CHAP. III. make war son or ap pect of advantage, are lawless robbers: but those who seem BOOK II. to delight in the ravages of war, who spread it on all sides, without reasons or pretexts, and even without any other mo- tions who tive than their own ferocity, are monsters, unworthy the name without reaof men. They should be considered as enemies to the human race, in the same manner as, in civil society, professed assas- parent mosins and incendiaries are guilty, not only towards the parti- tives. cular victims of their nefarious deeds, but also towards the state, which therefore proclaims them public enemies. All nations have a right to join in a confederacy for the purpose of punishing and even exterminating those savage nations. Such were several Gerinan tribes mentioned by Tacitussuch those barbarians who destroyed the Roman empire: nor was it till long after their conversion to Christianity that this ferocity wore off. Such have been the Turks and other Tartars-Genghis-khan, Timur Bec or Tamerlane, who, like Attila, were scourges employed by the wrath of Heaven, and who made war only for the pleasure of making it. Such are, in polished ages and among the most civilized nations, those supposed heroes, whose supreme delight is a battle, and who make war from inclination purely, and not from love to their country. Defensive war is just when made against an unjust aggres- ? 35. How sor. This requires no proof. Self-defence against unjust violence is not only the right, but the duty of a nation, and one of her most sacred duties. But if the But if the enemy who wages offensive war has justice on his side, we have no right to make forcible opposition; and the defensive war then becomes unjust for that enemy only exerts his lawful right :he took arms only to obtain justice which was refused to him; and it is an act of injustice to resist any one in the exertion of his right. defensive war is just or unjust. come just All that remains to be done in such a case is, to offer the ? 36. How invader a just satisfaction. If he will not be content with it may bethis, a nation gains one great advantage-that of having against an turned the balance of justice on her own side; and his hos- offensive tilities, now becoming unjust, as having no longer any founda- war which tion, may very justly be opposed. The Samnites, instigated by the ambition of their chiefs, had ravaged the lands of the allies of Rome. When they became sensible of their misconduct, they offered full reparation for the damages, with every reasonable satisfaction: but all their submissions could not appease the Romans; whereupon Caius Pontius, general of the Samnites, said to his men, "Since the Romans are absolutely determined on war, necessity justifies it on our side; an appeal to arms becomes. lawful on the part of those who are deprived of every other resource."-Justum est bellum, quibus necessarium; et pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes.* Livy, lib. ix. init. at first was just. BOOK. III. an offensive war is just in an evi dent cause. In order to estimate the justice of an offensive war, the CHAP. III. nature of the subject for which a nation takes up arms must 37. How be first considered. We should be thoroughly assured of our right, before we proceed to assert it in so dreadful a manner. If, therefore, the question relates to a thing which is evidently just, as the recovery of our property, the assertion of a [306] clear and incontestable right, or the attainment of just satisfaction for a manifest injury, and if we cannot obtain justice otherwise than by force of arms, offensive war becomes lawful. Two things are therefore necessary to render it just: 1, some right which is to be asserted-that is to say, that we be authorized to demand something of another nation: 2, that we be unable to obtain it otherwise than by force of arms. Necessity alone warrants the use of force. It is a dangerous and terrible resource. Nature, the common parent of mankind, allows of it only in cases of the last extremity, and when all other means fail. It is doing wrong to a nation, to make use of violence against her, before we know whether she be disposed to do us justice, or to refuse it. ¿ 38. In a doubtful cause. ? 39. War Those who, without trying pacific measures, run to arms on every trifling occasion, sufficiently show that justificatory reasons are, in their mouths, mere pretexts: they eagerly seize the opportunity of indulging their passions and gratifying their ambition under some colour of right. In a doubtful cause, where the rights are uncertain, obscure and disputable, all that can be reasonably required is, that the question be discussed (Book II. § 331), and that, if it be impossible fully to clear it up, the contest be terminated by an equitable compromise. If, therefore, one of the parties should refuse to accede to such conciliatory measures, the other is justifiable in taking up arms to compel him to an accommodation. And we must observe, that war does not decide the question: victory only compels the vanquished to subscribe to the treaty which terminates the difference. It is an error, no less absurd than pernicious, to say that war is to decide controversies between those who acknowledge no superior judge as is the case with nations. Victory usually favours the cause of strength and prudence, rather than that of right and justice. It would be a bad rule of decision; but it is an effectual mode of compelling him who refuses to accede to such measures as are consonant to justice; and it becomes just in the hands of a prince who uses it seasonably, and for a lawful cause. War cannot be just on both sides. One party claims a cannot be right; the other disputes it: the one complains of an injury ; just on both the other denies having done it. They may be considered as two individuals disputing on the truth of a proposition; and it is impossible that two contrary sentiments should be sides. 40. Some true at the same time. It may however happen that both the contending parties ful. [ 307 ] are candid and sincere in their intentions; and, in a doubtful BOOK III. cause, it is still uncertain which side is in the right. Where- CHAP. III. fore, since nations are equal and independent (Book II. § 36, times reand Prelim. §§ 18, 19), and cannot claim a right of judgment puted lawover each other, it follows, that in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of the two parties at war are to be accounted equally lawful, at least as to external effects, and until the decision of the cause. But neither does that circumstance deprive other nations of the liberty of forming their own judgment on the case, in order to determine how they are to act, and to assist that party who shall appear to have right on his side; nor does that effect of the independence of nations operate in exculpation of the author of an unjust war, who certainly incurs a high degree of guilt. But if he acts in consequence of invincible ignorance or error, the injustice of his arms is not imputable to him. to punish a nation. When offensive war has for its object the punishment of a 41. War nation, it ought, like every other war, to be founded on right undertaken and necessity. 1. On right :—an injury must have been actually received. Injury alone being a just cause of war (§ 26), the reparation of it may be lawfully prosecuted: or if, in its nature, it be irreparable (the only case in which we are allowed to punish), we are authorized to provide for our own safety, and even for that of all other nations, by inflicting on the offender a punishment capable of correcting him, and serving as an example to others. 2. A war of this kind must have necessity to justify it: that is to say, that, to be lawful, it must be the only remaining mode to obtain a just satisfaction; which implies a reasonable security for the time to come. If that complete satisfaction be offered, or if it may be obtained without a war, the injury is done away, and the right to security no longer authorizes us to seek vengeance for it.-(See Book II. §§ 49, 52.) The nation in fault is bound to submit to a punishment which she has deserved, and to suffer it by way of atonement: but she is not obliged to give herself up to the discretion of an incensed enemy. Therefore, when attacked she ought to make a tender of satisfaction, and ask what penalty is required; and if no explicit answer be given, or the adversary attempts to impose a disproportionate penalty, she then acquires a right to resist, and her defence becomes lawful. On the whole, however, it is evident that the offended party alone has a right to punish independent persons. We shall not here repeat what we have said elsewhere (Book II. § 7) of the dangerous mistake, or extravagant pretensions, of those who assume a right of punishing an independent nation for faults which do not concern them-who, madly setting themselves up as defenders of the cause of God, take upon them to punish the moral depravity, or irreligion, of a people not committed to their superintendency. BOOK III. CHAP. III. grandizement of a neighbouring power Here a very celebrated question, and of the highest importance, presents itself. It is asked, whether the aggrandize242. Whe- ment of a neighbouring power, by whom a nation fears she ther the ag- may one day be crushed, be a sufficient reason for making war against him-whether she be justifiable in taking up arms to oppose his aggrandizement, or to weaken him, with the sole view of securing herself from those dangers which can autho- the weaker states have almost always reason to apprehend from an overgrown power. To the majority of politicians this question is no problem: it is more difficult of solution to [308] those who wish to see justice and prudence ever inseparably united. rize a war against him. it cannot On the one hand, a state that increases her power by all the arts of good government, does no more than what is commendable-she fulfils her duties towards herself without violating those which she owes to other nations. The sovereign, who, by inheritance, by free election, or by any other just and honourable means, enlarges his dominions by the addition of new provinces or entire kingdoms, only makes use of his right, without injuring any person. How then should it be lawful to attack a state which, for its aggrandizement, makes use only of lawful means? We must either have actually suffered an injury or be visibly threatened with one, before we are authorized to take up arms, or have just grounds for making war (§§ 26, 27). On the other hand, it is but too well known, from sad and uniform experience, that predominating powers seldom fail to molest their neighbours, to oppress them, and even totally subjugate them, whenever an opportunity occurs, and they can do it with impunity. Europe was on the point of falling into servitude for want of a timely opposition to the growing fortune of Charles V. Is the danger to be waited for? Is the storm, which might be dispersed at its rising, to be permitted to increase? Are we to allow of the aggrandizement of a neighbour, and quietly wait till he makes his preparations to enslave us? Will it be a time to defend ourselves when we are deprived of the means? Prudence is a duty incumbent on all men, and most pointedly so on the heads of nations, as being commissioned to watch over the safety of a whole people. Let us endeavour to solve this momentous question, agreeably to the sacred principles of the law of nature and of nations. We shall find that they do not lead to weak scruples, and that it is an invariable truth that justice is inseparable from sound policy. ? 43. Alone, And first, let us observe, that prudence, which is, no doubt, and of itself, a virtue highly necessary in sovereigns, can never recommend the use of unlawful means for the attainment of a just and laudable end. Let not the safety of the people, that supreme law of the state, be alleged here in objection; for the very safety of the people itself, and the common safety of nations, prohibit the use of means which are repugnant to justice and give a right to attack him. BOOK III. CHAP. III. probity. Why are certain means unlawful? If we closely consider the point, if we trace it to its first principles, we shall see that it is purely because the introduction of them would be pernicious to human society, and productive of fatal consequences to all nations. See particularly what we have said concerning the observance of justice (Book II. Chap. V.). For the interest, therefore, and even the safety of nations, we ought to hold it as a sacred maxim, that the end does not sanctify the means. And since war is not justifiable on any [309] other ground than that of avenging an injury received, or preserving ourselves from one with which we are threatened (§ 26), it is a sacred principle of the law of nations, that an increase of power cannot, alone and of itself, give any one a right to take up arms in order to oppose it. No injury has been received from that power (so the question ? 44. How the appearsupposes); we must, therefore, have good grounds to think ances of ourselves threatened by him, before we can lawfully have re- danger give course to arms. Now power alone does not threaten an in- that right. jury-it must be accompanied by the will. It is, indeed, very unfortunate for mankind, that the will and inclination to oppress may be almost always supposed, where there is a power of oppressing with impunity. But these two things are not necessarily inseparable: and the only right which we derive from the circumstance of their being generally or frequently united, is, that of taking the first appearances for a sufficient indication. When once a state has given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her. They may come upon her at the moment when she is on the point of acquiring a formidable accession of power,-may demand securities, and if she hesitates to give them, may prevent her designs by force of arms. The interests of nations are, in point of importance, widely different from those of individuals the sovereign must not be remiss in his attention to them, nor suffer his generosity and greatness of soul to supersede his suspicions. A nation that has a neighbour at once powerful and ambitious has her all at stake. As men are under a necessity of regulating their conduct in most cases by probabilities, those probabilities claim their attention in proportion to the importance of the subject: and (to make use of a geometrical expression) their right to obviate a danger is in a compound ratio of the degree of probability and the greatness of the evil threatened. If the evil in question be of a supportable nature,—if it be only some slight loss,matters are not to be precipitated: there is no great danger in delaying our opposition to it till there be a certainty of our being threatened. But if the safety of the state lies at stake, our precaution and foresight cannot be extended too far. Must we delay to avert our ruin till it is become inevi |