Gentlemen, we are happy to have you here. You both have prepared statements which will be included in the record in full. We hope that you can summarize them for the subcommittee in order to maximize time for questions.

Dr. Harding, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HARRY HARDING, JR., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Mr. HARDING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great privilege for me to appear before the subcommittee today and also a great pleasure to appear with my friend and colleague, Prof. Alexan

der Eckstein.

I submitted a written statement to the subcommittee which I won't try to read. Instead let me try to summarize some of the most important points and then talk with you about any topic, whether or not it has been covered in my written statement or in my testimony.

THE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

The first point that I try to make in my prepared statement is that foreign policy and particularly relations with the United States have been a controversial political issue in China for the last 7 years.

We often tend to assume, because China is a relatively authoritarian system, that its foreign policymaking process is isolated from domestic political pressures. In fact, foreign policy and Sino-American relations have been a significant issue in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution. And the issue of Chinese-American détente has been more controversial in China than it has been in the United States.

SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

The specific terms of debate over foreign policy have varied somewhat since the debate began in the late 1960's. But I think we can summarize the arguments that proponents and the opponents of the rapprochement with the United States have made in China.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, the deployment of Russian forces on the SinoSoviet frontier and the border clashes beginning in 1969 obviously led the Chinese to be concerned about a possible Russian invasion of China.

Sino-American détente, so the proponents of détente argued, would be a quick, effective, and relatively inexpensive way of providing a counterweight to the Soviet threat and a way of bolstering China's deterrent with a minimal expenditure of economic resources.

At the same time, the proponents of the Sino-American rapprochement pointed out that the United States seemed willing to talk seriously for the first time about major issues and to consider important changes in its China policy.

There was the hope in Peking that détente would lead ultimately to American recognition of China and to a loosening of the American commitment to Taiwan, and thus would hasten the reunification of Taiwan and the rest of China.

ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

Finally, of course, the Sino-American rapprochement has been a part of a broader Chinese foreign policy, aimed at gaining access to technology and agricultural imports from the West.

The proponents of this foreign policy have argued that expanded economic contact with the West is crucial to the industrial development of China. They have pledged a major effort to substantially modernize the country in all spheres by the end of this century.

The opponents of détente have also made arguments which I think it important to understand. To a large part these arguments have been ideological, that it is wrong to compromise with U.S. imperialism. More specifically, however, from time to time the opponents of this policy have argued that it is wrong to rely on the United States for China's security. Instead, they argue China should and could rely upon its own military efforts, including extensive civil defense preparation, a redeployment of forces to the north, and the development of nuclear missiles and other weapons delivery systems.

THE TAIWAN QUESTION

Also since the Shanghai Communique, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, opponents of this policy in Peking have been able to point to relatively slow progress on the Taiwan issue. In general, they make the point that the United States has gotten the better of the deal in Sino-American détente. The opening to China helped the United States get out of Vietnam. It helped the United States to open a liaison office in Peking. What, they ask, have the Chinese gotten in return? Furthermore-and Professor Eckstein will have more to say about this than I-there also has been concern that greater economic contact with the West will not only mean the greater availability of Western technology and imports, but also risks becoming economically dependent upon the West. It also runs the risk that Western technology and other imports will be accompanied by an infusion of Western bourgeois values, which of course the Chinese wish to insulate themselves against.

I believe these are the arguments made by the proponents and the opponents of Sino-American détente. It is important to realize also that this debate has been linked to the succession in China and to the competition for power after the death of Mao.

Between 1969 and 1971, for example, Lin Piao, the former vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Minister of Defense, appeared to have opposed Sino-American rapprochement in large part because he felt it would weaken his own political position in China.

Later in 1973 and 1974 more radical leaders seem to have used the alleged costs of Sino-American détente to try to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the proponents of détente in China.

CONTROVERSY AND REASSESSMENT

My first point then is that Sino-American relations have been controversial in China.

The second point is that this debate has occurred in waves. It has not been constant. One of these waves is occurring right now. China appears today to be in another period of reassessment which is even more critical than those which have gone before.

As you know, the Chinese have in various ways been expressing dissatisfaction with Sino-American relations during this past year. It seems to me that this dissatisfaction is genuine. Part of it almost certainly is an attempt to influence what President Ford will bring with him to Peking. But much of it is also genuine concern about the status of Sino-American relations.

LESS NEED FOR U.S. COUNTERWEIGHT

It also seems to me that the dissatisfaction that is being expressed is deeper than in the past, not concerned simply with the details or timing of Sino-American relations, but with a basic underlying calculation. That is, I think the Chinese are beginning to wonder whether or not the United States is necessary or useful anymore as a counterweight against the Soviet Union.

As I argue in my prepared statement in more detail, the Chinese are less fearful now of a Soviet invasion than they were in 1969. Therefore their need for an American counterweight is less.

It is also amply clear from Secretary Kissinger's visit to China last month that the Chinese question the strength and the determination of the United States to serve as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and that they view our policy of détente toward the Soviet Union as little more than appeasement of Moscow.

A WIDER REASSESSMENT

Finally, reassessment that is going on today is more widespread than it has been in the past. During the previous periods of reassessment-in 1973-74 for example-it was primarily the leaders who were on the periphery of power in China who seemed to be critical of Sino-American relations.

Today the most important leaders, including Mao Tse-tung and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, are questioning and reexamining their relations with the United States.

I stress that should Mao himself begin to lose confidence in the policy of détente with the United States, this would be very serious indeed because Mao's support of the policy has been crucial at several points in the past.

U.S. POLICY ASSUMPTIONS QUESTIONED

Third, I would argue that four assumptions underlying our present China policy are at best only partly valid.

MODERATES WILL PREVAIL

What are these four assumptions? The first assumption is that the succession to Mao is settled, that moderates will continue to dominate the collective leadership in China, and that they will continue their policy of détente with the United States.

I would argue that the succession to Mao is not yet settled. The situation seems to be pretty stable at the moment. But there is still the chance that political changes will occur that will lead to a relatively more radical leadership, that is to say a leadership that will be less conciliatory towards the United States and less desirous of trade with the United States and other Western countries.

Moreover, even if the moderates do win the succession struggle, there is still the possibility of change in foreign policy in China. A moderate regime might be one to engage in a limited rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Even a relatively moderate leadership group will eventually lose patience with further delay of the normalization of relations and the solution of the Taiwan issue.

PERMANENCE OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

The second assumption, which I think is only partly valid, is that Sino-Soviet conflict is a permanent feature of international politics. The implication of this assumption of course is that the Chinese need the United States as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and that they therefore will do nothing to imperil the policy of détente with us.

It seems to me that even if Sino-Soviet conflict does continue, it does not preclude a cooling of relations between China and the United States. At several points in the past Chinese leaders have argued for a dual adversary position, that is that the Chinese can and should be hostile to both superpowers.

Even if the Sino-Soviet conflict continues, there will still be those in Peking who argue that that is no excuse for capitulation to imperialism.

More importantly, however, I do not believe that the Sino-Soviet conflict is necessarily permanent. Following the death of Mao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who basically seem to be anti-Soviet in their attitude, new leaders will be coming into power who may gradually begin to see the costs of rigid hostility towards the Soviet Union and the advantages of beginning a limited process of détente with their neighbor to the north.

Therefore it seems to me that we cannot let the Sino-Soviet conflict be the only underpinning of Sino-American relations, for that underpinning may undergo a change in the coming years.

CHINA WILL BE PATIENT

The third questionable assumption is that the Chinese will be patient indefinitely on the Taiwan issue and on the question of recognition. Those who hold this assumption argue that we need not be in any hurry to recognize China nor be concerned that so little progress has occurred since 1973.

I think it is true that many Chinese leaders do understand that there are both foreign and domestic constraints operating on the U.S. Government in this regard. However many do not. Or at least they claim not to. Moreover even Chinese patience is going to have its limits at some point. More and more Chinese are going to say, "When is normalization going to occur? When are we going to sit down with the

United States and negotiate some kind of a solution to the Taiwan question?" Once their patience reaches a limit they will press harder and demand less conciliatory terms for a resolution of these issues.

DÉTENTE WITH BOTH CHINA AND THE U.S.S.R.

Finally the fourth questionable assumption is that the United States can pursue détente with the Soviet Union and with China simultaneously. It is too early to say conclusively. But it would seem that Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking indicates that the Chinese do want us to choose between Peking and Moscow, and that we ought to take Chinese concerns into account when we negotiate with the Soviet Union just as we presently take Soviet concerns into account when we negotiate with the People's Republic of China.

NEED FOR REASSESSMENT

The fourth point that I make in the conclusion of the paper is that the United States too must begin to reassess Sino-American relations over the past several years, and examine the lack of progress in the normalization of relations, which we pledged in the Shanghai Communique in February 1972.

It seems to me that we should weigh the benefits of recognition against the costs of recognition against the risks of further delay. The benefits should not be exaggerated. This is an important point. Changing the plaque on the doors of liaison offices in Washington and Peking is not going to make a whole lot of difference to what goes on inside. Exchanges and trade most likely will be facilitated by recognition, although one must not be overly optimistic about the extent to which they will develop after recognition.

COSTS OF RECOGNITION

As far as costs are concerned, the most important costs of recognition would be the possibility of destabilizing the Taiwanese political situation, reducing Taiwanese security, and weakening the Taiwanese

economy.

It seems to me, however, that these costs are both diminishing and controllable. They are diminishing in the sense that Taiwan is beginning to adjust rather flexibly and efficiently to the new international situation and can be expected to adjust better over time.

Furthermore the costs are controllable. That is, the United States can and should insist on certain conditions when it recognizes the People's Republic of China. In particular, we should demand and receive assurances of the right to continued political, economic, and cultural contacts with the people of Taiwan. Also we should reiterate forcefully our traditional view that the Taiwan question should be settled by the Chinese involved without resort to the use or the threat of force.

THE RISKS OF FURTHER DELAY

Finally there are risks in further delay, particularly the risks that political changes in China and changing assessments of the international situation, will lead to a deterioration of relations between China and the United States, as new leaders come to power in both govern