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NEW YORK, JANUARY 11, 1788.
CONCERNING THE MILITIA.
The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia, would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp, and of the field, with mutual intelligence and concert; an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; And it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished, by confiding the regulation of the militia, to the direction of the national author. ity. It is therefore with the most evident propriety, that tho plan of the convention proposes to empowor the union “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the servico of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appoint
ment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”
Of the different grounds, which have been taken in opposition to this plan, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a freo country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation, and at the disposal of that body, wbich is constitutod the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the same body, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext, to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, it has been remarked, that there is no where any provision in the proposed constitution for requiring the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favourable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the federal govornment will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient oven to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth, as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, tbat a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its
declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of tho citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws; as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the inposition and col. lection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of descent, and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITatus is entirely destitute of colour, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the fedoral government over the militia, is as uncandid, as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make uso of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this extraordinary manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, composed of tho young and the ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbi. trary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia, may be pursued by the national government, is impossiblo to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangorous, wore tho constitution rutified, and wore I to deliver my soptimonts to a member of the federal legislature on the subjoct of a militia establishment, I should hold to him in substance the following discourse :
“The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States, is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements, is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, nor a week, nor even a month that will suffice for the
attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary, to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labour of the country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of a million of pounds. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labour and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise; and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course
of a year.
“But, though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yot it is a matter of the utmost importance, that a well digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate size, upon such principles as will really fit it for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defence of the state shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments; but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never bo formidable to the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, and those of their follow citizens. This appears to me the only substituto
that can be devised for a standing army; and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.”
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed constitution should I reason on the same subject; deducing arguments of safety, from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can
There is something so far fetchod, and so extravagant, in tho idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice, to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow citizens ? What shadow of danger can there be from men, who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests ? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary; while the particular states are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the states, ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale or romance; which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes—
“Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire ;" discolouring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and trans forming every thing it touches into a monster.