affected by said recognition in 1900 or thereafter of any claim that it might make to the right-of-way. The abandonment of this right-of-way by that company was caused solely by its own acts and intention, and not by any failure on the part of its grantor to recognize its claim thereto. That company lost its right to the easement by its own abandonment thereof, and a recognition of any claim thereto by the grantor thereof could not make it accept or retain the easement which it determined it did not want. By such abandonment the easement reverted to plaintiffs, and no recognition thereof by them of any right of the company thereto could stay such abandonment by the company or revest in it the easement after it was abandoned. These two plaintiffs were not estopped from claiming the rightof-way as against the defendant because it did not expend anything therefor and has not been caused in any way to act to its injury by reason of the alleged recognition of that claim. In said contracts it was expressly stipulated that the rights growing therefrom should be forfeited if the railroad was not completed within a specified time. That condition, we think, was broken, and the right-of-way was thereby forfeited and revested in plaintiffs by their re-entry or attempt to re-enter with a declaration of forfeiture. Schlesinger v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 152 U. S. 453; Moore v. Sharpe, 91 Ark. 407.

2. It is urged that the court permitted the introduction of incompetent testimony relative to the value of the land that was taken by defendant. The plaintiffs introduced a number of civil engineers who had acted as such for a number of years for various railroads and qualified as having a special knowledge as to the peculiar advantages of certain sites for the location of railroads and the value thereof for railroad purposes. They were expert witnesses upon the question of the adaptability or availability of a piece of land for railroad purposes. They were not familiar with agricultural or other lands in the neighborhood where the land in controversy was situated, nor with the value thereof for any purpose other than for railroad purposes. They saw the land in controversy, and carefully examined the gap and all the lands in that vicinity through which a railroad could be possibly located along the route of defendant's proposed line of railroad. They examined.

all these lands specially for the purpose of determining whether there was any other feasible route for a railroad through these mountains and the adaptability of the land involved in this suit for that purpose. They testified to facts tending to show a demand for railroad construction in that section of the country, and that this gap or pass located on plaintiff's land was especially available for railroad purposes and was practically the only feasible route through this mountainous country. They then testified to what in their opinion was the fair and reasonable cash market value of the land taken by defendant for its right-of-way. Counsel for defendant urge that the court erred in permitting these witnesses to testify that the land taken by defendant had a pecuniary advantage for a railroad site over all other lands in this vicinity along any possible route for a railroad, because of the great cost in making any other site feasible for the location of a railroad through these mountains; and in this connection the witnesses gave an estimate of the great expense and cost in preparing another site for railroad purposes in comparison with this site, to which testimony objection was made. It is urged that this testimony in effect based the value of the site taken upon the benefit that it might be to defendant and of its necessities to acquire that particular property, rather than on the actual market value thereof and the loss to the plaintiff by the defendant's appropriation thereof. But we do not think that this contention is well founded. The measure of the compensation which the landowner is entitled to recover from a railroad company which has appropriated same for its right-of way is the market value of the land so taken. In estimating that market value it is perfectly competent to consider the availability and adaptability of the land for the very purpose for which it is taken by the railroad company as an element of value which would attract any buyer for that purpose. In order to show the adaptability of the land taken for the purpose desired, it is competent to show the cost and expense that would be necessary to put other land in the condition of the land taken, which condition gives it a peculiar value for the purpose for which it is appropriated. This would not be estimating the damages by reason of the value of the property to the corporation which appropriated it, or by reason of its necessities to acquire

same; but would be simply showing an element of its value to any one who might desire it for that purpose. The owner has a right to obtain the market value of the land based upon its availability for the most valuable purposes for which it can be used. The peculiar circumstances of its location and the character of the surrounding country may be proved in order to show the adaptability of the land taken for the purpose desired because that would be an element of value which the owner would have a right to insist upon in estimating the value of his land. In the case of Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, the Supreme Court of the United States has laid down the rule that in determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes the inquiry is, what is it worth from its availability for all valuable uses? This rule has been approved by this court in a number of cases. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202; Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Boles, 88 Ark. 533; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Maxfield Co., 94 Ark. 135.

The market value of property is to be determined, not by the price of the property for any one particular purpose, but for any and all purposes for which it is likely to have value and induce purchasers. And so it is competent to show that it has a value for a peculiar purpose which would attract buyers, and any testimony is competent to show its adaptability for that peculiar purpose. Its availability for such peculiar purpose may be proved by showing its advantages over other property that might also be probably available for such purpose, for that would be an element of value that any buyer would take into consideration if he wished to purchase the property for such purpose. Testimony, therefore, of the cost and expense of placing other property that might be available for the desired. purpose in the condition of the property taken would tend to show the advantages of such property and its true market value to prospective buyers. This was the character of the testimony of which complaint is made. But we think that this testimony was competent. This testimony did not tend to base the value of this gap or pass upon what it was worth to the defendant or upon how profitably it might be employed or used by it. The purpose and tendency of this testimony was to show that this

site had a special pecuniary value over any other place in that mountainous section of the country for the location of a railroad, and thereby to show its availability and adaptability for railroad purposes. Its advantageous location was an element of value, and in determining what was its market value it was competent to show the facts and circumstances which made that location advantageous for railroad purposes which thus gave to it this element of value. The cost and expense of placing any other site in that section of the country in a condition available or adaptable for railroad purposes which the site in controversy possessed would tend to prove the peculiar advantages of this location for such object and its adaptability for such purposes. It was not error to admit such testimony for that purpose. Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, supra; In re Daly, 76 N. Y. Supp. 28; Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 507; State Line R. Co. v. Playford (Pa.), 14 Atl. 355; Seattle & Montana Ry. Co. v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509.

In its instructions the court carefully confined the jury to the market value of the land appropriated by defendant in determining the amount of the compensation therefor to which plaintiffs were entitled, and we think that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the amount of the damages which the jury returned in their verdict.

Upon an examination of the whole case we do not find that any prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.

STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. WILLIAMS.

Opinion delivered January 9, 1911.

I. HABEAS CORPUS-FORMER ADJUDICATION.-Under Kirby's Digest, § 3872, providing that if a prisoner remanded after hearing on habeas corpus shall obtain a second writ, it shall be the duty of the officer or other person on whom the same shall be served to return therewith the order remanding the prisoner, and if it appear that the prisoner was remanded for an offense adjudged not bailable, the prisoner shall forthwith be remanded without further proceedings," held that where it

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appears from an officer's return to a writ of habeas corpus that upon a prior application for bail the prisoner had been remanded for an offense adjudged not bailable, such judgment is a bar to further application for bail. (Page 246.)

SAME-JURISDICTION AS TO APPLICATIONS FOR BAIL IN CAPITAL CASES. When an indictment for a capital offense has been returned, the circuit court wherein the same is pending, or the judge thereof in vacation, is the only tribunal authorized in the first instance to hear an application for bail, except that an original application may be made to the Supreme Court where, because of unavoidable accident or casualty, no inferior court is competent to hear same. (Page 247.)

SAME JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT.-The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the proceedings of inferior courts, and of judges and chancellors at chambers, upon applications for writs of habeas corpus, and to review, revise and correct the action of the inferior court or judge. (Page 248.)

Certiorari to quash order of chancellor admitting to bail; John M. Elliott, Chancellor; judgment quashed.

Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, William H. Rector, Assistant, R. J. Williams, Prosecuting Attorney, J. H. Harrod, and H. F. Roleson, for the State.

Trimble & Robinson, P. R. Andrews, R. D. Smith, M. B. Norfleet, and S. H. Mann, for respondent.

KIRBY, J. On the 19th day of August, 1910, Robert Williams was committed to the jail of Lee County by A. S. Rogers, a justice of the peace of that county, upon the charge of being an accessory before the fact to the crime of murder in first degree for the killing of one B. F. Kirby in Lee County. Thereafter the said Williams was given into the custody of the sheriff of Pulaski County for safe keeping. Thereafter on the 16th day of September, 1910, the said Williams sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the Hon. John E. Martineau, Chancellor of the First Chancery District, to be admitted to bail.

The case was heard by Chancellor Martineau, and, after the hearing of testimony and the argument of counsel, his decision. was as follows: "I am of the opinion that the petitioner, Robert Williams, is guilty of accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree, and is not entitled to bail."

Thereafter, towit, on October 10, 1910, said Robert Williams was indicted by the grand jury of Lee County for the crime of