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states, under the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto beld together. But there are other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured, that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the states. And though the proposed constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of those instances, which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend, that the spirit which produced them, will assume new shapes that could not be foreseen, nor specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony of the states, are proper objects of federal superintendence and control.
It may be esteemed the basis of the union, that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." And if it be a just principle, that every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions, by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of priviloges and immunities, to which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfugo, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial, between the different states and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.
The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most bigotted idolizers of state authority, have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of
maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that tbey fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts, in cases in which the stato tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause, in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsid. erable weight in designating the federal courts, as the proper tribunals for the determinatlon of controversies between different states and their citizens. And it ought to have the same operation, in regard to some cases, between the citizens of the same state. Claims to land under grants of different states, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this description. The courts of neither of the granting states could be expected to be unbiassed. The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in favour of the grants of the state to which they belonged. And where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government.
Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which, ought to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composod. It is to comprehend "all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of anotber state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state, claiming lands
under grants of different states; and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens and subjects.". This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the union. Let us now review it in detail. It is then to extend,
First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under the constitution and the laws of the United States. This corrosponds with the two first classes of causes, which bave been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been asked, what is meant by “cases arising under the constitution," in contra-distinction from those " arising under the laws of the United States ?” The difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the state legislatures furnish examples. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from the constitution, and will have no connexion with any law of the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the constitution, and not under the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole.
It has also been askod, what need of the word “equity ?" What equitable causes can grow out of the constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigaţion, between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable, rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the states. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains: These are contracts, in which, though there inay have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law; yet there may bave boen some undue and unconscionablo advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of ono of the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would bo impossible for the federal judicatorios to do justico without
an equitable, as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants of different states, may afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. This reasoning 'may not be so palpable in those states where the formal and technical distinction between Law and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this state, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
The judiciary authority of the union is to extend
Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of tho United States, and to all cases affecting ain. bassadors, other public ministers and consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evi. dent connexion with the preservation of the national peace.
Third. To cases of admiralty and maritimo jurisdiction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classos of causes, proper for the cognizance of the national courts.
Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. These constitute the third of those classes.
Fifth. To controversies between two or more slatos; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last.
Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states. These fall within the last class, and are the only instances in which the proposed constitution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes between the citizens of the same state.
Seventh. To cases between a state and the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. These have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes ; and have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the constitution, it appears, that they are all conformable to the principles which ought to bave governed the structure of that department, and which were
necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial in. conveniences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations, as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a principle which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages.