and, especially, they ought not to suffer that dignity to be BOOK II. impaired. If, then, there are titles and honours, which, by CHAP. III. constant custom, belong to a prince, he may insist upon them; and he ought to do it on occasions where his glory is concerned. But it is proper to distinguish between neglect or the omission of what the established usage requires, and positive acts of disrespect and insult. The prince may complain of an instance of neglect, and, if it be not repaired, may consider it as an indication of ill-will: he has a right to demand, even by force of arms, the reparation of an insult. The czar Peter the First, in his manifesto against Sweden, complained that the cannon had not been fired on his passing at Riga. He might think it strange that they did not pay him this mark of respect, and he might complain of it; but, to have made this the subject of a war, must have indicated a preposterous prodigality of human blood. CHAP. IV. OF THE RIGHT TO SECURITY, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVE- CHAP. IV. REIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS. (104) IN vain does nature prescribe to nations, as well as to indi- § 49. Right viduals, the care of self-preservation, and of advancing their to security. own perfection and happiness, if she does not give them a right to preserve themselves from every thing that might render this care ineffectual. This right is nothing more than a moral power of acting, that is, the power of doing what is morally possible-what is proper and conformable to our duties. We have, then, in general, a right to do whatever is necessary to the discharge of our duties. Every nation, as well as every man, has, therefore, a right to prevent other nations from obstructing her preservation, her perfection, and happiness, that is, to preserve herself from all injuries (§ 18): and this right is a perfect one, since it is given to satisfy a natural and indispensable obligation: for, when we cannot use constraint in order to cause our rights to be respected, their effects are very uncertain. It is this right to preserve herself from all injury that is called the right to security. It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented. $ 50. It proA nation has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to duces the make use of force and every honourable expedient against right of re (104) As to the independence of nations, see in general, Cours de Droit Public. Paris, A. D. 1830, tom. 2, 1st sistance; BOOK II. Whosoever is actually engaged in opposition to her, and even CHAP. IV. to anticipate his machinations, observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain suspicions, lest she should incur the imputation of becoming herself an unjust [155] aggressor. $51. and that of ob taining re- When the evil is done, the same right to security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete reparation, and to employ force for that purpose, if neces sary. Finally, the offended party have a right to provide for the right of their future security, and to chastise the offender, by inflictpunishing. ing upon him a punishment capable of deterring him thenceforward from similar aggressions, and of intimidating those who might be tempted to imitate him. They may even, if necessary, disable the aggressor from doing further injury. They only make use of their right, in all these measures, which they adopt with good reason: and if evil thence results to him who has reduced them to the necessity of taking such steps, he must impute the consequences only to his own injustice. § 53. Right of all nationsagainst a mischie If, then, there is anywhere a nation of a restless and mischievous disposition, ever ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to excite domestic disturbances in their vous people dominions,-it is not to be doubted that all the others have a right to form a coalition in order to repress and chastise that nation, and to put it for ever after out of her power to injure them. Such would be the just fruits of the policy which Machiavel praises in Cæsar Borgia. The conduct followed by Philip II. king of Spain, was calculated to unite all Europe against him; and it was from just reasons that Henry the Great formed the design of humbling a power whose strength was formidable, and whose maxims were pernicious. $ 54. No nation has a right to The three preceding propositions are so many principles that furnish the various foundations for a just war, as we shall see in the proper place. It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the smallest right to interfere in interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights the govern- that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the other state. most precious, and that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury. (105) ment of an The sovereign is he to whom the nation has intrusted the (105) Nor has a subject of one state a right to enter into any contract with, or to assist the revolted colony of another before the same has been formally recognised as an independent state by its own government; and if a state assist a revolted colony, it is just ground of war on the part of the parent state. Thompson v. Powles, 2 Simon's Rep. 194; Taylor v. Barclay, id. 213. Ante, p. 141, note 95. CHAP. IV. himself the empire and the care of the government: she has invested him BOOK II. with her rights; she alone is directly interested in the manner in which the conductor she has chosen makes use of his power. § 55. One It does not, then, belong to any foreign power to take cog- sovereign nisance of the administration of that sovereign, to set himself cannotmake up for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it. judge of the If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them with conduct of severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business; and another. no other is called upon to oblige him to amend his conduct, and follow more wise and equitable maxims. It is the part of prudence to point out the occasions when officious and amicable representations may be made to him. The Spaniards violated all rules when they set themselves up as judges of the Inca Athualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to them, they would have had a right to [156] punish him. But they accused him of having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, &c.-things, for which he was not at all accountable to them; and, to fill the measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of Spain.* up a quarrel But, if the prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives § 56. How his subjects a legal right to resist him,-if tyranny, becom- far lawful to ing insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their own de- interfere in fence, every foreign power has a right to succour an op- between a pressed people who implore their assistance. The English sovereign justly complained of James II. The nobility and the most and his subdistinguished patriots having determined to check him in the jects. prosecution of his schemes, which manifestly tended to overthrow the constitution, and to destroy the liberties and the religion of the people, applied for assistance to the United Provinces. The authority of the Prince of Orange had, doubtless, an influence on the deliberations of the statesgeneral; but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice: for, when a people, from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties. Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, foreign powers may assist that party which appears to them to have justice on its side. He who assists an odious tyrant,-he who declares for an unjust and rebellious people,-violates his duty. But, when the bands of the political society are broken, or at least suspended, between the sovereign and his people, the contending parties may then be considered as two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and each of those who grant their assistance may imagine that he is acting in support of the better cause. * Garcillasso de la Vega. It fol BOOK II. lows, then, in virtue of the voluntary law of nations (see CHAP. IV. Prelim. § 21), that the two parties may act as having an equal right, and behave to each other accordingly till the decision of the affair. But we ought not to abuse this maxim, and make a handle of it to authorize odious machinations against the internal tranquillity of states. It is a violation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to revolt who actually pay obedience. to their sovereign, though they complain of his government. The practice of nations is conformable to our maxims. When the German protestants came to the assistance of the reformed party in France, the court never attempted to treat them otherwise than on the usual footing of enemies in general, and according to the laws of war. France was at the same time engaged in assisting the Netherlands then in arms against Spain, and expected that her troops should be considered in no other light than as auxiliaries in a regular war. But no power ever fails to complain, as of an atrocious wrong, if any one attempts by his emissaries to excite his subjects to revolt. [157] As to those monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, whom every brave man may justly exterminate from the face of the earth. All antiquity has praised Hercules for delivering the world from an Antæas, a Busiris, and a Diomede. $ 57. Right ence of for After having established the position that foreign nations of opposing have no right to interfere in the government of an independthe interfer- ent state, it is not difficult to prove that the latter has a right eign powers to oppose such interference. To govern herself according to in the affairs her own pleasure, is a necessary part of her independence. of govern- A sovereign state cannot be constrained in this respect, except ment. $58. The to religion. it be from a particular right which she has herself given to other states by her treaties; and, even if she has given them. such a right, yet it cannot, in an affair of so delicate a nature as that of government, be extended beyond the clear and express terms of the treaties. In every other case, a sovereign has a right to treat those as enemies who attempt to interfere in his domestic affairs otherwise than by their good offices. par Religion is in every sense an object of great importance to same rights a nation, and one of the most interesting subjects on which with respect the government can be employed. An independent people are accountable for their religion to God alone; in this ticular, as in every other, they have a right to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of their own conscience, and to prevent all foreign interference in an affair of so delicate a nature. The custom, long kept up in Christendom, When, however, we see a party the religion we profess, and a neighinflamed with deadly hatred against bouring prince persecuting in conse of causing all the affairs of religion to be decided and regu- BOOK II. lated in a general council, could only have been introduced _CHAP. IV. by the singular circumstance of the submission of the whole church to the same civil government, the Roman empire. When that empire was overthrown, and gave place to many independent kingdoms, this custom was found contrary to the first principles of government, to the very idea of independent states and political societies. It was, however, long supported by prejudice, ignorance, and superstition, by the authority of the popes and the power of the clergy, and still respected even at the time of the reformation. The states who had embraced the reformed religion offered to submit to the decisions of an impartial council lawfully assembled. At present they would not hesitate to declare, that, in matters of religion, they are equally independent of every power on earth, as they are in the affairs of civil government. The general and absolute authority of the pope and council is [158] absurd in every other system than that of those popes who strove to unite all Christendom in a single body, of which they pretended to be the supreme monarchs.* Catholic sovereigns have endeavoured to restrain that authority within such limits as are consistent with their supreme power: they do not receive the decrees of councils or the popes' bulls till they have caused them to be examined; and these ecclesiastical laws are of no force in their dominions unless confirmed by the prince. In the first book of this work, Chap. XII. we have sufficiently established the rights of a state in matters of religion; and we introduce them here again, only to draw just consequences from them with respect to the conduct which nations ought to observe towards each other. But even constrained It is, then, certain that we cannot, in opposition to the will § 59. No na of a nation, interfere in her religious concerns, without vio- tion can be lating her rights, and doing her an injury. Much less are with respect we allowed to employ force of arms to oblige her to receive to religion. a doctrine and a worship which we consider as divine. What right have men to set themselves up as the defenders and protectors of the cause of God? He can, whenever he pleases, lead nations to the knowledge of himself, by more effectual means than those of violence. Persecutors make no true converts. The monstrous maxim of extending religion by the sword, is a subversion of the rights of mankind, and the most quence the professors of that religion, it is lawful for us to give assistance to the sufferers,-as it was well remarked by James I. of England to Bouillon the ambassador of Mary de Medici, queen-regent of France,-" When my neighbours are attacked in a quarrel in which I am interested, the law of nature requires that I should antici, * See above, § 46, and Bodinus's Republic, book i. c. ix, with his quotations, p. m. 139. |