EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued.
III. Where a portion of plaintiffs' land was taken under the
act of July 1, 1918, just compensation is to be meas-
ured by the value of the portion taken together with
consequential damages to the remainder, but does not
include interest on the percentage which they could
have accepted, viz, 75 per cent of the award by the
President. Fannie C. Curtis et al., 139.
IV. Just compensation; act of July 1, 1918; refusal to accept
75 per cent of award; interest. Simon R. Curtis, 186.
V. An order for coal, given by the Navy Department under
the acts of March 4, 1917, and June 15, 1917, to a
company acting as sales agent for mining concerns,
was not obligatory upon the company that mined the
coal, and the mining company is not the proper party
plaintiff in a suit for just compensation. Before the
sales agent can maintain suit, the procedure pre-
scribed by the acts of March 4, 1917, and June 15, 1917,
must be observed, and acceptance in full of the prices
fixed by the Fuel Administrator under authority of the
Lever Act (act of August 10, 1917) is acquiescence in
the compensation so determined and precludes recovery
of any further amount. New River Collieries Co. et
al., 205.
VI. Just compensation in the amount of the fair market
value, together with interest, allowed by the court for
the taking, under the act of July 1, 1918, and the
proclamation of the President made pursuant thereto,
of plaintiff's leasehold interest in oyster lands, oysters
on the land, and personal property. Tignor, 321.
VII. Where the statute provides that one whose lands have
been taken by the Government may accept a certain
percentage of the amount determined by the President
to be just compensation, and sue for such additional
amount as will make up just compensation, and such
person refuses to accept any of the amount so deter-
mined, he is not entitled, in a judgment for just com-
pensation, to interest on the percentage which he could
have accepted. Thrift Bldg. Co., 338.
VIII. The market value of the Pipestone Reservation as of
the date of taking by the United States, ascertained
and allowed, together with interest. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 427.
IX. The procedure set forth in the acts of March 4, 1917,
and June 15, 1917, for the recovery of additional com-
pensation for a taking of materials, must be complied
with before suit. Atwater & Co., 621.
EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued.
X. The power conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy
by Executive order of August 21, 1917, was only such
as was given the President under the acts of March
4, 1917, and June 15, 1917, which was to place orders
for materials "usually produced or capable of being
produced" by the person with whom the order was given,
and on a refusal to accept or comply with them, to
seize the materials and operate the plant of the pro-
ducer.
When an order was given under these statutes for
the purchase of materials, the terms and prices fixed
therein, and the price accepted, or the order complied
with and materials delivered without formal acceptance,
there came into existence a valid contract.
XI. Plaintiff was a sales agent, purchasing and reselling coal
to its customers without physically handling the coal
and at the time orders were placed with it under the
acts of March 4, 1917, and June 15, 1917, did not own
any coal on the ground or at the mouth of a mine, or
any mines. Held, that orders for coal, given under such
circumstances, there being nothing of plaintiff's the
Government could seize on failure to comply therewith,
were not requisitions under said acts. Id.
XII. Just compensation for the taking of property under the
act of October 6, 1917, as amended by the act of July
1, 1918, determined and allowed, and judgment sus-
pended until plaintiff files releases of encumbrances.
Shields, 712.
ENCUMBRANCES.
See Eminent Domain, XII.
FEDERAL CONTROL.
See Eminent Domain, II; Jurisdiction, VI, VII.
GIFT INTER VIVOS.
See Taxes, XXVI.
GOOD WILL.
See Taxes, II.
INSURANCE.
See Taxes, VII, XIV.
INTEREST.
See Eminent Domain, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII; Jurisdiction, V;
Taxes, III, V. XVII, XXV.
INTERFERENCES BY GOVERNMENT.
See Contracts, XII.
JURISDICTION.
I. Where plaintiff alleges that he has "no information or
knowledge upon which to base an allegation" as to
Government orders or contracts for the manufacture
of ordnance involving the use of his patents, the petition
JURISDICTION-Continued.
in effect seeks a right of discovery, which the Court
of Claims is without power to grant. Blenkner, 18.
II. A suit to recover royalties in excess of those agreed upon
in a license contract permitting the Government to
manufacture, use, or sell a patented article can not be
maintained in the Court of Claims under the Dent
Act.
III. The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction of a case
sounding in tort, nor can the plaintiff, for the purpose
of establishing jurisdiction, waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit upon an implied promise to pay damages
therefor. Flynn, 33.
IV. When a statute creates a right against the United States
but furnishes no remedy, it may be found in the Court
of Claims, and where under the act of July 28, 1916,
the Interstate Commerce Commission has determined
a fair and reasonable compensation for mail service
rendered, which the Government refuses to pay, claim
therefor is found upon a law of Congress and cognizable
by the Court of Claims. New York Central R. R. Co.,
lessce, 115; Nevada County Narrow Gauge R. R. Co., 327.
V. Under the act of July 28, 1916, the Interstate Commerce
Commission was authorized to determine fair and
reasonable compensation for mail service rendered from
and after the date of application for such determina-
tion, and an increase in rates so determined is recover-
able by suit against the United States. In giving judg-
ment for such an increase the Court of Claims does not
determine just compensation, but gives effect to an
authorized order of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and interest thereon is forbidden by statute. Id.
VI. Where an agreement was entered into between the Director
General and a railroad company, whose lines were taken
under Federal control, releasing "the United States, the
President, the Director General, or any agent or agency
thereof by virtue of anything done or omitted," pursuant
to the Federal control acts, and the company thereafter
submitted to the Director General claims alleged to be
due under the agreement, which were subsequently dis-
missed by the board of referees provided for in the
Federal control act, on the ground that the agreement
removed the asserted claims from their jurisdiction, the
release so made discharged the United States from fur-
ther liability and the claims so asserted were properly
dismissed and furnish no ground for suit in the Court of
Claims. Missouri Southern R. R. Co., 136.
VII. When a contract is made between the Director General and
a railroad company under section 1 of the Federal control
act, suit or proceedings thereon is by section 206 of the
act against the Director General, or the agent appointed
by the President, in a district court or before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, and this right of action
is exclusively in those tribunals. Id.
See also Dent Act, I; Patents, I; Pay of Clerk, Conference
Minority, House of Representatives; Res Adjudicata; Special
Jurisdiction.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts, VI, XII; Sale of Supplies, II, III.
See Assignments; Taxes, VI, XXIII.
LOSS OF PROPERTY.
Personal property of an Army officer, stored by him with the
quartermaster while he was engaged in overseas duty, and
lost in storage, is not property for the loss of which he is
entitled to be reimbursed under the act of March 4, 1921, and
a finding by the Secretary of War to the contrary is not con-
clusive upon the court. Curran, 26.
MILEAGE.
See Army Pay.
MISREPRESENTATION.
See Contracts, XI, (1), (3).
I. The plaintiff, an officer in the Medical Corps of the Navy,
while on duty became ill, upon application was given
leave of absence and repaired to his home. While there
he was placed in a civilian hospital and his leave im-
mediately canceled. Held, that cancellation of leave
under circumstances which prevented the resumption of
military duties, did not constitute a restoration to duty
status and the expenses of medical attention at the
hospital not being incurred when he was on duty, sec.
1586, Revised Statutes, prohibits their reimbursement.
Morrow, 35.
II. Where a commander of the Navy, retired as such Septem-
ber 21, 1899, sued the United States for the retired pay
of a captain under section 11 of the act of March 3,
1899, and the Court of Claims decided adversely to his
claim, from which decision no appeal was taken, the
judgment of the court is res adjudicata against his right
to such pay. DuBose, administrator, 142.
III. A commission issued by the President September 25, 1925,
raising a commander of the Navy, retired as such Sep-
tember 21, 1899, to the rank of captain, effective as of
the date of retirement, did not, in the absence of a clear
intention on the part of Congress to do so, create a lia-
bility on the part of the United States for the correspond-
ing increase in pay. Id.
IV. The commission of a seaman as an ensign, provisional
rank, U. S. Naval Reserve Force, without compliance
with the act of August 29, 1916, requiring examination
and recommendation by a board of naval officers and
examination by medical officers for physical fitness, was
invalid, and pay appertaining to such rank can not be
recovered notwithstanding the services performed were
those of an ensign with designation as such. Beeman,
431; Murphy, 670; Kearney, 683.
V. A lieutenant in the Construction Corps of the Navy, who,
having reached the age of 64 years and completed 43
years of service, was placed on the retired list with
the rank of commodore, was entitled, under section 1481,
Revised Statutes, as amended, to retirement as a com-
modore and to the pay of that rank. Craig, 699.
See also Commutation of Quarters, etc., I.
OVERTIME.
See Contracts, IX.
PATENTS.
I. The right given by the act of October 6, 1917, to sue for
compensation for the use by the Government of an in-
vention, is dependent upon the issuance by the Com-
missioner of Patents of a secrecy order, and where no
such order has been issued, suit under this act can not
we maintained, nor does jurisdiction attach under the
act of June 25, 1910, as amended by the act of July 1,
1918, where the alleged infringing use occurs before the
patent was granted or more than six years prior to
institution of suit. Rodman Chemical Co., 39.
II. Oral testimony alone is insufficient and unreliable for the
purpose of showing anticipation as against issued letters
patent. Montgomery et al., assignees, 526.
III. (1) Unless an inventor has a patent which performs a
function that was not performed before, he is not a
pioneer inventor, and his claims are not to be accorded a
broad construction.
(2) The courts have uniformly taken into consideration,
in the construction of claims for which basic invention
is claimed, the question of the general and practical
utility of the device asserted to be pioneer in character.
Id.
IV. Under the patent statutes the claims of the patentee define
the patent, and when the language used is not obscure or
ambiguous and has a settled meaning, the courts are not
at liberty to enlarge the same by construing them to
intend something different. Id.
|