operating in a Cold War climate of suspicion and thus are more readily accepted and able to build upon public interest. As a "people's" organization open to "anyone who agrees with our goals," the USCPFA has grown and proliferated remarkably, aided in large part by the ability to arrange tours to the PRC. Each regional association receives an annual "quota" from China, perhaps as many as half a dozen delegations. Although some visits have been organized along interest-group lines, most tours have involved people from diverse backgrounds and, at least initially, membership in the Association apparently was not a necessary criterion. But as the "visa power" of the associations increased, so too did the preference that tour participants be members, and the prospect of a China trip has become a strong inducement to join-even for those unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the organization's general tone and posture. Since the associations are able to charge a flat amount that usually exceeds the per capita tour charges levied by China, these travels also provide a means of subsidizing their other activities. Thus far, the USCPFA either has not sought or has not succeeded in arranging an "exchange" program, since no Chinese groups have visited the U.S. under its auspices. Many local chapters, however, have actively participated in hosting Chinese delegations coming under other sponsorship, notably those through the "government facilitated" route, and regularly seek to arrange receptions or banner-waving throngs at airports. An interesting question, given the exchange patterns outlined above, is whether the Association might eventually emerge as an "alternate channel" for Chinese visitors to this country. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS Having started from base zero less than five years ago, exchanges between the U.S. and China have progressed remarkably and been of immense importance to the United States. Their effect on American public attitudes and perceptions, warped by decades of cold-war rhetoric, has been profound, and some have suggested that the impact on the people of China may well be no less significant. Information gained about Chinese society and politics, and about common societal problems that eventually might stimulate cooperative efforts toward their solution, has been invaluable, albeit limited. Through first-hand observations and interviews, China has emerged as a far more complex, successful, yet troubled society than our "Pekingologists" could have inferred from distant listening posts. Exchanges also have served to communicate important political signals, permitted sustained communication outside the constraints of formal diplomacy, and produced cordial personal relationships between a small but growing number of prominent American and Chinese citizens, in a range of fields, which could well prove of vital importance in the years ahead. Nevertheless, serious problems remain-none of which can be entirely separated from the realm of politics. 1. Reciprocity and mutual benefit. Presumably neither the signers of the Shanghai Communique, nor anyone else, expected the flow of visitors between the two countries to be even approximately equal. "Reciprocity" was desired primarily in the "facilitated exchange" arena. It quickly became apparent, however, that the term meant different things on each side of the Pacific. For China, with its highly centralized planning, it has meant an overall balance in the number of "facilitated" delegations, including those in the trade field and others not sponsored directly by the designated American committees. For the American committees, reflecting their private and independent status, it has meant seeking a balanced annual program for each of them. The greater problem, however, has involved the nature of the exchange themselves. The NCUSCR, and to a lesser extent the CSCPRC, expected a reasonable balance within each broad field-in performing arts and sports, civic affairs, science and technology, the social sciences and humanities-and also the right of each side to determine the composition of each of its delegations. For the Chinese, however, reciprocity seemed to mean accommodating each side's differing fields of interest, while emphasizing the need for detailed approval of each delegation by the host country. Since the U.S., both officially and privately, has consistently sought a larger and more diverse program, China has been free to accept and propose only the minimum needed to properly "symbolize their relationship with us." The result has been a program shaped primarily by Chinese views: an almost annual imbalance in the program of each U.S. organization; cultural exchanges primarily of performing groups and sports "spectaculars" to enhance public opinion rather than projects in education for civic affairs that might deepen understanding of specific issues; and scholarly exchanges predominantly in the sciences rather than in the more politically sensitive social science and humanities fields. The persistence of this pattern has become a source of increasing frustration and unhappiness in the respective American scholarly and civic constituencies. It has also raised serious questions about the continued viability of the U.S. organizations conducting the "facilitated" exchanges, especially in regard to financial support from foundations and other private sources. The question of reciprocity has also taken on strong political overtones in the context of individual exchange projects-most notably two that were cancelled at the eleventh hour in 1975. In March, barely two weeks before a large PRC performing arts troupe was to arrive in the U.S., China insisted on adding several program items, including a highly popular new song entitled "The People of Taiwan are our Brothers" which featured the lyrics "we must liberate Taiwan." Seeing this as a potential source of great embarrassment to local host groups across the country, and possibly a direct attempt to test American policy, the NCUSCR and the State Department opposed the program change. The impasse resulted in cancellation of the tour, to great mutual regret. In the Chinese view, the U.S. had violated the spirit of the Shanghai Communique regarding the status of Taiwan, and had wrongly elevated a purely internal matterTaiwan-to an international political issue. In the U.S. view, the Chinese had introduced a political element into a strictly cultural exchange and, especially since the Philadelphia Orchestra had carefully tailored its 1973 program to Chinese wishes, had failed to reciprocate by respecting the wishes of the host. In September, a delegation of American mayors, scheduled to visit China through the NCUSCR and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, was cancelled because of China's last-minute request that the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico (who was also President of the National League of Cities) be excluded. This time, it was the Americans who saw a political intrusion into an "internal matter," and the sponsoring organization held firm. China's position might well have been hardened in part by a desire for a quid pro quo following the performing arts incident. 2. Substantive content. As suggested above, there is an implicit tension between "form" and substance" in the selection of exchange projects. And within those exchanges that do take place, there are differing concerns regarding substantive content. American organizations, and the scholars and other publics they represent, have steadily pressured not only for "more" but "better." The PRC has seemed concerned primarily with giving foreigners a comprehensive overview of life in the new China through short-term tours, rather than opening specific facets of her developmnt to close scrutiny. In contrast, American hosts tend to "show and tell all" and to expect reciprocal treatment. Private American proposals for bilateral discussions of world problems have elicited few signs of interest from the PRC. The quest of Americans for longer stays in fewer places, in-depth professional visits, and cooperative research ventures has met with only minimal success. Members of Chinese scientific delegations have occasionally given lectures or papers at scholarly meetings here, and generally are showing greater willingness in this regard. Several American scientists of Chinese origin have spent two or three months conducting collaborative research in Chinese institutions. A number of other American scholars well known to China have made second visits of several months duration. But for most Americans, visits in either direction-however delightful and generally informative-have been less than completely rewarding in strictly professional terms. Without significant improvement in this regard, the interest of serious participants, and the credibility of exchange organizations, may well decline. Efforts to establish student exchanges, even in regard to language training, have been similarly unproductive. Several American students of Chinese origin have spent a year or more at universities and language institutes in Peking, but they are exceptions explained by personal acquaintanceship and/or ethnicity. Although hundreds of students are exchanged annually between China and other Western countries, there seem to be no immediate prospects for student exchange programs with the U.S.; and, as with long-term scholarly exchanges and cooperative research, the reasons are partly political. The Chinese imply that with hundreds of Taiwan students and teachers on U.S. campuses, and an embassy in Washington to support them, PRC students and scholars residing here might face awkward and embarrassing situations. In the interests of reciprocity, until the way is paved for their citizens to come for extended periods, China considers the reverse process equally "inconvenient." These circumstances have not, of course, precluded Chinese technicians from training in U.S. firms (though ad mittedly in cloistered circumstances) when important national needs were involved. Much of China's unwillingness even to experiment in this area surely reflects a reluctance to symbolize the U.S. relationship in more substantial terms. 3. Integrity. The "opening" to China unfortunately spawned a "visa culture" in some quarters, as many Americans became concerned about how their published views might prejudice chances for the pilgrimage to Peking or the exchange prospects of organizations in which they served. The problem was heightened for successful applicants, since the Chinese presumably would be especially interested in public reports about their trips. Although China has made clear her objections to "unwarranted speculation" about domestic politics, "distortions" of PRC life, and to even the vaguest implications of a "two Chinas" position, many visitors became more sensitive to Chinese reactions than there was need to be. But the sense of "prior restraint" with which Americans approached China, coupled with the vital and impressive society they saw (albeit superficially), resulted in a remarkably good press for the PRC, and raised the spectre of a new, unrealistic "love" phase in our traditional "love-hate" relationship. Premier Chou En-lai actually felt obliged to caution one group of American journalists about presenting an overly rosy picture, and a Harvard China specialist warned of the "Marcopoloitis that paralyzed American critical faculties in the early 1970s." Never the dominant mood, the "visa culture," and the uncritical analyses it abetted, subsided as the new relationship became a more normal part of the international landscape; but they probably will never disappear altogether. A more serious issue involves Chinese attitudes to events held in the U.S., particularly those cultural exchanges having great public visibility. Major concern has been expressed about the media; film and TV coverage occasionally has been curtailed when hosts could not provide adequate assurance that it would truly "promote friendship"-or, understandably perhaps, when it seemed the product would be used for "commercial exploitation." Writing of an incident in December, 1974, Jerome Cohen noted that: The forced cancellation of the press preview of the magnificient Chinese Archaeological Exhibition in Washington brings to the surface some of the implications of United States-Chinese exchanges in our country. Actually, China's interference with free communication goes beyond its refusal to accept journalists from South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, or Israel at the preview. The Chinese insisted upon, and were granted, the power to determine not only the intellectual content of catalogs and all public statements, but also even the books to be sold by the National Gallery Bookstore.* China's concerns may have been intensified by the political campaign underway in China at that particular time. But the question of how far American hosts should go in accommodating Chinese wishes about what Americans see and hear, while still seeking a constructive relationship with a radically different society, will certainly endure. There will always be some who do not stand up for their principles, others who make matters of principle out of issues that are not, and mutually exclusive principles which occasionally but inevitably produce conflict between the two countries. To pursue exchanges with complete integrity, we will need an equal store of patience, dedication, and diplomatic skill. FUTURE PROSPECTS By mid-1975, earlier thoughts that the President's fall visit to Peking might result in diplomatic recognition-and thus increased cultural relations-had begun to wane. Early indications were that at least "government facilitated" exchanges would be frozen at previous levels, reflecting an apparent cooling of the political relationship. But within any possible scenario, prospects for substantial improvement in either quantity or quality do not appear bright, especially given the already crowded and internationally competitive travel market. Without diplomatic recognition, a sizeable increase in Chinese visitors to the U.S. seems most unlikely; and private American visits to China will certainly remain highly selective and could reflect even greater emphasis on cultivating public support and key opinion leaders rather than on deepening learning opportunities. Diplomatic relations could, of course, come at any time-within months or not for years. When it does happen, the effect is likely to be most pronounced 3 Jerome A. Cohen, New York Times (opposite editorial page), December 18, 1974. • Ibid. on the form and substance of exchanges, rather than on the volume. The doors would be opened for students (especially in the language field), though it would be overly optimistic to expect more than a few dozen per year in each direction. A few selected scholars might engage in joint research for several months, and several journalists might be stationed in each capital. But even diplomatic relations are no guarantee of such developments, which will surely depend on China's judgments about the terms and specific implications of the formal tie. For the U.S., at least, the government would have a freer hand to sponsor and conduct exchange activities as it wishes without having only to "facilitate" the work of others; a formal exchange agreement might clarify the mutual interests of the two parties and establish useful guidelines; and some of the political clouds that occasionally have dimmed specific project would be dispelled. Under any circumstances, it will be much in the national interest to press for both greater reciprocity and increasingly substantive content in the exchange process-both through official and private channels. Apart from direct government-to-government negotiations, the three private organizations now conducting the "facilitated exchanges" (the CSCPRC, NCUSCR, and NCUSCT) provide the principal means of leverage, and their work could well be even more important after diplomatic relations are established. These committees, and the expertise they have developed, are important national resources in the effort to understand and deal cooperatively with the PRC. Our exchange relationships with China will never be entirely free from politics. For the PRC, a skilled practioner of cultural diplomacy, politics will remain "in command," and both governments will continue to view exchanges as an instrument of national policy. But it is easy to overlook the basic cultural, even moral, foundations of the exchange process, and the vast gap in mutual comprehension between American and PRC citizens that remains after five fruitful, but largely experimental, years of serious contact. Fortunately, despite their problems, exchanges have become an invaluable bridge for humanistic and scientific learning. The stakes are too large to treat them as simply an accessory to politics, or to let politics bar their steady evolution. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Dr. Murray. STATEMENT OF ANNE KEATLEY, STAFF DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE ON SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA EXCHANGE OF SPECIALISTS Ms. KEATLEY. Dr. Murray gave a survey of exchanges. I would like to discuss specifically the exchange of scientists, engineers, and professional specialists in general terms and also specifically within the Committee on Scholarly Communication's program. These kinds of visits began in 1971 when Americans began traveling to China. The first Chinese delegations came to the United States after President Nixon's visit there in 1972. Since then the committee estimates that approximately a thousand specialists have gone to China on specialty-oriented visits. Many of these have been Americans of Chinese origin. A large number of these have been in medical sciences. Scientists and engineers have constituted another large group. Fewer social scientists and humanists have visited. Approximately half of these have been Americans of Chinese origin, who, because of their language facility and ethnic ties, may have a more comprehensive access to Chinese society than those who do not have these facilities and ties. CHINESE DELEGATION The majority of the Chinese delegations that have come here since 1972 have been received by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC. The committee also has sent scholarly delegations to China. These delegations represent only a small percentage of the total number of scholars who travel to China. As Mr. Murray pointed out, the Chinese have been able to choose from among a large number of academicians who have applied to visit China. Most people would like to visit and most have applied several times for visas. The attachments to the paper that I have presented discuss the organization and programs of the Committee on Scholarly Communication. A list of our programs is on pages 15 and 16. A list of committee delegation reports is on page 17.1 Every committee delegation that goes to China agrees to write a publishable report of their visit. These are published by the National Academy of Sciences or by commercial publishers. CHINESE INTERESTS As Dr. Murray pointed out, the exchanges symbolize the new relationship between China and the United States. But both countries have other interests, both as to how the exchanges are conducted and their content. Most of the Chinese delegation to the United States have been in the areas of advanced science and technology, such as computer and laser technology, hydraulic engineering, telecommunications technology, and industrial automation. This is in accord with China's desire to develop into a technological society, Most Chinese delegations coming here are concerned with specific problems related to China's industrial and agricultural development. Exchange programs are directed at important economic and social needs in China. U.S. INTERESTS For the Americans going to China the interests and desires are more difficult to describe. Certainly there is an incredible fascination for China that is an important factor in driving bilateral relations. This is because we were cut off from China for 25 years. The Chinese have received a great deal of information about the United States, about U.S. science and technology. We have relatively little information about what the Chinese are doing. Chinese technical journals ceased publication at the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966 and only in the last few years have begun publication again. Americans have been interested in learning about Chinese society. Scientists and engineers have wanted to assess Chinese advancement in their particular fields. They want to find out what the Chinese are doing and to assess the status of Chinese science and technology. LONG-TERM BENEFITS The general view has been that the United States is more advanced than China is in most areas of science and technology. We have a great deal to contribute to China. It would probably be in our interest to do so in areas like food, feeding the Chinese population, and the de 1 See appendix 4 on p. 196. |