that does not concern you-'has remained nineteen years at the galleys. Five years for robbery with house-breaking, fourteen years for having tried to escape four times. The man is very dangerous.' All the world has turned me out, and are you willing to receive me? Is this an inn? Will you give me some food and a bed? Have you a stable?" "Madame Magloire," said the Bishop, "you will put clean sheets on the bed in the alcove." . . . The man understood this at once. The expression of his face, which had hitherto been gloomy and harsh, was marked with stupefaction, joy, doubt, and became extraordinary. He began stammering like a lunatic. "Is it true? What? You will let me stay? You will not turn me out, a convict? . . . Oh! what a worthy woman she was who sent me here!"

824. HONORÉ DE BALZAC. Sons of the Soil. (Part I, Ch. II; Part II, Ch. VIII.) . . . After an administration of twenty-five years, Gaubertin, the landsteward [of the manor of Les Aigues] found himself in possession of six hundred thousand francs in money. . . . Gaubertin expected at that time to become owner of Les Aigues, by means of a plot laid in the private office of Lupin, the notary. . . . The lawyer employed by the notary to manage the sale of the estate by auction was under personal obligations to Gaubertin. . . . Just as those interested expected to find their fortunes made, a lawyer came from Paris on the evening before the final settlement, and employed a notary at Ville-auxFayes, who happened to be one of his former clerks, to buy the estate of Les Aigues for a rich stranger, General Montcornet, which he did for eleven hundred thousand francs. . . . General Montcornet took possession of Les Aigues. . . .

The General was not deficient in the special cunning of an old military fox; and, after he had spent a few days in examining his new property, he saw that Gaubertin was a steward of the old style,—a swindler. . . . One fine morning, having caught Gaubertin "with his hand in the bag," as the saying is, the General flew into one of those rages peculiar to the imperial conquerors of many lands. In doing so, he committed a capital blunder,-one that would have ruined the whole life of a man of less wealth and less consistency than himself, and from which came the evils, both small and great, with which the present history teems. Brought up in the imperial school, accustomed to deal with men as a dictator, and full of contempt for "civilians," . . . he humiliated Gaubertin ruthlessly. “You are living off my land," said the General, with jesting severity. "Do you think I can live off the sky?" returned Gaubertin, with a sneer. "Out of my sight, blackguard! I dismiss you!" cried the : General, striking him with his whip. . . . If this history provided no other instruction than that offered by the quarrel between the General and his steward, it would still be useful to many persons as a lesson for their conduct in life. He who reads Machiavelli profitably, knows that human prudence consists in never threatening; in doing, but not saying; in promoting the retreat of an enemy and never stepping, as the saying is, on the tail of the serpent; and in avoiding, as one would murder, the infliction of a blow to the self-love of any one lower than one's self. . . . To say to a man, "You are a swindler," may be taken as a joke; but to catch him in the act and prove it to him with a cane on his back, to threaten him with a police court and not follow up the threat, is to remind him of the inequality of conditions. . . . Being, as he was, ignominiously dismissed, the man conceived against his late master one of those bitter hatreds which are literally a part of existence in provincial life,

the persistency, duration, and plots of which would astonish diplomatists who are trained to let nothing astonish them. A burning desire for vengeance led him to settle at Ville-aux-Fayes, and to take a position where he could injure Montcornet and stir up sufficient enmity against him to force him to sell Les Aigues...

In 1821 the General was almost peremptorily urged by his new steward, Sibilet, to be at Les Aigues before the month of May. Important matters had to be decided. A lease of nine years to the amount of thirty thousand francs, granted by Gaubertin, the former steward, in 1812 to a timber firm, the Gravelots, expired on the 15th of May of the current year. The timber firm refused to renew the lease unless a deduction was allowed on the last payment on the ground of damage to the timber by peasants cutting it down. The steward had started suit for the rent thus withheld. . . . "But," resumed the General, "what's the difficulty? Even if I do lose the suit against the Gravelots, a money wound is not mortal; and I'll have the leasing of my forest so well advertised that there will be plenty of competition, and I shall sell the timber at its true value." "Business is not done in that way, Monsieur le comte," said Sibilet. "Just suppose you get no lessees; what will you do?" "Cut the timber myself and sell it-" "You, a lumber-merchant?" said Sibilet. "Well, without looking at matters here, how would it be in Paris? You would have to hire a wood-yard, pay for a license and the taxes, also for the right of navigation, and duties, and the costs of unloading; besides the salary of a trustworthy agent-" "Yes, yes, that's out of the question," said the General, hastily, alarmed at the prospect. "But why can't I find persons to lease the timberrights as before?" "Monsieur le comte has enemies." "Who are they?" "Well, in the first place, there is Monsieur Gaubertin!"

"Do you mean the scoundrel whose place you took?" "Not so loud, Monsieur le comte," said Sibilet, showing fear; "I beg of you, not so loud,-my cook might hear us." "Do you mean to tell me that I am not to speak on my own estate of a villain who robbed me?” cried the General. "For the sake of your own peace and comfort, come further away, Monsieur le comte. Monsieur Gaubertin is mayor of Ville-aux-Fayes. . . . He is one of the most dangerous scoundrels to be found in all Burgundy, and he is now in a position to injure you." "In what way?" asked the General, sobering down. “Gaubertin has control of nearly one-third of the supplies sent to Paris. As general agent for the timber business, he orders all the work of the forests,—the felling, chopping, floating, and sending to market. Being in close relations with the workmen, he is the arbiter of prices. It has taken him three years to create this position, but he holds it now like a fortress. . . . For instance, he has so completely put a stop to competition that he has absolute control of the auction sales; the crown and the State are both dependent on him. Their timber is sold under the hammer and falls invariably to Gaubertin's dealers; in fact, no others attempt now to bid against them. . . . Then, too, Monsieur Gaubertin is the friend and patron of workingmen; he pays them well and keeps them always at work. . . . He is your enemy, Monsieur le comte. My advice to you is to capitulate and be reconciled with him. . . . If you attempt to work your own woods," continued Sibilet, turning the knife in the wound, "you will find yourself at the mercy of workmen who will force you to pay rich men's prices instead of market-prices. In short, they'll put you, as they did that poor Mariotte, in a position where you must sell at a loss. If you then try to lease the woods, you will get no tenants."

...

...

"Then what's to be done?" cried the General, his blood boiling as he tramped up and down before the bench. "Monsieur le comte," said Sibilet, abruptly, "what I say to you is not for my own interests, certainly; but I advise you to sell Les Aigues, and leave the neighborhood." On hearing these words, the General sprang back as if a cannon-ball had struck him; then he looked at Sibilet with a shrewd, diplomatic eye. "A General of the Imperial Guard running away from the rascals, when Madame la comtesse likes Les Aigues!" he said. "No, I'll sooner box Gaubertin's ears on the market-place of Ville-aux-Fayes, and force him to fight me that I may shoot him like a dog." "Monsieur le comte, Gaubertin is not such a fool as to let himself be brought into collision with you. . . . You won't succeed, Monsieur le comte; Gaubertin's arms are long; you will get yourself into difficulties from which you cannot escape." . . .

At the end of the month of May the General still gave no sign that he intended to sell Les Aigues; in fact, he was undecided. One night, about ten o'clock, he was returning from the forest through one of the six avenues that led to the pavilion of the rendezvous. He dismissed the keeper who accompanied him, as he was then so near the château. At a turn of the road a man armed with a gun came from behind a bush. "General," he said, "this is the third time I have had you at the end of my barrel, and the third time that I give you your life." "Why do you want to kill me, Bonnebault?" said the General, without showing the least emotion. "Faith, if I don't, somebody else will; but I, you see, I like the men who served the Emperor, and I can't make up my mind to shoot you like a partridge. Don't question me, for I'll tell you nothing; but you've got enemies, powerful enemies, cleverer than you, and they'll end by crushing you. . . . I'm an honest lad still, scamp as I am; but another fellow won't spare you."

...

A week after that singular conversation the whole arrondissement, indeed the whole department, was covered with posters, advertising the sale of Les Aigues at the office of Maître Corbineau, the notary of Soulanges. All the lots were knocked down to Rigou, and the price paid amounted to two millions five hundred thousand francs. The next day Rigou had the name changed; Monsieur Gaubertin took the woods, Rigou and Soudry the vineyards and the farms. The château and park were sold over again in small lots among the sons of the soil, the peasantry, excepting the pavilion, its dependencies, and fifty surrounding acres, which Monsieur Gaubertin retained as a gift to his poetic and sentimental spouse.

825. SIR CHARLES RUSSELL. Opening Speech before the Parnell Commission. (1889, Macmillan's ed., p. 214.) [The charge against the Irish Land League was of conspiring to encourage agrarian outrage. The League admitted that it had encouraged boycotting in the simple sense, and claimed a distinction between lawful boycotting and unlawful violence.] My lords, in this matter of boycotting, may I be forgiven for using the celebrated exclamation of Dr. Johnson, and say, "Let us clear our minds of cant." Boycotting has existed from the earliest times that human society existed. It is only a question of degree. Up to a certain point, boycotting is not only not criminal, but I say is justifiable and is right. For what does boycotting mean? It means the focusing of the opinion of the community in condemnation of the conduct of an individual of that community who offends the general sense of propriety, or offends against its general interests. Is there no boycotting at the bar? Is there no boycotting in the other professions? Is there no boycotting in

the church? Is there no boycotting in politics? Is there no boycotting of tradesmen in election times? What is the meaning of "sending a man to Coventry"? I say that boycotting-I am not justifying intimidation, I am not justifying force, I am not justifying violence in connection with it: those are different things-I am talking of an act of moral reprehension called boycotting, and I say it always has existed and always will exist. My lords, if I were to search ancient records, historical, sacred records, I could point to many instances of boycotting; but I need not go far back. We have had in our days very remarkable instances, not only of boycotting, but of effective and useful boycotting. What was the action of our great colonies when the ill-judged policy of this country sent them the criminal population, the offscouring of the old world, as the rotten seed from which their fresh population was to spring? What did they do? Why, they simply boycotted the Government officials in Australia. The most notable instance of all was in the Cape Colony, where they boycotted the governor, declined to serve him, declined to serve him with horses, declined to supply him with provisions until the objectionable ship which was importing and seeking to land the offscouring of this nation took its wretched burden to another place.

(C. Industrial Competition in its Relation to the Economic System.)

826. J. E. CAIRNES. Some Leading Principles of Political Economy. ·(1874, pp. 57, 218.) . . . The end of engaging in industry is the acquisition of wealth; and the means, self-denial, toil, forethought, vigilance. The problem of industry is, therefore, to attain wealth at the least expenditure of those bodily and mental exertions, or, as we may say, at the least sacrifice or cost. And the law of cost of production, as governing value, is merely the practical consequence and outcome of the pursuit of wealth under this condition. In order to perceive this, it is only necessary to keep steadily in view the two following facts: first, that, under the influence of the motive just indicated, men, in selecting their occupations, whether as laborers or as capitalists, will, so far as they have the power of choice, select those which, in return for a given sacrifice, yield, or promise to yield, the largest rewards; and, secondly, the fact that, under a system of separation of employments, industrial rewards consist for . each producer, or, more properly, for each group of producers, employed on a given work, in the value of the commodities which result from their exertions. ... Other things being the same, the aggregate of wages and profits received by any given group of producers will always vary with the value of the aggregate of commodities which they produce. Where wages and profits, therefore, in different occupations are in proportion to the sacrifices undergone, the value of the commodities proceeding from those occupations will also be in proportion to the same sacrifices, that is to say, the commodities will exchange in proportion to their costs of production. Now wages and profits will be in proportion to the sacrifices undergone, wherever, and only so far as, competition prevails among producers-wherever, and so far only as, laborers and capitalists have an effective choice in selecting among the various occupations presented to them in the industrial field. Give them this effective choice, and the correspondence of remuneration to sacrifice, not indeed in every act of production, but as a permanent and continuing state of things, is secured by the most active and constant of human motives. Each competitor, aiming at the largest reward in return for his sacrifices, will be drawn toward the occupations

which happen at the time to be the most remunerated; while he will equally be repelled from those in which the remuneration is below the average level. The supply of products proceeding from the better paid employments will thus be increased, and that from the less remunerative reduced, until supply, acting on price, corrects the inequality, and brings remuneration into proportion with the sacrifices undergone.

Competition, therefore, is at once the security for the correspondence of industrial remuneration with sacrifice, and also, and because it is so, the security for the correspondence of the values of commodities with the costs of their production. The indispensable condition to the action of cost of production as the regulator of normal values is thus the existence of an effective Competition among those engaged in industrial pursuits.

... These things being so, what can be the effect of an attempt on the part of Trades-Unions to compel, by pressure upon capitalists, an increase of the Wages-fund? . . . The permanent elevation of the average rate of wages, or, what comes to the same thing, the permanent elevation of the rate of wages in any branch of industry not accompanied by an equivalent fall in some other branch or branches-beyond the level determined by the economic conditions prevailing in the country is, as it seems to me, a feat beyond its power. Such is the broad general conclusion to which economic principles applied to the facts of the case appear to conduct us.

. . . Where strikes have been permanently successful, where they have not merely gained to-day what has been lost to-morrow, but have issued in a permanently improved condition of the workmen, I believe the explanation of their success will always be found in a state of trade exceptionally prosperous which would in any case before long have attracted an increase of capital, and resulted in an enlarged demand for labor. . . .

The power of workmen to compel by combination an advance of wages has generally been considered as more or less an open question; but that capitalists possess the corresponding power of keeping wages down by Combination has, for the most part, been taken for granted. In a well-known passage Adam Smith observes that employers are in a permanent conspiracy to keep wages down, and the context certainly implies the writer's belief that they are generally successful in this object. Nevertheless, I must venture to question the assumption, even though supported by Adam Smith's authority. I hold that, at least in countries in which the industrial and commercial spirit is strong, the power of capitalists by Combination to depress wages or to keep them down is not a whit more real than that of workmen by similar means to force them up. Either may, no doubt, effect their object for a time, but neither, as I believe, can be permanently successful. . . . My conclusion is that, though Combination, whether employed by capitalists or by laborers, may succeed in controlling for a time the price of labor, it is utterly powerless, in the hands of either, to effect a permanent alteration in the market rate of wages as determined by supply and demand. . . .

The methods by which Trades-Unions seek to operate on the rate of wages are numerous; but they all find a place under one or other of the three following heads: ... (1) Directly-by calling on employers to raise the rate of wages. ... (2) Indirectly-by regulations directed toward restricting the supply of labor. . . . The first of these methods is that which has been considered in the last chapter; and the reader has seen how far we found it to be efficacious and legitimate. The two remaining methods have now to be con