TABLE OF STATUTES CITED.

PAGE

8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, s. 9

PAGE

852

s. 39

852

8. 49

8. 40

1088

s. 104

1011

s. 105

1013

s. 157

1011

1042

s. 159

852

s. 164

852

c. 126, s. 22

100

c. 127, s. 18

842

c. 128, s. 4

849

8. 90

s. 5

1011

849

9 & 10 Vict. c. 3, s. 13

1013

c. 4, Ir.

1091

c. 11, s. 2

1070

c. 17, s. 7

c. 12, s. 2

1079

c. 27, s. 20
8. 22

1079

1013

880

c. 36, s. 13

1016, 1056

8. 90

s. 27

1013

s. 29

1013

1087

c. 24, s. 5

c. 37, s. 22, Ir.

1079

s. 28

100

834

c. 27, s. 7

s. 32

1079

834

8. 35

834

s. 26

s. 40 & Sch.

1079

834

1091

c. 39, s. 6

1013

c. 59

970

c. 64, s. 7, Ir.

119

1154

c. 70

1042

c. 74, s. 13

1016

8. 207

s. 14

1088

1015

c. 75

1009, 1062

c. 87, s. 5, Ir.

1015

c. 53

c. 93, s. 3

879

c. 95, s. 3

1079

s. 8

8.57

1079

1013

c. 79,

s. 85

s. 1

s. 86

1072

s. 111

1072

c. 99, s. 44

c. 100, s. 9

848

1073

7

8. 12

7

s. 13

1088

7

c. 105, s. 2
s. 4

s. 77

1070, 1079, 1086 1055, 1065, 1070,

1013

s. 15

852

833, 858

c. 102, s. 1

s. 16

838, 1029

s. 23

8. 49

838, 1029

682, 841, 843, 1030

s. 6

8.51

8. 96

c. 13, s. 1

682, 841, 843, 1030

682, 841, 843

1020

s. 5

1020

1070

8. 10

1014

8. 11

s. 18

852

s. 25

1020

8. 52

1020

8. 88

1019

c. 14, s. 7

852

1079

s. 8

1079

s. 29

1014

ERRAT A.

PAGE

for Carentedr's Co., read Carpenter's Co.

first line, insert Brandao v. Barnett, 12 Cl. & Fin., 787; 3 Com. B. 519, S.C. reversing judgment of Ex. Ch., but affirming that part of it, which relates to judicial notice of the general lien of bankers.

after Reynolds v. Fenton, insert 2 Com. B. 191.

at end, insert See 10 & 11 Vict. c. 119, § 5; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 56, § 121, Ir. ; 10 & 11 Vict. c. 90, § 3, Ir.

for Green v. Weller, read Green v. Waller.

15. n. (n)

18. n. (m)

at end, insert 3 Com. B. 661, S. C.

at end, insert Naish v. Brown, 2 C. & Kir. 219, per Pollock, C. B.
for Park, read Parke.

at end, insert Davis v. Curling, 8 Q.B. 286.

278. n. (u)

283. n. (n)

311. n. (d)

319. n. (c)

320. n. (j)

346.

396.

431. n. (b)

450. n. (q)

481. n. (t)

486. n. (v)

513. n. (c)

521. n. (i)

547. n. (m)

at end, insert Ramuz v. Crowe, 1 Ex. R. 167, where held, that drawer could not recover against acceptor on note payable to his order, which he had lost

even before indorsement. This case overrules Rolt v. Watson, and modifies the law as stated in the text.

after Maule, J., insert 3 Com. B. 754, S. C.

at end, insert 3 Com. B. 754, S. C.

second line of text, after indictments, insert or to criminal informations, R. v. Upton St. Leonard, 17 L. J. (N. S.) M. C. 13.

sixth line from bottom of text, for distinct, read district.

at end, insert Doe v. Phillips, 8 Q. B. 158.

at end, insert Baron de Bode's case, 8 Q. B. 243, 244.

at end, insert Freeman v. Tatham, 5 Hare, 329.

after McMahon v. Burchell, 2 Phill. 127, 132, 133, insert 1 Coop. temp. Cottenham, 475, S. C. and cases cited in note to that report.

at end, insert Watson v. King, 3 Com. B, 608.

after McGahey v. Alston, insert 2.

at end, insert King v. Norman, 11 Jurist, C. P. 824, 825. 555. n. (2) at end, insert Robertson v. Gantlett, 16 M. & W. 289.

559. n. (t) at end, insert, As to the effect of paying money into court, where one count of the declaration is on a bill of exchange, see Tattersall v. Parkinson, 11 Jurist, 658.

for 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 39, read 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 93.

649. n. (y)

662. n. (n)

after Thomas v. Fredericks, insert 16 L. J., N. S., Q. B. 393.

662. n. (o)

at end, insert Paine v. Strand Union, 8 Q. B. 326.

668. n. (v)

677. n. (b) 687. n. (1)

at end, insert Burton v. Reevell, 16 M. & W. 307.
after Thomas v. Fredericks, insert 16 L. J., N. S., Q. B. 393.
insert, But if the language of the guarantee leaves it doubtful whether the
consideration mentioned therein be a past or present consideration, parol
evidence will be admissible to explain the ambiguity, Goldshede v. Swan,
1 Ex. R. 154, and cases there cited.

690. n. (f) for 1 Lev. 1. read 3 Lev. 1.

697. n. (f)

698. n. (1)

708. n. (h) 725. n. (e)

728. n. (2)

740. n. (z)

at end, insert Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 Com. B. 766.

at end insert Tempest v. Kilner, 3 Com. B. 249; Bowlby v. Ball, id. 284. for Lemaine v. Stanley, read Lemayne v. Stanley.

at end, insert Moreover the circumstances must be such as to warrant the jury in inferring a promise to pay, and, therefore, if part-payment be accompanied by a positive refusal to pay the remainder, it will not take the case out of the statute, though the debtor admits that the remainder is due, Wainman v. Kynman, 1 Ex. R. 118.

after the case of Hartley v. Wharton, insert Harris v. Wall, 1 Ex. R. 122. at end, insert 16 M. & W. 208, S. C.

887. n. (p)

887. n. (q)

929. n. (h)

947. n. (j) 968. n. (p)

1032. n. (d)

1057. n. (h)

1080.

1083.

1092. n. (c)

1113. n. (p)

1130. n. (m)

1139. n. (u)

1183. n. (h)

1195. n. (b) 1233.

at end, insert Walker v. Tilly, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 261, where held by M. R. that the replication must be withdrawn before the plaintiff could examine the defendant.

at end, insert Dobbyn v. Adams, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 275.

at end, insert Att.-Gen. v. Sullivan, 1 Arm. Mac. & Og. 294, where held by
Brady, C. B., that it is not an inflexible rule in Ireland to reject a witness
who in a revenue cause has remained in Court, after an order for witnesses
to withdraw.

after 10 Jurist, 217, insert 8 Q. B. 208, 250-267, S. C.
at end, insert Att.-Gen. v. Hitchcock, 1 Ex. R. 91. That was an information
under the revenue laws, and a witness, who had given material evidence for
the Crown, was asked, on cross-examination, whether he had not said that
the officers of the Crown had offered him 20l. to give that evidence. He
denied that he had ever said so, and the Court held that evidence was
inadmissible to contradict him. The case deserves an attentive perusal.
for Green v. Weller, read Green v. Waller.

for Fuller v. Fitch, read Fuller v. Fotch.

first line of § 1191, for requiring, read authorising.
first line of text, for require, read authorise.

for 6 Geo. c. 16, read 6 Geo. 4, c. 16.

at end, insert See Newton v. Blunt, 3 Com. B. 675, where two actions having been brought against two joint-contractors, in respect of the same demand, and the debt and costs in one action having been paid, held that a judge at chambers might stay the proceedings in the other action without costs.

at end, insert R. v. Leeds, 17 L. J., N. S., M. C. 1.

for Grant v. M‘Lachl, read Grant v. M'Lachlin.

at end, insert Mollett v. Wackerbarth, 17 L. J., N. S., C. P. 47.
at end, insert see Dyer v. Green, 1 Ex. R. 71.
one line from bottom, for 721, 72, read 721-725.

§ 1. THE word EVIDENCE, considered in relation to Law, includes all the legal means, exclusive of mere argument, which tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation. This term and the word proof, are often used as synonymes; but the latter is applied, by accurate logicians, rather to the effect of evidence, than to evidence itself (a). None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error. In the investigation of matters of fact such evidence cannot be obtained; and the most that can be said is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them (b). The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not, whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient

(a) See Wills on Circums. Ev. 2; Whately's Logic, B. ii. c. iii. § 1.

(b) See Gambier's Guide to the Study of Moral Ev. 121. Even of mathematical truths this writer justly remarks, that, though capable of demonstration, they are admitted by most men solely on the moral evidence of general notoriety. Ib. 196.

B

2

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are proved by competent and satisfactory evidence.

§ 2. By competent evidence, is meant that which the law requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of an ordinary man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of important personal interest (c). Questions respecting the competency or admissibility of evidence, are entirely distinct from those which respect its sufficiency or effect; the former being exclusively within the province of the Court; the latter belonging exclusively to the jury (d).

§ 3. This branch of the law may be considered under three general heads, namely, First, The Nature and Principles of Evidence ;-Secondly, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules which govern its production;-And Thirdly, The Means of Proof, or the Instruments by which facts are established. This order will be followed in the present Treatise; but before we proceed, it will be convenient, first, to consider what matters the Courts will, of themselves, notice without proof, and next, to offer a few observations respecting the functions of the judge, as distinguished from those of the jury.

(c) 1 St. Ev. 578.

Carpenter's

(d) 1 Ph. Ev. 2; Carentedr's Co. v. Hayward, 1 Doug. 375, per Buller, J.