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be a Inuitted to leave a most advantageous superiority, in favour of the Ugited States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantago, of an extensive territory. For it cannot bo bolioved that any form of representative government, could bave succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immodiately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer, tho general reply ought to be suficient that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former, as well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, is apparently must to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place, corrupt itself; must next
corrupt the state legislatures; must then corrupt the house of representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident, that the senate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerato tho whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with cqual success on the house of represontatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch of the government, would inevitably dofeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succossion of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristino order. Is there any man who can seriously persuado himself, that the proposed senate
can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions ?
If reason condomns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experionce. The constitution of Maryland, fur. nishes the most apposite example. The senate of that state is elected, as the foderal sonate will be, indirectly by the people; and for a term less by one year only, than the federal senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment; and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colourable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal Benate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger, ought by this time to have been betrayed by the senate of Maryland; þut no such symptoms bave appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment}) and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any state in the union.
But if any thing could silenco tho jealousios on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The house of representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years : and in a very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the poople. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display, the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny, which are at some future period to be exenplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the auti-federal argument, the British bistory informs us, that
this hereditary assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the house of representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for life; continually gained on its authority, and finally drew all power into their own hands. The tribunos of Rome, who wore the reprosontatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. This fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistiblo force possessed by that branch of a free government, wbich has the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second punic war, lost almost the wholo of its original portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the federal senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of representatives with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be ablo to maintain even the constitutional authority of the senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature, the affections and suppori of the entire body of the people themselves.
NEW YORK, MARCH 7, 1788.
A FURTIER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE, IN
REGARD TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES.
It is a just, and not a new observation, that enemies to par. ticular persóns, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their consures to such things only in either, as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.
The 2d section gives power to the president, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR.”
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in manner most conducive to the public good. The convention appear to have been attentivo to both these points—they have directed the president to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the state legislatures.
This snode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the poople in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, the hopes, and foars of tho unwary and interested, ofton places men in office, by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.
As the select assemblies for choosing tho president, as well as the state legislatures who appoint the senators, will, in general, be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom tho people perceive just grounds for confidence. The constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the elections to men of whom the people have bad time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, liko transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue that, as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the president and senators so chosen, will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several states or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged.
Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs, has not yet become Bufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to