fiable. . . . If it was so, the publication is not a libel; and the defendant is entitled to a verdict. The jury found a verdict for the defendant. Erskine, Garrow, Gibbs, and Espinasse, for the plaintiff. LIBEL. Pleas: first, general issue; second, a justification as to a part of the libel. Replication, denying the justification. It was opened by R. V. Richards, for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was the postmaster of Rugely, and had also been a mercer, but that he had been unfortunate in trade, although he still continued in the situation of postmaster, respecting which the defendant had written a letter to Sir Francis Freeling, the secretary of the post-office. . . . It was read, and was to the following effect: ... "May 6, 1833. Sir, It is painful to me to make complaints, but I trust you will not think the present complaint frivolous. I reside two miles from Rugely, and send daily thither purposely for letters, and always send money enough to pay postages. On the present occasion it happened (which was very unusual) that I had three letters-one double, the postage of which was 1s. 8d. I sent 1s. 10d. only, and the postmaster or mistress would not let my servant have it without the postage being paid, though he said I should be by to-morrow, and pay for them. . . . His office is most negligently kept. The letter-box is closed an unreasonable time, and letters are continually denied which are there, and it is by all persons that I have heard speak of it complained of as a bad branch of your beautiful establishment. Is he entitled to charge a penny for a letter put in by a townsman? Is 1s. 8d. the postage of a double letter from London? I should make no inquiry of this sort if I did not think the man capable, from his conduct to his creditors, of fraud.” . . . ... ALDERSON, B. You may, under the plea of the general issue, show that you did not publish the libel, or that you published it under such circumstances as will make it a protected communication. The defendant. Our intercourse with the post-office is compulsory; and are we not to be allowed to make complaints of even imaginary grievances? ALDERSON, B. You had a right to make a complaint; and the only question is whether in writing this letter you have exceeded the bounds of a fair and honest complaint. The defendant addressed the jury, but did not go into any evidence in support of the plea of justification. ALDERSON, B. (in summing up).-Even if this letter, which was writ ten by the defendant, be a libel, it does not follow that there should be a verdict for the plaintiff; for, if it was written as a bona fide complaint, made to obtain redress in the proper quarter, the defendant would be entitled to a verdict, although the contents of the letter may not be strictly true. The question is then, Was this letter written bona fide to a person whom the defendant believed to have the power of giving him redress for a grievance that he really believed he had suffered? If the defendant believed that he had suffered an injury by the conduct of the plaintiff as postmaster, he had a right to make his complaint to the Duke of Richmond, or Sir Francis Freeling; but the defendant would not there be justified in introducing irrelevant matter to the injury of the plaintiff's character. . . . If the concluding part of the letter was introduced gratuitously to injure the plaintiff's character, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £10. 897. TOOGOOD v. SPYRING EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS. 1834 1 Cr. M. & R. 181 At the trial, before BOSANQUET, J., at the last spring assizes for the county of Devon, it appeared that the plaintiff was a journeyman carpenter and had been in the employ of Brinsdon, a master carpenter in the constant employ of the Earl of Devon, at Powderham Castle. That the defendant resided on a farm under the Earl of Devon. That the defendant required some repairs at his farm; and that, pursuant to the orders of Mr. Brinsdon, the plaintiff and another workman went to the defendant's residence on the 7th of January for the purpose of erecting a new door to the defendant's tool-house (which adjoined the cellar) and doing other repairs to the house and premises of the defendant. It was proved that the work was done in a negligent manner, and not to Brinsdon's satisfaction, the door being cut so small as not to answer the purpose for which it was intended. That, during the progress of the work, the plaintiff got drunk, and circumstances occurred which induced the defendant to believe that the plaintiff had broken open the cellar door and obtained access to his cider. Brinsdon had requested the defendant to inspect the work. It was proved that the plaintiff and one Taylor were at work on the 9th of January at Powderham Castle, and that the defendant came up, and, addressing himself to the plaintiff, spoke in his presence the following words: "What a d-d pretty piece of work you did at my house the other day." That the plaintiff said, "What, sir!" and that the defendant replied, "You broke open my cellar door, and got drunk, and spoiled the job you were about." That the plaintiff denied the charges, but that the defendant said he would swear it, and so would his three men. It was also proved that, in a subsequent conversation, when the plaintiff was not present, the defendant, in answer to a question put to him by Taylor whether he really thought the plaintiff had broken the cellar door, said, "I am sure he did it, and my people will swear to it." That the defendant then went away in search of Mr. Brinsdon. It was proved that the defendant afterwards saw Brinsdon on the same day, the 9th of January, and that he said to him that Toogood had spoiled the door, and that the cellar had been broken open, and that Toogood had got drunk. . . . The learned judge, in summing up the case to the jury, said that he should have thought that the defendant would have been justified if he had made the complaint to Mr. Brinsdon in the first instance, but that he had spoken the words in the presence of a third person, and that the speaking was not in the nature of a complaint to the plaintiff's employer. That it appeared to him that the act of making the imputation to the plaintiff in the presence of another person gave the plaintiff a right to maintain the action. That the plaintiff also was not justified in making the subsequent charge to Taylor, in the absence of the plaintiff, that he had broken open the cellar door. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, with 40s. damages, Follett, in Easter term last, obtained a rule to show cause why a nonsuit should not be entered, or a new trial had, on the grounds: first, that the circumstances under which the words were spoken constituted it a privileged communication; and, secondly, on the ground of misdirection on the part of the learned judge. Praed showed cause. With regard to the first point, it is submitted that this went beyond the nature of a privileged communication. Even if the defendant would have been justified in stating what he did to Brinsdon, he could not justify speaking the words to the plaintiff in the presence of a third person. . . Follett, contra. . . If the complaint is made under circumstances that induce the party to believe in the truth of it, and he makes the complaint to the other party bona fide, it is privileged. All the cases where it has been held that the communications were not justifiable were made to a third party, and not to the party himself. (ALDERSON, B. There are many cases in which words spoken in the presence of a third party have been held actionable, where the transaction was gone by, so that the party complained of was not able to right himself.) On a subsequent day the judgment of the Court was delivered by PARKE, B. In this case, which was argued before my Brothers BOLLAND, ALDERSON, GURNEY, and myself, a motion was made for a nonsuit, or a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. . . . Upon the trial it was objected that these were what are usually termed "privileged communications." The learned judge thought that the statement to Brinsdon might be so, but not the charge made in the ... presence of Taylor; and in respect of that charge, and of what was afterwards said to Taylor, both which statements formed the subject of the action, the plaintiff had a verdict. We agree in his opinion, that the communication to Brinsdon was protected, and that the statement, upon the second meeting, to Taylor, in the plaintiff's absence, was not; but we think, upon consideration, that the statement made to the plaintiff, though in the presence of Taylor, falls within the class of communications ordinarily called privileged,—that is, cases where the occasion of the publication affords a defense, in the absence of express malice. In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases the occasion prevents the inference of malice which the law draws from unauthorized communications, and affords a qualified defense depending upon the absence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits. Among the many cases which have been reported on this subject, one precisely in point has not, I believe, occurred; but one of the most ordinary and common instances in which the principle has been applied in practice is that of a former master giving the character of a discharged servant. And I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a communication that it should be made to some person interested in the inquiry alone, and not in the presence of a third person. If made with honesty of purpose to a party who has any interest in the inquiry (and that has been very liberally construed), the simple fact that there has been some casual bystander cannot alter the nature of the transaction. The business of life could not be well carried on if such restraints were imposed upon this and similar communications, and if, on every occasion in which they were made, they were not protected, unless strictly private. . . . Where, indeed, an opportunity is sought for making such a charge before third persons, which might have been made in private, it would afford strong evidence of a malicious intention, and thus deprive if of that immunity which the law allows to such a statement, when made with honesty of purpose. . . . In the present case the defendant stood in such a relation with respect to the plaintiff, though not strictly that of master, as to authorize him to impute blame to him, provided it was done fairly and honestly, for any supposed misconduct in the course of his employment; and we think that the fact that the imputation was made in Taylor's ... ... presence does not, of itself, render the communication unwarranted and officious, but at most is a circumstance to be left to the consideration of the jury. We agree with the learned judge that the statement to Taylor, in the plaintiff's absence, was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth, if it were, in point of fact, false. . . . As we think that at all events it should have been left to the jury whether the defendant acted maliciously or not on that occasion, there must be a new trial. Rule absolute for a new trial. ... 898. COWARD v. WELLINGTON. (1836. 7 C. & P. 531, 536.) LITTLEDALE, J. . . . With respect to the question of privileged communication, if a man bona fide writes a letter in his own defense, and for the defense and protection of his interests and rights, and is not actuated by any malice, that letter is privileged, although it may impute dishonesty to another. 899. WRIGHT v. Woodgate. (1835. 2 Cr. M. & R. 573, 577.) PARKE, B. . . . The term "privileged communication," as it was applied in this case, is not, perhaps, quite a correct expression. The proper meaning of a privileged communication is only this: that the occasion on which the communication was made rebuts the inference prima facie arising from a statement prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and puts it upon him to prove that there was malice in fact, that the defendant was actuated by motives of personal spite or ill-will independent of the occasion on which the communication was made. 900. BACON v. MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. 1887 ERROR to Berrien. 66 Mich. 166 (SMITH, J.) Argued April 6, 1887. Decided June 9, 1887. Case. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed. The facts as stated in the opinion were: The Michigan Central Railroad Company is, and for a long time has been, engaged in operating a railroad extending from Detroit to Chicago. It employs agents at different points on its line, who have the care of divisions of its road, and who are authorized to hire men to work for defendant. It has adopted and carried into effect a plan by which every employee who is discharged from its service is reported to every agent authorized to employ men upon the line of its road regularly once a month. A list is made out by the assistant superintendent in charge of a division, in which are entered the names of the persons discharged the previous month, their occupation and cause; and this list is sent to each of the agents of the company authorized to employ men, and by them these lists are kept on file for their future reference and guidance in employing men. If a person who has been discharged from the service |