PUMP COURT.

The Temple Newspaper and Review.

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JUNE 12, 1889.

Pro Lege.

AUCTION LAW.-II.

THE CONTRACT OF SALE.

WE dealt in our first article, in the issue of last week, with the question of an auctioneer's remuneration, and we propose now to consider in a general way those duties and liabilities incumbent on him, which are incidental to the contract of sale. In the first place, he is bound to adhere, like all agents, to the instructions he has received; much may and wisely will be left to his discretion, and at least he will, in all probability, be consulted before any definite decision, upon what is best to be done, is arrived at; but whether this be so or not, if his instructions are precise he must not deviate from them, if a limit of price is fixed he must not take less, and if a mode of sale is prescribed he must not depart from it. This general proposition requires only a slight qualification; if exact adherence to his instructions would involve the commission of fraud upon another or any illegal act, he is entitled to deviate to the extent necessary to avoid perpetrating the fraud or illegality. It will, however, be well, in all cases in which it is possible to do so, to communicate with the employer on discovery of what the consequences of strict adherence to the terms of the instructions will be. Should he refuse to sanction the necessary deviation, it will be needful for the auctioneer to refuse to carry out the contract, and to sue for remuneration for his services already rendered on a quantum meruit. It is his duty (subject to the foregoing remarks) to obtain the best price he reasonably can, to dispose of the subject-matter to the greatest advantage, but so long as the property remains unsold the authority to sell is revocable. Another case in which it will of course be necessary to stop the sale is where an injunction restraining it has been obtained. In the cases of ex parte Langley in re Bishop 13 Ch. D. 110, the duty of an auctioneer in this respect in somewhat peculiar circumstances was considered. A London solicitor had obtained from the Court of Bankruptcy in London an order restraining a sale under an execution in the country. He telegraphed notice of this order to the sheriff's officer. The Court of Appeal held that it was the duty of the sheriff's officer receiving such notice to telegraph to the Court of Bankruptcy or to the London agents of the sheriff, to ascertain whether an injunction had really been granted, but they decided that this was not the duty of the auctioneer who was conducting the sale, for that he was only bound to communicate with the sheriff's officer who instructed him to sell. These duties, then, may conveniently be considered under three heads: those prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to, the sale. As to the first, he must take, provided the interim custody is committed to him, due care of the subject-matter. What is this due care? Now an auc

tioneer is a bailee, and the bailment falls within the fifth kind specified in the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard, Smith's Leading Cases; he is bound to keep the goods entrusted to him with the same care that a prudent man would keep his own. He will therefore be liable for loss or damage arising by reason of his default or negligence, but not for accidental loss not contributed to by his default, though of course such liability may arise by reason of the terms of a special contract. How far it is his duty to insure them has not, we believe, been the subject of decision, though in the case of a factor whose position is in some respects analogous; there appears to be a duty to do so. No question of duty to insure can, however, it is conceived, arise where the goods are not removed by the auctioneer, but remain in the possession of the employer, in fact in statu quo. It may be worth while to note here one difference which will result from the goods being on the auctioneer's premises for sale, instead of on those of the owner if on the auctioneer's they are privileged from distress, but if on owner's they are not privileged; Lyons v. Elliott, 1 Q.B.D.

210.

Another question which demands special attention from the fact that some erroneous notions are believed to obtain with reference to it is this: Suppose an auctioneer advertises a sale as to take place on a given day, and when the day arrives persons are present, having come on the faith of the advertisement, and find that the sale will not be held. Can an action be maintained against him to recover damages for money expended and time lost, on the ground of misrepresentation? Or, to put the case differently, does the advertisement amount to a contract or warranty with any person who expends time and money, in reliance on the statements in the advertisement that the sale will be held as advertised? Prior to a case which we shall give, this was felt to be a question of no little difficulty. For in Denton v. Great Northern Railway Company, 5 Ell. and B. 860, the time-tables of a railway company were held to amount to a representation that trains would run at the times specified thereon. However, in Harris v. Nickerson, L.R., 8 Q.B. 286, an action was brought against the defendant, an anctioneer, to recover for loss of time and expenses in these circumstances: Defendant advertised in the London papers that certain brewing materials, plant, and office furniture would be sold by him at Bury St. Edmunds on a certain day and the two following days. The plaintiff, a commission broker in London, having a commission to buy the office furniture, went down to the sale, but on the third day on which the furniture was advertised for sale all the lots of furniture were withdrawn. Plaintiff claimed in respect of two days' loss of time, thirdclass railway fare, and two days' board and lodging, and the Judge of the City of London Court gave judgment in his favour, but gave defendant leave to appeal; and on appeal, a Court consisting of Blackburn, Quain, and Archibald, JJ., held that the action could not be maintained, for that the advertising the sale was a mere declaration, and did not amount to a contract with anyone who might act upon it, nor to a warranty that all the articles advertised would be put up for sale, and accordingly they reversed the judgment of the Court below.

Passing to the duties of the auctioneer on sale, they may briefly be comprehended in what we have already laid down. He should adhere to his instructions, and endeavour, consistently with such adherence, to yet the best price reasonably obtainable. In selling he must not, unless authorised expressly, or unless such a mode of sale is, in the circumstances, warranted by usages of trade, sell on credit, though, as we mentioned in our last article, he may take a cheque in payment of a deposit, for that is a reasonable practice.

So in the case of Williams v. Evans, L.R., 1 Q.B. 352 the Court of Queen's Bench held that an auctioneer who had been authorised to sell goods on the conditions that purchasers should pay a deposit at once, and the remainder of the purchase-money to the auctioneer on or before delivery of the goods, had no authority to receive payment by a bill of exchange, and that such payment would not discharge the purchaser.

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A curious question, though not by any means unlikely to occur, called for decision in Sweeting v. Turner, L.R., 7 Q.B. 310. In that case defendant, an auctioneer, sold certain goods for plaintiff, the owner, on premises

occupied by plaintiff and another, and in respect of which the latter owed the landlord rent. By the conditions of sale each lot was to be taken to be delivered at the fall of the hammer, after which time it was to remain at the exclusive risk of the purchaser. After the sale, and before the goods were removed, the landlord threatened to distrain on them, whereupon the auctioneer paid the rent and deducted it from the amount the goods had realised, and paid over the balance to the plaintiff. The Court (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held the auctioneer was not justified as against the plaintiff in paying the rent, as on the sale of each lot the property passed to the purchaser, who would have had to bear the loss if the landlord had distrained. Further, it will be well to note that, if before selling, the auctioneer learns that the property he is commissioned to sell does not belong to his employer, he should, of course, not attempt to sell it, inasmuch as he would be liable in damages to the owner; and when he has concluded a contract he must not, without express authority, allow it to be rescinded and the property returned. Adverting to duties and liabilities subsequent to sale, the auctioneer must, on receipt of the purchase-money, pay it over to his employer, deducting only his remuneration and expenses. With regard to the deposit, however, he is in general a stakeholder, and should therefore retain it until completion or rescission, as the case may be. If the goods are not sold, then, subject to his lien on them for any remuneration he may be entitled to in respect of the attempt to sell and right to retain them until payment thereof, he must restore them to the owner; and it is well to bear in mind that, both in respect of the goods themselves and the proceeds thereof, he is in a fiduciary capacity within the meaning of the Debtors Act, 1869, Sec. 4, and if he makes default in payment of the proceeds of sale of goods entrusted to him for sale when ordered to pay it by a Court of Equity, he is liable to attachment, whether he still holds the money or has parted with it. Crowther v. Elgood, 84 Ch. Div. 691. The Court of Appeal refused to interfere on appeal to them (see W.N., 1887, 26). The duty of an auctioneer as to the deposit may be conveniently considered first. We have noticed above that he is in general in the position of a stakeholder. This position may, however, be altered by the terms of the contract, and it appears from the case of Brown v. Farebrother, W.N., 1888, 225, that when a sale has been held under the order of the Court and the deposit paid to the auctioneers, they should band the amount, less their charges, over to the vendor's solicitor, he, and not they, being the proper person to pay money into Court. Assuming, however, that his position with regard to the deposit is the normal one of a stakeholder, to what extent will he be liable to proceedings at the suit of the purchaser? In Smith v. Earl of Egmont, 6 Ch. Div. 469, Jessel, M.R., held that although it is the law that an auctioneer holding the deposit on a purchase may be made a defendant in an action for specific performance, yet, as a general rule, the proper practice is not to make him a defendant when the deposit is of small amount, unless he refuses to pay it into Court when required; but when the deposit is of large amount he may properly be made a defendant, unless he had paid it into Court before action was brought. Another case to which reference may be made on the question of an auctioneer's liability is Heatley v. Newton, 19 Ch. Div. 323.

Upon payment by the purchaser of his purchase-money it is the duty of the auctioneer to render an account and pay over the balance of it remaining after deducting his remuneration and expenses. He may, however, be met with a claim to the purchase-money adverse to the right of his employer; what must he in such circumstances do? It will be necessary to explain what we mean by an adverse claim. Now, an adverse claim must not be understood as signifying claims on the fund created by the employer in favour of the claimant, or claims which, while affirming the title of the employer, assert a right derived through that title. In this latter class of cases the auctioneer should communicate with the employer, and so ascertain whether the claim preferred is genuine; but if admitted to be genuine, he will in general be entitled and bound to satisfy it, and such a payment will pro tanto discharge him against his employer. Nor do these cases present, as a rule, much difficulty. The cases which do, however, present considerable difficulty are those where a person other than the

employer claims the proceeds on the ground that the goods sold belonged to him, and were not the property of the employer, who had no right to authorise the sale, the claimant asserting in fact a title not through but in derogation of that of the employer at the time of the employment. For very good reason the law does not, as a rule, permit a bailee to deny that his bailor had a title to the subject-matter bailed at the time of the bailment. If the auctioneer has any doubts, he should refuse the commission or stipulate for an indemnity; but in general he cannot perform the commission and then set up jus tertii-allege that a person other than his employer is entitled to the proceeds of sales. This has often been distinctly laid down as the general principle, and in the recent decision of ex parte Davies, in re Sadler, L.R., 19 Ch. D. 86, it was held that if a bailee, with full knowledge of an adverse claim, accepts the bailment, he cannot afterwards set up existence of such claim as against his bailor.

There are, however, instances in which it has been allowed, and one example is afforded by the case of Hardman v. Willcock, 9 Bing, 382 n. In that case the defendant was employed by plaintiff to sell, as auctioneer, certain goods then in the plaintiff's possession. Before the sale a notice was given to the defendant by the assignees of an insolvent that the goods were their property as such assignees, and that they had been fraudulently removed by collusion between the plaintiff and the insolvent. The defendant after that notice sold the property, and rendered an account of the sale of it to the plaintiff. But in the result, on an indemnity being given to him by the assignees, he refused to pay over to the plaintiff the money arising from the sale; and on an action for money had and received being brought against him by the plaintiff, he set up in defence the right of the assignees. Judgment was given for the defendant, and this judgment the Court, Alderson and Patteson, JJ., refused to disturb, on the ground that in the circumstances the defendant was entitled to set up the right of the assignees to receive the proceeds as against the plaintiff. They said, "It is clear that if the insolvent had put the goods into the hands of the defendant for sale his assignees would have stepped in and claimed the produce from the defendant, and that the insolvent could not have maintained this action after such claim. And we think that the plaintiff who takes the goods by a fraud between him and the insolvent can be in no better situation than the insolvent himself." It remains only to consider with what the auctioneer will be charged in rendering his account to his employer. He will, of course, be liable for all sums which he has received on behalf of the employer and losses incurred through his own negligence, and indeed in cases in which he parts with money paid to him on behalf of his employer on a forged authority he will in general be liable, even though the failure to recognise the forgery as such was not attributable to negligence. The ground for this is obvious; the agent is liable to the principal for all moneys received on behalf of the latter, and can only discharge himself of that liability by showing payment either to the employer or to some other person by his direction, express or implied. The auctioneer will not, however, in general be liable to account to the employer for the purchase-money, unless he has-or but for his negligence would have-received it, or unless he has so acted as to mislead the employer to his prejudice, with reference to payment of it, or has sold on credit when he is forbidden to do so, or though not expressly forbidden he cannot show that such a mode of sale was reasonable and usual.

TRINITY VACATION, 1889.-NOTICE. THERE will be no sitting in Court in the Trinity Vacation During the Vacation all applications which may require to be immediately or promptly heard are to be made to the Honourable Mr. Justice Denman, or the Honourable Mr. Justice A. L. Smith.

Mr. Justice Denman will act as Vacation Judge from Saturday, 8th June, till Wednesday, 12th June, both days inclusive. His Lordship will sit in Queen's Bench Judges' Chambers on Tuesday, 11th June, and Wednesday, 12th June. On other days within the above period, applications in urgent Chancery matters may be made to his Lordship

at his private residence, No. 8, Cranley-gardens, South Kensington, S.W.

Mr. Justice A. L. Smith will act as Vacation Judge from Thursday, 13th June, till Monday, 17th June, both days inclusive. His Lordship will sit in Queen's Bench Judges' Chambers on Monday, 17th June. On other days, within the above period, applications in urgent Chancery matters may be made to his Lordship at 53, Lansdowne-road, Kensington Park, W.

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In any case of great urgency the brief of counsel may sent to the judge by book-post, or parcel, prepaid, accompanied by office copies of the affidavits in support of the application, and also by a minute, on a separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider the applicant entitled to, and an envelope capable of receiving 66 and addressed as follows:papers, Chancery Official Letter: To the Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrars' Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C."

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On applications for injunctions, in addition to the above, a copy of the writ, and a certificate of writ issued, must also be sent.

The papers sent to the judge will be returned to the registrar.

Royal Courts of Justice, 29th May, 1889.

HAMILTON ET AL V. BAKER. (The Sara).-Disbursement by Master of Ship.-Maritime Lien.-Priority over Mortgagee of Ship.-Merchant Shipping Act, 1854.-Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1861.-Respondent was a master mariner. The Sara was a steamship belonging to a limited company, and managed on their behalf by J. F. Cohen and Co., the directors of the company, who, early in 1885, employed respondent to act as master of the vessel on a voyage from England to the River Plate and back to Antwerp, calling on the return voyage at St. Vincent, in the Cape de Verde Islands, for coals. J. F. Cohen and Co. instructed respondent to apply at St. Vincent to M. and N. for the necessary coals, which were supplied by them; and respondent, in acordance with the instructions of J. F. Cohen and Co., gave M. and N. a bill of exchange drawn by him on J. F. Cohen and Co. for £182, for the necessary coals and port charges. The vessel proceeded to Antwerp, and afterwards went via Middlesbrough to Marseilles. J. and W. Hamilton were mortgagees of the vessel, the date of the mortgage being April 23rd, 1884. The bill of exchange, which had been accepted by J. F. Cohen and Co., was dishonoured, and notice of dishonour given to respondent. When the vessel arrived at Marseilles one of the appellants went out and took possession under their mortgage, and discharged respondent, who asked appellants to indemnify him against his liability on the bill, but they declined to do so. The holders claimed payment, and respondent then commenced this action against the owners of the Sara to recover the amount of the bill. J. and W. Hamilton intervened in the action as mortgagees, and denied the respondent's right to claim the amount sued for against the vessel. At the trial, Butt, J., held that the respondent had a maritime lien for the disbursements represented by the amount of the bill, which took priority over the mortgage of the appellants. The Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Butt, J. Held (by Lord Halsbury. L.C., Lords Watson and Macnaghten), reversing the decision of Court of Appeal, that neither the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, nor the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1861, conferred a maritime lien on the master for disbursements, and that the mortgagees were entitled to priority. The Mary Ann, 1 Adm. and Eccl. 12., and cases founded on that decision, overruled.

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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. OPENSHAW v. OAKLEY.-Construction of Statute.-Effect of Hawkers' Act, 1888, on prior Local Statutes-Penalty on Persons other than Licensed Hawkers selling, etc.—License no longer required.-Defendant was a hawker, who not having any license, had sold fish, etc., within the town of Bolton, and was summoned under certain local acts for having (he not being a licensed hawker or auctioneer) sold the same in a place in the borough, not being his own house or shop. He set up the Hawkers' Act, 1888 (51 and 52 Vict., c. 32, s. 3), relieving hawkers from Excise licenses, and the magistrates held that inasmuch as if he had been licensed as a hawker, he would have come within the exception in the local act in favour of licensed hawkers and auctioneers, the Hawkers' Act, 1888, having rendered a license unnecessary, he came within the

exception, and they refused to convict. Held (by Field and Cave, JJ.) that the magistrate ought to have convicted, for that the defendant not being a licensed hawker did not come within the exception, and did fall within the clause of the local act imposing the penalty; the Hawkers' Act, 1888, though abolishing the Excise license, not having enlarged the exception of "licensed hawkers" into one in favour of 66 hawkers," or repealed the local act.

WERTH v. LONDON AND WESTMINSTER LOAN AND DISCOUNT COMPANY.-Seizure of Goods under Bill of Sale-Notification by Tenant to Landlord, and Distraint by Landlord after Sunset-Right of Tenant to waive Invalidity on that ground -Validity against Holder of Bill of Sale.-In October, 1887, Bell, a tenant, gave the company a bill of sale on his furniture for the loan of £40, containing the usual powers of seizure. In October last the company sent and seized the goods, and a man was left in possession. Bell communicated with his landlord, whose solicitor wrote to the company, claiming the goods for rent due, and at 9 p.m. on Saturday, October 6th, this letter was delivered by Bell to the man in possession for the company, saying to him: "I distrain on these goods for my landlord, for the rent due." Between three and four o'clock on the Monday morning, four men with a wagon came to the house on the company's behalf, and began to remove the furniture. The plaintiff (the landlord) was sent for and came, and asserted his right to the goods, and put his hand on one of the articles, and said he distrained on the goods for his rent. The company's men however, removed the goods, and the landlord brought an action in the County-court, but was nonsuited, the Judge being of opinion there was no valid distress. A Divisional Court (consisting of Huddleston, B., and Manisty, J.), however, held there was a valid distress, and directed a new trial. At the second trial, before the County-court Judge's deputy, the jury in effect found there had been a distress, but the Deputy-Judge directed a verdict for the company to be entered, holding that there could be no distress in law either after sunset or on a Sunday. Held (by Manisty and Mathew JJ.) that it was open to the tenant to waive the objection to the distress being levied after sunset (i e., at 9 p.m. on the Saturday), and that he had done so, and there being evidence of, and the jury having found there was a distress, the landlord was entitled to a verdict for the amount of his rent as against the company.

WATKINS v. SCOTTISH IMPERIAL INSURANCE Co.-R S.C. Order ix., Rule 8.-Action in English Courts against Scottish Corporation, having Place of Business in England.-Action on a policy of insurance effected on his own life by husband of plaintiff with defendant company. The defendant company is a Scottish corporation, with an office in King William Street, London. The company contended that no action would lie against it in the English Courts, and a judge at Chambers stayed the action on that ground. Held (by Mathew and Grantham, JJ.) that a company or corporation domiciled in Scotland cannot be sued in the English Courts.

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In re COMMUTATION OF TITHES ACT-EX PARTE JONES. -Arrears of Tithes.- Notice of Intention to Distrain.Sufficient Distress then on Premises.-Neglect to Distrain for considerable time.-Absence of Sufficient Distress subsequently, and Application under 6 and 7 William IV., c. 71, sec. 82.The amount of arrears of tithe due from a Welsh farmer on August 1st, 1888, was £1 3s. 2d. On August 13th notice of intention to distrain was given on behalf of the rector. distress was, however, made, and the tithes were not paid. Cattle were on the land, and remained there during August and September, which, if distrained, would have produced sufficient to pay arrears and costs. On October 18th, however, examination of the premises having been made on behalf of the rector, it was found that no sufficient distress was on the premises, and application was made to Stephen J., under 6 and 7 William IV., c. 71, sec. 82, and his lordship made an order under that section, directing the Sheriff of Flint to summon a jury to assess the arrears, etc. Held (by Mathew and Grantham, JJ.) that the order of Stephen, J., must be upheld, for that the fact that there had been sufficient distress on the land during August and September, and the fact that the rector had not then distrained did not disentitle him to obtain the order under 6 and 7 William IV., c. 71, sec. 82.

COURT OF APPEAL.

In re FAWCETT and HOLMES' CONTRACT for Sale.-Vendor and Purchaser-Particulars and Conditions of Sale-Condi tion providing that Misdescription should be a Subject for Compensation-Whether so Material that the Condition did not apply. The trustees of the will of F. put up for sale by auction certain property which had belonged to him situate at Wakefield, and Holmes bid for and was declared the purchaser of lot 1, which was described in the particulars as that messuage or dwelling-house known as Quarry House, situate in Teall Street, Wakefield, with the builder's yard, stables and premises, as lately in the occupation of George Fawcett, and

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was raised_to_£76,664, and last year it amounted to £105,402. Twelve years ago the life funds were £559,709; in 1882, £718,140; and in 1888, £915,613, or an increase of £71,956, by far the largest sum in a single year that the company has been enabled to add to its assurance fund for many years. The increase at all points is most striking and noteworthy. The company has uniformly been managed at a moderate rate of expenditure. The ratio last year shows, as might be expected, a slight advance, which does not call for special comment. In the fire department the premiums were £124,570, after deducting reinsurance premiums, as compared with £47,987 in 1876, having increased by considerably more than two and a half times within the last dozen years. The fire losses in 1876 were 56 per cent. of the net premium income, and last year were 49.93 per cent. The average rate from the commencement of the company is nearly 60 per cent., therefore the year 1888 has indeed been a harvest-time for the Caledonian. The commission and management expenses are £42,467, being 34.09 per cent., against 33.50 in 1887. The total fire insurance funds, including the paid-up capital, which in 1876 amounted to £186,639, last year reached the sum of £374,694, being rather more than three times the amount of the fire premiums. This exhibits a degree of financial strength almost unequalled. The directors have wisely taken advantage of the exceptionally good year to make a moderate addition to the already strong reserve. They have accordingly added £10,000 to the fire guarantee fund, and £500 to the reserve premium account, which now stands at £62,500, or one-half of the premium income, which represents the provision for the current fire risks up to the dates when the next premiums become due. This reserve, while not always made, is a most commendable feature, and, per se, shows the wisdom of providing for the current half-year's amount of unexpired risk before apportioning the dividend to the proprietors. Some authorities, whose competency to form a well-balanced judgment on the subject has not been questioned, consider a reserve of onethird of the premium income to be sufficient; but while not committing ourselves to any decided opinion at the moment as to what the exact proportion ought to be, it will be perfectly clear to our readers that, in being able to reserve one-half of its premium income, the Caledonian enjoys a very enviable position among fire offices. The remaining surplus for the year is £32,194, and the directors recommend that from this sum a dividend of £1 38. per share be paid, which will absorb £20,700, and leave a balance of £11,494 to be carried forward. compares with £1 18. last year, and with such a capital return on their money the shareholders may be well satisfied. The investments of the Caledonian are unexceptional, and yield a high rate of interest. The valuations are conducted on the strictest possible bases, and handsome bonuses are distributed to the policy-holders. The company also grants very large surrender values, of which condition, however, the assured do not avail themselves to any extent, as they are fully contented with their contract, and know they can withdraw at any time, and always receive a large portion of their premiums back if they so wish. The Caledonian was the first British office to adopt the non-forfeiture plan, and has carried out the spirit of the principle in a most liberal manner. The actuary has embodied in the new prospectus apparently every new improvement introduced into the business of life assurance. Mr. David Deuchar, the manager and actuary to whom so. much of the success of the company is directly due, is in every sense of the word a successful manager, and an actuary of the highest standing. He has, too, the rare gift of personal magnetism, and there is probably no other insurance office marked in so large a degree with esprit de corps and loyalty on the part of both indoor and outdoor staff to the able management of this old and wealthy

company.

THE Standard is known throughout the The Standard civilised world as one of the largest and Life Assurance Company. best of the British insurance offices. The total funds stand at £6,990,313. The management has always been energetic, and has been

net premiums only having been valued. The surplus divided amongst the policy-holders in 1870 was £331,591; in 1875, £372,710; in 1880, £389,744; and in 1885, £485,091. The several schemes of division are the old or tontine scheme, the new or equal scheme (introduced after the investigation in 1865), the Colonial scheme (which is the same in principle as the equal scheme, but differs in amount), and the original schemes of the Minerva and Victoria Companies. In the equal scheme, on which, we believe, the majority of recently effected policies are taken, there is no difference whatever in the bonus allotted to the several policyholders at the last four divisions, it being £1 10s. per cent. per annum at all ages, the Colonial scheme giving £1 58. in 1870, £1 68. in 1875, £1 48. in 1880, and £1 8s. in 1885 per cent per annum, uniform at all ages. The tontine scheme in 1870 gave 10s. per £100 for each year of policy existence. Thus, for five years' standing the bonus would be £2 10s.; for twenty years' standing, £10; and for forty years' standing, £20. In 1875 the amount was considerably less, viz., 68. for each £100 and each year of policy existence. Both in 1880 and in 1885 the amount was 4s. 6d. for each £100 and each year, being £2 58. for ten years, or £9 plicated, but we have made them as clear as the limited for forty years. The different plans are somewhat comspace at our disposal will allow. We may add that bonuses "vest" (a Scotch term) after a policy has been in force five years, and that the shareholders receive a dividend of 10 per cent. per annum, besides a proportion of profits at each investigation, which is paid with the dividend, so that the investment in a company of the magnitude and prosperity of the Standard is a highly profitable one for the proprietors. Altogether, the company is in an uncommonly healthy and financially sound condition.