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be a necessary and implied justification from the occasion. So that what, taken abstractedly, would be a publication, may from the occasion prove to be none; as if it were read in a judicial proceeding. Words may also be justified on account of the subject-matter, or other circumstances. In this case, instead of the plaintiff's showing it to be false and malicious, it appears to be incident to the application by Rogers to the master of the servant. And the letter was written to the brother-in-law of the plaintiff for the express purpose of preventing an action being brought. . . . Judgment for the defendant.

911. RODGERS v. CLIFTON. (1803. 3 B. & P. 587, 594.) CHAMBRE, J. . . . I take the law to be well settled that, where a master is applied to for the character of a servant, the former is not called upon in an action to prove the truth of any aspersions thrown out by him against the latter; . . . in such case the master is justified, unless the servant prove express malice in the act of the former. Besides the cases cited at the bar, I will refer to the case of Lowry v. Aikenhead et ux., Mich. 8 Geo. III, before Lord Mansfield. In that case the rule laid down by Lord MANSFIELD was that, where a person intending to hire a servant applies to his former master for a character, the master is not bound to prove the truth of the character which he gives; for what he speaks of the servant he does not speak officiously, but only discloses that which rests in his own knowledge alone; but that where a master speaks ill of a servant who has quitted his place, without any previous application having been made to him [the master], there he must plead and prove the truth of the character in justification.

912. HARWOOD v. GREEN

NISI PRIUS. 1827

3 C. & P. 141

LIBEL. The plaintiff was the master of a ship called the Jupiter, which was employed in the transport service, and the defendant was a lieutenant in the navy, who had been appointed by the government as agent or superintendent on board that ship. The libel was contained in a letter addressed to the secretary at Lloyd's, and imputed to the plaintiff misconduct and incapacity in the management of the vessel. The pleas were: first, not guilty; secondly, a justification of the whole of the libel; and, thirdly and fourthly, justifications of particular parts of it. The secretary of Lloyd's was called as a witness, and stated that, in the reading-room there, a notice was fixed on a board (that being the usual mode), stating that the letter in question might be seen by the parties interested.

He was asked by Wilde, Serjt., on his cross-examination, whether it had been the practice for officers in the navy to make communications to Lloyd's.

Taddy, Serjt., objected. If it was any part of the duty of an officer in the navy to make such communications, then it might be inquired

into; but we cannot receive evidence of any practice in a case like this. A communication to Lloyd's is no more than a communication to any other coffee-house.

Wilde, Serjt. Lloyd's being the place where persons assemble who are connected with the maritime interests of the country, if it has been the practice for officers in the navy to send communications there, that may go far, coupled with other circumstances, to show quo animo the defendant in this case acted.

BEST, C. J. Do you offer it as an answer to the action?

Wilde, Serjt. Not alone, but in conjunction with other circum

stances.

...

BEST, C. J. I am of opinion that an officer in the navy has no right to make any communication to Lloyd's, but only to the government by whom he is employed. There are certain things which are privileged communications; but I am of opinion that this is not of that description. If the defendant, instead of writing to Lloyd's, had written to the Navy Board, then it would have been impossible to maintain any action against him, unless it could be shown that his statements were false to his knowledge. An officer in the navy is to make no communication but to his employers. If this is not a privileged communication, then it stands upon the same ground as any other description of libel; therefore, what others have been in the habit of doing can be no evidence in this case. . . . My Brother Wilde shall have leave to move if he thinks I am wrong in my opinion.

Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £50. Taddy, Serjt., and Platt, for the plaintiff. Wilde, Serjt., for the defendant.

913. TODD v. HAWKINS

NISI PRIUS. 1837

8 C. & P. 88

LIBEL. Plea, not guilty. It appeared that the plaintiff was a sharebroker, and that the plaintiff and defendant had also been in partnership in the tea trade, but that they had dissolved their partnership in the year 1835. It further appeared that the wife of the defendant was the daughter of the late Dr. Taft, a Wesleyan minister, and that in the year 1836 the plaintiff was paying his addresses to Mrs. Taft, the mother of the defendant's wife. These facts were proved by Mrs. Taft, who also stated that in the month of July, 1836, she received a letter, which was the subject of the present action, from the defendant, and that she gave it to the plaintiff, who returned it after a copy had been made of it, and that the original letter was then burnt. In her cross-examination Mrs. Taft said the defendant would receive an accession of property on her second marriage, or when his

youngest child comes of age, which would be about seven years hence, so that property would the sooner come into the possession of the defendant, in right of his wife, by Mrs. Taft's second marriage.

The letter was to the following effect:

"Dear Ma,-I feel very severely the coldness and constraint which compels me to communicate my sentiments to you through the medium of a letter, but the misery to yourself and the evil consequences to your family, which must inevitably ensue from the step I fear you are about to take, impel me to waive every private consideration and to do my duty to you honestly, and, I hope, you will feel, respectfully. . . I am quite sure from all that I have ever seen and known of your character that wilfully to do so with your eyes open would be utterly abhorrent to you, and that it can only be accounted for by your being the victim to the plausible artifice of a wicked and artful man, and I most earnestly wish you to investigate thoroughly his character, for I honestly assure you, and I speak it as free from personal prejudice as I am able, and with the fear of a lie in my heart, that his character in York amongst those who best know him is that of an unprincipled trickster. To make money, by no matter what means, appears to be his principal object, as he is constantly descending in transactions of that nature to the meanest artifice and juggle, which an honestminded man would rather die than be guilty of. I am much afraid that these remarks will fail of having their proper weight upon your mind, by your attributing them to prejudice from injury received on my part; but I assure you that, although I can never think of him in any other light than that of a fraudulent man, I think him much too worthless for resentment. . . . Mamma, examine well into your motives, search deeply your own heart. Is the love of money or anxiety after worldly appearance there? Are you sacrificing to Mammon, and making your children pass through the fire to Moloch? The spoils of the widow and fatherless are in his treasure, the moth and rust will corrupt them, and his money will perish in the using. Do let me press upon you the conduct which as a prudent person you ought, and as a professor of Christ you dare not but do. . . . I pray God bestow upon you every necessary good, and so direct your way that you may keep his testimonies. Yours very affectionately, W. Hawkins."

...

ALDERSON, B. (in summing up). The question you will have to determine is whether, the writing of this letter being justified by the circumstances under which it was written, there is anything to show that the defendant was actuated by malice. . . . Here is a widow about to contract marriage with the plaintiff; the defendant is her son-in-law; I think, therefore, that he was justified in writing this letter to her, provided you are satisfied that in doing so he acted bona fide, although the imputations contained in the letter be false or based upon the most erroneous information. There is no doubt that, unless this letter were justified by the occasion, it is a libel, and, had Mrs. Taft and the defendant been strangers to each other, this would have been a mere question of damages. However, in this case, although the letter be derogatory to the plaintiff's character and written in stronger language than a prudent man would use, you must consider

whether it was written sincerely and with a desire to benefit the person to whom it was addressed. . . . So far as pecuniary interests are concerned, it would be to the advantage of the defendant that this lady should marry, and that tends to show bona fides, as men do not in general act maliciously and at the same time against their own interests. The whole of the circumstances are before you, and the occasion is one which prima facie justifies the letter. .

Verdict for the defendant.

ALDERSON, B. I hope it will be understood that this verdict is founded on the fact that this letter was a confidential communication. The Foreman of the jury. My lord, that is so.

R. Alexander and Wightman, for the plaintiff. C. Cresswell and Mathews, for the defendant.

914. WHITELEY v. ADAMS. (1863. 15 C. B. N. s. 392, 419.) BYLES, J. . . . I conceive the rule upon this subject to be clear ever since the case of Toogood v. Spyring [ante, No. 897]. The law considers the publication of defamatory matter to be malicious "unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his interest is concerned." The more that case is examined, the more carefully and accurately the rule will be found to be expressed. Its application to particular cases has always been attended with the greatest difficulty: the combinations of circumstances are so infinitely various. ... KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion. There is no difference as to the rule of what constitutes a privileged communication. It is clearly and accurately laid down in Toogood v. Spyring [ante, No. 897], and also in Harrison v. Bush, 5 Ellis & B. 344. The only difficulty is as to its application to the facts and circumstances of this case. That is a difficulty which must often arise from the infinitely various combinations of circumstances.

915. DAVIES v. SNEAD. (1870. L. R. 5 Q. B. 608, 611.)

BLACKBURN, J.

The difficulty is to determine when it becomes right for a person to speak. There is a large class of cases where there is no duty other than a duty of imperfect obligation to come forward and state facts tending to the disadvantage of a third person. A common instance is that of a master answering inquiries about a servant, and the reason given in that case for the application of the doctrine of privileged communication is that without such a protection the affairs of life could not go on. Great difficulty sometimes arises in drawing the line. . . . Where a person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of society that he should tell to a third person certain facts, then, if he bona fide and without malice does tell them, it is a privileged communication.

916. WALLER v. LOCH. (1881. L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 619, 622.) BRETT, L. J. I think that the definition by BLACKBURN, J., in Davies v. Snead [supra, No. 915], is the best; it leaves out all misleading words, saying nothing about "duty," and states in plain terms what I conceive to be the true rule. . . . COTTON, L. J. The material question is whether the answer given by the defendant was a privileged communication. Different definitions have been given of what constitutes a privileged communication, and, though BRETT, L. J.,

objects to the use of the word "duty," I am disposed to say that it is a communication made in discharge of a duty, legal, moral, or social,-a legal duty or a duty of imperfect obligation. A duty of imperfect obligation attaches on every one to do what is for the good of society.

917. RUDE v. NASS

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. 1891

79 Wis. 321

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Grant County. The following statement of the case was prepared by Mr. Justice CASSODAY: It appears from the record that the defendant has been a minister in various Norwegian Lutheran churches ever since 1866. That at the time of the trial the plaintiff was thirty-one years of age, and had been a teacher of vocal music for several years at various places. That from the spring of 1884 until some time in 1885 he led the singing in one of the defendant's congregations, and also taught singing school at the same place or in the vicinity. That in the fall of 1885 he went to Crawford County, and in the early spring of 1886 to Washington Prairie, Winneshiek County, Iowa, where he continued his vocation. That while there, and on July 26, 1886, he was arrested and brought before a justice of the peace on the charge of having wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously seduced, debauched, and carnally known a daughter of the complainant, an unmarried female of previous chaste character. That under date of July 30, 1886, a letter, of which the following is a copy, was written in behalf of the father of the girl, and sent from said Washington Prairie to the defendant at Boscobel, Wisconsin, to wit:

"Rev. O. Nass-Highest Honored: I have learned that a person by the name of J. E. N. Rude, or, as he has called himself, J. E. Nelson, has been a resident among your congregations. As the same person has lived around here, and his conduct here was such that we had to have him arrested, I should be pleased to get all the information from you in regard to his conduct while he lived in your congregation, and that you will keep nothing secret as to what you know about this man, and that you will tell me whether he had any family relations down there. All information you can give will be of great interest to us in an important case. Respectfully, O. H. Sivesind, Postmaster. Washington Prairie, Iowa."

That in answer to that letter, and under date of August 3, 1886, the defendant wrote in the Norwegian language, and sent from Boscobel, to the person named, at said Washington Prairie, a letter, of which the following is a copy, to wit:

"O. H. Sivesind, Washington Prairie, Iowa-Mr. O. H. Sivesind: In regard to your communication of the 30th, I will inform you as follows: The person concerned, namely, J. E. N. Rude, alias J. E. Nelson, alias Johan Nilsen, came

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