BOOK I. from what is the object of all political society-the safety of the nation, which is the supreme law.* But, if the distinc-CHAP. IV. tion of which we are treating is of no moment with respect to the right, it can be of none in practice, with respect to expediency. As it is very difficult to oppose an absolute prince, and it cannot be done without raising great disturbances in the state, and the most violent and dangerous commotions, it ought to be attempted only in cases of extremity, when the public miseries are raised to such a height that the people may, say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel bello bene mutari, that it is better to expose themselves to a civil war than to endure them. But if the prince's authority is limited, if it in some respects depends on a senate, or a parliament that represents the nation, there are means of resisting and curbing him, without exposing the state to violent shocks. When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, there can be no reason for waiting until it becomes extreme. tween the king and his subjects. [ 21 ] But however limited a prince's authority may be, he is a 52. Arbicommonly very jealous of it; it seldom happens that he pa- tration betiently suffers resistance, and peaceably submits to the judg ment of his people. Can he want support, while he is the distributor of favours? We see too many base and ambitious souls, for whom the state of a rich and decorated slave has more charms than that of a modest and virtuous citizen. It is therefore always difficult for a nation to resist a prince and pronounce sentence on his conduct, without exposing the state to dangerous troubles, and to shocks capable of overturning it. This has sometimes occasioned a compromise between the prince and the subjects, to submit to the decision of a friendly power all the disputes that might arise between them. Thus the kings of Denmark, by solemn treaties, formerly referred to those of Sweden the differences that might arise between them and their senate; and this the kings of Sweden have also done with regard to those of Denmark. The princes and states of West Friesland, and the burgesses of Embden, have in the same manner constituted the republic of the United. Provinces the judge of their differences. The princes and the city of Neufchatel established, in 1406, the canton of Berne perpetual judge and arbitrator of their disputes. Thus also, according to the spirit of the Helvetic confederacy, the entire body takes cognisance of the disturbances that arise in any Populi patroni non pauciora neque minora præsidia habent. Certe a republica, unde ortum habet regia potestas, rebus exigentibus, regens in jus vocari potest, et, si sanitatem respuat, principatu spoliari; neque ita in principem jura potestatis transtulit, ut non sibi majorem reservârit potestatem. Ibid. Est tamen salutaris cogitatio, ut sit principibus persuasum, si rempublicam oppresserint, si vitiis et fœditate intolerandi erunt, ca se conditione vivere, ut non jure tantum, sed cum laude et gloria, perimi possint. Ibid.-Note, edit. A. D. 1797. BOOK I. of the confederated states, though each of them is truly soveCHAP. IV. reign and independent. which sub jects owe to 253. The As soon as a nation acknowledges a prince for its lawful obedience sovereign, all the citizens owe him a faithful obedience. He can neither govern the state, nor perform what the nation exa sovereign. pects from him, if he be not punctually obeyed. Subjects then have no right, in doubtful cases, to examine the wisdom or justice of their sovereign's commands; this examination belongs to the prince: his subjects ought to suppose (if there be a possibility of supposing it) that all his orders are just and salutary he alone is accountable for the evil that may result from them. 254. In what cases they may resist him. ence. Nevertheless this ought not to be entirely a blind obediNo engagement can oblige, or even authorize, a man to violate the law of nature. All authors who have any regard to conscience or decency agree that no one ought to obey such commands as are evidently contrary to that sacred law. Those governors of places who bravely refused to execute the barbarous orders of Charles IX. on the memorable day of St. Bartholomew, have been universally praised; and the court did not dare to punish them, at least openly. "Sire," said the brave Orte, governor of Bayonne, in his letter, "I have communicated your majesty's command to your faithful inhabitants and warriors in the garrison; and I have found there only good citizens and brave soldiers, but not a single executioner: wherefore both they and I most humbly entreat your majesty to be pleased to employ our hands and our lives in things that are possible, however hazardous they may be; and we will exert ourselves to the last drop of our blood in the execution of them."* The Count [ 22 ] de Tende, Charny, and others, replied to those who brought them the orders of the court, that they had too great a respect for the king, to believe that such barbarous orders came from him." It is more difficult to determine in what cases a subject may not only refuse to obey, but even resist a sovereign, and oppose his violence by force. When a sovereign does injury to any one, he acts without any real authority; but we ought not thence to conclude hastily that the subject may resist him. The nature of sovereignty, and the welfare of the state, will not permit citizens to oppose a prince whenever his commands appear to them unjust or prejudicial. This would be falling back into the state of nature, and rendering government impossible. A subject ought patiently to suffer from the prince doubtful wrongs, and wrongs that are supportable; the former, because whoever has submitted to the decision of a judge, is no longer capable of deciding his own pretensions; and as to those that are supportable, they ought to be sacri Mezeray's History of France, vol. ii. p. 1107. OF THE SOVEREIGN. BOOK I. CHAP. IV. ficed to the peace and safety of the state, on account of the great advantages obtained by living in society. It is presumed, as matter of course, that every citizen has tacitly engaged to observe this moderation; because, without it, society could not exist. But when the injuries are manifest and atrocious, when a prince, without any apparent reason, attempts to deprive us of life, or of those things the loss of which would render life irksome, who can dispute our right to resist him? Self-preservation is not only a natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and absolutely renounce it. And though he might give it up, can he be considered as having done it by his political engagements, since he entered into society only to establish his own safety upon a more solid basis? The welfare of society does not require such a sacrifice; and, as Barbeyrac well observes in his notes on Grotius, "If the public interest requires that those who obey should suffer some inconvenience, it is no less for the public interest that those who command should be afraid of driving their patience to the utmost extremity."* The prince who violates all laws, who no longer observes any measures, and who would in his transports of fury take away the life of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend themselves. The person of the sovereign is sacred and inviolable: but he who, after having lost all the sentiments of a sovereign, divests himself even of the appearances and exterior conduct of a monarch, degrades himself: he no longer retains the sacred character of a sovereign, and cannot retain the prerogatives attached to that exalted rank. However, if this prince is not a monster,—if he is furious only against us in particular, and [ 23 ] from the effects of a sudden transport or a violent passion, and is supportable to the rest of the nation, the respect we ought to pay to the tranquillity of the state is such, and the respect due to sovereign majesty so powerful, that we are strictly obliged to seek every other means of preservation, rather than to put his person in danger. Every one knows the example set by David: he fled, he kept himself concealed, to secure himself from Saul's fury, and more than once spared the life of his persecutor. When the reason of Charles VI. of France was suddenly disordered by a fatal accident, he in his fury killed several of those who surrounded him: none of them thought of securing his own life at the expense of that of the king; they only endeavoured to disarm and secure him. They did their duty like men of honour and faithful subjects, in exposing their lives to save that of this unfortunate monarch: such a sacrifice is due to the state and De Jure Belli & Pacis, lib. i. cap. iv. 11, n. 2. 89 to sovereign majesty: furious from the derangement of his faculties, Charles was not guilty: he might recover his health, and again become a good king. What has been said is sufficient for the intention of this work: the reader may see these questions treated more at large in many books that are well known. We shall conclude this subject with an important observation. A sovereign is undoubtedly allowed to employ ministers to ease him in the painful offices of government; but he ought never to surrender his authority to them. When a nation chooses a conductor, it is not with a view that he should deliver up his charge into other hands. Ministers ought only to be instruments in the hands of the prince; he ought constantly to direct them, and continually endeavour to know whether they act according to his intentions. If the imbecility of age, or any infirmity, render him incapable of governing, a regent ought to be nominated, according to the laws of the state: but when once the sovereign is capable of holding the reins, let him insist on being served, but never suffer himself to be superseded. The last kings of France of the first race surrendered the government and authority to the mayors of the palace: thus becoming mere phantoms, they justly lost the title and honours of a dignity of which they had abandoned the functions. The nation has every thing to gain in crowning an all-powerful minister, for he will improve that soil as his own inheritance, which he plundered whilst he only reaped precarious advantages from it. CHAP. V. 2 56. Of elective states. CHAP. V. OF STATES ELECTIVE, SUCCESSIVE OR HEREDITARY, AND OF WE have seen in the preceding chapter, that it originally belongs to a nation to confer the supreme authority, and to choose the person by whom it is to be governed. If it confers [24] the sovereignty on him for his own person only, reserving to itself the right of choosing a successor after the sovereign's death, the state is elective. As soon as the prince is elected according to the laws, he enters into the possession of all the prerogatives which those laws annex to his dignity. kings are 2 57. Whe- It has been debated, whether elective kings and princes are her elective real sovereigns. But he who lays any stress on this circumstance must have only a very confused idea of sovereignty. reigns. The manner in which a prince obtains his dignity has nothing to do with determining its nature. We must consider, first, whether the nation itself forms an independent society (see real sove BOOK I. chap. 1), and secondly, what is the extent of the power it has intrusted to the prince. Whenever the chief of an independ- CHAP. V. ent state really represents his nation, he ought to be considered as a true sovereign (§ 40), even though his authority should be limited in several respects. and here When a nation would avoid the troubles which seldom fail? 58. Of to accompany the election of a sovereign, it makes its choice successive for a long succession of years, by establishing the right of ditary succession, or by rendering the crown hereditary in a family, states. according to the order and rules that appear most agreeable The origin to that nation. The name of an Hereditary State or Kingdom of the right is given to that where the successor is appointed by the same sion. law that regulates the successions of individuals. The Successive Kingdom is that where a person succeeds according to a particular fundamental law of the state. Thus the lineal succession, and of males alone, is established in France. of succes The right of succession is not always the primitive esta- 8 59. Other blishment of a nation; it may have been introduced by the origins of concession of another sovereign, and even by usurpation. But this right. when it is supported by long possession, the people are considered as consenting to it; and this tacit consent renders it lawful, though the source be vicious. It rests then on the foundation we have already pointed out-a foundation that alone is lawful and incapable of being shaken, and to which we must ever revert. sources The same right, according to Grotius and the generality 2 60. Other of writers, may be derived from other sources, as conquest, which still or the right of a proprietor, who, being master of a country, amount to should invite inhabitants to settle there, and give them lands, the same on condition of their acknowledging him and his heirs for thing. their sovereigns. But as it is absurd to suppose that a society of men can place themselves in subjection otherwise than with a view to their own safety and welfare, and still more that they can bind their posterity on any other footing, it ultimately amounts to the same thing; and it must still be said that the succession is established by the express will, or the tacit consent of the nation, for the welfare and safety of the state. order of the It thus remains an undeniable truth, that in all cases the 3 61. A nasuccession is established or received only with a view to the tion may public welfare and the general safety. If it happened then change the that the order established in this respect became destructive succession. to the state, the nation would certainly have a right to change it by a new law. Salus populi suprema lex, the safety of [25] the people is the supreme law; and this law is agreeable to the strictest justice, the people having united in society only with a view to their safety and greater advantage.* * Nimirum, quod publicæ salutis bus exigentibus, immutari quid obstat? causa et communi consensu statutum MARIANA, ibid. c. iv. est, eadem multitudinis voluntate, re 91 |