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pers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that "States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil government." *
The last objection of any consequence at present recollected, turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan. The great bulk of the citizens of America, are with reason convinced that union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alter&tions; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to the national head, and that tbese require a different organization of the federal government; a single body being an unsafe depository of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the question of expense is given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. The two branches of the legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons; the same number of which congress, under the existing confederation, may be composed. It is true that this number is intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of the country. It is evident, that a less number would, oven in the first instance, have been unsafe; and that a continuance of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very .nadequate representation of the people.
* Vide Rutherford's Institutes, vol. 2. book 11. chap. I. sect. xlv. and rv. – Vide also Grotius, book 11. chap. ix. sect. viii. and ix.
Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government. Let us examine this a little.
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present government, are the same which will be required under the new. : There are now a secretary at war, a secretary for foreign affairs, a secretary for domestic affairs, a board of treasury consisting of three persons, a treasurer, assistants, clerk, &c. These offices are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new, as well as the old. As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed constitution can make no other difference, than to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of federal officers; but it will not follow, that this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of state for national officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons omployed will be wholly of the latter description. The states individually, will stand in no need of any for this purposo. Wbat difference can it make in point of expense, to pay officers of the customs appointed by the state, or by the United States?
Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense, which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented ? The chief item which occurs to me, respects the support of the judges of the United States. I do not add the president, because thero is now a president of congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of those which will be incurred on account of the president of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. But upor no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.
Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed Government. The first thing which presents itself is, that a great part of the business, that now keeps congress sitting through the year, will be transacted by the president. Even the management of foreign negociations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principlos concerted with the senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident, that a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the senate and the house of representatives : We may suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this oxtra occupation to the senate. From this circumstanco we may infer, that until the bouse of ropresentatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a considerablo saving of expense from the difforence between the constant session of the present, and tho temporary session of the future congress.
But there is another circumstance, of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the state legislatures, as well as congress. The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. It has thence happened, that the sessions of the state legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the mere local business. More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of the several states amount to two thousand and upwards; which number has hitherto performed what, under the new system, will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or a fifth of that number. The congress under the proposed government will do all the business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of the state legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the affairs of their particular states, and will not bave to sit in any
proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference, in tho time of the sessions of the state legislatures, will be clear gain, and will alono form an article of saving, which may be rogarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.
The result from these observations is, that the sources of additional expense from the establishment of the proposed constitution are much fower than may have been imagined; th they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that, while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government less expensivo would be incompetent to the purposes of the union.
NEW YORK, AUGUST 15, 1788,
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points — "the analogy of the proposed government to your own state constitution,” and “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated, and so completely exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been already said; which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the government of this state holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellencies of the former. Among the pretended defects, are the re-eligibility of the executive; the want of a council; the omission of a formal bill of rights; the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press : These, and several others, which bave been noted in the course of our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing con. stitution of this state, as on the one proposed for the Union: