N.S. 337.

NEXT week the Comte de Paris celebrates his silver wedding by a monster garden-party of Royalists at that famous hostelry, the Star and Garter, Richmond, and the Prince of Wales is expected to be present. The Star and Garter, by the way, celebrated its restoration" after the fire by a superb dinner last week. A body of some sixty guests enjoyed the chef's triumphs, under the genial presidency of Mr. A. M. Broadley, and both the excellence of the menu and the perfectly charming scheme of decoration employed in the renovated building, proved that in Signor Mella the hotel has found a proprietor gifted equally with enterprise and good taste. Under Signor Mella's control the Star and Garter should speedily even excel its ancient renown as the most charming resort within an easy drive of the metropolis.

IN Hancock v. Smith we have an important decision of the Court of Appeal as to the application of the rule in Clayton's case, 1 Mor. 572. The facts were shortly as follows. Hancock on 17th January, 1888, obtained judgment against Smith for £650, and costs. Smith was a stockbroker, keeping a current account at his bankers in his own name, into which he paid the proceeds of securities sold by him for his clients. On 6th October, 1888, he paid into the account £14 12s. 6d., the monies of a client, a Miss Palmer; on 15th October, 1888, he paid in £60, belonging to another client named Shaw. The balance standing to his credit on that day was £532 13s. 6d. Between the 15th October and 5th November, 1888, he paid in further sums amounting to £1,367 17s. 10d., but during that period he had drawn out £1,599 10s. 1d., and the balance standing to his credit on November 5th was only £301 1s. 3d. On the 5th November, 1888, the plaintiff obtained a garnishee order nisi against the balance standing to defendant's credit at the bank. This order was served on the bank, and several persons, including Miss Palmer and Shaw, made claims against the balance. There was enough to satisfy the claims of Miss Palmer and Shaw, but they were disallowed in Chambers, and subsequently by North, J. The evidence showed that the payments out had been used by defendant in making payments to his clients, and that the payments in consisted entirely of trust monies. Miss Palmer and Shaw were the only unsatisfied claimants against the balance. If the rule in Clayton's case were applied, it was clear that the case of the claimants, Miss Palmer and Shaw, must fail, for if the payments out were appropriated to the monies paid in in order of date, their monies had been drawn out and paid away. North, J., held the rule applied. Now, in the important case of in re Hallett Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696, it was decided by the Court of first instance that where monies belonging to two cestuis que trustent have been paid by a trustee into his own account at his bankers, and there is a contest as to priority between the cestuis que trustent, the rule in Clayton's case applies, and accordingly the sum first paid in is held to have been first drawn out. The peculiarity of the present case, however, consisted in this that no other cestui que trust save the two elaimants, Miss Palmer and Shaw, had any claim against the balance, and the contest, therefore, was between Hancock, the judgment creditor of Smith, and the latter's two clients, Miss Palmer and Shaw. The Court of Appeal (consisting of Lord Halsbury, L.C., and Cotton and Fry, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of North, J., pointing out that there was no competition as between the cestuis que trustent themselves, and the rule in Clayton's case was inapplicable as between Hancock, who, between Hancock, who, under the garnishee order, would have no superior title or right to the fund than Smith himself had, and Smith's clients.

THE important decision on the meaning of a condition incorporated in a policy of fire insurance of the Sun Fire Office v. Hart et al, on which we commented at some length in our issue of February 27th (Vol. VIII, No. 123, p.

The Queen v. Tolson lays at rest an open question in Criminal Law on which there has not been so much dearth as conflict of decision. Unfortunately, however, none of the decisions was of preponderating authority, and for years the point has been a moot one. The facts were that the prisoner, who had been indicted for bigamy, was married on the 11th September, 1880, her husband deserting her in December, 1881. She herself and her father made inquiries, with the result that she believed, and, as the jury found, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, that her husband was dead-in fact, that he was lost in a vessel lost at sea. Accordingly in January, 1887, she married again. Shortly after the second marriage her first husband reappeared. The prisoner was convicted in order to raise the question of law for the decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, which now quashed the conviction. There was, however, no little difference of opinion among the Judges. The majority in favour of quashing the conviction consisted of Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Hawkins, Stephen, Cave, Day, A. L. Smith, Wills, Grantham, and Charles, JJ.; the minority for maintaining the conviction, of Denman, J., Pollock, B., Field, J., Huddleston, B., and Manisty, J. We confess, without entering upon the legal arguments, we think the result satisfactory: the proviso of 24 and 25 Vict., c. 100 s. 57, enacts that a conviction for bigamy shall not be had in the case of any person marrying again whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent for seven years last past, and is not known to be living at the time. That is to say, a gratuitous belief founded on ignorance, if the husband has been absent continually, etc., for seven years, is by statute a sufficient answer to the charge. An honest and reasonable belief that one's husband or wife is dead will probably seem to many persons a stronger ground.

IN consequence of the success attending Mr. Alexander's matinée of The Grandsire at Terry's Theatre, last week, the performance will be repeated on Wednesday next at 3 p.m., seats for which may now be booked at the theatre and libraries. The booking for the performance last week was extremely heavy, and amongst the audience were most of the leading lights of London society. Hundreds were turned away from the doors unable to obtain admission.

MISS ALICE LINGARD will create the leading part in Mr. J. W. Pigott's new comedy drama, Which Wins, to be done at Terry's, on Wednesday, June 12. Miss Lingard, with the exception of her performances at the Haymarket in old comedy, has not been seen in London since her appearance in Sister Mary, in 1887.

ONE of those interesting little problems which will arise, even in the best regulated settlements, came up for solution before Mr. Justice Kay the other day in the case of In re Wyatt, Gowan, and Wyatt. By a marriage settlement, dated in 1875, personal property of the wife was settled upon trust for the intended wife for life, and after her death upon trust to pay the income to the intended husband (but, alas! for that worthy individual only), "so long as he shall remain unmarried, and from and after the death of the survivor" upon trast as to the capital for the children of the marriage, as the husband and wife or the survivor should appoint, and in default for sons at twenty one, and daughters at that age or marriage. There was the usual advancement clause exercisable with the consent of the husband or wife, or the survivor, during their lives, and the ultimate trust in default of issue was for the wife, if she survived, and if the husband survived for the wife's appointees by will, and in default for her next of kin. It should be mentioned that the settlement also contained a life policy of the husband, which was settled upon like trusts, except that, if the wife survived and married again, the policy moneys were to be held upon the same trusts as if she were then dead. There was also a covenant in the common form for the settlement for this and after acquired property of the wife, including reversionary interests of the value of £500 and upwards, upon trust for sale, but as to the reversionary property not until it fell into possession, the proceeds to be held upon the trusts declared of the wife's property.

THERE were six children of the marriage. In 1886 the wife died, and the husband took out administration to her estate. About three years after the death of his first wife the husband married again in January, 1889. The trustees took out an originating summons to ascertain that neat little problem, who, since the husband's second marriage, was entitled to the income of the wife's property under the settlement.

Ir was clear that the limitation in favour of the husband was subject to the condition of his not marrying again. His interest, therefore, ceased on his second marriage, and Mr. Justice Kay held that it was impossible to imply a life estate to him, for that would be inconsistent with that limitation. Nor could the argument be allowed that the case could be brought within the doctrine of acceleration of remainders or reversionary interests. His lordship was of opinion that upon the husband marrying again there was a resulting trust of the income during the rest of his life to his first wife's legal personal representatives. His lordship also held that the interest was not a reversionary interest included in the covenant to settle after acquiring property of the wife, and was not intended to be so included. In the end his lordship came to the conclusion (which seems correct) that the undisposed-of income belonged to the husband, as the administrator of the wife.

In re the Callao Bis Company will shortly come before the Court of Appeal. It will be remembered an application was made to North, J., to sanction a scheme for reconstruction. The company was being voluntarily wound up under Section 161 of the Companies Act, 1862, and a special resolution had been duly passed authorising an agreement whereby the assets of the old company were to be sold to the new company, in consideration of the issue of shares in the new company to the shareholders of the old company. An application was made ex parte on behalf of the voluntary liquidator and the company for the sanction of the Court. The object of obtaining this sanction was to prevent the transaction being invalidated in the event of an order for winding up or supervision being made by the Court within a year from the passing of the resolution. North, J., however, decided he had no jurisdiction to sanction the scheme, on the ground that no order for winding up or supervision had been made by the Court. An application was then made (May 18th) to the Court of Appeal, but their lordships declined to hear the appeal ex parte, though they gave leave to serve notice of motion on a creditor of, and dissentient shareholder in, the company for the 29th inst. The point is one of no small importance, and the decision will be awaited with no little interest in the commercial world.

LORD COLERIDGE, L.C.J., and Hawkins, J., recently delivered judgment in the case of Ford v. Wiley, which was heard last sittings, and raised the question whether polling or dishorning cattle by sawing off their horns close to the head constituted cruelty to animals within the Statute 12 and 13 Vict., c. 92, s. 2. The Court, though their lordships took time to prepare the considered judg ments which have now been delivered, stated that they held the practice to be distinctly illegal, and to constitute cruelty within the meaning of the enactment. The reasons now given for the decision are so instructive that we shall touch on them shortly. The mere infliction even of extreme pain, the Lord Chief Justice said, was not enough, for it might be inflicted in circumstances which rendered it reasonably necessary for purposes of medicine or surgery, by way of proper punishment or discipline, to enable an animal to attain its due degree of development, or render it fit for ordinary use. The case for the necessity of the practice, however, broke down; the evidence not only did not show need for it, but plainly showed it was not necessary. It was shown that the practice had been for twenty years discontinued throughout almost the whole of England and Wales, and, save in three counties, in Scotland; also in Ireland, where the practice was more common, the object, or one of the objects, for having recourse to it was the not very legitimate one of disguising the age of the animal, with a view to deceiving purchasers. The Higbland

Agricultural Society had fifteen years ago condemned, and still condemns, the practice as cruel, and it was clear on the evidence of the veterinary surgeons called that the operation inflicted great torture on the animals at the time, and that great pain was felt for three weeks or more afterwards. On the other side it was shown that dishorned beasts sold for thirty or forty shillings apiece more, that they could be packed more closely, and therefore carried more cheaply, and also could not gore each other. Lord Coleridge said that necessity to constitute an excuse under the Act did not mean simply that the object of the operation could not be otherwise secured; there must be some proportion between the object and the means, and he held that the pain inflicted for the slight gain was utterly disproportionate, the more so that goring could be prevented by cutting off the tips of the horns merely, where they are far less sensitive, or by tipping the horn. The main difficulty in the case consisted in the fact that the legality of the practice impeached has been recognised in both a Scotch and an Irish case, but it did not appear in either of those cases that the Court had before it evidence either of the great and prolonged pain caused or the absence of need for the practice.

LEGAL HONOURS.

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MR. HARRY WILMOT LEE, Solicitor, has been appointed Chapter Clerk, Registrar, and Steward of the Courts of St. Paul's Cathedral, in succession to his father the late Mr. John Benjamin Lee. Mr. H. W. Lee is registrar of the Charterhouse, High Bailiff of the City of Westminster, returning officer for the Boroughs of the Strand and St. George's, Hanover Square, registrar of the Diocese of London, secretary to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and to the Bishops of London, Winchester, Durham, Bath and Wells, Ely, Carlisle, Hereford, Norwich, and Ripon. Admitted in 1870.

MR. ZACHARY EDWARDS, barrister, has been appointed Mayor of the borough of Lyme Regis. Called at Lincoln's Inn in Hilary Term, 1865.

MR. THOMAS BURY, solicitor, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Denbighshire to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Bury is town clerk of the borough of Wrexham, and was admitted in 1865.

MR. WILLIAM WAKELIN, solicitor, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Radnorshire to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Wakelin is registrar of the Presteign County Court, and was admitted in 1875.

MR. ROBERT FREDERICK SISSON, solicitor, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Flintshire to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Sisson is registrar of the St. Asaph County Court, and his firm are joint clerks to the county magistrates. Admitted in 1878.

THE TEMPLE NEWSPAPER LAW REPORTS.

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COURT OF APPEAL.

BERESFORD-HOPE v. LADY SANDHURST.-Local Government Act, 1888, Sect. 2.-Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.-Capacity of Woman to be Elected a County Councillor.-Votes

Given to Her Thrown Away.-Notorious Disqualification — At a recent election of County Councillors for the Brixton Division of the Administrative County of London, Lady Sandhurst was returned; her sex was of course known, and also that it might prove to be a legal disqualification, it being a subject of common public discussion at the time. Held (by Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Lord Esher, M.R., and Cotton, Lindley, Fry, and Lopes, L.J.J.) that leave to appeal having been given by the Court below, the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the case. Held also (affirming the decision of Huddleston, B., and Stephen, J.), that a woman cannot be elected a County Councillor; and further, that votes given to her must, in the circumstances, be treated as thrown away on the ground that the fact, to which the law annexed disqualification, was notorious, so that the candidate, if otherwise qualified, who obtained next highest number of votes, was entitled to the seat.

In re SALMON PRIEST v. UPPLEBY.-R.S.C. Order XVI., r. 48.-Contribution or Indemnity.-Third Party Notice Issued by Defendant.-Appeal by Plaintiff against Judgment in Favour of Defendant.-Need for Service of Notice of Appeal on Third Party by Appellant or by Respondent.-Order LVIII., rr. 182. -Parties Directly Affected.-Action was brought in respect of

breach of trust alleged to have been committed by defendant, G. C. Uppleby, who had been appointed trustee of a will, but had retired from the trusts, and the other defendants had been appointed trustees in his place. G. C. Uppleby denied liability to the plaintiff, but he claimed, in the event of the Court holding him liable, indemnity from some third parties against whom, by leave, he issued a third party notice. The third parties appeared, and denied liability, and Stirling, J., gave them leave to deliver a statement of defence, it being also ordered that the question of indemnity should be dealt with at, but immediately after, the trial of the action; and the third parties were to be at liberty to appear at the trial, and take such part therein as the Judge might think proper. Kekewich, J., tried the action, Counsel appearing on behalf of the third parties. Judgment was given for defendant, G. C. Uppleby, and consequently no question of indemnity arose. Plaintiff appealed, and served his notice of appeal on the defendant only, and not on the third parties. Held (by Lord Esher, M.R., and Fry, L.J., dissentiente Cotton, L.J.) that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to serve notice of appeal on the third parties under Order 58, Rules 1 and 2, for they were not parties directly affected by the result of the appeal, and also that the Court ought not to hear the appeal without the presence of the third parties, and that the defendant ought to have applied to the Court for leave to serve them with notice. Per Cotton, L.J., dissentiente, that Order 58, Rule 2, did not apply, and that even if it did, the third parties were directly affected by the result of the appeal within the meaning of that rule, and that it was the duty of the appellant to make his appeal perfect, and therefore to have served the third parties.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

KINNAIRD v. TROLLOPE.--Mortgagor and Mortgagee.-Liability of Mortgagor for Interest. When Ceases to Run.Tender.-Circumstances whence Mortgagee might Infer Tender Useless.- In 1870 T. mortgaged certain property to the plaintiffs, to secure £12,000 and interest, the mortgage being in the usual form. In 1872 T. sold the equity of redemption to Earl of Glasgow for £9,100, and Lord Glasgow, in 1875, gave a further charge on the property to plaintiffs to secure £8,000 and interest. In November, 1886, plaintiffs applied to T. (the present defen. dant) for payment of the £12,000 and an arrear of interest owing. T. expressed willingness to pay this within a short time on having a transfer of the property mortgaged to them in 1870, but plaintiffs denied T.'s right to redeem the property, except on payment of both the £12,000 and the £8,000. Plaintiffs then commenced an action against T., claiming £12,000 and interest on the covenant contained in the mortgage of 1870. Stirling, J., held the plaintiffs were only entitled to judgment on the terms of their reconveying the property to T., subject to such equity of redemption as might be subsisting in any person other than T. Accounts were subsequently directed to be taken to ascertain the amount of principal and interest due on the mortgage to the plaintiffs. The Chief Clerk certified that the plaintiffs were entitled to an amount for interest, which was calculated up to the date of actual payment. T. objected that though no actual tender had been made, yet the conduct of the plaintiffs in insisting on a condition they had no right to impose, amounted to dispensing with the need for a tender, and stopped interest running. Held (by Stirling, J.) that no tender having been made, and it not appearing that T. had from the commencement of the proceedings been ready and willing to pay the £12,000 and interest, until the decision of the Court that he was entitled to redeem on doing so had been obtained, the Court could not stop the interest, which must be paid by T. down to the date of payment off.

In re BASCHIERA'S TRADE MARK.-Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Acts, 1883, Sect. 72.-Near Resemblance Calculated to Deceive Usage of Trade of Referring to an Article by the Distinguishing Feature of Label.-Motion for direction to Comptroller-General of Patents and Trade Marks to proceed with the registration of a trade mark which applicants sought to register. Applicants, an old-established firm of match-makers in Venice, had for more than 35 years past been in the habit of placing on bills, &c., connected with their business, a representation of the winged lion of St. Mark-the arms of the city of Venice. In July, 1887, they applied to the Comptroller for registration of this figure as a new trade mark for wax vesta3. At that date various figures of lions were already registered as trade marks for matches, principally on behalf of Bryant and May, and Comptroller refused to register, on the ground of the similarity of the mark applicants desired to register, to one already registered for Bryant and May, holding it was such as was calculated to deceive. It was shown that a practice prevailed in the trade of calling matches by the name of the principal feature of the label, e.g., tiger matches, lion matches, &c. Held (by Chitty, J.) that having regard to the usage of the trade, and the similarity of the trade mark proposed to be registered to that already on the register, the application must be refused, for that the two marks so nearly resembled as to be calculated to deceive within sect. 72 of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. REDGRAVE (Appellant), KELLY (Respondent).-Truck Act (1 and 2 William IV., c. 37) s. 33.-Payment of Wages Otherwise than in Coin.-Scope of the Act.-Fines Imposed for Misconduct.-Deduction of from Wages.-Respondent is proprietor of a confectionery business, and as such employs a number of young girls and other persons at weekly wages. During a week in February last one Louisa Donovan was told that she would be fined 2d. for spoiling a paste brush and for doing her work (wrapping up confectionery) badly; or the Saturday of that week she received 2s. 10d. instead of 3s., the full amount of her wages for the week. Another girl was told during the same week she would be fined 2d. for spoiling a tray of work and being impudent, and on the Saturday received 3s. 10d. instead of 4s. An Inspector of Factories laid information against respondent contending that these deductions constituted offences within the Truck Act. The Magistrate held that this was not so, and the Inspector appealed. Held (by Mathew and Grantham, JJ.) that the Magistrate was right, for that the imposition of a fine and its deduction from the wages was not within the mischief the Act 1 and 2 William IV., c. 37, s. 3, was passed to prevent.

In re J. H. LAMB, a Solicitor.-Allowing an Unqualified Person to Practice in name of Solicitor.-Sentence Court Compelled to Pronounce in such Case.-6 and 7 Vict,. c. 33, s. 32.— Absence of Power to Mitigate.-Power of another Court to Review.-Lamb had been ordered to be struck off the roll for allowing an unqualified person to practise in his name, pursuant to 6 and 7 Vict., c. 33, s. 32. This was an application, on affidavits of his good conduct, for mitigation of the sentence, and that his name might be replaced on the roll. Held (by Field and Cave, JJ.) that the Court had in such circumstances no alternative, if satisfied the offence in question had been committed, but were bound under the above-mentioned statute to order that the solicitor be struck off the roll, and that sentence having been passed, another Court had no authority to alter or mitigate it.

COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED. REG. v. GORDON.-24 and 25 Vict., c. 96.-Obtain Promissory Note by False Pretences.-Statement of Intention or Repre sentation of Existing Fact.-Money Lender.-Indictment for Obtaining Money by False Pretences.-Defendant, a moneylender at Worcester, advertised. Prosecutor, a farmer named Brown, went with his wife to Worcester, and saw prisoner, and desired to borrow £100. Brown and his father, who could not read, then went to see prisoner, from whom they obtained, however, £60 only, though they signed a promissory note for £100, payable in quarterly instalments by the end of two years. Brown remonstrated at receiving only £60, but prisoner said £40 was what he charged; his wife then saw he had only received £60, and they offered to return it to the prisoner, who would not accept it. Amongst other counts there was one in which the prisoner was charged with "inducing them to make the said promissory note for £100 by false pretence, that he was prepared to pay them, or one of them, £100." Held (by Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Mathew, Cave, Wills, and Grantham, JJ.) that the conviction could be sustained on the above count.

TRUST FUNDS INVESTMENT BILL.
SHORT TITLE.

1. This Act may be cited as the Trust Investment Act, 1889. EXTENT OF ACT.

2. This Act shall not extend to Scotland. AUTHORISED INVESTMENTS.

3. It shall be lawful for a trustee, unless expressly forbidden by the instrument (if any) creating the trust, to invest any trust funds in his hands in manner following, that is to say:

(a.) In any of the Parliamentary stocks or public funds, or Government securities of the United Kingdom.

(b.) On real securities in England, Wales, or Ireland. (c.) In the stock of the Bank of England or the Bank of Ireland.

(d.) In India Three and a Half per Cent. Stock and India Three per Cent. Stock, or in any other capital stock which may at any time hereafter be issued by the Secretary of State in Council of India, under the authority of Act of Parliament, and charged on the revenues of India.

(e.) In any securities the interest of which is or shall be guaranteed by Parliament.

(f.) In consolidated stock created by the Metropolitan Board of Works, or debenture stock