CHAP. XVIII. terminating methods of terminating their differences. These are-first, BOOK II. an amicable accommodation. Let each party coolly and candidly examine the subject of the dispute, and do justice to the their disother; or let him whose right is too uncertain, voluntarily putes. renounce it. There are even occasions when it may be pro- 1. Amicaper for him who has the clearer right, to renounce it, for the ble accomsake of preserving peace,-occasions, which it is the part of modation. prudence to discover. To renounce a right in this manner, is not abandoning or neglecting it. People are under no obligation to you for what you abandon: but you gain a friend in the party to whom you amicably yield up what was the subject of a dispute. mise. Compromise is a second method of bringing disputes to a 327. 2. peaceable termination. It is an agreement, by which, with- Comproout precisely deciding on the justice of the jarring preten-' sions, the parties recede on both sides, and determine what share each shall have of the thing in dispute, or agree to give it entirely to one of the claimants on condition of certain indemnifications granted to the other. Mediation, in which a common friend interposes his good a 328. 3. offices, frequently proves efficacious in engaging the contend- Mediation. ing parties to meet each other halfway,-to come to a good understanding,-to enter into an agreement or compromise respecting their rights, and, if the question relates to an injury, to offer and accept a reasonable satisfaction. The office of mediator requires as great a degree of integrity, as of prudence and address. He ought to observe a strict impartiality; he should soften the reproaches of the disputants, calm their resentments, and dispose their minds to a reconciliation. His duty is to favour well-founded claims, and to effect the restoration, to each party, of what belongs to him: but he ought not scrupulously to insist on rigid justice. He is a conciliator, and not a judge: his business is to procure peace; and he ought to induce him who has right on his side to relax something of his pretensions, if necessary, with a view to so great a blessing. The mediator is not guarantee for the treaty which he has conducted, unless he has expressly undertaken to guarantee it. That is an engagement of too great consequence to be [277] imposed on any one, without his own consent clearly manifested. At present, when the affairs of the sovereigns of Europe are so connected, that each has an eye on what passes between those who are the most distant, mediation is a mode of conciliation much used. Does any dispute arise? The friendly powers, those who are afraid of seeing the flames of war kindled, offer their mediation, and make overtures of peace and accommodation. When sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions and 329. 4. are nevertheless desirous of preserving or restoring peace, Arbitration. they sometimes submit the decision of their disputes to arbi BOOK II. CHAP. XVIII. trators chosen by common agreement. When once the contending parties have entered into articles of arbitration, they are bound to abide by the sentence of the arbitrators: they have engaged to do this; and the faith of treaties should be religiously observed. If, however, the arbitrators, by pronouncing a sentence evidently unjust and unreasonable, should forfeit the character with which they were invested, their judgment would deserve no attention: the parties had appealed to it only with a view to the decision of doubtful questions. Suppose a board of arbitrators should, by way of reparation for some offence, condemn a sovereign state to become subject to the state she has offended, will any man of sense assert that she is bound to submit to such decision? If the injustice is of small consequence, it should be borne for the sake of peace; and if it is not absolutely evident, we ought to endure it, as an evil to which we have voluntarily exposed ourselves. For if it were necessary that we should be convinced of the justice of a sentence before we would submit to it, it would be of very little use to appoint arbitrators. There is no reason to apprehend, that, by allowing the parties a liberty of refusing to submit to a manifestly unjust and unreasonable sentence, we should render arbitration useless our decision is by no means repugnant to the nature of recognisances or arbitration articles. There can be no difficulty in the affair, except in case of the parties having signed vague and unlimited articles, in which they have not precisely specified the subject of the dispute, or marked the bounds of their opposite pretensions. It may then happen, as in the example just alleged, that the arbitrators will exceed their power, and pronounce on what has not been really submitted to their decision. Being called in to determine what satisfaction a state ought to make for an offence, they may condemn her to become subject to the state she has offended. But she certainly never gave them so extensive a power; and their absurd sentence is not binding. In order to obviate all difficulty, and cut off every pretext of which fraud might make a handle, it is necessary that the arbitration articles should precisely specify the subject in dispute, the restrictive and opposite pretensions of the parties, the demands of the one, and the objections of the other. These constitute the whole of what is submitted to the decision of the arbitrators; and it is upon these points alone that the [278] parties promise to abide by their judgment. If, then, their sentence be confined within these precise bounds, the disputants must acquiesce in it. They cannot say that it is manifestly unjust, since it is pronounced on a question which they have themselves rendered doubtful by the disordance of their claims, and which has been referred, as such, to the decision. of the arbitrators. Before they can pretend to evade such a sentence, they should prove, by incontestable facts, that it was the offspring of corruption or flagrant partiality. Arbitration is a very reasonable mode, and one that is perfectly conformable to the law of nature, for the decision of every dispute which does not directly interest the safety of the nation. Though the claim of justice may be mistaken by the arbitrators, it is still more to be feared that it will be overpowered in an appeal to the sword. The Swiss have had the precaution, in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they have contracted with the neighbouring powers, to agree beforehand on the manner in which their disputes were to be submitted to arbitrators, in case they could not adjust them in an amicable manner. (132) This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the Helvetic republic in that flourishing state which secures her liberty, and renders her respectable throughout Europe. BOOK II. CHAP. XVII. In order to put in practice any of these methods, it is ne-a 330. Concessary to speak with each other, and to confer together. Con- ferences and ferences and congresses are therefore a mode of conciliation, congresses. which the law of nature recommends to nations, as well calculated to bring their differences to an amicable termination. Congresses are assemblies of plenipotentiaries appointed to find out means of conciliation, and to discuss and adjust the reciprocal pretensions of the contending parties. To afford the prospect of a happy issue of their deliberations, such meetings should be formed and directed by a sincere desire of peace and concord. In the present century, Europe has witnessed two general congresses,-that of Cambray,* and that of Soissons,† both tedious farces acted on the political theatre, in which the principal performers were less desirous of coming to an accommodation than of appearing to desire it. tween evi In order at present to ascertain in what manner and how 2 331. Disfar a nation is bound to resort or accede to these various tinction to modes of accommodation, and which of them she ought to be made beprefer, it becomes necessary, in the first place, to distinguish dent and between cases that are evident, and those that are doubtful. doubtful Does the question relate to a right that is clear, certain, and cases. incontestable? A sovereign, if he possesses sufficient strength, may peremptorily prosecute and defend that right, without exposing it to the doubtful issue of an arbitration. Shall he submit to negotiate and compound for a thing that evidently belongs to him, and which is disputed without the least shadow of jus- [ 279 ] tice? Much less will he subject it to arbitration. But he ought not to neglect those methods of conciliation, which, (132) The stipulations between private partners and others in anticipation of mere possible disputes is analogous, and though not legally binding, yet, in practice, in case of differences, the mere stipulation is usually considered by the parties as obligatory, in point of honour, * In 1724. BOOK II. without endangering his own right, may induce his opponent CHAP. XVIII. to listen to reason,—such as mediation and conferences. Nature gives us no right to have recourse to forcible means, except where gentle and pacific methods prove ineffectual. It is not permitted to be so inflexible in uncertain and doubtful questions. Who will dare to insist that another shall immediately, and without examination, relinquish to him a disputable right? This would be a means of rendering wars perpetual and inevitable. Both the contending parties may be equally convinced of the justice of their claims: why, therefore, should either yield to the other? In such a case, they can only demand an examination of the question, propose a conference or an arbitration, or offer to settle the point by articles of agreement. ? 332. Of essential those of less importance. In the disputes that arise between sovereigns, it is moreover necessary to make a proper distinction between essential rights, and rights and rights of inferior importance: for, according to the difference in the two cases, a different line of conduct is to be pursued. A nation is under many obligations of duty towards herself, towards other nations, and towards the great society of mankind. We know that the duties we owe to ourselves are, generally speaking, paramount to those we owe to others; but this is to be understood only of such duties as bear some proportion to each other. We cannot refuse, in some degree, to forget ourselves with respect to interests that are not essential, and to make some sacrifices, in order to assist other persons, and especially for the greater benefit of human society and let us even remark, that we are invited by our own advantage, by our own safety, to make these generous sacrifices; for the private good of each is intimately connected with the general happiness. What idea should we entertain of a prince or a nation who would refuse to give up the smallest advantage for the sake of procuring to the world the inestimable blessings of peace? Every power therefore owes this respect to the happiness of human society, to show himself open to every mode of conciliation, in questions relating to interests which are neither essential nor of great importance. If he exposes himself to the loss of something by an accommodation, by a compromise, or by an arbitration, he ought to be sensible what are the dangers, the evils, the calamities of war, and to consider that peace is well worth a small sacrifice. But if any one would rob a nation of one of her essential rights, or a right without which she could not hope to support her national existence, if an ambitious neighbour threatens [ 280] the liberty of a republic,-if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her, she will take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt the mode of conferences on so odious a pretension; she will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, exhaust every resource, and gloriously lavish her blood to the last drop if necessary. BOOK II. To listen to the smallest proposition, is putting every thing to the risk. such an occasion she may truly say and if fortune prove unfavourable, a free people will prefer death to servitude. What would have become of Rome, had she listened to timid counsels, when Hannibal was encamped before her walls? The Swiss, ever so ready to embrace pacific measures or submit to legal decisions in disputes respecting less essential points, have uniformly spurned at all idea of compromise with those who harboured designs against their liberty. They even refused on such occasions to submit their disputes to arbitration, or to the judgment of the emperors.* having re In doubtful causes which do not involve essential points, 333. How if one of the parties will not accede either to a conference, we acquire an accommodation, a compromise, or an arbitration, the other a right of has only the last resource for the defence of himself and his course to rights, an appeal to the sword; and he has justice on his force in a side in taking up arms against so untractable an adversary. doubtful For, in a doubtful cause, we can only demand all the reasonable methods of elucidating the question, and of deciding or accommodating the dispute (§ 331). cause, out attempt But let us never lose sight of what a nation owes to her 2 334. and own security, nor of that prudence by which she ought con- even withstantly to be directed. To authorize her to have recourse to ing other arms, it is not always necessary that every conciliatory mea- measures. sure be first expressly rejected: it is sufficient that she have every reason to believe that the enemy would not enter into those measures with sincerity,-that they could not be brought to terminate in a happy result,-and that the intervening delay would only expose her to a greater danger of being overpowered. This maxim is incontestable; but its application in practice is very delicate. A sovereign who would not be considered as a disturber of the public peace, will not be induced abruptly to attack him who has not refused to accede to pacific measures, unless he be able to justify his conduct in the eyes of all mankind, by proving that he has reason to consider those peaceable appearances as an artifice employed for the purpose of amusing him, and taking him by surprise. To make his bare suspicions serve as sufficient authority for such a step, would be sapping every foundation on which rests the security of nations. The faith of one nation has ever been suspected by an * When, in the year 1355, they submitted their differences with the dukes of Austria, in relation to the countries of Zug and Glaris, to the arbitration of Charles IV., it was not without this preliminary condition, that the emperor should not touch the liberty of those |