furnish it, or when the public safety would be exposed. BOOK III. circumstance also dispenses with it. This would be one of CHAP. VI. those cases in which a treaty becomes pernicious to the state, and therefore not obligatory (Book II. § 160). But we here speak of an imminent danger, threatening the very existence of the state. The case of such a danger is tacitly and necessarily reserved in every treaty. As to remote dangers, or those of no extraordinary magnitude,-since [327] they are inseparable from every military alliance, it would be absurd to pretend that they should create an exception; and the sovereign may expose the nation to them in consideration of the advantages which she reaps from the alliance. 93. Other cases. Two of the parties in an alliance coming to a rupture. 294. Re In virtue of these principles, we are absolved from the obligation of sending assistance to an ally while we are ourselves engaged in a war which requires our whole strength. If we are able to oppose our own enemies and to assist our ally at the same time, no reason can be pleaded for such dispensation. But, in such cases, it rests with ourselves to determine what our circumstances and strength will allow. It is the same with other things which may have been promised, as, for instance, provisions. There is no obligation to furnish an ally with them when we want them for our own use. We forbear to repeat in this place what we have said of various other cases, in discoursing of treaties in general, as, for example, of the preference due to the more ancient ally (Book II. § 167), and to a protector (ibid. § 204), of the meaning to be annexed to the term "allies," in a treaty in which they are reserved (ibid. § 309). Let us only add, on this last question, that, in a warlike alliance made against all opponents, the allies excepted, this exception is to be understood only of the present allies. Otherwise, it would afterwards be easy to elude the former treaty by new alliances; and it would be impossible for us to know either what we are doing in concluding such a treaty, or what we gain by it. A case which we have not spoken of is this:-Three powers have entered into a treaty of defensive alliance: two of them quarrel, and make war on each other:-how is the third to act? The treaty does not bind him to assist either the one or the other; for it would be absurd to say that he has promised his assistance to each against the other, or to one of the two in prejudice of the other. The only obligation, therefore, which the treaty imposes on him, is to endeavour, by the interposition of his good offices, to effect a reconciliation between his allies; and if his mediation proves unsuccessful, he remains at liberty to assist the party who appears to have justice on his side. To refuse an ally the succours due to him, without having fusal of the any just cause to allege for such refusal, is doing him an injury, since it is a violation of the perfect right which we gave him by a formal engagement. I speak of evident cases, it succours due in vir BOOK III. alliance. being then only that the right is perfect; for, in those of a doubtful nature, it rests with each party to judge what he is CHAP. VI. able to do (§ 92): but he is to judge maturely and impartially, tue of an and to act with candour. And as it is an obligation naturally incumbent on us, to repair any damage caused by our fault, and especially by our injustice, we are bound to indemnify an ally for all the losses he may have sustained in consequence. of our unjust refusal. How much circumspection, therefore, is to be used in forming engagements, which we cannot refuse to fulfil without material injury to our affairs or our [328] honour, and which, on the other hand, if complied with, may be productive of the most serious consequences. An engagement, which may draw us into a war, is of great 2 95. The moment in it the very existence of the state is at stake. enemy's He who in an alliance promises a subsidy or a body of auxilia- associates. ries, sometimes imagines that he only risks a sum of money or a certain number of soldiers; whereas he often exposes himself to war and all its calamities. The nation against whom he furnishes assistance will look upon him as her enemy; and should her arms prove successful, she will carry the war into his country. But it remains to be determined whether she can do this with justice, and on what occasions. Some authors* decide in general, that whoever joins our enemy, or assists him against us with money, troops, or in any other manner whatever, becomes thereby our enemy, and gives us a right to make war against him:-a cruel decision, and highly inimical to the peace of nations! It cannot be supported by principles; and happily the practice of Europe stands in opposition to it. It is true, indeed, that every associate of my enemy is himself my enemy. It is of little consequence whether any one makes war on me directly, and in his own name, or under the auspices of another. Whatever rights war gives me against my principal enemy, the like it gives me against all his associates: for I derive those rights from the right to security, from the care of my own defence; and I am equally attacked by the one and the other party. But the question is, to know whom I may lawfully account my enemy's associate, united against me in war. common cause with First, in that class I shall rank all those who are really 96. Those united in a warlike association with my enemy, and who who make a make a common cause with him, though it is only in the name of that principal enemy that the war is carried on. the enemy There is no need of proving this. In the ordinary and open are his assowarlike associations, the war is carried on in the name of all ciates; the allies, who are all equally enemies (§ 80). In the second place, I account as associates of my enemy, 97. And those who assist him in his war without being obliged to it those who See Wolf, Jus Gentium, 22 730 and 737. BOOK II. by any against CHAP. VI. ing obliged to it by treaties; aty. Since they freely and voluntarily declare they, of their own accord, choose to become my assist him, enemies. If they go no farther than furnishing a determined without be- succour, allowing some troops to be raised, or advancing money,—and, in other respects, preserve towards me the accustomed relations of friendship and neutrality,-I may overlook that ground of complaint; but still I have a right to call them to account for it. This prudent caution of not always coming to an open rupture with those who give such assistance to our enemy, that we may not force them to join him with all their strength,-this forbearance, I say, has gradually introduced the custom of not looking on such assistance as an act of hostility, especially when it consists [329] only in the permission to enlist volunteers. How often have the Switzers granted levies to France, at the same time that they refused such an indulgence to the house of Austria, though both powers were in alliance with them! How often have they allowed one prince to levy troops in their country, and refused the same permission to his enemy, when they were not in alliance with either! They granted or denied that favour according as they judged it most expedient for themselves; and no power has ever dared to attack them on that account. But if prudence dissuades us from making use of all our right, it does not thereby destroy that right. A cautious nation chooses rather to overlook certain points, than unnecessarily to increase the number of her enemies. ? 98. alliance Or with him. Thirdly, those, who, being united with my enemy by an who are in offensive alliance, actively assist him in the war which he an offensive declares against me, those, I say, concur in the injury intended against me. They show themselves my enemies, and I have a right to treat them as such. Accordingly, the Switzers, whose example we have above quoted, seldom grant troops except for defensive war. To those in the service of France, it has ever been a standing order from their sovereigns, not to carry arms against the empire, or against the states of the house of Austria in Germany. In 1644, the captains of the Neufchatel regiment of Guy, on information that they were destined to serve under Marshal Turenne, in Germany, declared that they would rather die than disobey their sovereign and violate the alliances of the Helvetic body. Since France has been mistress of Alsace, the Switzers who serve in her armies never pass the Rhine to attack the empire. The gallant Daxelhoffer, captain of a Berne. company in the French service, consisting of 200 men, and of which his four sons formed the first rank, seeing the general would oblige him to pass the Rhine, broke his espontoon, and marched back with his company to Berne. 299. How Even a defensive alliance made expressly against me, or a defensive (which amounts to the same thing) concluded with my enemy alliance as- during the war, or on the certain prospect of its speedy de CHAP. VI. claration, is an act of association against me; and if followed BOOK III. by effects, I may look on the party who has contracted it as my enemy. The case is here precisely the same as that of a sociates nation assisting my enemy without being under any obliga- with the tion to do so, and choosing of her own accord to become my enemy. (See § 97.) enemy. A defensive alliance, though of a general nature, and made ? 100. Anbefore any appearance of the present war, produces also the other case. same effect, if it stipulates the assistance of the whole strength of the allies: for in this case it is a real league, or warlike association; and, besides, it were absurd that I should be debarred from making war on a nation who opposes me with all her might, and thus exhausting the source of those succours with which she furnishes my enemy. In what light am I to consider an auxiliary who comes to make war on me at the head of all his forces? It would be mockery on his part, to pretend that he is not my enemy. What [ 330 ] more could he do, were he openly to declare himself such? He shows no tenderness for me on the occasion: he only wishes that a tender regard should be paid to himself. And shall I suffer him to preserve his provinces in peace, and secure from all danger, whilst he is doing me all the mischief in his power? No! the law of nature, the law of nations, obliges us to be just; but does not condemn us to be dupes. does not produce the same effect. But, if a defensive alliance has not been made against me 3 101. In in particular, nor concluded at the time when I was openly what case it preparing for war, or had already begun it,—and if the allies have only stipulated in it that each of them shall furnish a stated succour to him who shall be attacked,—I cannot require that they should neglect to fulfil a solemn treaty, which they had an unquestionable right to conclude without any injury to me. In furnishing my enemy with assistance, they only acquit themselves of a debt: they do me no wrong in discharging it; and, consequently, they afford me no just grounds for making war on them (§ 26). Neither can I say that my safety obliges me to attack them; for I should thereby only increase the number of my enemies, and, instead of a slender succour which they furnish against me, should draw on myself the whole power of those nations. It is, therefore, only the troops which they send as auxiliaries, that I am to consider as enemies. These are actually united with my enemies and fighting against me. The contrary principles would tend to multiply wars, and spread them beyond all bounds, to the common ruin of nations. It is happy for Europe, that, in this instance, the established custom is in accord with the true principles. A prince seldom presumes to complain of a nation's contributing to the defence of her ally by furnishing him with succours which were promised in former treaties,-in treaties that were not made against that prince in particular. In the last BOOK III. war, the United Provinces long continued to supply the queen CHAP. VI. of Hungary with subsidies, and even with troops; and France never complained of these proceedings till those troops marched into Alsace to attack the French frontier. Switzerland, in virtue of her alliance with France, furnishes that crown with numerous bodies of troops, and, nevertheless, lives in peace with all Europe. There is one case, however, which might form an exception to the general rule; it is that of a defensive war which is evidently unjust. For in such case there no longer exists any obligation to assist an ally (§§ 86, 87, 89). If you undertake to do it without necessity, and in violation of your duty, you do an injury to the enemy, and declare against him out of mere wantonness. But this is a case that very rarely occurs between nations. There are few defensive wars without at least some apparent reason to warrant their justice or necessity. Now, on any dubious occasion, each state is sole judge of the justice of her own cause; and the presumption is in favour of your ally (§ 86). Besides, it belongs to you alone to determine what conduct on your part will be con[331] formable to your duties and to your engagements; and consequently nothing less than the most palpable evidence can authorize the enemy of your ally to charge you with supporting an unjust war, contrary to the conviction of your own conscience. In fine, the voluntary law of nations ordains, that, in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of both parties shall, with regard to external effects, be accounted equally lawful (§ 40). ? 102. Whether it be declare war any The real associates of my enemy being my enemies, I have against them the same rights as against the principal necessary to enemy (§ 95). And as their own conduct proclaims them against the my enemies, and they take up arms against me in the first instance, I may Ι make war on them without declaration : the war being sufficiently declared by their own act. This is especially the case of those who in any manner whatever concur to make an offensive war against me; and it is likewise the case of all those whom we have mentioned in §§ 96, 97, 98, 99, 100. enemy's associates. But it is not thus with those nations which assist my enemy in a defensive war: I cannot consider them as his associates (§ 101). If I am entitled to complain of their furnishing him with succours, this is a new ground of quarrel between me and them. I may expostulate with them, and, on not receiving satisfaction, prosecute my right, and make war on them. But in this case there must be a previous declaration ($51). The example of Manlius, who made war on the Galatians for having supplied Antiochus with troops, is not a case in point. Grotius* censures the Roman general for * De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. iii. cap. iii. 10. |