BOOK I. CHAP. I. There occurs no greater difficulty with respect to tributary states; for though the payment of tribute to a foreign power does in some degree diminish the dignity of those states, from? 7. of tributary its being a confession of their weakness,-yet it suffers their states. sovereignty to subsist entire. The custom of paying tribute was formerly very common,-the weaker by that means purchasing of their more powerful neighbour an exemption from oppression, or at that price securing his protection, without ceasing to be sovereigns. states. The Germanic nations introduced another custom-that a 8. of of requiring homage from a state either vanquished, or too feudatory weak to make resistance. Sometimes even, a prince has given sovereignties in fee, and sovereigns have voluntarily rendered themselves feudatories to others. When the homage leaves independency and sovereign authority in the administration of the state, and only means certain duties to the lord of the fee, or even a mere honorary acknowledgment, it does not prevent the state or the feudatory prince being strictly sovereign. The king of Naples pays homage for his kingdom to the pope, and is nevertheless reckoned among the principal sovereigns of Europe. ject to the same prince. Two sovereign states may also be subject to the same ? 9. Of two prince, without any dependence on each other, and each may states subretain all its rights as a free and sovereign state. The king of Prussia is sovereign prince of Neufchatel in Switzerland, without that principality being in any manner united to his other dominions; so that the people of Neufchatel, in virtue of their franchises, may serve a foreign power at war with the king of Prussia, provided that the war be not on account of that principality. republic. Finally, several sovereign and independent states may ? 10. of unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, with- states formout ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state. They ing a federal will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfil engagements which he has voluntarily contracted. Such were formerly the cities of Greece; such are at present the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, (13) and such the members of the Helvetic body. volted colony, or part of a parent or principal state, no subject of another state can legally make a contract with it or assist the same without leave of his own government, before its separate independence has been recognised by his own government. Jones 4. Garcia del Rio, 1 Turn. & Russ. 297; Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. Rep. 202; (13) Of course, the words "at pre- state that BOOK I. But a people that has passed under the dominion of anCHAP. I. other is no longer a state, and can no longer avail itself directly 11. Of a of the law of nations. Such were the nations and kingdoms which the Romans rendered subject to their empire; the has passed under the generality even of those whom they honoured with the name dominion of of friends and allies no longer formed real states. Within themselves they were governed by their own laws and magistrates; but without, they were in every thing obliged to follow the orders of Rome; they dared not of themselves either to make war or contract alliances; and could not treat with nations. another. [ 4 ] 12. The The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; free and indeobjects of pendent states are moral persons, whose rights and obligations this treatise. we are to establish in this treatise. CHAP. II. CHAP. II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DUTIES OF A NATION TOWARDS to act a its nature. ITSELF. 13. A na- IF the rights of a nation spring from its obligations, it is tion ought principally from those that relate to itself. It will further greeably to appear, that its duties towards others depend very much on its duties towards itself, as the former are to be regulated and measured by the latter. As we are then to treat of the obligations and rights of nations, an attention to order requires that we should begin by establishing what each nation owes to itself. (14) The general and fundamental rule of our duties towards ourselves is, that every moral being ought to live in a manner conformable to his nature, naturæ convenienter vivere.(14) A nation is a being determined by its essential attributes. that has its own nature, and can act in conformity to it. There are then actions of a nation as such, wherein it is concerned in its national character, and which are either suitable Vattel wrote, and it is unnecessary to (14) If to particularize may be has acquired powers far beyond its diminutive extent. These being established, it becomes the duty of such a state, and of those exercising the powers of government, to cultivate and improve these natural advantages; and in that view the ancient exclusive navigation system, constituting England the carrier of Europe and the world, were highly laudable; and it is to be hoped that a return of the system, injudiciously abandoned, will ere long take place.-C. or opposite to what constitutes it a nation; so that it is not BOOK I. a matter of indifference whether it performs some of those CHAP. II. actions, and omits others. In this respect, the Law of Nature prescribes it certain duties. We shall see, in this first book, what conduct a nation ought to observe, in order that it may not be wanting to itself. But we shall first sketch out a general idea of this subject. vation and perfection of a nation. He who no longer exists can have no duties to perform and 14. of a moral being is charged with obligations to himself, only with the presera view to his perfection and happiness: for to preserve and to perfect his own nature, is the sum of all his duties to himself. The preservation of a nation consists in the duration of the political association by which it is formed. If a period is put to this association, the nation or state no longer subsists, though the individuals that composed it still exist. The perfection of a nation is found in what renders it capable of obtaining the end of civil society; and a nation is in a perfect state, when nothing necessary is wanting to arrive at that end. We know that the perfection of a thing consists, generally, in the perfect agreement of all its constituent parts to tend to the same end. A nation being a multitude of men united together in civil society-if in that multitude all conspire to attain the end proposed in forming a civil society, the nation is perfect; and it is more or less so, according as it approaches more or less to that perfect agree- [5] ment. In the same manner its external state will be more or less perfect, according as it concurs with the interior perfection of the nation. civil society. The end or object of civil society is to procure for the ? 15. What citizens whatever they stand in need of for the necessities, is the end of the conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in general, whatever constitutes happiness,-with the peaceful possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with security, and, finally, a mutual defence against all external violence. It is now easy to form a just idea of the perfection of a state or nation:-every thing in it must conspire to promote the ends we have pointed out. an obligation to pre In the act of association, by virtue of which a multitude & 16. A naof men form together a state or nation, each individual has tion is under entered into engagements with all, to promote the general welfare; and all have entered into engagements with each serve itself. individual, to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest that these reciprocal engagements can no otherwise be fulfilled than by maintaining the political association. The entire nation is then obliged to maintain that association; and as their preservation depends on its continuance, it thence follows that every nation is obliged to perform the duty of self-preservation. This obligation, so natural to each individual of God's BOOK I. creation, is not derived to nations immediately from nature, CHAP. II. but from the agreement by which civil society is formed: it is therefore not absolute, but conditional,-that is to say, it supposes a human act, to wit, the social compact. And as compacts may be dissolved by common consent of the parties -if the individuals that compose a nation should unanimously agree to break the link that binds them, it would be lawful for them to do so, and thus to destroy the state or nation; but they would doubtless incur a degree of guilt, if they took this step without just and weighty reasons; for civil societies are approved by the Law of Nature, which recommends them. to mankind, as the true means of supplying all their wants, and of effectually advancing towards their own perfection. Moreover, civil society is so useful, nay so necessary to all citizens, that it may well be considered as morally impossible for them to consent unanimously to break it without necessity. But what citizens may or ought to do what the majority of them may resolve in certain cases of necessity or of pressing exigency-are questions that will be treated of elsewhere: they cannot be solidly determined without some principles which we have not yet established. For the present, it is sufficient to have proved, that, in general, as long as the political society subsists, the whole nation is obliged to endeavour to maintain it. its members. ? 17. And If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less obliged to preserve carefully to preserve all its members. The nation owes this to itself, since the loss even of one of its members weakens it, and is injurious to its preservation. It owes this also to the members in particular, in consequence of the very act of association; for those who compose a nation are united for their [6] defence and common advantage; and none can justly be deprived of this union, and of the advantages he expects to derive from it, while he on his side fulfils the conditions.(15) 18. A nation has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation. The body of a nation cannot then abandon a province, a town, or even a single individual who is a part of it, unless compelled to it by necessity, or indispensably obliged to it by the strongest reasons founded on the public safety.(16) Since then a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation. For the Law of Nature gives us a right to every thing without which we cannot fulfil our obligation; otherwise it would oblige us (15) This principle is in every respect recognised and acted upon by our municipal law. It is in respect of, and as a due return for, the protection every natural born subject is entitled to, and actually does, by law, receive from the instant of his birth, that all the obligations of allegiance attach upon him, and from which he cannot by any act of his own emancipate him self. This is the principle upon which is founded the rule "Nemo potest exuere patriam," Calvin's case, 7 Coke, 25; Co. Lit. 129, a; and see an interesting application of that rule in Macdonald's case, Forster's Crown Law, 59.-C. (16) In tracing the consequences of this rule, we shall hereafter perceive how important is the rule itself.-C. BOOK I. to do impossibilities, or rather would contradict itself in prescribing us a duty, and at the same time debarring us of the CHAP. II. only means of fulfilling it. It will doubtless be here understood, that those means ought not to be unjust in themselves, or such as are absolutely forbidden by the Law of Nature. As it is impossible that it should ever permit the use of such means, if on a particular occasion no other present themselves for fulfilling a general obligation, the obligation must, in that particular instance, be looked on as impossible, and consequently void. thing that might occa By an evident consequence from what has been said, a na-3 19. It tion ought carefully to avoid, as much as possible, whatever ought to might cause its destruction, or that of the state, which is the avoid every same thing. A nation or state has a right to every thing that can help sion its deto ward off imminent danger, and keep at a distance whatever struction. is capable of causing its ruin; and that from the very same? 20. of reasons that establish its right to the things necessary to its preservation. (17) its right to every thing that may ? 21. A na The second general duty of a nation towards itself is to promote labour at its own perfection and that of its state. It is this this end. double perfection that renders a nation capable of attaining tion ought the end of civil society: it would be absurd to unite in to perfect society, and yet not endeavour to promote the end of that itself and union. Here the entire body of a nation, and each individual citizen, are bound by a double obligation, the one immediately proceeding from nature, and the other resulting from their reciprocal engagements. Nature lays an obligation upon each man to labour after his own perfection; and in so doing, he labours after that of civil society, which could not fail to be very flourishing, were it composed of none but good citizens. But the individual finding in a well-regulated society, the most powerful succours to enable him to fulfil the task which Nature imposes upon him in relation to himself, for becoming better, and consequently more happy, he is doubtless obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect. the state. All the citizens who form a political society reciprocally engage to advance the common welfare, and as far as possi- [ 7 ] ble to promote the advantage of each member. Since then the perfection of the society is what enables it to secure equally the happiness of the body and that of the members, the grand object of the engagements and duties of a citizen is to aim at this perfection. This is more particularly the (17) Salus populi suprema est lex. Upon this principle it has been established, that for national defence in war, it is legal to pull down or injure the property of any private individual. |