APPENDIX 2

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, (182)

should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that: Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX 3

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES REGARDING SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

(At the request of Chairman Hamilton, witnesses submitted the following remarks to up-date their original statements in light of subsequent developments in China.)

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF A. DOAK BARNETT, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FEBRUARY 24, 1976

LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN CHINA

The appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Acting Premier (accompanied by press and poster attacks on "capitalist roaders" in China, many clearly directed at Teng Hsiao-p'ing), marks a new stage in the difficult, on-going process of political struggle in China. Hua's sudden unexpected rise to the top of the government in Peking surprised virtually all China specialists, academic and governmental, outside of China. There is little doubt that most Chinese were taken equally by surprise.

It is obviously necessary to be prepared for such surprises. There are likely to be more of them. Decisions on major appointments in China are made secretly by a handful of Politburo-level leaders (and probably sometimes by Mao himself), and consequently they are inherently unpredictable by "outsiders" (whether Chinese or non-Chinese) who have no access to the inner councils at the highest levels of leadership in Peking. It is possible to understand, in broad terms, the basic processes at work in China, the principal issues that are being debated, and the major group interests that are clashing; but one should expect that shifts in personal relationships and power positions at the top of the Chinese leadership will be concealed, from the Chinese public as well as the outside world, until they are deliberately revealed after the fact.

China specialists have long been aware that profound differences have divided the Chinese leadership. Some major policy disputes can be traced to the 1950s. Conflicts over basic values, over many concrete policies, over bureaucratic interests, over power positions, and over the fundamental problems of political succession and generational change in China increased steadily in the 1960s. They culminated in a temporary breakdown of the Chinese political system in the Cultural Revolution, during 1966-68. Ever since then, the regime in Peking has been attempting to repair China's institutions and rebuild its leadership. This has been a very difficult process, but since 1969, at least until recently, the overall trends have been toward gradually increasing stability, moderation, and pragmatism (in relative Chinese terms, at least), even though radical ideologues (sometimes, clearly, with Mao's support) have periodically mounted ideological campaigns to resist these trends.

One reason that the attacks on Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the elevation of Hua (at least temporarily) to the Premiership which Teng had been expected to assume after Chou En-lai's death, have been so surprising is that a great deal of evidence over the past three years has supported the judgment that Chou En-lai worked hard and with considerable success to prepare the way for an orderly process in his own succession. It appeared that he had laid the groundwork for the emergence of a compromise collective leadership group, with Teng playing a very key role. It also appeared that Teng, following his political rehabilitation in 1973, had been able to consolidate a very strong position. Both the Party Congress in 1973 and then the National People's Congress meeting in early 1975 seemed to be important steps in a relatively orderly process of change. One reason Teng appeared to be strongly positioned to move up to the Premiership was the fact that he had acquired three key roles, almost certainly with Chou's backing; he was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Senior Vice Premier, and the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

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In contrast, Hua Kuo-feng was a rising but little known leader, whose status was in no way comparable to Teng's. For many years, it is true, Hua had been an important provincial Party leader in Hunan (Mao's home province), and in 1973 he was one of several provincial leaders elevated to Politburo status. Then, in 1975 he became Minister of Public Security (the man in charge of China's police system), which was obviously a step upward in the Chinese hierarchy. But there was no clue that he had any basis for jumping suddenly to the very top of the Government, and he remained a little-known figure. (Even today extraordinarily little is known about Hua. There is no reliable information on his birth date, although he is believed to be in his mid-50's, or about his birthplace, which some reports indicate is Shensi.) Hua had considerable experience in Hunan not only in general Party work but also in running agricultural programs, and not long ago made a major speech at the well-publicized Tachai Conference on agricultural policy. This, plus his recent police work, are about the sum of what is known about his career specialties. He has obviously had very little exposure to international affairs.

In light of all the above, how can one best explain the elevation of Hua rather than Teng to be Acting Premier following Chou's death? One thing seems fairly clear. The death of Chou reactivated the deep-rooted conflicts over power and policy in China (which during 1973-75 seemed to have been brought under somewhat better control then previously), and it stimulated the radicals in China to renew their attacks both on recent policy trends and on Teng as an individual. But it is still too early to judge, on the basis of the very limited data available, exactly what has happened within the leadership in Peking, or what the long-run implications of recent developments may be. Several hypotheses are plausible; and it could be some time before it is possible to judge which may be correct.

Mao himself may have decided to purge or downgrade Teng; in view of Teng's reputation for being a pragmatist rather than an ideological Maoist, and the fact that he was a major target of attack by the Maoists in the late 1960s, that is certainly possible. (If so, it obviously raises a question about the extent to which Mao genuinely supported Teng's earlier rehabilitation.) It is also possible, however, that China's radicals-but not necessarily Mao himself—took the initiative in pushing for Teng's ouster or demotion, and that Mao simply gave them free rein. Another very real possibility is that the top leadership was simply unable after Chou's death to agree on Teng as Premier, and that in a situation of deadlock they decided to appoint Hua as a compromise candidate to act as Premier temporarily, until a more "permanent" Premier could be agreed upon. Still another hypothesis-though less plausible in my view-is that Hua may in the end prove to be "Teng's man". (It is true that there is little on the public record to indicate that he himself has been a radical.)

Despite the attacks on Teng, it is too early to count him definitely out of the struggle. It is also too early to conclude that Hua is likely to last at the top. Today, the influence of China's radicals appears to have increased somewhat, temporarily at least, but their power position rests heavily on their links to Mao himself, and it could well be undercut when Mao goes. In contrast, many pragmatic moderates, although attacked by the radicals and suspected by Mao of deviationism, appear to have strong institutional bases in the Party and state bureaucracies and military establishment. The role of the military will unquestionably be crucial in any serious struggles that develop in China, and little is known at present about where its top leaders now stand.

In sum, there are still too many unanswerable questions to permit accurate analysis or confident prediction about specific leadership changes and their meaning, and possible consequences for the future. One thing that can be said is that the process of succession and generational change in China, which has already been underway for some years, will continue for a fairly long time to come, and it will involve many difficult problems. It is also clear that the basic conflicts of values and policy disputes that have long divided the Chinese leadership remain unresolved and are not likely to be resolved soon, at least not in any "final" sense. (I attempt to analyze these issues and problems in some detail in my recent book, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era.) In a very fundamental sense, China is now in a transition period, and we are likely therefore to see more changes in China's top leadership in the period ahead. When Mao finally dies, the uncertainties, and the changes,will doubtless increase.

A key question, obviously, is whether it will be possible for China's leaders to contain and minimize their conflicts, and create a viable compromise, collective leadership for the transitional period. Just before Chou's death, the prospects that this would be possible appeared to improve. Now they appear more problem