. Pomeroy in his most estimable work on Equity Jurisprudence, with reference to bills of peace or injunction to prevent multiplicity of suits, and to which, as we have said, practically all the cases refer, will be found quoted, with proper reference, on page 992 of our recent note appended to Illinois Steel Co. v. Schroeder, 126 Am. St. Rep. 991, and need not be here repeated in full. A reference to the rule there given will show that while the learned author says in effect that, in actions brought by numerous individuals against a single adversary, equity should not interfere by injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits unless there is a community of interest in "the subject matter of the controversy" among the numerous individuals, or between each of them and their single adversary, he further recognizes that equity may afford relief by injunction in some such cases, although there is no such com munity of interest among the parties as before stated, provided there is a community of interest among them in "the question of law and fact involved in the controversy." It would appear from this brief statement of Prof. Pomeroy's views, that this acknowledged authority on equity jurisprudence was somewhat doubtful himself, as to how the "multiplicity of suits" doctrine should be applied in every case. At any rate, whenever an application of this doctrine has been sought, the rule mentioned has invoked much discussion from the bench, and has resulted in irreconcilable conflict of judicial opinion. As to the proper application of this twofold rule, the cases can best speak for themselves. IV. Illustrations. a. Where Community of Interest in the Questions of Law and Fact Involved in the Controversy is Held Sufficient to Justify Relief by Injunction. The principal case (ante, p. 20) affords the only illustration we have discovered where it has been held that a mere community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in a controversy, without any such interest in the subject matter, will justify equity in enjoining the prosecution of numerous actions at law, brought by separate individuals against a single body, to recover damages for personal injuries growing out of a single tort, until the common defense can be established. But while this case seems to stand alone in its application of the doctrine recognized by Mr. Pomeroy, under the particular circumstances stated, the same principle has been often applied under other circumstances, which, by analogy, uphold the ruling in the principal case. Thus, in Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 132 Cal. 408, 64 Pac. 572, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 497, a bill was filed by the railroad company to enjoin the prosecution of some six hundred and seventy-four actions, already begun by numerous parties against it, to recover penalties or damages claimed to be due to each of them for an alleged violation by the company of a statutory provision (Civil Code, section 490), relative to the sale of tickets entitling the holder to stop-over privileges, until the liability of the company under the statute could be determined in one action. Speaking to the objection made by defendants as to the form of the bill, the court admitted that the proceeding was somewhat novel, but said the facts upon which it was inaugurated were also novel, and it could see no reason why equity should not assume jurisdiction; and the judgment of the lower court in granting the injunction was affirmed. True, there was an independent equity in this case which seemed sufficient to justify the injunction, but the supreme court said that it could properly have been granted on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits. In Guess v. Stone Mountain Granite & Ry. Co., 67 Ga. 215, numerous persons living in a town on the line of a railway extending to a granite quarry operated under charter brought suits against the comAm. St. Rep., Vol. 131-3 |