BOOK I. CHAP. XII. CHAP. XII. OF PIETY AND RELIGION. PIETY and religion have an essential influence on the 3 125. of happiness of a nation, and, from their importance, deserve a piety. particular chapter. Nothing is so proper as piety to strengthen virtue, and give it its due extent. By the word Piety, I mean a disposition of soul that leads us to direct all our actions towards the Deity, and to endeavour to please him in every thing we do. To the practice of this virtue all mankind are indispensably obliged: it is the purest source of their felicity; and those who unite in civil society are under still greater obligations to practise it. A nation ought then to be pious. The superiors intrusted with the public affairs should constantly endeavour to deserve the approbation of their divine Master; and whatever they do in the name of the state, ought to be regulated by this grand view. The care of forming pious dispositions in all the people should be constantly one of the principal objects of their vigilance, and from this the state will derive very great advantages. A serious attention to merit, in all our actions, the approbation. of an infinitely wise Being, cannot fail of producing excellent citizens. Enlightened piety in the people is the firmest support of a lawful authority; and, in the sovereign's heart, it is the pledge of the people's safety, and excites their confidence. Ye lords of the earth, who acknowledge no superior here below, what security can we have for the purity of your intentions, if we do not conceive you to be deeply impressed with respect for the common Father and Lord of men, and animated with a desire to please him? 2 attended We have already insinuated that piety ought to be at- 126. It tended with knowledge. In vain would we propose to please ought to be God, if we know not the means of doing it. But what a with knowdeluge of evils arises, when men, heated by so powerful a ledge. motive, are prompted to take methods that are equally false [56] and pernicious! A blind piety only produces superstitious bigots, fanatics, and persecutors, a thousand times more dangerous and destructive to society than libertines are. There have appeared barbarous tyrants who have talked of nothing but the glory of God, while they crushed the people, and counts, and nobility of distinguished noblemen of the best families in Gerrank, all armed from head to foot. many. History of the Helvetic ConThe Swiss were no more than thirteen federacy, by DE WATTEVILLE, vol. i. p. hundred men, ill armed. In this battle, 183.-TSCHUDI.-ETTERLIN. SCHODEthe duke of Austria perished, with two LER.RÆBMAN.-[See the national thousand of his forces, in which num- consequences of this valour, stated post, ber were six hundred and seventy-six 190, pp. 92–3.] BOOK I. trampled under foot the most sacred laws of nature. It was CHAP. XII. from a refinement of piety, that the anabaptists of the sixteenth century refused all obedience to the powers of the earth. James Clement and Ravaillac,* those execrable parricides, thought themselves animated by the most sublime. devotion. 127. Of ternal and external. 2128. Rights of individuals. Religion consists in the doctrines concerning the Deity and religion in the things of another life, and in the worship appointed to the honour of the Supreme Being. So far as it is seated in the heart, it is an affair of conscience, in which every one ought to be directed by his own understanding: but so far as it is external, and publicly established, it is an affair of state. Every man is obliged to endeavour to obtain just ideas of God, to know his laws, his views with respect to his creatures, and the end for which they were created. Man doubtless owes the most pure love, the most profound respect to his Creator; and to keep alive these dispositions, and act in consequence of them, he should honour God in all his actions, and show, by the most suitable means, the sentiments that fill Liberty of his mind. This short explanation is sufficient to prove that conscience. man is essentially and necessarily free to make use of his own choice in matters of religion. His belief is not to be commanded; and what kind of worship must that be which is produced by force? Worship consists in certain actions performed with an immediate view to the honour of God; there can be no worship proper for any man, which he does not believe suitable to that end. The obligation of sincerely endeavouring to know God, of serving him, and adoring him from the bottom of the heart, being imposed on man by his very nature,—it is impossible that, by his engagements with society, he should have exonerated himself from that duty, or deprived himself of the liberty which is absolutely necessary for the performance of it. It must then be concluded, that liberty of conscience is a natural and inviolable right. It is a disgrace to human nature, that a truth of this kind should stand in need of proof. 129. Pub But we should take care not to extend this liberty beyond lic establish- its just bounds. In religious affairs a citizen has only a ment of re- right to be free from compulsion, but can by no means claim that of openly doing what he pleases, without regard to the [57] consequences it may produce on society. (52) The establishment of religion by law, and its public exercise, are matters of state, and are necessarily under the jurisdiction of the The former assassinated Henry III. of France; the latter murdered his successor, Henry IV. (52) With respect to these in England, and punishments for the violation, see 4 Bla. Com. 41 to 66. Blasphemy, or a libel, stating our Saviour to have been an impostor, and a murderer in principle, and a fanatic, is an indictable misdemeanor at common law. Rex v. Waddington, 1 Barn. & Cress. 26. And as to modern regulation, see 4 Bla. Com. 443.-C. BOOK I. CHAP. XII. Duties and political authority. If all men are bound to serve God, the entire nation, in her national capacity, is doubtless obliged to serve and honour him (Prelim. § 5). And as this important rights of the duty is to be discharged by the nation in whatever manner nation. she judges best,-to the nation it belongs to determine what religion she will follow, and what public worship she thinks proper to establish. blished re If there be as yet no religion established by public autho- 130. When rity, the nation ought to use the utmost care, in order to there is as know and establish the best. That which shall have the ap- yet no estaprobation of the majority shall be received, and publicly esta- ligion. blished by law; by which means it will become the religion of the state. But if a considerable part of the nation is obstinately bent upon following another, it is asked-What does the law of nations require in such a case? Let us first remember that liberty of conscience is a natural right, and that there must be no constraint in this respect. There remain then but two methods to take,-either to permit this party of the citizens to exercise the religion they choose to profess, or to separate them from the society, leaving them their property, and their share of the country that belonged to the nation in common,-and thus to form two new states instead of one. The latter method appears by no means proper: it would weaken the nation, and thus would be inconsistent with that regard which she owes to her own preservation. It is therefore of more advantage to adopt the former method, and thus to establish two religions in the state. But if these religions are too incompatible; if there be reason to fear that they will produce divisions among the citizens, and disorder in public affairs, there is a third method, a wise medium between the two former, of which the Swiss have furnished examples. The cantons of Glaris and Appenzel were, in the sixteenth century, each divided into two parts: the one preserved the Romish religion, and the other embraced the Reformation; each part has a distinct government of its own for domestic affairs; but on foreign affairs they unite, and form but one and the same republic, one and the same canton. Finally, if the number of citizens who would profess a different religion from that established by the nation be inconsiderable; and if, for good and just reasons, it be thought improper to allow the exercise of several religions in the state -those citizens have a right to sell their lands, to retire with their families, and take all their property with them. For their engagements to society, and their submission to the public authority, can never oblige them to violate their consciences. If the society will not allow me to do that to which I think myself bound by an indispensable obligation, it is obliged to allow me permission to depart. When the choice of a religion is already made, and there is? 131. When one established by law, the nation ought to protect and sup- there is an BOOK I. CHAP. XII. established religion. 132. Duties and port that, religion, and preserve it as an establishment of the greatest importance, without, however, blindly rejecting the changes that may be proposed to render it more pure and useful for we ought, in all things, to aim at perfection (§ 21). But as all innovations, in this case, are full of danger, and can seldom be produced without disturbances, they ought not to be attempted upon slight grounds, without necessity, or very important reasons. It solely belongs to the society, the state, the entire nation, to determine the necessity or propriety of those changes; and no private individual has a right to attempt them by his own authority, nor consequently to preach to the people a new doctrine. Let him offer his sentiments to the conductors of the nation, and submit to the orders he receives from them. But if a new religion spreads, and becomes fixed in the minds of the people, as it commonly happens, independently of the public authority, and without any deliberation in common, it will be then necessary to adopt the mode of reasoning we followed in the preceding section on the case of choosing a religion; to pay attention to the number of those who follow the new opinions-to remember that no earthly power has authority over the consciences of men,-and to unite the maxims of sound policy with those of justice and equity. We have thus given a brief compendium of the duties and rights of a nation with regard to religion. Let us now come to those of the sovereign. These cannot be exactly the same with regard as those of the nation which the sovereign represents. The to religion. nature of the subject opposes it; for in religion nobody can rights of the Sovereign give up his liberty. To give a clear and distinct view of those rights and duties of the prince, and to establish them on a solid basis, it is necessary here to refer to the distinction we have made in the two preceding sections: if there is question of establishing a religion in a state that has not yet received one, the sovereign may doubtless favour that which to him appears the true or the best religion,-may have it announced to the people, and, by mild and suitable means, endeavour to establish it: he is even bound to do this, because he is obliged to attend to every thing that concerns the happiness of the nation. But in this he has no right to use authority and constraint. Since there was no religion established in the society when he received his authority, the people gave him no power in this respect; the support of the laws relating to religion is no part of his office, and does not belong to the authority with which they intrusted him. Numa was the founder of the religion of the ancient Romans: but he persuaded the people to receive it. If he had been able to command in that instance, he would not have had recourse to the revelations of the nymph Egeria. Though the sovereign cannot exert any authority in order to establish a religion where there is none, he is authorized, and even obliged, to employ all his OF PIETY AND RELIGION. power to hinder the introduction of one which he judges per- BOOK I. CHAP. XII. established The prince, or the conductor, to whom the nation has in- 133. trusted the care of the government and the exercise of the Where sovereign power, is obliged to watch over the preservation of there is an the received religion, the worship established by law, and has religion. a right to restrain those who attempt to destroy or disturb it. But to acquit himself of this duty in a manner equally just and wise, he ought never to lose sight of the character in which he is called to act, and the reason of his being invested with it. Religion is of extreme importance to the peace and welfare of society; and the prince is obliged to have an eye to every thing in which the state is interested. This is all that calls him to interfere in religion, or to protect and defend it. It is therefore upon this footing only that he can interfere: consequently, he ought to exert his authority against those alone whose conduct in religious matters is prejudicial or dangerous to the state; but he must not extend it to pretended crimes against God, the punishment of which exclusively belongs to the Sovereign Judge, the searcher of hearts. Let us remember that religion is no farther an affair of state, than as it is exterior and publicly established: that of the heart can only depend on the conscience. The prince has no right to punish any persons but those that disturb society; and it would be very unjust in him to inflict pains and penalties on any person whatsoever for his private opinions, when that person neither takes pains to divulge them, nor to obtain followers. It is a principle of fanaticism, a source of evils and of the most notorious injustice, to imagine that frail mortals ought to take up the cause of God, maintain his glory by acts of violence, and avenge him on his enemies. Let us only give to sovereigns, said a great statesman and an excellent citizen-let us give them, for the common advantage, the power of punishing whatever is injurious to charity in society. It appertains not to human justice to become the avenger of what concerns the cause of God.† Cicero, who was as able and as great in state affairs as in philosophy and eloquence, thought like the Duke of Sully. In the laws he proposes relating to religion, he says, on the subject of piety and interior religion, "if any one transgresses, God will revenge it:" but he declares the crime capital that should be The Duke de Sully; see his Memoirs digested by M. de l'Ecluse, vol. v. pp. 135, 136. † Deorum injuriæ diis curæ.-Tacit. Ann. book i. c. 73. 131 |