CHAP. I. seek to promote their own advantage at the expense and de- BOOK IV. triment of other nations: however intent they may be on their own happiness, they will ever be careful to combine it with that of others, and with justice and equity. Thus disposed, they will necessarily cultivate peace. If they do not live together in peace, how can they perform those mutual and sacred duties which nature enjoins them? And this state is found to be no less necessary to their happiness than to the discharge of their duties. Thus, the law of nature every way obliges them to seek and cultivate peace. That divine law has no other end in view than the welfare of mankind to that object all its rules and all its precepts tend: they are all deducible from this principle, that men should seek their own felicity; and morality is no more than the art of acquiring happiness. As this is true of individuals, it is equally so of nations, as must appear evident to any one who will but take the trouble of reflecting on what we have said of their common and reciprocal duties, in the first chapter of the second book. to it. This obligation of cultivating peace binds the sovereign by ? 3. The soa double tie. He owes this attention to his people, on whom vereign's war would pour a torrent of evils; and he owes it in the obligation most strict and indispensable manner, since it is solely for the advantage and welfare of the nation that he is intrusted with the government. (Book I. § 39.) He owes the same attention to foreign nations, whose happiness likewise is disturbed by The nation's duty in this respect has been shown in the preceding chapter; and the sovereign, being invested with the public authority, is at the same time charged with all the duties of the society, or body of the nation. (Book I. § 41.) war. The nation or the sovereign ought not only to refrain, on ? 4. Extent their own part, from disturbing that peace which is so salu- of this duty. tary to mankind: they are, moreover, bound to promote it as far as lies in their power,-to prevent others from breaking it without necessity, and to inspire them with the love of justice, equity, and public tranquillity,—in a word, with the love of peace. It is one of the best offices a sovereign can render to nations, and to the whole universe. What a glorious and amiable character is that of peace-maker! Were a powerful prince thoroughly acquainted with the advantages attending it, were he to conceive what pure and effulgent glory he may derive from that endearing character, together with the gratitude, the love, the veneration, and the confidence of nations, did he know what it is to reign over the hearts of men, he would wish thus to become the benefactor, the [431] friend, the father of mankind; and in being so, he would find infinitely more delight than in the most splendid conquests. Augustus, shutting the temple of Janus, giving peace to the universe, and adjusting the disputes of kings and nations, BOOK IV. Augustus, at that moment, appears the greatest of mortals, and, as it were, a god upon earth. CHAP. I. 25. Of the disturbers of the public peace. 26. How be continu ed. But those disturbers of the public peace,-those scourges of the earth, who, fired by a lawless thirst of power, or impelled by the pride and ferocity of their disposition, snatch up arms without justice or reason, and sport with the quiet of mankind and the blood of their subjects,-those monstrous heroes, though almost deified by the foolish admiration of the vulgar, are in effect the most cruel enemies of the human race, and ought to be treated as such. Experience shows what a train of calamities war entails even upon nations that are not immediately engaged in it. War disturbs commerce, destroys the subsistence of mankind, raises the price of all the most necessary articles, spreads just alarms, and obliges all nations to be upon their guard, and to keep up an armed force. He, therefore, who without just cause breaks the general peace, unavoidably does an injury even to those nations which are not the objects of his arms; and by his pernicious example he essentially attacks the happiness and safety of every nation upon earth. He gives them a right to join in a general confederacy for the purpose of repressing and chastising him, and depriving him of a power which he so enormously abuses. What evils does he not bring on his own nation, lavishing her blood to gratify his inordinate passions, and exposing her to the resentment of a host of enemies! A famous minister of the last century has justly merited the indignation of his country, by involving her in unjust or unnecessary wars. If by his abilities and indefatigable application, he procured her distinguished successes in the field of battle, he drew on her, at least for a time, the execration of all Europe. The love of peace should equally prevent us from embarkfar war may ing in a war without necessity, and from persevering in it after the necessity has ceased to exist. When a sovereign has been compelled to take up arms for just and important reasons, he may carry on the operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to procure justice and safety. (Book III. § 28.) If the cause be dubious, the just end of war can only be to bring the enemy to an equitable compromise (Book III. § 38); and consequently the war must not be continued beyond that point. The moment our enemy proposes or consents to such compromise, it is our duty to desist from hostilities. But if we have to do with a perfidious enemy, it would be [432] imprudent to trust either his words or his oaths. In such case, justice allows and prudence requires that we should avail ourselves of a successful war, and follow up our advantages, till we have humbled a dangerous and excessive power, or compelled the enemy to give us sufficient security for the time to come. CHAP. I. Finally, if the enemy obstinately rejects equitable condi- BOOK IV. tions, he himself forces us to continue our progress till we. have obtained a complete and decisive victory, by which he is absolutely reduced and subjected. The use to be made of victory has been shown above. (Book III. Chap. VIII. IX. XIII.) When one of the parties is reduced to sue for peace, or ? 7. Peace both are weary of the war, then thoughts of an accommoda- the end of tion are entertained, and the conditions are agreed on. Thus peace steps in and puts a period to the war. war. The general and necessary effects of peace are the reconci- ? 8. Geneliation of enemies and the cessation of hostilities on both ral effects sides. It restores the two nations to their natural state. of peace. CHAP. II. TREATIES OF PEACE. (188) CHAP. II. WHEN the belligerent powers have agreed to lay down ? 9. Definitheir arms, the agreement or contract in which they stipulate tion of a the conditions of peace, and regulate the manner in which it treaty of is to be restored and supported, is called the treaty of peace. peace. cluded. The same power who has the right of making war, of de- 10. By હૈ termining on it, of declaring it, and of directing its opera- whom it tions, has naturally that likewise of making and concluding may be conthe treaty of peace. (189) These two powers are connected together, and the latter naturally follows from the former. If the ruler of the state is empowered to judge of the causes and reasons for which war is to be undertaken,-of the time and circumstances proper for commencing it, of the manner in which it is to be supported and carried on,-it is therefore his province also to set bounds to its progress, to point out the time when it shall be discontinued, and to conclude a peace. But this power does not necessarily include that of granting or accepting whatever conditions he pleases, with a view to peace. Though the state has intrusted to the prudence of her ruler the general care of determining on war and peace, yet she may have limited his power in many particulars by the fundamental laws. Thus, Francis the First, king of France, had the absolute disposal of war and peace: and yet the assembly of Cognac declared that he had no authority to alienate any (188) Upon the subject of treaties in general, and their construction, see ante, book ii. ch. xii. p. 192-274. Whilst examining the sections of Vattel relative to treaties, it will be found advisable to read the modern treaties, which are collected in Chitty's Commercial (189) Ante, 291-2; and see Hoop, 1 BOOK IV. part of the kingdom by a treaty of peace. (See Book I. § 265.) CHAP. II. A nation that has the free disposal of her domestic affairs, and of the form of her government, may intrust a single person, or an assembly, with the power of making peace, although she has not given them that of making war. Of this we have an instance in Sweden, where, since the death of [433] Charles XII., the king cannot declare war without the consent of the states assembled in diet; but he may make peace in conjunction with the senate. It is less dangerous for a nation. to intrust her rulers with this latter power, than with the former. She may reasonably expect that they will not make peace till it suits with the interest of the state. But their passions, their own interest, their private views, too often influence their resolutions where there is question of undertaking a war. Besides, it must be a very disadvantageous peace, indeed, that is not preferable to war, whereas, on the other hand, to exchange peace for war is always very hazardous. 2 11. Alien When a prince, who is possessed only of limited authority, has a power to make peace, as he cannot of himself grant whatever conditions he pleases, it is incumbent on those who wish to treat with him on sure grounds, to require that the treaty of peace be ratified by the nation, or by those who are empowered to perform the stipulations contained in it. If, for instance, any potentate, in negotiating a treaty of peace with Sweden, requires a defensive alliance or guarantee as the condition, this stipulation will not be valid, unless approved and accepted by the diet, who alone have the power of carrying it into effect. The kings of England are authorized to conclude treaties of peace and alliance; but they cannot, by those treaties, alienate any of the possessions of the crown without the consent of parliament. Neither can they, without the concurrence of that body, raise any money in the kingdom; wherefore, whenever they conclude any subsidiary treaty, it is their constant rule to lay it before the parliament, in order that they may be certain of the concurrence of that assembly to enable them to make good their engagements. When the emperor Charles V. required of Francis the First, his prisoner, such conditions as that king could not grant without the consent of the nation, he should have detained him till the states-general of France had ratified the treaty of Madrid, and Burgundy had acquiesced in it: thus he would not have lost the fruits of his victory by an oversight which appears very surprising in a prince of his abilities. We shall not repeat here what we have said on a former ations made occasion concerning the alienation of a part of the state by a treaty (Book I. §§ 263, &c.), or of the whole state. (Ibid. §§ 68, &c.) We shall therefore content ourselves with observing, that, in case of a pressing necessity, such as is produced by the events of an unfortunate war, the alienations made by the of peace. CHAP. II. prince, in order to save the remainder of the state, are consi- BOOK iv. dered as approved and ratified by the mere silence of the nation, when she has not, in the form of her government, retained some easy and ordinary method of giving her express consent, and has lodged an absolute power in the prince's hands. The states-general are abolished in France by disuse and by the tacit consent of the nation. Whenever, therefore, that kingdom is reduced to any calamitous exigency, it belongs to the king alone to determine by what sacrifices he may pur- [ 434 ] chase peace and his enemies will treat with him on a sure footing. It would be a vain plea on the part of the people, to say that it was only through fear they acquiesced in the abolition of the states-general. The fact is, that they did acquiesce, and thereby suffered the king to acquire all the powers necessary for contracting with foreign states in the name of the nation. In every state there must necessarily be some power with which other nations may treat on secure grounds. A certain historian* says, that, "by the fundamental laws, the kings of France cannot, to the prejudice of their successors, renounce any of their rights, by any treaty, whether voluntary or compulsory." The fundamental laws may indeed withhold from the king the power of alienating, without the nation's consent, what belongs to the state; but they cannot invalidate an alienation or renunciation made with that consent. And if the nation has permitted matters to proceed to such lengths that she now has no longer any means of expressly declaring her consent, her silence alone, on such occa sions, is in reality a tacit consent. Otherwise there would be no possibility of treating on sure grounds with such a state; and her pretending thus beforehand to invalidate all future treaties would be an infringement of the law of nations, which ordains that all states should retain the means of treating with each other (Book I. § 262), and should observe their treaties. (Book II. §§ 163, 269, &c.) It is to be observed, however, that in our examination. whether the consent of the nation be requisite for alienating any part of the state, we mean such parts as are still in the nation's possession, and not those which have fallen into the enemy's hands during the course of the war: for, as these latter are no longer possessed by the nation, it is the sovereign * The abbé de Choisi, Hist. de Charles national approbation, and the character V. p. 492. of a law of the state. The cardinals who examined this affair by order of the pope, whom Charles II. had consulted, paid no regard to Maria Theresa's renunciation, as not deeming it of sufficient force to invalidate the laws of the country, and to supersede the established custom.-Memoirs of M. de St. Philippe, vol. i. p. 29.-Ed. A. D. 1797. The renunciation made by Anne of Austria, consort of Louis the Thirteenth, was good and valid, because it was confirmed by the general assembly of the cortes, and registered in all the offices. The case was otherwise with that made by Anna Theresa, which was not sanctioned by those formalities, -consequently, not stamped with the |