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CHAP. IX.

annoy us in a dangerous manner. It is also sometimes prac- BOOK III. tised when we have no other means of forcing an enemy make war with humanity, or punishing him for some instance of outrageous conduct. But it is only in cases of the last extremity, and with reluctance, that good princes exert a right of so rigorous a nature. In the year 1694, the English [369] bombarded several maritime towns of France, on account of the great injury done to the British trade by their privateers. But the virtuous and noble-minded consort of William the Third did not receive the news of these exploits with real satisfaction. She expressed a sensible concern that war should render such acts of hostility necessary, adding, that she hoped such operations would be viewed in so odious a light, as to induce both parties to desist from them in future.*

Fortresses, ramparts, and every kind of fortification are a 170. Desolely appropriated to the purposes of war: and in a just molition of war, nothing is more natural, nothing more justifiable, than fortresses. to demolish those which we do not intend to retain in our own possession. We so far weaken the enemy, and do not involve an innocent multitude in the losses which we cause him. This was the grand advantage that France derived from her victories in a war in which she did not aim at making conquests.

Safe-guards are granted to lands and houses intended to g 171. Safebe spared, whether from pure favour, or with the proviso of guards. a contribution. These consist of soldiers, who protect them against parties, by producing the general's orders. The persons of these soldiers must be considered by the enemy as sacred: he cannot commit any hostilities against them, since they have taken their station there as benefactors, and for the safety of his subjects. They are to be respected in the same manner as an escort appointed to a garrison, or to prisoners of war, on their return to their own country.

moderation

What we have advanced is sufficient to give an idea of the 172. Gemoderation which we ought to observe, even in the most just neral rule of war, in exerting our right to pillage and ravage the enemy's respecting country. Except the single case in which there is question the evil of punishing an enemy, the whole is reducible to this general which may rule. All damage done to the enemy unnecessarily, every be done to act of hostility which does not tend to procure victory and an enemy. bring the war to a conclusion, is a licentiousness condemned by the law of nature.

deter

luntary law of nations

But this licentiousness is unavoidably suffered to pass with 173. Rule impunity, and to a certain degree, tolerated, between nation of the voand nation. How then shall in particular cases, we, mine with precision to what lengths it was necessary to carry on the same hostilities, in order to bring the war to a happy conclusion? subject. And even if the point could be exactly ascertained, nations acknowledge no common judge: each forms her own judg

Histoire de Guillaume III. liv. vi. tom. ii. p. 66.

BOOK III. ment of the conduct she is to pursue in fulfilling her duties. CHAP. IX. If you once open a door for continual accusations of outrageous excess in hostilities, you will only augment the number of complaints, and inflame the minds of the contending parties with increasing animosity: fresh injuries will be perpetually springing up; and the sword will never be sheathed till one [370] of the parties be utterly destroyed. The whole, therefore, should, between nation and nation, be confined to general rules, independent of circumstances, and sure and easy in the application. Now the rules cannot answer this description, unless they teach us to view things in an absolute sense,-to consider them in themselves and in their own nature. As, therefore, with respect to hostilities against the enemy's person, the voluntary law of nations only prohibits those measures which are in themselves unlawful and odious, such as poisoning, assassination, treachery, the massacre of an enemy who has surrendered and from whom we have nothing to fear, so the same law, in the question now before us, condemns every act of hostility which, of its own nature, and independently of circumstances, contributes nothing to the success of our arms, and does not increase our strength or weaken that of the enemy: and, on the other hand, it permits or tolerates every act which in itself is naturally adapted to promote the object of the war, without considering whether such act of hostility was unnecessary, useless, or superfluous, in that particular instance, unless there be the clearest evidence to prove that an exception ought to have been made in the case in question: for where there is positive evidence, the freedom of judgment no longer exists. Hence, the pillaging of a country, or ravaging it with fire, is not, in a general view of the matter, a violation of the laws of war: but if an enemy of much superior strength treats in this manner a town or province which he might easily keep in his possession as a means of obtaining an equitable and advantageous peace, he is universally accused of making war like a furious barbarian. Thus the wanton destruction of public monuments, temples, tombs, statues, paintings, &c., is absolutely condemned, even by the voluntary law of nations, as never being conducive to the lawful object of war. The pillage and destruction of towns, the devastation of the open country, ravaging, setting fire to houses, are measures no less odious and detestable on every occasion when they are evidently put in practice without absolute necessity, or at least very cogent reasons. But as the perpetrators of such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate them under pretext of deservedly punishing the enemy,-be it here observed, that the natural and voluntary law of nations does not allow us to inflict such punishments, except for enormous offences against the law of nations and even then, it is glorious to listen to the voice. of humanity and clemency, when rigour is not absolutely ne

cessary. Cicero condemns the conduct of his countrymen in BOOK III. destroying Corinth to avenge the unworthy treatment offered CHAP. IX. to the Roman ambassadors, because Rome was able to assert the dignity of her ministers without proceeding to such extreme rigour.

CHAP. X.

OF FAITH BETWEEN ENEMIES, OF STRATAGEMS, ARTIFICES IN
WAR, SPIES, AND SOME OTHER PRACTICES.

[ 371 ]

CHAP. X.

between

THE faith of promises and treaties is the basis of the peace $ 174. Faith of nations, as we have shown in an express chapter (Book II. to be sacred Ch. XV.) It is sacred among men, and absolutely essential enemies. to their common safety. Are we then dispensed from it towards an enemy? To imagine that between two nations at war every duty ceases, every tie of humanity is broken, would be an error equally gross and destructive. Men, although reduced to the necessity of taking up arms for their own defence, and in support of their rights, do not therefore cease to be men. They are still subject to the same laws of nature:otherwise there would be no laws of war. Even he who wages an unjust war against us is still a man: we still owe him whatever that quality requires of us. But a conflict arises between. our duties towards ourselves, and those which connect us with other men. The right to security authorizes us to put in practice, against this unjust enemy, every thing necessary for repelling him, or bringing him to reason. But all those duties, the exercise of which is not necessarily suspended by this conflict, subsist in their full force: they are still obligatory on us, both with respect to the enemy and to all the rest of mankind. Now, the obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in time of war by virtue of the preference which the duties towards ourselves are entitled to, that it then becomes more necessary than ever. There are a thousand occasions, even in the course of the war, when, in order to check its rage, and alleviate the calamities which follow in its train, the mutual interest and safety of both the contending parties requires that they should agree on certain points. What would become of prisoners of war, capitulating garrisons, and towns that surrender, if the word of an enemy were not to be relied on? War would degenerate into an unbridled and cruel licentiousness its evils would be restrained by no bounds; and how could we ever bring it to a conclusion and re-establish peace? If faith be banished from among enemies, a war can never be terminated with any degree of safety, otherwise than by the total destruction of one of the parties. The slightest

BOOK III. difference, the least quarrel, would produce a war similar to CHAP. x. that of Hannibal against the Romans, in which the parties fought, not for this or that province, not for sovereignty or for glory, but for the very existence of their respective na[372]tions. Thus it is certain that the faith of promises and treaties is to be held sacred in war as well as in peace, between enemies as well as between friends. (166)

$ 175. What treaties are

to be observed be

tween enemies.

§ 176. On what occa

may be broken.

The conventions, the treaties made with a nation, are broken or annulled by a war arising between the contracting parties, either because those compacts are grounded on a tacit supposition of the continuance of peace, or because each of the parties, being authorized to deprive his enemy of what belongs to him, takes from him those rights which he had conferred on him by treaty. Yet here we must except those treaties by which certain things are stipulated in case of a rupture,―as, for instance, the length of time to be allowed on each side for the subjects of the other nation to quit the country,-the neutrality of a town or province, insured by mutual consent, &c. Since, by treaties of this nature, we mean to provide for what shall be observed in case of a rupture, we renounce the right of cancelling them by a declaration of war.

For the same reason, all promises made to an enemy in the course of a war are obligatory. For when once we treat with him whilst the sword is unsheathed, we tacitly but necessarily renounce all power of breaking the compact by way of compensation or on account of the war, as we cancel antecedent treaties, otherwise it would be doing nothing, and there would be an absurdity in treating with the enemy at all.

But conventions made during a war are like all other comsions they pacts and treaties, of which the reciprocal observance is a tacit condition (Book II. § 202): we are no longer bound to observe them towards an enemy who has himself been the first to violate them. And even where there is question of two separate conventions which are wholly unconnected with each other,although we are never justifiable in using perfidy on the plea of our having to do with an enemy who has broken his word on a former occasion, we may nevertheless suspend the effect of a promise in order to compel him to repair his breach of faith; and what we have promised him may be detained by way of security, till he has given satisfaction for his perfidy. Thus, at the taking of Namur, in 1695, the King of England caused Marshal Boufflers to be put under arrest, and, notwithstanding the capitulation, detained him prisoner, for the purpose of obliging France to make reparation for the infractions of the capitulations of Dixmude and Deinse.†

De salute certatum est.

Britain of contracts of ransom, constitute exceptions, post, 403-4 4.—C. Histoire de Guillaume III. tom. ii.

(166) To this doctrine, the prohibi-
tion of subjects of belligerent states
having commercial contracts with each p. 148.
other, and the prohibition in Grea

СНАР. Х.

$ 177. Of

Good-faith consists not only in the observance of our pro- BOOK III. mises, but also in not deceiving on such occasions as lay us under any sort of obligation to speak the truth. From this subject arises a question which has been warmly debated in lies. former days, and which appeared not a little intricate at a time when people did not entertain just or accurate ideas respecting the nature of a lie. Several writers, and especially divines, have made truth a kind of deity, to which, for its own sake, and independently of its consequences, we owe a certain inviolable respect. They have absolutely condemned every [373] speech that is contrary to the speaker's thoughts: they have pronounced it to be our duty, on every occasion when we cannot be silent, to speak the truth according to the best of our knowledge, and to sacrifice to their divinity our dearest interests rather than be deficient in respect to her. But philoterests, of more accurate ideas and more profound penetration have cleared up that notion, so confused, and so false in its consequences. They have acknowledged that truth in general is to be respected, as being the soul of human society, the basis of all confidence in the mutual intercourse of men,-and, consequently, that a man ought not to speak an untruth, even in matters of indifference, lest he weaken the respect due to truth in general, and injure himself by rendering his veracity questionable even when he speaks seriously. But in thus grounding the respect due to truth on its effects, they took the right road, and soon found it easy to distinguish between the occasions when we are obliged to speak the truth, or declare our thoughts, and those when there exists no such obligation. The appellation of lies is given only to the words of a man who speaks contrary to his thoughts, on occasions when he is under an obligation to speak the truth. Another name (in Latin, falsiloquium*) is applied to any false discourse to persons who have no right to insist on our telling them the truth in the particular case in question.

These principles being laid down, it is not difficult to ascertain the lawful use of truth or falsehood towards an enemy on particular occasions. Whenever we have expressly or tacitly engaged to speak truth, we are indispensably obliged to it by that faith of which we have proved the inviolability. Such is the case of conventions and treaties :-it is indispensably necessary that they should imply a tacit engagement to speak the truth; for it would be absurd to allege that we do not enter into any obligation of not deceiving the enemy under colour of treating with him :-it would be downright mockery, -it would be doing nothing. We are also bound to speak the truth to an enemy on all occasions when we are naturally obliged to it by the laws of humanity,-that is to say, whenever the success of our arms, and the duties we owe to our

* Falsiloquy, false speaking, untruth, falsehood.

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