however, would bring the date of the inscription down to the sixth century; for the epithet déσrowa did not begin to be applied to the Deipara long before the Justinian age. And it may be said that, as Justinian was the professed exterminator of the ancient religion of Greece and Rome, it would not have been safe for any one of his subjects to profane the name of the god of the emperor, by putting it in juxtaposition with the gods of the heathens. It must be added here, that this epithet began to be given to the empress as a title about the same period. But it is not easy to believe that the Lady Queen of the inscription refers to the emperor's wife. She must have been a goddess. It may be supposed also that she is the same as Isis, the great goddess of Egypt. Her worship indeed was quite fashionable in Greece during the Roman period, and her name appears in connection with Sarapis, Anubis, and Harpocrates, in several of the Delian inscriptions; but I am not aware that the Greeks ever designated her by the appellation the Lady Queen. * Pausanias informs us that the Lady ( Aéσrowa) was the daughter of Poseidon and Demeter. This distinctive epithet was analogous to the Maid ( Kópŋ), the popular name of Persephone or Persephoneia, the daughter of Zeus and Demeter. Pausanias is prevented by his religious scruples from disclosing her real name to the uninitiated. He only states that Aéorowa bears the same relation to this mystical divinity, that Κόρη does to Περσεφόνη. This Lady was the favorite goddess of the Arcadians.† And if we assume that she is identical with the Lady Queen of the inscription, it is natural to infer that her worship was not confined to Arcadia. On the walls of the church of Saint Nicholas (8 "Ayios Nikóλaos), near what is called, by courtesy, the Fort of Volo (τò Káστpov TOÛ Bóλov), I found the following sepulchral inscriptions. The slabs had * INSCR. 2293. 2295. 2302. . † Pavs. 8, 37, 9 (6) Ταύτην δὲ μάλιστα θεῶν σέβουσιν οἱ ̓Αρκάδες τὴν Δέσποιναν, θυγατέρα δὲ αὐτὴν Ποσειδῶνός φασιν εἶναι καὶ Δήμητρος. Ἐπίκλησις εἰς τοὺς πολλούς ἐστιν αὐτῇ Δέσποινα, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ἐκ Διὸς Κόρην ἐπονομάζουσιν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐστιν ὄνομα Περσεφόνῃ, καθὰ ̔́Ομηρος καὶ ἔτι πρότερον Πάμφως ἐποίησαν. Τῆς δὲ Δεσποίνης τὸ ὄνομα ἔδεισα εἰς τοὺς ἀτελέστους ypápew. For this unwillingness to reveal the true name, compare HER. 2, 170 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ ταφαὶ τοῦ οὐκ ὅσιον ποιεῦμαι ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ πρήγματι ἐξαγορεύειν τοὔνομα ἐν Σάϊ. been brought from the ruins of Pagasa, in the vicinity of said fort. With one exception they contain nothing but proper names and adjectives derived from proper names. I copied them in conformity with the philological canon that no ancient writing should be suffered to perish. Η ῥα ποθεινὸς πᾶσιν ἔβης δόμον Αϊδος οὔπω Εἴκοσ ̓ ἐτῶν, μῆνας δ ̓ ἐξ ἔτι λειπόμενος, Διόγενες· γένος ΔΕ ΛΥΓΙ. ΝΣΤΥΓΙ. ΝΤΕΓ. ΝΕΥΣΙ ̓Αλλ' [ο]ὐκ ἔστι τύχην προφυγεῖν καὶ δαίμονα ΝΗΤ Professor Jeffries Wyman, exhibiting a stereoscopic view of the skeleton of a double human foetus, discussed the question of the mode of origin of such monstrosities, and insisted that they never arose from actual coalescence of two individuals, but from the more or less extensive longitudinal division, or rather bifurcation, of the primitive stripe of the ovum, with which the development of the embryo begins. He was thus led to consider the question of individuality, and to maintain the ground that, since the two bodies or parts of bodies were not formed by the coalescence of two originally distinct primitive stripes, therefore they were to be regarded as one individual, even in a case so extreme as that of the Siamese twins. This view was criticised by Professors Parsons, Bowen, and Gray, the latter assenting to this view of the origination of such double individuals, as agreeing with the chorisis or similar doubling of organs in the vegetable kingdom; but insisting that to call the Siamese twins one individual was a practical reductio ad absurdum of that idea of individuality, and that individuality should be considered as of complete or incomplete realization; e. g. that a bicephalous monster was the result of an incomplete development, the Siamese twins, of an essentially effectual development of two individuals out of the foundation of one, or in the normal place of one. Dr. C. Pickering submitted a statement relative to the geographical distribution of species, viz.: That his experience as a naturalist had led him to the conclusion, that the main limiting cause in the diffusion of species is to be found in the envelope of the ovum; in other words, the shell of the ovum governs the diffusion of species. When the shell of the ovum breaks before exclusion, as in animals called viviparous, the species cannot be diffused by means of ova. Other organic beings capable of locomotion are diffused both by ova and the wandering progeny; but plants are diffused exclusively by ova. Change the order of Nature; let the ova of insects be all borne VOL. V. 11 about by the winds and waves, and insects would disappear from the planet : Or fasten the seeds of plants, hide them away in the select situations in which insects deposit their ova; and plants in their turn would in the end become extinct. At some future day, when the envelope of ova shall have received more attention from naturalists, the ovum alone may probably be found to point out, with very considerable accuracy, the geographical distribution." Professor Gray made some critical remarks, suggesting that The problem of determining the geographical distribution of a species from the condition of its ovum or seed might be expected to transcend human powers in any supposable state of our knowledge of the latter, even if the principle announced were theoretically admissible to the full extent. Aptitude for dissemination was one element, but only one out of several. That it was by no means always the determining element, at least in the vegetable kingdom, might be inferred from the fact, that, while as a whole the seeds of the vast order Compositæ were endowed with unusual facilities for dispersion, the species on the whole were not at all remarkable for wideness of range, but rather the contrary; and, what seemed more paradoxical, Dr. Hooker had shown that (at least in some parts of the southern hemisphere) those Compositæ provided with a downy pappus, like that of Senecio, were in general more restricted in their actual geographical range than those destitute of a pappus. The vast genus Senecio has a downy pappus in all its species; but although the genus is cosmopolite, the species appear to be more than usually restricted, each to one district. Professor Bowen made some observations upon Instinct. He remarked that there are three distinct questions concerning this faculty, which need to be carefully distinguished from each other. 1. What are the characteristics of Instinct? 2. What is the relation of Instinct to Intellect properly so called, that is, to human Intellect, and is the difference in kind or only in degree? 3. Whether Instinct and Intellect are ever conjoined, or found to exist together in the same being, either in the brute or in man. The answer to these last two questions has been confused, or rendered difficult, chiefly because the answer to the first has been left vague and indeterminate. So long as the word Instinct is vaguely used to designate all the mental endowments of the brute, be they what they may, and so long as the word Intellect is used with equal vagueness to designate all the mental endowments of man, be they what they may,so long it will be impossible to draw a sharp line of distinction between the two, or to say that the two are never conjoined in the same being. What, then, are the mental endowments which belong in common to man and the brute, but which are not entitled to be called either Instinct in the one case, or Intellect in the other? The following are at least some of them, perhaps all. Appetites; propensities, including blind or involuntary imitation; affections; memory, and simple imagination, or the power of calling up mental pictures of individual material objects, both being manifested in the dreams of dogs; simple association, as when a gesture or a rod suggests to an animal the pain of a previous whipping; and judgment in its simplest form or lowest function, resulting from the direct comparison of one material thing, observed at the moment, with another, as when dogs and cats judge correctly the height or distance which they can safely leap, or the size of the orifice that will admit the passage of their bodies. Neither Intellect nor Instinct is necessary for the action of the appetites, impulses, or affections; though one or the other is needed to obtain the means of gratifying them, and to control them, or to keep down their action when their demands are inordinate or obstructive to the attainment of some higher end. Though these impulses are determinate, or point to certain objects to the exclusion of others, such determination is not the result of comparison and deliberate choice, such as is exercised by the Intellect; but it is the necessary result of the constitution of the being in whom certain propensities are implanted to the exclusion of others. Neither Instinct nor Intellect causes the determination to one kind of food rather than another, or the preference of one class of sounds to another; we can only say, that the palate and the auditory nerve are so constituted as to give pleasure in the one case, and pain or disgust in the other. Such preferences and dislikes are no more indications of thought and purpose on the part of the animals which feel them, than is the persistent pointing of the magnetic needle to the poles, when compared with the indifference of unmagnet |