BOOK I. duty of the body collective in all their common deliberations, CHAP. II. and in every thing they do as a body.(18) 22. And to A nation therefore ought to prevent, and carefully to avoid, avoid every whatever may hinder its perfection and that of the state, or trary to its retard the progress either of the one or the other.(19) thing con perfection. rights it derives from We may then conclude, as we have done above in regard to 23. The the preservation of a state (§ 18), that a nation has a right to every thing without which it cannot attain the perfection of the members and of the state, or prevent and repel whatever is contrary to this double perfection. these obli- On this subject, the English furnish us an example highly worthy of attention. That illustrious nation distinguishes itself in a glorious manner by its application to every thing that can render the state more flourishing. An admirable constitution there places every citizen in a situation that enables him to contribute to this great end, and everywhere diffuses that spirit of genuine patriotism which zealously exerts itself for the public welfare. We there see private citizens form considerable enterprises, in order to promote the glory and welfare of the nation. And while a bad prince would find his hands tied up, a wise and moderate king finds the most powerful aids to give success to his glorious designs. The nobles and the representatives of the people form a link of confidence between the monarch and the nation, and, concurring with him in every thing that tends to promote the public welfare, partly ease him of the burden of government, give stability to his power, and procure him an obedience the more perfect, as it is voluntary. Every good citizen sees that the strength of the state is really the advantage of all, and not that of a single person.(20) Happy constitution! which they did not suddenly obtain: it has cost rivers of blood; but they have not purchased it too dear. May luxury, that pest so fatal to the manly and patriotic virtues, that minister of corruption so dangerous to liberty, never overthrow a monument that does so much honour to human nature-a monument capable of teaching kings how glorious it is to rule over a free people! (18) In a highly intelligent and cultivated society like England, this principle is exemplified in an extraordinary degree; for in the legislative assembly, members of parliament, without any private interest excepting the approba tion of their countrymen, almost destroy themselves by exertion in discussing the improvement of existing regulations; and this indeed even to excess as regards long speeches, sometimes even counteracting their own laudable endeavours.-C. as to the duty of all nations to prevent the violation of the law of nations.-C. (20) This is indeed a flattering compliment from Vattel, a foreigner; but certainly it is just; for although, as a commercial nation, it might be supposed that each individual principally labours for his own individual gain; yet when we refer to the spirited einployment of capital in building national bridges, canals, rail-roads, &c. not yielding even 21. per cent., it must be admitted that great public spirit for (19) See Book I. chap. xxiii. 283, national good very generally prevails. 72 -0. BOOK 1. There is another nation illustrious by its bravery and its victories. Its numerous and valiant nobility, its extensive CHAP. II. and fertile dominions, might render it respectable throughout all Europe, and in a short time it might be in a most flourishing situation, but its constitution opposes this; and such is its attachment to that constitution, that there is no room to expect a proper remedy will ever be applied. In vain might a magnanimous king, raised by his virtues above the pursuits of ambition and injustice, form the most salutary designs for [8] promoting the happiness of his people;-in vain might those designs be approved by the more sensible part, by the majority of the nation;-a single deputy, obstinate, or corrupted by a foreign power, might put a stop to all, and disconcert the wisest and most necessary measures. From an excessive jealousy of its liberty, that nation has taken such precautions as must necessarily place it out of the power of the king to make any attempts on the liberties of the public. But is it not evident that those precautions exceed the end proposed, -that they tie the hands of the most just and wise prince, and deprive him of the means of securing the public freedom against the enterprises of foreign powers, and of rendering the nation rich and happy? Is it not evident that the nation has deprived itself of the power of acting, and that its councils are exposed to the caprice or treachery of a single member? to know We shall conclude this chapter, with observing that a 25. A nanation ought to know itself.(21) Without this knowledge it tion ought cannot make any successful endeavours after its own per- itself.(21) fection. It ought to have a just idea of its state, to enable it to take the most proper measures; it ought to know the progress it has already made, and what further advances it has still to make,-what advantages it possesses, and what defects it labours under, in order to preserve the former, and correct the latter. Without this knowledge a nation will act at random, and often take the most improper measures. It will think it acts with great wisdom in imitating the conduct of nations that are reputed wise and skilful,-not perceiving that such or such regulation, such or such practice, though salutary to one state, is often pernicious to another. Every thing ought to be conducted according to its nature. Nations cannot be well governed without such regulations as are suitable to their respective characters; and in order to this, their characters ought to be known. true wisdom. Every moral and wise (21) This is one of the soundest and most important principles that can be advanced, whether it refers to individuals or to nations, and is essential even to the attainment of the rudiments of Self-Knowledge. BOOK I. CHAP. III. 2 26. Of public authority. 27. What is the constitution of a state. CHAP. III. OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A STATE, AND THE DUTIES AND WE were unable to avoid, in the first chapter, anticipating something of the subject of this. We have seen already that every political society must necessarily establish a public authority to regulate their common affairs, to prescribe to each individual the conduct he ought to observe with a view to the public welfare, and to possess the means of procuring obedience. This authority essentially belongs to the body of the society; but it may be exercised in a variety of ways; and every society has a right to choose that mode which suits it best. The fundamental regulation that determines the manner in which the public authority is to be executed, is what forms the constitution of the state. In this is seen the form in which the nation acts in quality of a body politic,-how and [9] by whom the people are to be governed, and what are the rights and duties of the governors. This constitution is in fact nothing more than the establishment of the order in which a nation proposes to labour in common for obtaining those advantages with a view to which the political society was established. 28. The nation ought to choose the The perfection of a state, and its aptitude to attain the ends of society, must then depend on its constitution: consequently the most important concern of a nation that forms a political best consti- society, and its first and most essential duty towards itself, is tution. 8 29. Of political, fundamental, and civil laws. to choose the best constitution possible, and that most suitable to its circumstances. When it makes this choice, it lays the foundation of its own preservation, safety, perfection, and happiness-it cannot take too much care in placing these on a solid basis. The laws are regulations established by public authority, to be observed in society. All these ought to relate to the welfare of the state and of the citizens. The laws made directly with a view to the public welfare are political laws; and in this class, those that concern the body itself and the being of the society, the form of government, the manner in which the public authority is to be exerted,—those, in a word, which together form the constitution of the state, are the fundamental laws. The civil laws are those that regulate the rights and conduct of the citizens among themselves. Every nation that would not be wanting to itself, ought to apply its utmost care in establishing these laws, and principally its fundamental laws,-in establishing them, I say, with OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A STATE. wisdom, in a manner suitable to the genius of the people, and to all the circumstances in which they may be placed: they ought to determine them and make them known with plainness and precision, to the end that they may possess stability, that they may not be eluded, and, that they may create, if possible, no dissension-that, on the one hand, he or they to whom the exercise of the sovereign power is committed, and the citizens, on the other, may equally know their duty and their rights. It is not here necessary to consider in detail what that constitution and those laws ought to be: that discussion belongs to public law and politics. Besides, the laws and constitutions of different states must necessarily vary according to the disposition of the people, and other cirIn the Law of Nations we must adhere to generals. We here consider the duty of a nation towards itself, principally to determine the conduct that it ought to observe in that great society which nature has established among all nations. These duties give it rights, that serve as a rule to establish what it may require from other nations, and reciprocally what others may require from it. cumstances. BOOK I. CHAP. III. the consti The constitution and laws of a state are the basis of the 2 30. Of the public tranquillity, the firmest support of political authority, support of and a security for the liberty of the citizens. But this con- tution and stitution is a vain phantom, and the best laws are useless, if obedience they be not religiously observed: the nation ought then to to the laws. watch very attentively, in order to render them equally re- [ 10 ] spected by those who govern, and by the people destined to obey. To attack the constitution of the state, and to violate its laws, is a capital crime against society; and if those guilty of it are invested with authority, they add to this crime a perfidious abuse of the power with which they are intrusted. The nation ought constantly to repress them with its utmost vigour and vigilance, as the importance of the case requires. It is very uncommon to see the laws and constitution of a state openly and boldly opposed: it is against silent and gradual attacks that a nation ought to be particularly on its guard. Sudden revolutions strike the imaginations of men: they are detailed in history; their secret springs are developed. But we overlook the changes that insensibly happen by a long train of steps that are but slightly marked. It would be rendering nations an important service to show from history how many states have thus entirely changed their nature, and lost their original constitution. This would awaken the attention of mankind:-impressed thenceforward with this excellent maxim (no less essential in politics than in morals) principiis obsta,-they would no longer shut their eyes against innovations, which, though inconsiderable in themselves, may serve as steps to mount to higher and more pernicious enterprises. The consequences of a good or bad constitution being of 75 CHAP. III. rights of a BOOK I. such importance, and the nation being strictly obliged to procure, as far as possible, the best and most convenient one, it 231. The has a right to every thing necessary to enable it to fulfil this nation with obligation (§ 18). It is then manifest that a nation has an respect to indisputable right to form, maintain, and perfect its constituits consti- tion, to regulate at pleasure every thing relating to the gotution and vernment, and that no person can have a just right to hinder it. Government is established only for the sake of the nation, with a view to its safety and happiness. government. 32. It the government. ment. If any nation is dissatisfied with the public administration, may reform it may apply the necessary remedies, and reform the governBut observe that I say "the nation;" for I am very far from meaning to authorize a few malcontents or incendiaries to give disturbance to their governors by exciting murmurs and seditions. None but the body of a nation have a right to check those at the helm when they abuse their power. When the nation is silent and obeys, the people are considered as approving the conduct of their superiors, or at least finding it supportable; and it is not the business of a small number of citizens to put the state in danger, under the pretence of reforming it. ? 33. And In virtue of the same principles, it is certain that if the may change nation is uneasy under its constitution, it has a right to change it. the consti tution. There can be no difficulty in the case, if the whole nation be unanimously inclined to make this change. But it is asked, what is to be done if the people are divided? In the [11] ordinary management of the state, the opinion of the majority must pass without dispute for that of the whole nation; otherwise it would be almost impossible for the society ever to take any resolution. It appears then, by parity of reasoning, that a nation may change the constitution of the state by a majority of votes; and whenever there is nothing in this change that can be considered as contrary to the act of civil association, or to the intention of those united under it, the whole are bound to conform to the resolution of the majority. (22) But if the question be, to quit a form of government, to which alone it appeared that the people were willing to submit on their entering into the bonds of society,—if the greater part of a free people, after the example of the Jews in the time of Samuel, are weary of liberty, and resolved to submit to the authority of a monarch,-those citizens who are more jealous of that privilege, so invaluable to those who (22) In 1 Bla. Com. 51-2, it is contended, that, unless in cases where the natural law or conscience dictates the observance of municipal laws, it is optional, in a moral view, to observe the positive law, or to pay the penalty when detected in the breach; but that doctrine, as regards the moral duty to observe laws, has been justly refuted. See Sedgwick's Commentaries, 61; 2 Bos. & Pul. 375; 5 Bar. & Ald. 341; sed vide 13 Ves. jun. 315, 316.-C. |