Nor has the death of Chou En-lai or the present campaign had any significant effect on Sino-Sovlet relations. With one dramatic exception-the unexpected release in December of a Soviet helicopter crew, held in China on spying charges since March 1974-Chinese policy statements and commentary on the Soviet Union have remained extremely hostile. Foreign visitors to China have reported that Hua Kuo-feng took harsh anti-Soviet positions in his conversations with them. And it is clear that capitulation to Soviet "social imperialism" has been one important target of the continuing campaign against "capitulationism" in China. Nonetheless, recent developments may have longer-term implications for SinoAmerican relations. For one thing, the death of Chou En-lai has removed one of the most influential advocates of Sino-American detente, and a man who may have been willing to be relatively conciliatory toward the United States on the Taiwan issue. Chou's successors, particularly Hua Kuo-feng, do not appear to have any personal commitment to improving relations with the United States. Compared to Chou, they may be less willing or less able to meet American conditions concerning the normalization of relations. Second, much will depend on the outcome of the current "movement from the left." As I indicated in my original testimony, the campaign, if it continues and deepens, could lead toward a political climate in China hostile toward both the United States and the Soviet Union, and toward high levels of trade, scientific, and cultural exchange with the West. If so, that too would make it more difficult for our two countries to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the normalization of Sino-American relations. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS When Alexander Eckstein and I appeared before the Subcommittee, we were asked what we would recommend that the Congress do to facilitate the normalization of Sino-American relations. Since then, I have given that question a bit more thought, and would like to take this opportunity to make two specific recommendations. First, the Congress should begin to study the legal implications for AmericanTaiwanese relations of the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Will the withdrawal of American diplomatic recognition mean that Taiwan will lose most-favored nation status? How can that be avoided? What will be the impact on American investment on Taiwan? Can that impact be minimized? And so on. In short, the Congress should be prepared to adopt, well in advance of our withdrawal of recognition, the legislation necessary to ensure that AmericanTaiwanese relations suffer the smallest possible harm from the normalization of Sino-American relations. Second, if the Congress agrees that the United States should maintain its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, it should recognize the need for some sort of Congressional endorsement of that commitment. Well in advance of any termination of the mutual defense treaty between Taiwan and the United States, the Congress should consider, together with the Executive Branch the type of commitment that the United States might be prepared to undertake with regard to Taiwan, and the proper form for expressing Congressional consent and endorsement. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS P. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS PROGRAM, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Stanford, Calif., March 19, 1976. Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. HAMILTON: Thank you for your letter of February 23rd inviting additional thoughts about recent developments in China. Although it is premature to talk confidently about their foreign policy implications, I might add a few points. 5 New York Times, February 19. 1976. There is already some limited evidence that China's trade policy-particularly the import of advanced Western technology-has been subjected to some criticism. See Radio Peking, February 13, 1976, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: People's Republic of China, February 18, 1976, pp. E14-16; and Radio Peking, February 14, 1976, in ibid., pp. E12-14. The changes in Peking since early January certainly have seemed dramatic— the death of Premier Cnou En-iai, the surprise appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Acting Premier, the subsequent attacks on Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and even the Nixons' controversial visit-but we should not be unduly alarmed. These events are unlikely in themselves to pose a major threat to progress in Sino-American relations. For one thing, the PRC's political process has always been cyclical, with periodic "rectification campaigns" used as vehicles for public debate of major issues and the policy pendulum swinging back and forth in an appropriately dialectical fashion. We should not be shocked when these debates affect not only the masses but reach deep within the leadership itself. For another, the recent changes seem to reflect a primary concern with domestic issues, and there is little direct evidence that foreign policy has been a major focus. However, I suspect that the minimal rate or progress on certain foreign policy fronts, noticeably vis-a-vis the United States and Taiwan, has given additional leverage to those Chinese leaders arguing for more "revolutionary" and less "pragmatic" policies than those associated with former Premier Chou. If the recent developments do not reflect or constitute a setback for U.S.-China relations per se, they are unlikely to do much, if anything, to advance them significantly. Secretary Kissinger has repeatedly stressed that Sino-American relations are based on fundamental and mutual geopolitical interests. But a number of recent developments, e.g. the Helsinki agreements and Moscow's actions in Africa, confirm China's earlier alarms about Soviet expansionism and, perhaps, her doubts about the United States as an important counterbalance. If the "basic interests" of the two countries have not changed, China's interpretation of our value to her possibly has; Peking's new leadership may well be both less optimistic and less patient regarding the benefits of accommodating U.S. concerns and, therefore, become even more difficult negotiators on such vital questions as Taiwan. Although U.S.-China relations are likely to stay at the present plateau until after the U.S. Presidential elections and the resolution of current policy debates in China, we can reasonably expect a stiffer PRC negotiating position in pursuit of progress with us. My earlier testimony dealt with cultural relations and exchanges, and I should comment briefly on that area. Well before the recent leadership changes, several domestic campaigns were underway that, particularly in retrospect, raise potentially troubling questions for the exchange process. The November-January attacks on "revisionist tendencies" in China's education have been intensified in recent months. Strident criticism of those who would "reverse previous verdicts" of the Cultural Revolution in such areas as education, science and technology, and agriculture reflect concern about the possible emergence of a new technocratic elite and renewed stress on Mao's egalitarian goals. Any steps to weaken university admission preferences for "worker, peasant, and soldier" students are to be resisted; universities and research institutes are admonished not to ignore practical socio-economic problems or place specialized, advanced training above practical training and applied research. But while this might imply criticism of advanced scientific research per se, there have been no explicit indications that this is the case, and there are some signs that basic research continues uninterrupted. There are implications of renewed emphasis on "selfreliance" and on criticizing persons, notably scientists and economic planners, who "worship foreign things", but these, too, are not very clear. The new campaign thus has raised questions about whether China will, for the short run, maintain the current level of scientific and technical exchange with foreign countries and the steady development of specialized scientific research programs and institutions, but there is no evidence yet for jumping to such conclusions. The present campaign could make cultural and scholarly exchanges somewhat more difficult, however, by further politicizing the selection and conduct of projects. I suspect that China will continue to welcome foreign visitors, including Americans, for short-term visits, but that there will be no significant expansion for some time. Our "government facilitated" exchanges might encounter new difficulties as China's desire for visible symbols remains limited and political criteria become even more important in the negotiations. In my earlier testimony, I was not sanguine about the prospects for early expansion of the semi-official exchanges under any foreseeable circumstances, given the experience of other countries; I suspect that the PRC leadership changes and current policy debates have further dimmed the prospects for substantial growth in the short term. At the same time, I would not expect a dramatic retrenchment in the already modest level of "official" exchange activity. The greater danger is that, having had their expectations steadily raised in recent years, interested Americans may find the new upheavals in China confusing and even disenchanting, and become impatient with the lethargic pace in expanding scholarly and cultural relationships. But periodic political upheavals in China, and our own political cycles, should not divert us from the pursuit of our own long-term interests in developing professional and personal ties between Americans and their Chinese counterparts. Just as the Chinese must calculate what is tactically possible in dealing with the United States during an election year, so we must calculate what is possible at any given moment with China. We need to look well beyond the present to the long-run benefits of a sustained exchange effort. Yours sincerely, DOUGLAS P. MURRAY, Director. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF ALLEN S. WHITING, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, MARCH 17, 1976 Predicting Chinese politics is hazardous in terms of individual personalities, as shown by the unexpected fall of Liu Shao-ch'i in 1966 and the sudden demise of Lin Piao in 1971. Equally surprising was the attack on Teng Hsiao-p'ing in 1976 following the funeral of Chou En-lai. However to conclude from this that we are unable to forecast Chinese policy, at least in its larger dimensions over time, would be erroneous. Therefore I wish to address the most recent developments in the context of their implication for PRC foreign policy over the next five years, rather than speculate on who will win the succession struggle. It is true that personalities, or more precisely factions, can make a difference in policy outcomes. The Cultural Revolution revealed individuals, factions, and coalitions in confrontation over a wide range of problems, including education, production incentives, political authority, the allocation of resources, developmental priorities, and foreign relations. One could dichotomize these confrontations with suggestive labels of "radical" versus "moderate" or "ideological" versus "pragmatic," although differences were actually more subtle and embodied shifts in emphasis rather than mutually exclusive positions. Unfortunately we know very little about the political proclivities of various individuals in Peking and throughout the vast political system in China. It is wiser to focus on probable groupings, their position in the system, their interests and political orientation, and their power. Here our base for inference is somewhat firmer although it still leaves much to be desired. Specifically we know that the middle and upper echelons of the bureaucracy, both central and provincial, are staffed by "returned cadres" who occupy posts they held before the Cultural Revolution. Similarly the temporary ascendancy of the "revolutionary masses" in 1968-69 has been eclipsed by "restored cadres" in the party apparatus whose authority has won increasing emphasis over the past few years. Against these two groupings are arranged the formed Red Guards whose continuing political role in organization and party reflects their ideological fervor as guardians of the faith. In addition to this political differentiation there is a generational cleavage with younger, newer arrivals in the political system contending with older, upper level echelons. University campuses provide frontline troops for attacking the Establishment, with additional recruits from workers and peasants who resent privileged experts. The media, controlled by the socalled Shanghai faction under the leadership of Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife, vent the grievances of these younger, more radically inclined groups. Although the confrontation has turned around the personality of Teng and been explicitly focussed on education, its implications reach across the entire spectrum of policy issues at stake since 1966, and to a lesser extent since 1958. At the heart of this dispute is Mao's revolutionary ethos, his vision of China's future. Mao wants to modernize and develop the sinews of power but not at the cost of egalitarian values and political consciousness. His strictures against material incentives, differential rewards, hierarchical authority, and emulation of foreign-specifically Soviet-systems have fuelled debate and political campaigns for the past twenty years. However there is reason to believe that this is a losing battle and that its echos will fade once Mao leaves the scene. In the immediate future those restored to office after the Cultural Revolution, most notably Teng, may fall. Lip service will be given to Mao's principles. But practice and policy are unlikely to change significantly from their 1974-75 contours. This means continued reliance upon key imports of foreign technology to upgrade China's industrial program. This in turns means dependence on stable foreign relations, particularly with West Europe, Japan, and the United States, and abstention from radical adventurism. Domestically it means maintaining the goals enunciated by the late premier Chou En-lai at the last National People's Congress in January 1975, including the herculean effort to place China in the rank of the most advanced industrial countries by the year 2000. Behind the radical rhetoric of the next months or years a realistic appreciation of what is required for attaining this goal will preclude any return to the violence and near anarchy of 1967-68. The present balance of power lies on the side of the middle-level bureaucrats, the military, and the experienced party officials. Having seen the costs of confusion and chaos during the Cultural Revolution they are unlikely to remain passive in the face of recurring attacks. Teng Hsiao-p'ing may be expendable but the policy of political stability and economic growth will be maintained. |