CHAP. VI. having begun that war without a declaration. The Galatians, BOOK III. in furnishing troops for an offensive war against the Romans, had declared themselves enemies to Rome. It would appear, indeed, that, on peace being concluded with Antiochus, Manlius ought to have waited for orders from Rome before he attacked the Galatians; and then, if that expedition was considered as a fresh war, he should have not only issued a declaration, but also made a demand of satisfaction, previous to the commencement of hostilities (§ 51). But the treaty with the king of Syria had not yet received its consummation: and it concerned that monarch alone, without making any mention of his adherents. Therefore Manlius undertook the expedition against the Galatians, as a consequence or a remnant of the war with Antiochus. This is what he himself very well observed in his speech to the senate;* and he even added, that his first measure was to try whether he could bring the Galatians to reasonable terms. Grotius more appositely quotes the example of Ulysses and his followers,blaming them for having, without any declaration of war, attacked the Ciconians, who had sent succours to Priam during the siege of Troy.† CHAP. VII. [ 332 ] OF NEUTRALITY-AND THE PASSAGE OF TROOPS THROUGH A CHAP. VII. NEUTRAL COUNTRY. (151) tral nations. NEUTRAL nations are those who, in time of war, do not? 103. Neutake any part in the contest, but remain common friends to both parties, without favouring the arms of the one to the prejudice of the other. Here we are to consider the obligations and rights flowing from neutrality. observed by a neutral nation. In order rightly to understand this question, we must avoid 2 104. Conconfounding what may lawfully be done by a nation that is duct to be free from all engagements, with what she may do if she expects to be treated as perfectly neutral in a war. As long as a neutral nation wishes securely to enjoy the advantages of her neutrality, she must in all things show a strict impartiality towards the belligerent powers: for, should she favour one of the parties to the prejudice of the other, she cannot com Livy, lib. xxxviii. † Grotius, ubi supra, not. 3. (151) The modern illustrating decisions upon neutrals, and neutrality, will be found collected in 1 Chitty's Com mercial Law, 43-64, 383-490; Id. BOOK III. plain of being treated by him as an adherent and confederate CHAP. VII. of his enemy. Her neutrality would be a fraudulent neu trality, of which no nation will consent to be the dupe. It is sometimes suffered to pass unnoticed, merely for want of ability to resent it; we choose to connive at it, rather than excite a more powerful opposition against us. But the present question is, to determine what may lawfully be done, not what prudence may dictate according to circumstances. Let us therefore examine, in what consists that impartiality which a neutral nation ought to observe. It solely relates to war, and includes two articles,-1. To give no assistance when there is no obligation to give it,—nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or any thing of direct use in war. I do not say, "to give assistance equally," but "to give no assistance:" for it would be absurd that a state should at one and the same time assist two nations at war with each other; and, besides, it would be impossible to do it with equality. The same things, the like number of troops, the like quantity of arms, of stores, &c., furnished in different circumstances, are no longer equivalent succours. 2. In whatever does not relate to war, a neutral and impartial nation must not refuse to one of the parties, on account of his present quarrel, what she grants to the other. This does not deprive her of the liberty to make the advantage of the state still serve as her rule of conduct in her negotiations, her friendly connections, and her commerce. When this reason induces her to give preferences in things which are ever at the free disposal of the possessor, she only makes use of her right, and is not chargeable with partiality. But to refuse any of [333] those things to one of the parties purely because he is at war with the other, and because she wishes to favour the latter, would be departing from the line of strict neutrality. ? 105. An ally may succour due from him, I have said that a neutral state ought to give no assistance to either of the parties, when "under no obligation to give it." furnish the This restriction is necessary. We have already seen, that when a sovereign furnishes the moderate succour due in virtue of a former defensive alliance, he does not become an associate in the war (§ 101). He may, therefore, fulfil his engagement, and yet observe a strict neutrality. Of this, Europe affords frequent instances. and remain neuter. ? 106. Right of remain ing neuter. When a war breaks out between two nations, all other states that are not bound by treaties are free to remain neuter; and, if either of the belligerent powers attempted to force them to a junction with him, he would do them an injury, inasmuch as he would be guilty of an infringement on their independency in a very essential point. To themselves alone it belongs to determine whether any reason exists to induce them to join in the contest; and there are two points which claim their consideration: 1. The justice of the cause. If that be evident, injustice is not to be countenanced: on the contrary, CHAP. VII. it is generous and praiseworthy to succour oppressed inno- BOOK III. cence, when we possess the ability. If the case be dubious, the other nations may suspend their judgment, and not engage in a foreign quarrel. 2. When convinced which party has justice on his side, they have still to consider whether it be for the advantage of the state to concern themselves in this affair, and to embark in the war. trality. A nation making war, or preparing to make it, often pro- 107. Treaposes a treaty of neutrality to a state of which she entertains ties of neususpicions. It is prudent to learn betimes what she has to expect, and not to run the risk of a neighbour's suddenly joining with the enemy in the heat of the war. In every case where neutrality is allowable, it is also allowable to bind ourselves to it by treaty. Sometimes even necessity renders this justifiable. Thus, although it be the duty of all nations to assist oppressed innocence (Book II. § 4), yet, if an unjust conqueror, ready to invade his neighbour's possessions, makes me an offer of neutrality when he is able to crush me, what can I do better than to accept it? I yield to necessity; and my inability discharges me from a natural obligation. The same inability would even excuse me from a perfect obligation contracted by an alliance. The enemy of my ally threatens me with a vast superiority of force: my fate is in his hand: he requires me to renounce the liberty of furnishing any assistance against him. Necessity, and the care of my own safety, absolve me from my engagements. Thus it was that Louis the Fourteenth compelled Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy, to quit the party of the allies. But, then, the necessity must be very urgent. It is only the cowardly, or the perfidious, who avail themselves of the slightest grounds of alarm, to violate their promises and desert their duty. In the late war, the king [ 334 ] of Poland, elector of Saxony, and the king of Sardinia, firmly held out against the unfortunate course of events, and, to their great honour, could not be brought to treat without the concurrence of their allies. ditional rea son for mak Another reason renders these treaties of neutrality useful, ? 108. Adand even necessary. A nation that wishes to secure her own peace, when the flames of war are kindling in her neighbour-ing these hood, cannot more successfully attain that object than by con- treaties. cluding treaties with both parties, expressly agreeing what each may do or require in virtue of the neutrality. This is a sure mode to preserve herself in peace, and to obviate all disputes and cavils. trality. Without such treaties, it is to be feared that disputes will a 109. Founoften arise respecting what neutrality does or does not allow. dation of the This subject presents many questions which authors have dis- rules of neucussed with great heat, and which have given rise to the most dangerous quarrels between nations. Yet the law of nature and of nations has its invariable principles, and affords rules BOOK III. CHAP. VII. 2 110. How levies may be allowed, money lent, and every kind of on this head, as well as on the others. Some things also have grown into custom among civilized nations, and are to be conformed to by those who would not incur the reproach of unjustly breaking the peace.* As to the rules of the natural law of nations, they result from a just combination of the laws of war, with the liberty, the safety, the advantages, the commerce, and the other rights of neutral nations. It is on this principle that we shall lay down the following rules :— First, no act on the part of a nation, which falls within the exercise of her rights, and is done solely with a view to her own good, without partiality, without a design of favouring one power to the prejudice of another,-no act of that kind, I say, can in general be considered as contrary to neutrality; things sold, nor does it become such, except on particular occasions, when without a it cannot take place without injury to one of the parties, who neutrality. has then a particular right to oppose it. Thus, the besieger breach of has a right to prohibit access to the place besieged (see § 117 in the sequel). Except in cases of this nature, shall the quarrels of others deprive me of the free exercise of my rights in the pursuit of measures which I judge advantageous to my people? Therefore, when it is the custom of a nation, for the purpose of employing and training her subjects, to permit levies of troops in favour of a particular power to whom she thinks proper to intrust them, the enemy of that power cannot look upon such permissions as acts of hostility, unless they are given with a view to the invasion of his territories, or the [335] support of an odious and evidently unjust cause. He cannot even demand, as matter of right, that the like favour be granted to him, because that nation may have reasons for refusing him, which do not hold good with regard to his adversary; and it belongs to that nation alone to judge of what best suits her circumstances. The Switzers, as we have already observed, grant levies of troops to whom they please; and no power has hitherto thought fit to quarrel with them on that head. It must, however, be owned, that, if those levies were considerable, and constituted the principal strength of my enemy, while, without any substantial reason being alleged, I were absolutely refused all levies whatever,-I should have just cause to consider that nation as leagued with my enemy; and, in this case, the care of my own safety would authorize me to treat her as such. The case is the same with respect to money which a nation may have been accustomed to lend out at interest. If the sovereign, or his subjects, lend money to my enemy on that The following is an instance :-It was determined by the Dutch, that, on a vessel's entering a neutral port, after having taken any of the enemies of her nation prisoners on the high seas, she should be obliged to set those prisoners at liberty, because they were then fallen into the power of a nation that was in neutrality with the belligerent parties.— The same rule had been observed by England in the war between Spain and the United Provinces. footing, and refuse it to me because they have not the same confidence in me, this is no breach of neutrality. They lodge their property where they think it safest. If such preference be not founded on good reasons, I may impute it to ill-will against me, or to a predilection for my enemy. Yet if I should make it a pretence for declaring war, both the true principles of the law of nations, and the general custom happily established in Europe, would join in condemning me. While it appears that this nation lends out her money purely for the sake of gaining an interest upon it, she is at liberty to dispose of it according to her own discretion; and I have no right to complain. But if the loan were evidently granted for the purpose of enabling an enemy to attack me, this would be concurring in the war against me. If the troops, above alluded to, were furnished to my enemy by the state herself, and at her own expense, or the money in like manner lent by the state, without interest, it would no longer be a doubtful question whether such assistance were incompatible with neutrality. Further, it may be affirmed on the same principles, that if a nation trades in arms, timber for ship-building, vessels, and warlike stores,—I cannot take it amiss that she sells such things to my enemy, provided she does not refuse to sell them to me also at a reasonable price. She carries on her trade without any design to injure me; and by continuing it in the same manner as if I were not engaged in war, she gives me no just cause of complaint. BOOK III. CHAP. VII. 111. Trade of neutral nations with those which are at war. In what I have said above, it is supposed that my enemy goes himself to a neutral country to make his purchases. Let us now discuss another case,-that of neutral nations resorting to my enemy's country for commercial purposes. It is certain, that, as they have no part in my quarrel, they are under no obligation to renounce their commerce for the sake of avoiding to supply my enemy with the means of carrying [ 336 ] on the war against me. Should they affect to refuse selling me a single article, while at the same time they take pains to convey an abundant supply to my enemy, with an evident intention to favour him, such partial conduct would exclude them from the neutrality they enjoyed. But if they only continue their customary trade, they do not thereby declare themselves against my interest: they only exercise a right which they are under no obligation of sacrificing to me. (152) (152) It must be a continuance only Deb. 935. It has even been holden that of such customary trade. See Horne on a British-born subject, while domiciled Captures, 215-233; De Tastet v. Tay- in a neutral country, may legally trade lor, 4 Taunt. 238; Bell v. Reid, 1 Maule from that country with a state at war & Selw. 727; and an able speech of with this country. Bell v. Reid, 1 Maule Lord Erskine, 8th March, 1808, upon & Selwyn. 727.-C. the orders in Council; 10 Cobbett's Parl. |