CHAP. XII.

with several

BOOK II. There is nothing to prevent a sovereign from entering into engagements of the same nature with two or more nations, if $166. How he be able to fulfil those several engagements to his different treaties may allies at the same time. For instance, a commercial treaty be concluded with one nation does not deprive us of the liberty of afterwards nations with contracting similar engagements with other states, unless we have, in the former treaty, bound ourselves by a promise not to grant the same advantages to any other nation. We may in the same manner promise to assist two different allies with troops, if we are able to furnish them, or if there is no probability that both will have occasion for them at the same time.

the same

view.

$167. The

more an

cient ally

entitled to a

If nevertheless the contrary happens, the more ancient ally is entitled to a preference: for, the engagement was pure and absolute with respect to him; whereas we could not conpreference. tract with the more recent ally, without a reservation of the rights of the former. Such reservation is founded in justice, and is tacitly understood, even if not expressly made.

$168. We owe no as

sistance in an unjust

war.

$169. General divi

sion of trea

ties.

1. Those that relate

to things al

The justice of the cause is another ground of preference between two allies. We ought even to refuse assistance to the one whose cause is unjust, whether he be at war with one of our allies, or with another state: to assist him on such occasion, would in the event be the same thing as if we had contracted an alliance for an unjust purpose; which we are not allowed to do (§ 161). No one can be validly engaged to support injustice.

Grotius divides treaties into two general classes,-first, those which turn merely on things to which the parties were already bound by the law of nature,-secondly, those by which they enter into further engagements.* By the former we acquire a perfect right to things to which we before had only an imperfect right, so that we may thenceforward deready due mand as our due what before we could only request as an by the law office of humanity. Such treaties became very necessary beof nature. tween the nations of antiquity, who, as we have already observed, did not think themselves bound to any duty towards people who were not in the number of their allies. They are useful even between the most polished nations, in order the better to secure the succours they may expect, to determine the measure and degree of those succours, and to show on what they have to depend,-to regulate what cannot in general be determined by the law of nature, and thus to obviate all difficulties, by providing against the various interpretations of that law. Finally, as no nation possesses inexhaustible means of assistance, it is prudent to secure to ourselves a peculiar right to that assistance which cannot be granted to all the world.

To this first class belong all simple treaties of peace and friendship, when the engagements which we thereby contract

• De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. xv. § 5.

CHAP. XII.

make no addition to those duties that men owe to each other BOOK II. as brethren and as members of the human society: such are those treaties that permit commerce, passage, &c.

ties with the duties we

If the assistance and offices that are due by virtue of such § 170. Co!a treaty should on any occasion prove incompatible with the lision of duties a nation owes to herself, or with what the sovereign these treaowes to his own nation, the case is tacitly and necessarily excepted in the treaty. For, neither the nation nor the owe to oursovereign could enter into an engagement to neglect the care selves. of their own safety, or the safety of the state, in order to contribute to that of their ally. If the sovereign, in order to preserve his own nation, has occasion for the things he has promised in the treaty,-if, for instance, he has engaged to furnish corn, and in a time of dearth he has scarcely sufficient for the subsistence of his subjects, he ought without hesitation to give a preference to his own nation; for, it is only so far as he has it in his power to give assistance to a foreign nation, that he naturally owes such assistance; and it was upon that footing alone that he could promise it in a treaty. Now, it is not in his power to deprive his own nation. of the means of subsistence in order to assist another nation at their expense. Necessity here forms an exception, and he does not violate the treaty, because he cannot fulfil it.

promise to

The treaties by which we simply agree not to do any evil § 171. Treato an ally, to abstain, with respect to him, from all harm, ties in which offence, and injury, are not necessary, and produce no new we barely right, since every individual already possesses a perfect natu- do no inral right to be exempt from harm, injury, and real offence. jury. Such treaties, however, become very useful, and accidentally necessary, among those barbarous nations who think they have a right to act as they please towards foreigners. They are not wholly useless with nations less savage, who, without so far divesting themselves of humanity, entertain a much less powerful sense of a natural obligation, than of one which they have themselves contracted by solemn engagements: and would to God that this manner of thinking were entirely confined to barbarians! We see too frequent effects of it among those who boast of a perfection much superior to the law of nature. But the imputation of perfidy is prejudicial to the rulers of nations, and thus becomes formidable even to those who are little solicitous to merit the appellation of virtuous men, and who feel no scruple in silencing the reproaches of conscience.

cerning things that

Treaties by which we contract engagements that were not $172. Treaimposed on us by the law of nature, are either equal or un- ties conequal. Equal treaties are those in which the contracting parties are not napromise the same things, or things that are equivalent, or, turally due. finally, things that are equitably proportioned, so that the Equal condition of the parties is equal. Such is, for example, a

Treaties.

[199]

BOOK II. defensive alliance, in which the parties reciprocally stipulate CHAP. XII. for the same succours. Such is an offensive alliance, in which it is agreed that each of the allies shall furnish the same number of vessels, the same number of troops, of cavalry and infantry, or an equivalent in vessels, in troops, in artillery, or in money. Such is also a league in which the quota of each of the allies is regulated in proportion to the interest he takes or may have in the design of the league. Thus, the emperor and the king of England, in order to induce the states-general of the United Provinces to accede to the treaty of Vienna of the 16th of March, 1731, consented that the republic should only promise to her allies the assistance of four thousand foot and a thousand horse, though they engaged, in case of an attack upon the republic, to furnish her, each, with eight thousand foot and four thousand horse. We are also to place in the class of equal treaties those which stipulate that the allies shall consider themselves as embarked in a common cause, and shall act with all their strength. Notwithstanding a real inequality in their strength, they are nevertheless willing in this instance to consider it as equal.

$173. Ob

preserving

equality in treaties.

Equal treaties may be subdivided into as many species as there are of different transactions between sovereigns. Thus, they treat of the conditions of commerce, of their mutual defence, of associations in war, of reciprocally granting each other a passage, or refusing it to the enemies of their ally; they engage not to build fortresses in certain places, &c. But it would be needless to enter into these particulars: generals are sufficient, and are easily applied to particular cases.

Nations being no less obliged than individuals to pay a ligation of regard to equity, they ought, as much as possible, to preserve equality in their treaties. When, therefore, the parties are able reciprocally to afford each other equal advantages, the law of nature requires that their treaties should be equal, unless there exist some particular reason for deviating from that equality, such, for instance, as gratitude for a former benefit, the hope of gaining the inviolable attachment of a nation, some private motive, which renders one of the contracting parties particularly anxious to have the treaty concluded, &c. Nay, viewing the transaction in its proper point of light, the consideration of that particular reason restores to the treaty that equality which seems to be destroyed by the difference of the things promised.

I see those pretended great politicians smile, who employ all their subtilty in circumventing those with whom they treat, and in so managing the conditions of the treaty, that all the advantages shall accrue to their masters. Far from blushing at a conduct so contrary to equity, to rectitude and natural honesty, they glory in it, and think themselves entitled to the appellation of able negotiators. How long shall we continue to see men in public characters take a pride in practices that

would disgrace a private individual? The private man, if he BOOK II. is void of conscience, laughs also at the rules of morality and CHAP. XII. justice; but he laughs in secret: it would be dangerous and prejudicial to him to make a public mockery of them. Men [200] in power more openly sacrifice honour and honesty to present advantage: but, fortunately for mankind, it often happens that such seeming advantage proves fatal to them; and even between sovereigns, candour and rectitude are found to be the safest policy. All the subtilties, all the tergiversations of a famous minister, on the occasion of a treaty in which Spain was deeply interested, turned at length to his own confusion, and to the detriment of his master; while England, by her good faith and generosity to her allies, gained immense credit, and rose to the highest pitch of influence and respectability.

treaties and

equal alli

ances.

When people speak of equal treaties, they have commonly $174. Difin their minds a double idea of equality, viz. equality in the ference beengagements, and equality in the dignity of the contracting tween equal parties. It becomes therefore necessary to remove all ambiguity; and for that purpose, we may make a distinction between equal treaties and equal alliances. Equal treaties are those in which there is an equality in the promises made, as we have above explained (§ 172); and equal alliances, those in which equal treats with equal, making no difference in the dignity of the contracting parties, or, at least, admitting no too glaring superiority, but merely a pre-eminence of honour and rank. Thus kings treat with the emperor on a footing of equality, though they do not hesitate to allow him precedency; thus great republics treat with kings on the same footing, notwithstanding the pre-eminence which the former now-adays yield to the latter. Thus all true sovereigns ought to treat with the most powerful monarch, since they are as really sovereigns, and as independent as himself. (See § 37 of this Book.)

ances.

Unequal treaties are those in which the allies do not reci- § 175. Unprocally promise to each other the same things, or things equal treaequivalent; and an alliance is unequal when it makes a differ- ties and unence in the dignity of the contracting parties. It is true, that equal allimost commonly an unequal treaty will be at the same time an unequal alliance; as great potentates are seldom accustomed to give or to promise more than is given or promised to them, unless such concessions be fully compensated in the article of honour and glory; and, on the other hand, a weak state does not submit to burdensome conditions without being obliged also to acknowledge the superiority of her ally.

Those unequal treaties that are at the same time unequal alliances, are divided into two classes,-the first consisting of those where the inequality prevails on the side of the more considerable power,-the second comprehending treaties where the inequality is on the side of the inferior power.

BOOK II.

Treaties of the former class, without attributing to the more CHAP. XII. powerful of the contracting parties any right over the weaker, simply allow him a superiority of honours and respect. We have treated of this in Book I. § 5. Frequently a great monarch, wishing to engage a weaker state in his interest, offers [201] her advantageous conditions,-promises her gratuitous succours, or greater than he stipulates for himself: but at the same time he claims a superiority of dignity, and requires respect from his ally. It is this last particular which renders the alliance unequal: and to this circumstance we must attentively advert; for, with alliances of this nature we are not to confound those in which the parties treat on a footing of equality, though the more powerful of the allies, for particular reasons, gives more than he receives, promises his assistance gratis, without requiring gratuitous assistance in his turn, or promises more considerable succours, or even the assistance of all his forces:-here the alliance is equal, but the treaty is unequal, unless indeed we may be allowed to say, that, as the party who makes the greater concessions has a greater interest in concluding the treaty, this consideration restores the equality. Thus, at a time when France found herself embarrassed in a momentous war with the house of Austria, and the cardinal de Richelieu wished to humble that formidable power, he, like an able minister, concluded a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus, in which all the advantage appeared to be on the side of Sweden. From a bare consideration of the stipulations of that treaty, it would have been pronounced an unequal one; but the advantages which France derived from it, amply compensated for that inequality. The alliance of France with the Swiss, if we regard the stipulations alone, is an unequal treaty; but the valour of the Swiss troops has long since counterbalanced that inequality; and the difference in the interests and wants of the parties serves still further to preserve the equilibrium. France, often involved. in bloody wars, has received essential services from the Swiss : the Helvetic body, void of ambition, and untainted with the spirit of conquest, may live in peace with the whole world; they have nothing to fear, since they have feelingly convinced the ambitious, that the love of liberty gives the nation sufficient strength to defend her frontiers. This alliance may at certain times have appeared unequal:-our forefathers* paid little attention to ceremony:-but, in reality, and especially since the absolute independence of the Swiss is acknowledged by the empire itself, the alliance is certainly equal, although the Helvetic body do not hesitate to yield to the king of France all that pre-eminence which the established usage of modern Europe attributes to crowned heads, and especially to great monarchs.

* The author was a native of Switzerland.