they soon reorganized into the National Security Corps based on the Soviet model. The Ministry of Information gave them control over the use of mass media of communication for propaganda purposes, and the Ministry of Agriculture placed them in a position to compel allegiance from agricultural workers and small peasants.

Moreover, it will be recalled that at the time of the liberation from the German occupation four fifths of the country was occupied by Soviet troops and remained so occupied for eight subsequent months.

Despite these advantages enjoyed by the Communist Party, 62 percent of the vote in the first postwar election went to the nonCommunist parties. Nevertheless, in subsequent developments the Communists ignored the fact that they were a minority and attempted to discredit and undermine non-Communist parties such as the Slovak Democrats and the National Socialists.

The Communists had given sufficient evidence before the recent seizure of power that they could not and would not tolerate any political opposition, which they identified as treason to the state. This was brought out at the time of the coup by immediate formation of action committees, the sudden appearance of a well-disciplined and fully armed factory militia in Prague, and the swift and ruthless purge of the non-Communist leaders. These steps reveal a high degree of preparation, a high degree of organization, for seizure of power. It is a pattern designed to usurp control of a state. We should ascertain to what extent outside assistance contributed to this thorough preparation. It shows how impossible it is for those who believe in government through democratic processes and parliamentary methods to cooperate in good faith with the Communists. At the time of the coup the tension in Czechoslovakia was heightened by reports of Soviet intervention and of the presence of a large number of Soviet agents in the country. It was at this time that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin arrived in Prague. Shortly thereafter during the crisis there appeared on the streets of Prague special heavily armed police shock regiments. These regiments under the command of the Communist Minister of Interior were called out to patrol the streets and to search the headquarters of opposition parties. Great numbers of armed factory militia also appeared in Prague, marching in military formation, wearing red arm bands, and carrying the Soviet flag.

All the indications of the birth of a police state were evident: complete seizure of control over broadcasting facilities, elimination of non-Communist newspaper editors, suppression of a number of non-Communist periodicals, and the imposition of complete censorship. Since the Putsch no true opposition publications exist in Czechoslovakia. Virtually all journalists hitherto critical of the Communists have been purged. A large number of journalists have been expelled from the association of Czech journalists, among them Lev Sychrava, Delegate to the United Nations Commission on Freedom of Information and winner of a 1947 prize as the best Czech journalist.

All non-Communist parties were purged and a number of nonCommunist functionaries were arrested.

"Action committees" were formed and given full administrative control over the duly constituted organs of the Republic. There was no existing basis in Czechoslovak law for any such act.

Yet according to porters available here very little overt opposition to the Communist coup was apparent. How are we to understand

that the majority of the Czechoslovak people, known for their traditional adherence to democratic majority rule, acquiesced to the Communist minority? Could it be that the coup occurred because over the shoulder of the minority glared the face of a foreign power? Is it not significant that the minority was led by individuals indoctrinated by a foreign power who had been in close association with its authorities?

There are men of universally respected reputations who have for years been a part of Czechoslovak political life and who have now found it necessary for a second time in ten years to flee their homeland. They were present during the crisis and can perhaps shed some light on the question of how it was that totalitarian police-state methods were substituted for traditional Czech democratic procedure without any significant overt expression of protest on the part of the Czechoslovakian people.

As has been pointed out in the Security Council discussions, the Czechoslovak story assumes added significance where compared with developments that have taken place throughout eastern and central Europe. In Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland, while details varied, the general pattern was the same. Like Czechoslovakia, all these countries have been occupied by the Soviet armies. The chief steps were the acquisition by the Communists of key posts in the Cabinet; control of the police; control of the armies; control of the media of mass communications; and finally control of or subversion of the judiciary. In none of these countries did the Communists enjoy popular support sufficient to warrant their commanding position in the government. In such countries where truly free elections were held they received as little as 17 percent of the total vote, and the largest vote they received was 38 percent.

There is a striking uniformity in techniques applied by the Communists in their fight against the majority. In all five countries they concentrated their propaganda barrage against one non-Communist party after another. The familiar pattern of accusation of conspiracy against the state and of hostility to the Soviet Union was used.

Let us think of the trial of the Bulgarian peasant leader, Petkov; the trial of Maniu of Rumania; the arrest of the popular peasant leader, Kovács, in Hungary; the trials of opposition leaders in Poland; and, finally, in Czechoslovakia the charges of conspiracy against Vladimir Krajina, one of the oustanding underground leaders in the resistance against the Germans.

The remarkably similar methods lead of course to remarkably similar results. In all five countries we are now confronted with regimes controlled unquestionably and totally by the Communist parties. The policies of these regimes would seem to follow without deviation the interests of the Soviet Union.

As was the case previously in the other four countries, the new Czechoslovak regime has now cast aside the entire substance of parliamentary practice. All effective opposition leaders are removed, the opposition journalists deprived of their freedom to write, the traditional autonomy of the 600-year-old Charles University of Prague brutally violated by the dismissal of its duly elected head followed by a purge of a substantial number of its professors.

The uniformity and the smooth operation of the pattern raises the logical question whether or not there is any coordination from a

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central point for the implementation of this pattern. Is it not significant that the top Communists in Hungary such as the Deputy Prime Minister, Rakosi, and the economic czar, Vas, Foreign Minister Pauker in Rumania, Prime Minister Dimitrov and Foreign Minister Kolarov of Bulgaria, and the entire leadership of Czechoslovakia, including Premier Gottwald, Cabinet Ministers Fierlinger, Kopecky, Nejedly, and the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Slansky, have all spent years of active work in Moscow and have been in close association with both the Soviet Communist leaders as well as the Communist leaders in other countries and that some of them have even become Soviet citizens?

To complete the similarity of the patterns in all those countries, is it a mere coincidence as I pointed out on Tuesday that the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky appeared in Bucharest at the crucial moment and another Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Zorin, was present in Prague at the time of the February coup?

What is the significance of the fact that after the Czechoslovak Government had indicated its readiness to participate in the Marshall Plan this decision was reversed as a result of a telephone call to Prague from Moscow where the Czechoslovak Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had been summoned? Is it not significant that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as well as the Communist Parties of other European countries, including all the countries of eastern Europe joined with the Soviet Communist Party in the Cominform in October 1947? Is it also not significant that shortly thereafter the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia became more aggressive? The leading role of the Soviet Communist Party in the Cominform is a matter of common knowledge.

All of these circumstances lead to the basic question: Has the Government of Czechoslovakia been subverted with the assistance, direct or indirect, of an outside power? Has a threat of the use of force or of other pressure or interference by an outside power been directed against the political independence of Czechoslovakia? If the answer is in the affirmative then we are confronted with a situation which very definitely is outside of article 2 (7) and concerns the Security Council.

We have heard many contradictory statements in the course of this discussion. The Council must ascertain the truth. It should never condemn nor approve blindly. This was a consideration in my previous proposal that the Council should invite the Representative of the new Czechoslovak Government to the table.1

2

This invitation has now been rejected. Why? The rejection is

1 Bulletin of April 18, 1948. p. 517.

"A letter dated April 8, 1948, to the Secretary-General from Dr. Vladimir Houdek, representative of Czechoslovakia to the U. N. (see U. N. Document S/718 of April 10, 1948), follows:

"SIR: Referring to your letter dated April 6, 1948, and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention:

"The discussion of internal matters before the Security Council is in contradiction to the provisions of the Charter. Such matters are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The Czechoslovak Government therefore rejects with indignation the unfounded complaint which has been put before the Security Council.

"Czechoslovakia has been and will remain a peace-loving state and wishes to maintain friendly relations with peace-loving nations on the basis of mutual respect in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The discussion on the changes in the composition of the Czechoslovak Government based on slanderous allegations has confirmed our conviction that it is only a pretext to stir up the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union and other states of eastern Europe with which Czechoslovakia has strong bonds of friendship. Such action is in flagrant contradiction to one of the fundamental tasks of the United Nations which is to promote friendly relations between nations in order to strengthen international peace and security.

"Since the discussion of internal matters of Czechoslovakia in the Security Council is contrary to the basic principles of the Charter, inspired by the aim of protecting the sovereignty and independence of states, the Czechoslovak Government does not find it possible to take in any way part in such discussion.”

based on the thesis that article 2 (7) applies. This, as I have said previously, is a matter for determination by this Council. The new Czech regime and the Soviet Union are attempting to decide that question for the Security Council, to dictate their unilateral and prejudiced opinion on this point to the Council. This is a highhanded and arbitrary way of behaving which would be surprising had it not come from these regimes. This refusal to participate does not give me a feeling of confidence that all is well. If these regimes had a clear conscience, surely they would seize eagerly the opportunity of presenting their side of the case to the Council. They would not oppose the Council's learning the facts by taking evidence. This refusal makes me feel more than ever that it is important for the Security Council to get to the bottom of this situation.

We have also now been told that there are groups of men outside of Czechoslovakia who were leaders in the political life of this country prior to the coup. The Representative of Chile has made a suggestion for the creation by the Council of a subcommittee to hear the stories of these leaders who were in Czechoslovakia when the coup occurred and presumably should have firsthand knowledge of the events at that time and those which led up to the coup. My Government feels the Council would not be discharging fully its obligations if it did not hear these people. It feels that the creation of a sub-group to receive such testimony and to obtain other available information and to report back to the full Council on it is a convenient and feasible procedure.

We feel the subcommittee should consist of representatives of five states of the Council. In our view the terms of reference should be very simple. The subcommittee should be authorized to hear the testimony of these Czech political leaders and to report on this testimony to the Security Council.

My Government feels that it is essential that such information be obtained in order that the Council will be better able to decide what further steps should be taken on this matter. I should add that we would not consider the activity of such a sub-group to be in any way an investigation. The proposal before us has the full support of my Government.

270. UNITED STATES POSITION ON ELECTORAL PROCEDURES AND SUPPRESSION OF OPPOSITION IN HUNGARY

(a) Statement by the Department of State, March 6, 19471

The Government of the United States, in keeping with its undertakings as a signatory of the Yalta Declaration, its responsibility under the armistice as a participant in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, and its determination to assist the Hungarian people toward the establishment of democratic independence as envisaged in the peace treaty with Hungary, is impelled at this time to express its feeling of concern at the political crisis which has now been precipitated in Hungary. The pattern of recent political developments in

Department of State Bulletin of March 16, 1947, p. 495. On September 22, 1945, the United State Representative in Hungary indicated the willingness of his Government to establish relations and negotiate a treaty with the provisional Hungarian Government on condition that it would give full assurances for free and untrammeled elections for a representative government, and also provide as far as possible for the freedom of political expression of democratic parties and the right of assembly (Department of State Bulletin of September 30, 1945, p. 478).

Hungary appears to threaten the right of the people to live under a government of their own free choosing, for it involves foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary in support of repeated aggressive attempts by Hungarian minority elements to coerce the popularly elected majority.

Unable to achieve their political ends through normal constitutional processes, the Hungarian Communists, together with other members of the Leftist bloc, have endeavored to implicate a number of representatives of the majority Smallholders Party in a recently revealed plot against the Republic and, by demanding the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity from Smallholders deputies, to weaken the parliamentary position to which that party was duly elected by the Hungarian people. Simultaneously, police and administrative authorities responsive to the dictates of these minority elements have utilized their powers of investigation of the conspiracy not toward the expeditious judicial resolution of a threat against the state but to conduct a general campaign against their political opponents.

The Soviet High Command in Hungary has now, by direct intervention, brought the situation to a crisis. Following the refusal of the Smallholders Party to abrogate, in connection with the investigation of the conspiracy, the parliamentary immunity of Deputy Béla Kovács, until recently Secretary General of the Smallholders Party, Soviet occupation forces have arrested Mr. Kovács. The grounds given for that arrest are allegations that he "actively participated in the formation of subversive and anti-Soviet terror groups" and "in organizing espionage directed against the Soviet Union". Despite the importance of this step, this Soviet action has been taken unilaterally without prior discussion with the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Allied Control Commission. On the basis of its present information, the United States Government believes these grounds and the charges are unwarranted.

These developments, in the opinion of the United States Government, constitute an unjustified interference in Hungarian internal affairs, the effect of which will be to support the efforts of a small group in Hungary to substitute a minority dictatorship for a responsible administration representative of the will of the Hungarian people as expressed in free and untrammeled elections. The United States Government is opposed to this attempt to nullify the electoral mandate given by the Hungarian people.

In these circumstances, the United States Government requests that the Soviet and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission be instructed by their respective governments to join with the United States representative on the Allied Control Commission in examining, in cooperation with the Hungarian Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, and President of the National Assembly, the facts of the present situation, including the case of Mr. Kovács and the conspiracy, and in making recommendations to the Hungarian Government as to steps which should be taken for an orderly solution. The United States Government also requests that the Soviet authorities take no further measures without consulting the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Allied Control Commission.

The above views of the United States Government have been communicated to the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary and to the Hungarian, Soviet, and British Governments.