Decision of DOUGLAS, J:- This is an action of libel, complaining of the publication of an article which appeared in the defendant's newspaper October 13, 1889, purporting, under displayed headings, to give an account of "Gov. Brown's Legal Troubles," with the subtitles, also displayed, "Creditor in form of New England Butt Company After Him Red Hot for Settlement. Other peculiar matters. Journalistic Stock Transfer to former Governor's Son to be probed in action brought." The legal principles applicable to a case of this kind have been recently announced by this Court in Metcalf v. Times Publishing Co., 20 R. I. 674. . . . It is conceded that the proceedings of the courts in a general way constitute legitimate items for the newsgatherer to publish. The results of a majority of cases tried, as a matter of fact, concern no one but the parties to them, but incidentally propositions of law are considered which interest the community generally; and it would be contracting the right of free speech into a narrow channel to require a selection of only those cases for report which concern public questions. To a fair and true publication of his case a litigant must submit. It is only an extension of the publicity of the court-room itself.

But this principle gives neither to a newspaper nor to an individual the right to prejudge a case, or to misstate it, or to hold up to scorn or ridicule, either directly or by natural implication from his language, a party who is pursuing his legal remedies in court. If one avails himself of the privilege, which is given for public reasons, to publish a report of court proceedings, he must make such report full, true, and fair, at his peril. Tried by these principles the article complained of in this case is plainly libellous. It relates truthfully enough certain things that took place in court. It reproduces with substantial accuracy the tenor of the pleadings, and states the history of the litigation which terminated in the issue of an execution and the levy of it upon the plaintiff's residence. Most of the facts, categorically stated, are substantially true; and if this were all, while the reference to cases long ago terminated might be considered a stretch of the newsgatherer's net not required by any public necessity, the article could not be seriously condemned. But every statement of fact is accompanied with comment, and inference, and insinuation directly tending to excite ridicule and depreciation of the plaintiff's character. More than this there are direct statements which assert or clearly imply the plaintiff's inability to meet his pecuniary obligations. In one part of the article the assertion is made that "whether or not he can keep" his residence "out of the auctioneer's hands depends upon the result of a hearing which will take place to-morrow in the Appellate Division," and this statement might well happen to be read by persons who would not read the whole article and come upon the statement below, which changes the alternative prophesied by saying: "It is said that Mr. Brown now has reached the point where he will have

to produce money or suffer the amputation of property possessions credited to him," which is itself an insinuation that he was carrying property in his name which did not belong to him and thus obtaining false credit. The frequent references throughout the article to the plaintiff's connection with an evening paper published in competition with the defendant's journal, as well as the whole tone of the article and its reference to the plaintiff, show that the motive of the publication was to do personal injury to the plaintiff, from dislike and illwill, and not the giving to the public a fair and truthful report of the litigation which is made the occasion of it. . .

In consequence of this publication the defendant, who had been engaged in business in this community for thirty years, was required by the bank with which he was accustomed to deal to furnish a statement of assets and liabilities, and he was compelled to submit to this humiliation as if he had been suspected of insolvency. He further testifies to a considerable loss of trade in a neighboring city where this paper was circulated. These elements of actual damage are necessarily indefinite as data for computation in money of the injury done, but the case is one which forbids the assessment of merely nominal damages. Taking into account the circulation of the paper, which was admitted at the trial to be 32,000 per diem, and all the other circumstances of the case, I do not consider the sum of $1,500 as an excessive remuneration to the plaintiff for what he must have suffered from this libel, and I assess the damages at that amount. Decision for the plaintiff for $1,500 and costs.

Edward D. Bassett and Dexter B. Potter, for plaintiff.

Charles A. Wilson and William J. Brown, for defendant.

SUB-TOPIC B. REPORTS OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS

947. HENRY JEPHSON. The Platform, its Rise and Progress. (1892. vol. I, p. 57.) . . . [By the middle of the 1700s], the House of Commons had, as matter of fact, ceased to be a control on the Crown for the people, and had become a control on the people, acting in opposition to their interests when those clashed with the interests of the Crown. . . . It was this feeling of hostility to popular co-operation which led to an event which had a vast indirect influence on the Platform, namely, the publication of the debates of Parliament. The King and the House of Commons, whilst still in grips with Wilkes, came into conflict with the Press. By a long and well-known order of the Commons, it was "highly criminal" in any printer to publish an account of the debates without the particular permission of the Speaker, and until this time such reports as were published in the newspapers were very limited in extent, and given in a very guarded style. But with the awakening of political life, and with the growing thirst for political information, greater freedom was gradually and tentatively exercised by the Press. The practice remained unnoticed by Parliament until, on one occasion, some speeches were published in such a manner as led to a complaint being made in the House of Commons on the subject. Then the whole subject came up for discussion, and a bitter struggle ensued between Parlia

ment and the Press. It was quite in keeping with the autocratic ideas of the time that efforts should be made to prevent the public knowing what passed in the House of Commons. . . . Lord NORTH endeavored to give effect to the King's wishes as regards "putting a stop to the lawless method of publishing debates": and vehement and prolonged debates took place on the subject in the House of Commons. The quarrel with the Press merged into a quarrel with the most powerful and popular corporation then existing, the city of London, and war raged between it and Parliament on the subject. Printers were ordered to prison by the House of Commons, but the city magistrates bailed them out. The House of Commons messengers sent to arrest the printers were themselves arrested by the city officers. At last the House took the extreme step of committing the Lord Mayor of London and one alderman to the tower. . . . When Parliament was prorogued, and the session came to an end, the imprisonment of the Lord Mayor and the Alderman also came to an end, and on their release they were received by the populace of London with a frenzy of acclamation and approbation. It was soon made evident, and, indeed, proved even to the House of Commons itself, that there was no power to check the Press; no means of preventing the publication of the debates. Editors, accordingly, from that time forward, began to give the debates at length, and though the practice was never actually recognized by Parliament, it has never been interrupted, nor any curtailment of the freedom of publishing the proceedings of Parliament attempted. . . .

It would be difficult to overrate the effect which the publication of the debates in Parliament had on the political education of the people. It was practically their initiation into the affairs of State. Their attention was directed to their political rights and interest; the freedom of speech which happily existed in Parliament was an incentive to them to maintain freedom of speech outside Parliament; the discussions in Parliament suggested discussions outside; and the arguments used by the Legislature afforded material for thought, and taught and enlightened the people. It gradually instructed them in the art of political discussion, and gave a turn to the national character in the direction of discussion which, happily for the peace of the kingdom, has been the most valuable preventive of violence and disorder. From this time, moreover, the connection between a member and his constituents entered on a new phase. The latter acquired the means of judging of the conduct and services of their representatives with more accuracy than they were able to do before, and the representatives were forced to accord greater respect to the claims of their constituents by knowing that they were indirectly heard by them.

948. PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN. (1843. Hansard's Debates, Vol. LXX, p. 1254. July 18.) . . . On clause 7, permitting reports of proceedings in courts of justice and in the two Houses of Parliament to be published. The LORD CHANCELLOR observed, that every petition presented to Parliament would be a proceeding in Parliament within the language of the Act, and, however scandalous, would be under its protection. Lord CAMPBELL said, that this was a most important clause. It was founded upon the tenth proposition of the recommendations of the Committee on the Law of Libel, which ran thus:"That no action, indictment, or information shall be maintainable for a faithful report of any proceedings of courts of justice, or before magistrates acting in the discharge of their duty, or of any proceedings in either House of Parliament at which strangers have been permitted to be present, provided that such pro

ceedings are not of such a nature that a report thereof would be contrary to good manners." In practice all fair reports of legal proceedings were sanctioned, not only where there had been final judgment, but on ex parte applications. The Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench was in favor of the clause as it stood, and was of opinion that if a report were faithful, even in ex parte cases the representation would be viewed as ex parte, and as likely to be partial, so that the evil effect would be counteracted. As to police reports, their legality had long been doubted; but the police magistrates were of opinion that the benefit arising from them exceeded the evil. In the case of Curry v. Walter [supra, No. 942], the principle he contended for had been recognized. . . . No doubt, a Member of Parliament attempting to abuse the privileges of Parliament, for the purposes of slander, was the worst of slanderers, and he certainly should endeavor to secure the public against such a gross abuse. No one could question that any member of Parliament, for instance, who published his own speech containing statements injurious to private character, without any answer that might have been given to it, would show that he had not had a bona fide motive. But faithful and bona fide reports of Parliamentary proceedings, why ought not they to be as much protected as similar reports of legal proceedings? . . . He proposed, then, to assimilate the law in respect to Parliamentary proceedings generally to the law as regarded legal proceedings. This would not sanction unfair and unfaithful reports, but only those which were fair and faithful. . . .

Lord BROUGHAM was decidedly of opinion that Parliament could not discharge its high functions without the most entire freedom of debate. In proportion, however, as there should be an absolute and unrestrained privilege within the walls of Parliament for saying whatever any member might think proper to say, restrained only by his sense of duty; so, in the same proportion, was the necessity absolute, that there should not be given an unrestrained power to the press to publish everything that was said in Parliament. There was no fear of the proceedings of Parliament not being published. Practically, therefore, there was no necessity for such a provision as this. In the course of all his experience at the bar, he never remembered a single prosecution or action for the publication of a speech delivered in Parliament. . .

Lord CAMPBELL said, it was impossible to frame any law that might not be abused; but he thought the words which he proposed to introduce, that there should be no prosecution where the publication was "without malice," would sufficiently narrow the clause to prevent it extending its protection to improper publications. . . .

The committee divided on the question that the clause stand part of the bill, when the numbers were Contents 5; non-contents 11; majority 6. Clause

rejected.

949. WASON v. WALTER

QUEEN'S BENCH. 1868

L. R. 4 Q. B. 73

FIRST Count, that Earl Russell had, at the request of the plaintiff, presented to the House of Lords a petition of the plaintiff wherein he prayed that a committee of the House might be appointed to investigate certain charges made by the plaintiff against Sir Fitzroy Kelly,

and thereupon the defendant falsely and maliciously printed and published in the Times newspaper, in the form of a debate in the House of Lords, the words following: The count then set out verbatim the report which was given at very considerable length in the Times of the 13th of February, 1867, of a debate in the House of Lords on the previous evening. The following is the substance of the report: Earl Russell presented a petition from Mr. Wason, (the plaintiff) stating (inter alia), that Sir Fitzroy Kelly, lately appointed Lord Chief Baron, did in the year 1835, when a barrister, pledge his honor as a gentleman to the truth of that which he knew to be false, for the purpose of deceiving an election committee of the House of Commons, and praying the appointment of a committee to investigate the charges, and if the committee should find them proved, that the House would concur with the other house of parliament in praying the Queen that Sir Fitzroy Kelly might be relieved from his judicial position. Earl Russell stated that he should not ask the House to assent to the prayer of the petition, as he did not concur in it. . . . "It therefore appears to me," said Earl Russell, that Mr. Wason's statement must be regarded as a fabrication." The Lord Chancellor (Lord Chelmsford) then went more in detail into the charges, and gave the same refutation of them, in stronger language, concluding "this petition will now lie on the table a perpetual record of his (the plaintiff's) falsehood and malignity."

66

Plea: Not guilty. At the trial before COCKBURN, C. J., at the sittings in London after Michaelmas Term, 1867, the publication having been proved, the plaintiff was examined and admitted that he was mistaken in making the particular charge of falsehood against Sir F. Kelly, specified in the letter to Lord Derby. On behalf of the defendant, who was admitted to be a proprietor of the Times, it was proved that the libel charged in the first count was an accurate report of the debate. The Lord Chief Justice told the jury, that if they were satisfied that the matter charged as a libel in the first count was a faithful and correct report of the proceedings in the House of Lords, and of the speeches delivered on the occasion, he directed them in point of law that it was a privileged publication, and one which was not the subject of a civil action, and they should find for the defendant on that count. . . . The jury found on both counts for the defendant. A rule was afterwards obtained for a new trial, for misdirection.

...

Sir J. B. Karslake, Q. C. (A. G.), J. D. Coleridge, Q. C., and C. W. Wood, showed cause. The first and principal question is, whether a faithful report in a newspaper of a debate in either house of parliament is prima facie privileged, although it contains defamatory matter. . . . There is no direct authority one way or the other, as to whether reports of parliamentary debates are privileged. . . .

T. Jones, Q. C., and R. E. Turner, in support of the rule. As to the