mitted, so, in case of affray or breach of the peace committed in his presence, he must show that the party arrested by him was guilty. Nor can a private individual justify, if he procure the arrest of an innocent person for a misdemeanor, by an officer, without warrant; in such case he is answerable; he can no more lawfully cause such an arrest than he can make it himself. Hobbs v. Branscomb, 3 Camp. 420; Hopkins v. Crowe, 7 Car. & P. 373; Derecourt v. Corbishley, 5 El. & Bl. 188; Price v. Seeley, 10 Clark & F. 28; Collett v. Foster, 2 Hurl. & N. 356; Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41, 20 N.E. 644; Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug. 360 [post, No. 1076]. . . . We conclude, therefore, that the arrest of the plaintiff was unlawful. And, as already intimated, this conclusion disposes of the first two of the defendant's exceptions; for, assuming that the conductor had a right, as a matter of law, to make the inquiry he did, as a means of identification, and assuming that, by the plaintiff's conduct, the conductor had reason to believe, and did believe, that the plaintiff was fraudulently evading the payment of his fare, still, as we have seen, all this would have afforded no justification, in law. . . . The verdict for the plaintiff was not against law, nor against the weight of evidence. 2. Are the damages excessive? The principles upon which damages are to be assessed in this class of cases were elaborately discussed by this Court in Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427. We need state here only the conclusions. . . . We think the plaintiff's conduct gave the conductor reason to believe - and he says he did believe that the plaintiff was attempting to ride upon a ticket not his own, and which he had no right to use. This, of course, is not a justification; but it deserves full consideration, in determining whether punitive damages are allowable, or in estimating the injury to the plaintiff's wounded sensibilities. Under all the circumstances, we think $10 will be ample compensation. The entry will be: Exceptions overruled. If the plaintiff files a remittitur of all the verdict in excess of $10 within 30 days after the rescript is received, motion for new trial overruled; otherwise, motion sustained. 968. ENRIGHT v. GIBSON SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1906 219 Ill. 550, 76 N. E. 689 APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District:-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. OSCAR E. HEARD, Judge, presiding. This was a suit brought by appellee, Estella A. Gibson, against appellant, in the Superior Court of Cook county. The declaration consisted of two counts. The first count alleged false imprisonment, and the second, malicious prosecution. The cause was tried before a jury, and a verdict rendered for $5,000, $2,500 of which was remitted and judgment entered for the sum of $2,500, from which an appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, and a further appeal is now prosecuted to this Court. Appellant conducted an employment office in the city of Chicago. Appellee was his clerk and in charge of what is termed by the evidence "the female department." For that department she kept a certain book, which contained merely the list of persons wanting female help, their locations and street numbers, the class of work and the wages proposed to be paid. Appellee had been thus employed about six weeks. On Saturday evening, May 25, 1901, she took the book in question home with her, claiming that it was for the purpose of sewing the covers on the index to it and completing the index to the entries of orders. The appellant suspected that she had taken this book for the purpose of copying and furnishing to his competitors the entries therein contained. He missed the book the same evening that appellee took it and sent a clerk to recall appellee to the office, who claims that when he saw appellee she directed him to return to appellant and say to appellant that he did not see her. On Sunday afternoon she returned to the office with the book. Appellant was there and requested her to take a seat. She offered to show him the book and to tell him what she had been doing with it. Appellant immediately called an officer, directed him to arrest appellee and accompanied the officer and appellee to the police station, where appellee was confined over night. Appellee claims that the door of the room in which she was detained until the officer arrived was locked, while the evidence on the part of appellant tends to show the contrary. On Monday morning, after appellee had been taken to the police station and confined over night, appellant made a complaint charging appellee with larceny of the book in question. The cause was heard the following day and appellee was discharged, and the suit at bar followed. William E. Mason, and Lewis F. Mason, for appellant. Morse Ives, and G. I. Haight, for appellee. Mr. Justice RICKS delivered the opinion of the Court (after stating the facts as above). The errors relied upon relate wholly to the instructions. 1. The complaint is, that instructions 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 offered by appellant were not given as offered, but were modified by the Court and given as modified. . . . The seventeenth, as offered, advised the jury that the burden of proof was upon appellee to show that the defendant did not have probable cause, and that if she failed to do so the jury should find the defendant not guilty. . . . The nineteenth, as offered, was that the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted without probable cause and with malice, and that if the jury believed, from the evidence, there was probable cause and no malice was shown, they should find the defendant not guilty. . . . All these instructions, as offered, were general, and unless modified would be applicable alike to each count of the declaration. The Court refused them as offered, and modified each of them by restricting its application to the second count of the declaration. As modified and given, they stated correct principles of law applicable to the charge of malicious prosecution. 2. Counsel for appellant, however, takes the position that the instructions are also applicable to the charge of false imprisonment contained in the first count, and in support of that contention cite Harpham v. Whitney, 77 Ill. 32, Bourne v. Stout, 62 id. 261, McGuire v. Goodman, 31 Ill. App. 420, and Ford v. Buckley, 68 id. 447. While those cases announce the principle that appellant contends for, they are applied wholly to cases for malicious prosecution, and not to cases for false imprisonment. Not one of the cases cited arose upon the charge of false imprisonment. By the common law, and according to the holdings in many of the States, a private person may justify an arrest by showing that a felony had been actually committed and that he had reasonable grounds to suspect that the person arrested committed the felony. (2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed. 885; 3 Cyc. 885, and authorities therein cited.) By section 4 of division 6 of our Criminal Code (Hurd's Stat. 1903, par. 342, p. 677,) it is provided: . . . "An arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person without warrant, for a criminal offence committed or attempted in his presence, and by an officer, when a criminal offence has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it." From the reading of this statute it would seem that there is pointed out a distinction between the power of a citizen to make an arrest and that of an officer. A citizen may arrest when an offence is committed or attempted to be committed in his presence; so, too, may an officer under the same circumstances. But an officer may also arrest where the criminal offence has in fact been committed and he has reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested has committed it. But this latter power is not extended to a citizen by the statute. The policy of the law in this State seems to be that a citizen must not be permitted to take the law into his own hands and to make arrests upon suspicion or upon probable cause of guilt. If the citizen knows a crime has been committed it is his duty to appear before a magistrate and make a complaint, in which he states that the crime has been committed, and in which he may state, upon reasonable information and belief, that the party named is the guilty party, whereupon the magistrate will issue his warrant directed to all sheriffs, coroners and constables in the State, or, in case of emergency or in the absence of such officer, may direct the same to a private individual. When this course is pursued, ample protection is given to the citizen who makes the complaint or who may make the arrest under the warrant, and to the accused person named in the warrant. If the private citizen, without observing these formalities of law, may constitute himself an officer and jailer upon mere suspicion or probable cause of guilt of the accused person, it would place in the hands of the vicious or ill disposed a power the exercise of which might result in a greater evil than might arise from the occasional escape of guilty parties before the officers can be called or the forms of law observed. Such has been the view of this Court from an early date, and is clearly expressed in Dodds v. Board, 43 Ill. 95. There Board brought suit against Dodds and others for false imprisonment. Logan, one of the defendants in that suit, attempted to justify by a plea in which he alleged that a larceny had recently been committed in that neighborhood and that he had reasonable ground to believe that the plaintiff was guilty as an accessory to said crime. A demurrer was sustained to this plea. We think this case a clear announcement of the rule in this State that before a private citizen can justify an arrest made by him, he must show not only that a crime has in fact been committed, but that the person arrested is guilty of the crime. This case was followed and quoted with approval in Kindred v. Stitt, 51 Ill. 401; and to the same effect is Johnson v. Von Kettler, 84 id. 315. These cases, as we think, are in keeping with the provisions of the statute above quoted. In fact, as we understand it, the statute above was enacted since the rendition of these opinions by this Court, and we regard the statute as the enactment of the rule as formulated by this Court. . . ... We think there was no error in the modification of the instructions, and that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed, which is accordingly done. Judgment affirmed. 969. KNICKERBOCKER STEAMBOAT COMPANY v. CUSACK UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DISTRICT. 1909 172 Fed. 358 IN Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The defendant in the court below brings this writ of error to review a judgment for the plaintiff entered upon the verdict of a jury in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff was a passenger on board the excursion steamer General Slocum, belonging to the defendant, on an excursion trip from Paterson, N. J., to Rockaway Beach and return. There was some fighting on the boat, in the course of which plaintiff was assaulted. The mate of the Slocum separated the parties, put the plaintiff's assailant and some other persons in the hold, and, when the steamboat arrived at Rockaway Beach, pointed plaintiff out and directed a police officer to arrest him. The officer took plaintiff to the magistrate's Court at Far Rockaway, where the mate made a complaint against him. The plaintiff at first pleaded not guilty, but afterwards changed his plea to guilty, and was fined $5.00. He did not have the money to pay the fine, and he was chained with some criminals and put into a van and driven to Long Island City, where he was put in jail and kept in confinement until the next morning, when he was discharged. He sued for this false imprisonment, and obtained a verdict for $800 damages. Benjamin Trapnell, for plaintiff in error. Henry H. Bowman, for defendant in error. Before LACOMBE, TOWNSEND, and COXE, Circuit Judges. 1. The claim of counsel for defendant that the plea of guilty in the magistrate's court was a bar to this action is not well founded. The authorities are practically unanimous to the effect that, in an action solely for false imprisonment, the termination of the criminal proceedings is immaterial. Newell on Malicious Prosecution, 307; Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463; Hopner v. McGowan, 116 N. Y. 405–410, 22 N. E. 558;. 2. Here the plaintiff was guilty of only a misdemeanor, and the arrest was illegal. Thorn v. Turck, 94 N. Y. 90. . . . The general rule of damages in cases of false imprisonment is that the person causing a wrongful imprisonment is liable for all the natural and probable consequences thereof. . . . In respect to this proposition the trial Court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows: "It seems to me very clear that the proceedings which followed from the time Officer Thompson laid his hand on him until he was back at his home flow naturally from the action of the mate in pointing him out to Officer Thompson." . . . The independent illegal acts of the officers of the law are not the natural and probable consequences of such false arrest. Thus, in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 54 Fed. 474, 4 C. C. A. 447, where plaintiff sued the railway company for forcible removal from a train by a constable acting on complaint of defendant, the Court held the company not liable for the acts of the officer after plaintiff's removal in putting plaintiff in irons, formally arresting him on warrant, and detaining him until released on bail. And in Frankfurter v. Bryan, 12 Ill. App. 549, it is held that, where the arrest is caused on one charge and a fine was imposed on another charge, the complainant was not liable for the false arrest. . . . But, as to the question whether the action of the magistrate or other officer of the law after the surrender of the person imprisoned is the natural and probable consequence of the original unlawful act, the authorities are in conflict. . . . In Murphy . Countiss, 1 Harr. (Del.) 143, in an action for trespass, assault, and battery and false imprisonment, the Court held that the plaintiff could recover, not merely for the time the constable was bringing |