BOOK I. have tasted it, though obliged to suffer the majority to do as they please, are under no obligation at all to submit to the CHAP. III. new government: they may quit a society which seems to have dissolved itself in order to unite again under another form: they have a right to retire elsewhere, to sell their lands, and take with them all their effects. tive power, Here, again, a very important question presents itself. It 2 34. Of essentially belongs to the society to make laws both in rela- the legislation to the manner in which it desires to be governed, and to and whether the conduct of the citizens: this is called the legislative power. it can The nation may intrust the exercise of it to the prince, or to change the an assembly; or to that assembly and the prince jointly; constitution. who have then a right to make new laws and to repeal old (23) ones. (23) It is asked, whether their power extends to the fundamental laws-whether they may change the constitution of the state? The principles we have laid down lead us to decide with certainty, that the authority of these legislators does not extend so far, and that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change them. For the constitution of the state ought to possess stability: and since that was first established by the nation, which afterwards intrusted certain persons with the legislative power, the fundamental laws are excepted from their commission. It is visible that the society only intended to make provision for having the state constantly furnished with laws suited to particular conjunctures, and, for that purpose, gave the legislature the power of abrogating the ancient civil and political laws that were not fundamental, and of making new ones; but nothing leads us to think that it meant to submit the constitution itself to their will. In short, it is from the constitution that those legislators derive their power: how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority? By the fundamental laws of England, the two houses of parliament, in concert with the king, exercise the legislative power: but, if the two houses should resolve to suppress themselves, and to invest the king with full and absolute authority, certainly the nation would not suffer it. [12] And who would dare to assert that they would not have a right to oppose it? But if the parliament entered into a debate on making so considerable a change, and the whole (23) Thus, during the last war, English acts of Parliament delegated to the king in council the power of making temporary orders and laws regulating commerce. So by a bill of 3 Will. 4, power was proposed to be given to eight of the judges to make rules and orders respecting pleading, these not being considered unconstitutional dele- BOOK I. nation was voluntarily silent upon it, this would be considered CHAP. III. as an approbation of the act of its representatives. 235. The nation ought not it without great cau But in treating here of the change of the constitution, we treat only of the right: the question of expediency belongs to politics. We shall therefore only observe in general, that. to attempt great changes in a state being delicate and dangerous operations, and frequent changes being in their own nature prejudicial, a people ought to be very circumspect in this point, and never be inclined to make innovations without the most pressing reasons, or an absolute necessity. The fickleness of the Athenians was ever inimical to the happiness of the republic, and at length proved fatal to that liberty of which they were so jealous, without knowing how to enjoy it. tion. 236. It is We may conclude from what has been said (§ 31), that if the judge of any disputes arise in a state respecting the fundamental all disputes laws, the public administration, or the rights of the different the govern- powers of which it is composed, it belongs to the nation alone to judge and determine them conformably to its political relating to ment. 2 37. No foreign power has a right to interfere. constitution. In short, all these affairs being solely a national concern, no foreign power has a right to interfere in them, nor ought to intermeddle with them otherwise than by its good offices, unless requested to do it, or induced by particular reasons. If any intrude into the domestic concerns of another nation, and attempt to put a constraint on its deliberations, they do it an injury. CHAP. IV. 238. Of the CHAP. IV. OF THE SOVEREIGN, HIS OBLIGATIONS, AND HIS RIGHTS. THE reader cannot expect to find here a long deduction sovereign. of the rights of sovereignty, and the functions of a prince. These are to be found in treatises on the public law. In this chapter we only propose to show, in consequence of the grand principles of the law of nations, what a sovereign is, and to give a general idea of his obligations and his rights. We have said that the sovereignty is that public authority which commands in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to perform, to obtain the end of its institution. This authority originally and essentially belonged to the body of the society, to which each member submitted, and ceded his natural right of conducting himself in every thing as he pleased, according to the dictates of his own understanding, and of doing himself justice. But the body of the society does not always retain in its own hands this sovereign authority: it frequently intrusts it to a senate, or to a single person. That senate, or that person, is then the sovereign. BOOK I. It is evident that men form a political society, and submit to laws, solely for their own advantage and safety. The CHAP. IV. sovereign authority is then established only for the common? 39. It is solely estabgood of all the citizens; and it would be absurd to think that lished for the it could change its nature on passing into the hands of a safety and senate or a monarch. Flattery, therefore, cannot, without advantage rendering itself equally ridiculous and odious, deny that the of society. sovereign is only established for the safety and advantage of society. A good prince, a wise conductor of society, ought to have his mind impressed with this great truth, that the sovereign power is solely intrusted to him for the safety of the state, and the happiness of all the people; that he is not permitted to consider himself as the principal object in the administration of affairs, to seek his own satisfaction, or his private advantage; but that he ought to direct all his views, all his steps, to the greatest advantage of the state and people who have submitted to him.* What a noble sight it is to see aking of England rendering his parliament an account of his principal operations-assuring that body, the representatives of the nation, that he has no other end in view than the glory of the state and the happiness of his people-and affectionately thanking all who concur with him in such salutary views! Certainly, a monarch who makes use of this language, and by his conduct proves the sincerity of his professions, is, in the opinion of the wise, the only great man. But, in most kingdoms, a criminal flattery has long since caused these maxims to be forgotten. A crowd of servile courtiers easily persuade a proud monarch that the nation was made for him, and not he for the nation. He soon considers the kingdom as a patrimony that is his own property, and his people as a herd of cattle from which he is to derive his wealth, and which he may dispose of to answer his own views, and gratify his passions. Hence those fatal wars undertaken by ambition, restlessness, hatred, and pride;hence those oppressive taxes, whose produce is dissipated by ruinous luxury, or squandered upon mistresses and favourites; -hence, in fine, are important posts given by favour, while public merit is neglected, and every thing that does not immediately interest the prince is abandoned to ministers and subalterns. Who can, in this unhappy government, discover an authority established for the public welfare? A great The last words of Louis VI. to his son Louis VII. were-"Remember, my son, that royalty is but a public employment, of which you must render a rigorous account to him who is the sole disposer of crowns and sceptres." Abbe Velley's Hist. of France, Vol. III. p. 65. Timur-Bec declared (as he often be fore had done on similar occasions) that BOOK I. CHAP. IV. prince will be on his guard even against his virtues. Let us not say, with some writers, that private virtues are not the virtues of kings-a maxim of superficial politicians, or of [14] those who are very inaccurate in their expressions. Goodness, friendship, gratitude, are still virtues on the throne; and would to God they were always to be found there! But a wise king does not yield an undiscerning obedience to their impulse. He cherishes them, he cultivates them in his private life; but in state affairs he listens only to justice and sound policy. And why? because he knows that the government was intrusted to him only for the happiness of society, and that, therefore, he ought not to consult his own pleasure in the use he makes of his power. He tempers his goodness with wisdom; he gives to friendship his domestic and private favours; he distributes posts and employments according to merit; public rewards to services done to the state. In a word, he uses the public power only with a view to the public welfare. All this is comprehended in that fine saying of Lewis XII.:"A king of France does not revenge the injuries of a duke of Orleans." ? 40. Of his ter. A political society is a moral person (Prelim. § 2) inasmuch representa as it has an understanding and a will, of which it makes use tive charac- for the conduct of its affairs, and is capable of obligations and rights. When, therefore, a people confer the sovereignty on any one person, they invest him with their understanding and will, and make over to him their obligations and rights, so far as relates to the administration of the state, and to the exercise of the public authority. The sovereign, or conductor of the state, thus becoming the depositary of the obligations and rights relative to government, in him is found the moral person, who, without absolutely ceasing to exist in the nation, acts thenceforwards only in him and by him. Such is the origin of the representative character attributed to the sovereign. He represents the nation in all the affairs in which he may happen to be engaged as a sovereign. It does not debase the dignity of the greatest monarch to attribute to him this representative character; on the contrary, nothing sheds a greater lustre on it, since the monarch thus unites in 241. He is his own person all the majesty that belongs to the entire body intrusted of the nation. with the ob ligations of The sovereign, thus clothed with the public authority, with the nation, every thing that constitutes the moral personality of the and invested nation, of course becomes bound by the obligations of that nation, and invested with its rights. with its rights. 242. His duty with respect to All that has been said in Chap. II. of the general duties of a nation towards itself particularly regards the sovereign. He is the depositary of the empire, and of the power of commanding whatever conduces to the public welfare; he ought, perfection of therefore, as a tender and wise father, and as a faithful adthe nation. ministrator, to watch for the nation, and take care to preserve the preservation and BOOK I. it, and render it more perfect; to better its state, and to secure it, as far as possible, against every thing that threatens CHAP. IV. its safety or its happiness. Hence all the rights which a nation derives from its obli- 43. His gation to preserve and perfect itself, and to improve its state, rights in this (see §§ 18, 20, and 23, of this book); all these rights, I say, respect. reside in the sovereign, who is therefore indifferently called [ 15 ] the conductor of the society, superior, prince, &c. nation. We have observed above, that every nation ought to know 3 44. He itself. This obligation devolves on the sovereign, since it is ought to he who is to watch over the preservation and perfection of know the the nation. The duty which the law of nature here imposes on the conductors of nations is of extreme importance, and of considerable extent. They ought exactly to know the whole country subject to their authority; its qualities, defects, advantages, and situation with regard to the neighbouring states; and they ought to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and general inclinations of their people, their virtues, vices, talents, &c. All these branches of knowledge are necessary to enable them to govern properly. The prince derives his authority from the nation; he pos- 2 45. The sesses just so much of it as they have thought proper to intrust extent of his him with.* If the nation has plainly and simply invested power. him with the sovereignty, without limitation or division, he is supposed to be invested with all the prerogatives, without Prerogawhich the sovereign command or authority could not be ex- tives of maerted in the manner most conducive to the public welfare. jesty. These are called regal prerogatives, or the prerogatives of majesty. support the But when the sovereign power is limited and regulated by 2 46. The the fundamental laws of the state, those laws show the prince prince the extent and bounds of his power, and the manner in which ought to he is to exert it. The prince is therefore strictly obliged not respect and only to respect, but also to support them. The constitution fundaand the fundamental laws are the plan on which the nation mental has resolved to labour for the attainment of happiness; the laws. execution is intrusted to the prince. Let him religiously follow this plan; let him consider the fundamental laws as inviolable and sacred rules; and remember that the moment he deviates from them, his commands become unjust, and are but a criminal abuse of the power with which he is intrusted. He is, by virtue of that power, the guardian and defender of Neque enim se princeps reipublicæ the sovereign. Quod caput est, sit et singulorum dominum arbitrabitur, principi persuasum, totius reipublica quamvis assentatoribus id in aurem majorem quam ipsius unius auctoritainsusurrantibus, sed rectorem mercede tem esse: neque pessimis hominibus a civibus designata, quam augere, nisi credat diversum affirmantibus gratifiipsis volentibus, nefas existimabit. candi studio; quæ magna pernicies est. Ibid. c. v.-From this principle it fol- Ibid. lows that the nation is superior to |