his attributing to every independent man, and of course to every sovereign, an odd kind of right to punish faults which involve an enormous violation of the laws of nature, though they do not affect either his rights or his safety. But we have shown (Book I. § 169) that men derive the right of punishment solely from their right to provide for their own safety; and consequently they cannot claim it except against those by whom they have been injured. Could it escape Grotius, that, notwithstanding all the precautions added by him in the following paragraphs, his opinion opens a door to all the ravages of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts? Mohammed and his successors have desolated and subdued Asia, to avenge the indignity done to the unity of the Godhead; all whom they termed associators or idolaters fell victims to their devout fury. BOOK II. CHAP. I. [ 138 ] Since nations ought to perform these duties or offices of 8. The humanity towards each other, according as one stands in need, right to require the and the other can reasonably comply with them,-every nation offices of being free, independent, and sole arbitress of her own actions, humanity. it belongs to each to consider whether her situation warrants her in asking or granting any thing on this head. Thus, 1. Every nation has a perfect right to ask of another that assistance and those kind offices which she conceives herself to stand in need of. To prevent her, would be doing her an injury. If she makes the application without necessity, she is guilty of a breach of duty; but, in this respect, she is wholly independent of the judgment of others. A nation has a right to ask for these kind offices, but not to demand them. whether they are to For, 2. These offices being due only in necessity, and by a 9. The nation which can comply with them without being wanting to right of itself; the nation that is applied to has, on the other hand, a judging right of judging whether the case really demands them, and whether circumstances will allow her to grant them consist- be granted. ently with that regard which she ought to pay to her own safety and interests: for instance, a nation is in want of corn, and applies to another nation to sell her a quantity of it:in this case it rests with the latter party to judge whether, by a compliance with the request, they will not expose themselves to the danger of a scarcity: and, if they refuse to comply, their determination is to be patiently acquiesced in. We have very lately seen a prudent performance of this duty on the part of Russia: she generously assisted Sweden when threatened with a famine, but refused to other powers the liberty of purchasing corn in Livonia, from the circumstance of standing herself in need of it, and, no doubt, from weighty political motives likewise. Thus, the right which a nation has to the offices of humanity 10. A nais but an imperfect one: she cannot compel another nation to tion is not to compel the performance of them. The nation that unreasonably other refuses them offends against equity, which consists in acting CHAP. I. BOOK II. conformably to the imperfect right of another: but thereby no injury is done; injury or injustice being a trespass against the perfect right of another. offices of which the refusal is no wrong. It is impossible that nations should mutually discharge all these several duties if they do not love each other. This is 11. Mu- the pure source from which the offices of humanity should tual love of proceed; they will retain the character and perfection of it. Then nations will be seen sincerely and cheerfully to help each other, earnestly to promote their common welfare, and cultivate peace, without jealousy or distrust. nations. 212. Each nation A real friendship will be seen to reign among them; and this happy state consists in a mutual affection. Every nation is obliged to cultivate the friendship of other nations, and carefully to avoid whatever might kindle their enmity against of others. her. Wise and prudent nations often pursue this line of con ought to cultivate the friendship duct from views of direct and present interest: a more noble, [139] more general, and less direct interest, is too rarely the motive with a view to the advantage of others, and of politicians. If it be incontestable that men must love each other in order to answer the views of nature and discharge the duties which she prescribes them, as well as for their own private advantage, can it be doubted that nations are under the like reciprocal obligation? Is it in the power of men, on dividing themselves into different political bodies, to break the ties of that universal society which nature has established amongst them? 13. To If a man ought to qualify himself for becoming useful to perfect itself other men,-and a citizen, for rendering useful services to his country and fellow citizens, a nation likewise, in perfecting herself, ought to have in view the acquisition of a greater degree of ability to promote the perfection and happiness of other nations; she should be careful to set them good examples, and avoid setting them a pattern of any thing evil. Imitation is natural to mankind: the virtues of a celebrated nation are sometimes imitated, and much more frequently its vices and defects. set them good examples. 11. To Glory being a possession of great importance to a nation, take care of as we have shown in a particular chapter expressly devoted their glory to the subject,*-the duty of a nation extends even to the care of the glory of other nations. In the first place, she should, on occasion, contribute to enable them to merit true glory secondly, she should do them in this respect all the justice due to them, and use all proper endeavours that such justice be universally done them: finally, instead of irritating, she should kindly extenuate the bad effect which some slight blemishes may produce. 15. DI ference of religion From the manner in which we have established the obligation of performing the offices of humanity, it plainly appears to be solely founded on the nature of man. Wherefore, no Book I. chap. xv. CHAP. I. offices of humanity. nation can refuse them to another, under pretence of its pro- BOOK II. fessing a different religion: to be entitled to them, it is sufficient that the claimant is our fellow-creature. A conformity ought not to of belief and worship may become a new tie of friendship preclude the between nations: but no difference in these respects can warrant us in laying aside the character of men, or the sentiments annexed to it. As we have already related (§ 5) some instances well worthy of imitation, let us here do justice to the pontiff who at present fills the see of Rome, and has recently given a very remarkable example, and which cannot be too highly commended. Information being given to that prince, that several Dutch ships remained at Civita Vecchia, not daring to put to sea for fear of the Algerine corsairs, he immediately issued orders that the frigates of the ecclesiastical state should convoy those ships out of danger; and his nuncio at Brussels received instructions to signify to the ministers of the statesgeneral, that his holiness made it a rule to protect commerce and perform the duties of humanity, without regarding any difference of religion. Such exalted sentiments cannot fail of raising a veneration for Benedict XIV. even amongst Protestants. (92) of the offices [140] How happy would mankind be, were these amiable precepts 16. Rule of nature everywhere observed! Nations would communicate and measure to each other their products and their knowledge; a profound of humanity. peace would prevail all over the earth, and enrich it with its invaluable fruits; industry, the sciences, and the arts would be employed in promoting our happiness, no less than in relieving our wants; violent methods of deciding contests would be no more heard of; all differences would be terminated by moderation, justice, and equity; the world would have the appearance of a large republic; men would live everywhere like brothers, and each individual be a citizen of the universe. That this idea should be but a delightful dream! yet it flows from the nature and essence of man.' * But disorderly passions, and private and mistaken interest, will for ever prevent its being realized. Let us, then, consider what limitations (92) He was much celebrated and spoken of in Lord Charlemont's Travels in A. D. 1742.-C. Here, again, let us call in the anthority of Cicero to our support. "All mankind (says that excellent philosopher) should lay it down as their constant rule of action, that individual and general advantage should be the same: for, if each man strives to grasp every advantage for himself, all the ties of human society will be broken. And, if nature ordains that man should feel interested in the welfare of his fellow-man, whoever he be, and for the single reason that he is a man,-it necessarily follows, that, ac- BOOK II. CHAP. I. the present state of men, and the ordinary maxims and conduct of nations, may render necessary in the practice of these precepts of nature, which are in themselves so noble and excellent. The law of nature cannot condemn the good to become the dupes and prey of the wicked, and the victims of their injustice and ingratitude. Melancholy experience shows that most nations aim only to strengthen and enrich themselves at the expense of others,-to domineer over them, and even, if an opportunity offers, to oppress and bring them under the yoke. Prudence does not allow us to strengthen an enemy, (93) or one in whom we discover a desire of plundering and oppressing us and the care of our own safety forbids it. We have seen (§ 3, &c.) that a nation does not owe her assistance and the offices of humanity to other nations, except so far as the grant of them is reconcilable with her duties to herself. Hence, it evidently follows, that, though the universal love of mankind obliges us to grant at all times, and to all, even to our enemies, those offices which can only tend to render them more moderate and virtuous, because no inconvenience is to be apprehended from granting them, we are not obliged to give them such succours as probably may become destructive to ourselves. Thus, 1. The exceeding importance of trade, not only to the wants and conveniences of life, but likewise to the strength of a state, and furnishing it with the means of defending itself against its enemies, and the insatiable [141] avidity of those nations which seek wholly and exclusively to engross it, thus, I say, these circumstances authorize a nation possessed of a branch of trade, or the secret of some important manufacture or fabric, to reserve to herself those sources of wealth, and, instead of communicating them to foreign nations, to take measures against it. But, where the necessaries or conveniences of life are in question, the nation ought to sell them to others at a reasonable price, and not convert her monopoly into a system of odious extortion. To commerce England chiefly owes her greatness, her power, and her safety who, then, will presume to blame her for endeavouring, by every fair and just method, to retain the several branches of it in her own hand? 2. As to things directly and more particularly useful for war, a nation is under no obligation to sell them to others of whom it has the smallest suspicion; and prudence even declares against it. Thus, by the Roman laws, people were very justly prohibited to instruct the barbarous nations in building galleys. Thus, in England, laws have been enacted (93) The same prudential consideration extends also in time of peace; for, who can anticipate how soon after advantages have been conferred or granted without equivalent to another state, she may declare war against the nation who conferred them?-C. to prevent the best method of ship-building from being carried BOOK II. out of the kingdom. This caution is to be carried farther, with respect to nations more justly suspected. Thus, when the Turks were successfully pursuing their victorious career, and rapidly advancing to the zenith of power, all Christian nations ought, independent of every bigoted consideration, to have considered them as enemies; even the most distant of those nations, though not engaged in any contest with them, would have been justifiable in breaking off all commerce with a people who made it their profession to subdue by force of arms. all who would not acknowledge the authority of their prophet. CHAP. I. regard to the prince. Let us further observe, with regard to the prince in par- 17. Partiticular, that he ought not, in affairs of this nature, to obey cular limitawithout reserve all the suggestions of a noble and generous tion with heart impelling him to sacrifice his own interests to the advantage of others, or to motives of generosity; because it is not his private interest that is in question, but that of the state that of the nation who has committed herself to his care. Cicero says that a great and elevated soul despises pleasures, wealth, life itself, and makes no account of them, when the common utility lies at stake.* He is right, and such sentiments are to be admired in a private person; but generosity is not to be exerted at the expense of others. The head or conductor of a nation ought not to practise that virtue in public affairs without great circumspection, nor to a greater extent than will redound to the glory and real advantage of the state. As to the common good of human society, he ought to pay the same attention to it as the nation he represents would be obliged to pay were the government of her affairs in her own hand. But, though the duties of a nation towards herself set 18. No bounds to the obligation of performing the offices of human- nation ity, they cannot in the least affect the prohibition of doing ought to inany harm to others, of causing them any prejudice,-in a jure others. word, of injuring them †. If every [142] man is, by his very nature, obliged to assist in promoting the perfection of others, much more cogent are the reasons which forbid him to increase their imperfection, and that of their condition. The same duties are incumbent on nations (Prelim. §§ 5, 6). No nation, therefore, ought to commit any actions tending to impair the perfection of other nations, and that of their condition, or to impede their progress,-in other De Offic. lib. iii. cap. v. † Lézer (professedly borrowed from the Latin lado) is the term used by the author, who, in order the better to explain his meaning, proceeds to inform us, that "nuire (to hurt), offenser (to offend), faire tort (to wrong), porter dommage (to cause detriment), porter prejudice (to prejudice), blesser (to |