BANK v. HAY. can make any material difference whether we test it by the law of agency or by that of negotiable instruments-the result must be the same in either case. Nor is it necessary to adopt as law in this State the view expressed by Mr. Daniel, in regard to Coolidge v. Payson, in so far as it may be at variance with the principle as stated in that case, or may seem to go beyond it. Even in that view we must reach the same conclusion. The plaintiff's cashier testified that while he had seen the letters of 1 February, 1905, and 7 March, 1905, "he cashed the draft on the faith of the defendant's letter to Hinson, dated 24 January, 1905, and because similar prior drafts had been paid." He was not, therefore, misled to the prejudice of the bank by anything that is said in the two letters of February and March. They may, though, be still considered on the question of the authority of Hinson to draw the draft. There is one thing that appears prominently in those two letters, namely, the fact that Hay & Co. were not pleased with the prospect of their agency at Morganton and were complaining of the agent's failure to secure any business, while the expense account had grown until it had about reached the limit justified by any reasonable expectation of commissions to offset it or to cover the outlay. They also furnish the only evidence we have of the usual amount of the agent's drafts on his principal, to-wit, twenty dollars. After all this, Hinson, just one week from the date of the last letter, draws the draft in suit for three times the amount of his last draft, and for expenses, not already incurred, but those likely to arise thereafter in another place. The case shows that all of the letters in the correspondence were delivered to plaintiff in response to his notice to produce them, and he selected only the three which were put in evidence. The letter of 7 March, 1905, calls upon Hinson to give an account of his agency, but it does not appear that he did so, BANK v. HAY. nor is it shown that he ever was instructed to go to Asheville, or notified Hay & Bro. of his intention to do so or of his purpose to draw on them for $60. It is true the cashier testified that similar drafts had before been paid. When, to whom; and for what amount? If to this bank and for as much as sixty dollars, or anything approximating that amount, why were they not produced? They may have been similar in other respects, without being at all identical in amount. Let it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the payment of prior drafts was evidence of the agent's authority to draw this one, which may be questioned (Marriner v. Lumber Co., 113 N. C., 52), unless the facts estab lished such a course of dealing between the parties theretofore as would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that the agent possessed the requisite authority, or, in other words, as would give him the apparent authority, or estop the alleged principal from denying that he had full authority. Hay v. Ben. Assn. (at this term); McCraw v. Ins. Co., 78 N. C., 149; Story on Agency, secs. 95 and 260. Hay & Bro. could not have known from the face of the drafts thus paid by them that they had been cashed by the plaintiff bank, as that fact would not be indicated on the draft. If they had been forwarded through the bank at Morganton to a bank at Raleigh, merely for collection, they would present the same appearance when received by Hay & Bro. as if they had been cashed by the plaintiff bank. The principal might be willing to give his agent authority to draw for his expenses, provided he forwarded the drafts for collection, when he would not risk such an authority with the agent if his drafts were to be cashed by a bank. In the latter case, the principal might be cut off from defenses against his agent which in the former he would have. Without specifying the particular advantages the principal would have when the dealings are confined strictly between BANK v. HAY. himself and his agent without the intervention of a third party, we may say generally that the doctrine of apparent authority or of estoppel would not enter into such a business relation to the prejudice of the principal where no actual authority existed. The principal could also take advantage of the state of his account between himself and his agent, or of the agent's misconduct, and there are other conceivable defenses he might have against the agent which would not avail him as against an innocent third party. We have referred to this view of the case for the purpose of remarking that the correspondence between Hay & Bro. and their agent, Hinson, seems to confer an authority, not to have drafts on them cashed at a bank, but to draw for his expenses and forward the drafts for collection. The letter of January 24 clearly shows this to have been what was meant. The only object in having him draw at stated intervals was to remind Hay & Bro. that the instalment for expenses was due, for in that letter they tell him to draw or to write a few days in advance so that they would be reminded to send the check. The letters show that the alleged authority to draw was nothing more than private instructions by Hay & Bro. to their agent as to how he should conduct this part of the business. The power to bind the principal by the making or endorsing of negotiable paper is an important one, not lightly to Be inferred. It should be conferred directly, unless by necessary implication the duties of the agent cannot be performed without the exercise of the power, or where, as otherwise expressed, the power is practically indispensable to accomplish the object of the agency, and the person dealing with the agent must, subject to the principles heretofore stated, see to it that his authority is adequate. Mechem on Agency (1889), secs. 389-393. We cannot read the correspondence to be found in this case without being convinced that there was BANK v. HAY. enough upon its face to put the plaintiff bank upon its guard and to cause an inquiry to be made into the agent's authority before cashing his draft. Further, we think that the instructions were intended to be private and confidential and not as the basis of credit to be extended to the agent nor as an authority to him to obtain cash from a bank upon drafts to be drawn by him, nor by fair and reasonable implication did they authorize Hinson to make the draft in question. By comparing the correspondence with the draft, the latter appears at least to be a little out of the ordinary and should have excited suspicion as to the agent's assumption of authority to draw. It follows from all we have said that the plaintiff's right to recover can be maintained neither upon any well-settled principle in the law. of agency nor yet upon any in the law of negotiable instruments, either before or since the adoption of our statute, Revisal, ch. 54. There was certainly no harm done the plaintiff when the Court excluded the proposed evidence as to what the agent stated at the time he drew the draft and received the money thereon, namely, that he needed the money to pay his expenses at Asheville while there as agent. His Honor took the correct view of the case and properly directed a nonsuit. upon the evidence. No Error. PARKER V. INSURANCE CO. PARKER v. INSURANCE COMPANY. (Filed December 11, 1906). Appeal and Error-Presumptions-Findings of Fact-Insurance Companies-Service of Summons-Fire Policy -Inconsistent Defenses-Iron-safe Clause-Proofs of Loss-Nonsuit-Limitation of Actions. 1. An exception to the Court's refusal to dismiss an action against a foreign insurance company because the summons was not served on the State Insurance Commissioner as required by Revisal, section 4750, cannot be sustained, where the trial Judge found no facts and it does not appear affirmatively that the company is licensed to do business in this State. 2. In the absence of any statement of the facts by the trial Judge, this Court must presume, in support of his ruling, which is presumed to be correct, that he found as a fact that the defendant was not duly licensed, and that Revisal, section 4750, did not apply, but that the process had been properly served under Revisal, section 440. 3. Upon a motion to dismiss an action because the summons had not been properly served, the defendant had the right to have the facts stated by the Judge, but in the absence of any request to the Judge so to do, his failure to state them was not error. 4. In an action to recover a loss under a fire insurance policy, the defendant having denied its liability to the plaintiff on the policy by alleging that there was a violation of the Iron-safe Clause, whereby the policy became null and void, it cannot now successfully plead the failure of the plaintiff to file proofs of loss and defeat his recovery, as the defense is inconsistent with that of non-compliance with the Iron-safe Clause. 5. In an action to recover a loss under a fire insurance policy, where the Iron-safe Clause allows thirty days for making the inventory and the books are not required to be opened until the inventory is completed, the defendant cannot avail itself of any alleged violation of any provision in the Iron-safe Clause, where the fire occurred within thirty days after the policy was issued. 6. Under Revisal, section 4809, which provides that no insurance company shall limit the time within which an action may be commenced to less than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, or to less than six months from the time a nonsuit is taken in an |