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country, almost with one voice, to make so singular and solemn an experiment, for correcting the errours of a system, by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they båve proposed, was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them, that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empiro, were turned with the keenest anxiety, to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe, that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of tho United States. Thoy had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the proposition, made by a single stato (Virginia) towards a partial amendmont of the confederation had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the liberty assumed by a very few deputies, from a very few states, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by tbe public opinion, but actually carried into effect, by twelve out of the thirteen states. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative powers, warranted in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory, the transcendant and procious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness :"'* since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally, to move in concert towards their object : and it is therefore essential, that such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens
* Declaration of Independence.
They mast have recollected, that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege, of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the states were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts, and defending their rights: and that conventions were elected in the several states, for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed. Nor could it bave been forgotten, that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contondod for. Thoy must have borno in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed, was to be submitted to the people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it for ever: its approbation blot out all antecedent errours and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies.
Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidenco in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay, and the hazard of events; let me ask the man, who can raise his mind to one elevated con. ception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, op the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whoso propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control,
let me then ask, what sentence he bas in reserve for the twelve states who usurped the power of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the confederation; and for the state of New York, in particular, who first urged, and then complied with this unauthorized interposition?
But that the objectors may bo disarmod of overy protext, it shall be granted for a moment, that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances, in proposing a constitution for their country : does it follow that the constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected ? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example, of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be not so much from whom the advice comes, as whether the advice be good.
The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the constitution, is the subject under investigation.
NEW YORK, JANUARY 22, 1788.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS PROPOSED TO BE VESTED IN
The constitution proposed by the convention, may be con. sidered under two general points of view. The First relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the states. The second, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the first view of the subject, two important questions arise :-1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper ?—2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several states ?
Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the first question.
It cannot havo escapod thoso, who have attonded with candour to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered, how far these powers were necossary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniencies which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident
to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject, cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field of rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid peoplo will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness, involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conforred, tho point first to be decided is, whother such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the union; and that this may be the moro conveniently done, they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects : 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the states; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the states from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the first class, are those of declaring war, and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger, is one of the primitive objects of civil socioty. It is an avowed and essential object of tho American union. Tho powors requisite for attaining it, must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary ? No man will